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Afghanistan: Why we should be there (or not), how to conduct the mission (or not) & when to leave

It seems this event is open to the public:
http://www.canadianinternationalcouncil.org/download/calendardo/nationalca/invitationen_may25pdf?attachment=1

You are cordially invited to join the Canadian International Council and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Canada for a timely event:

Expert Panel Discussion on Afghanistan Disengagement: Balancing Security, Foreign and Domestic Policy Implications. A Transatlantic Dialogue.

Panel Discussion on May 25, 2010, 4:00 to 6:00 pm
Ottawa, Fairmont Château Laurier, 1 Rideau Street, Canadian Room
Reception to follow: 6:00 pm

While Canada will end its combat mission in Afghanistan in 2011, things are less clear for other ISAF troop contributing nations, such as the United States and Germany.

U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates recently announced that the troop drawdown could begin earlier than July 2011, but he did not say how long it would take. Germany’s Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, on the other hand, wants German soldiers to be back home in 2013, but refuses to give a start date for the withdrawal: “Otherwise, the terrorists would know how long they still have to hold out.”

Why are the positions amongst the transatlantic partners so different? What impact does the new U.S. strategy have on the ground? What kind of post military withdrawal activities and commitments are needed to ensure the price of engagement was not in vain?

High profile speakers from Canada, the U.S. and Germany will be able to shed some light on these questions and discuss how foreign policy has to be weighed in balance with domestic policy considerations and security concerns.

We hope that you will be able to participate in our discussion on May 25, and look forward to your response at your earliest convenience, no later than noon Thursday, May 20. You may RSVP to by email to ottawa@canadianinternationalcouncil.org or call 613-520-3916. Please be advised that the event is free, but that seating is limited.

Pia Bungarten
Representative to the U.S. and Canada, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES)

Colin Robertson
President, National Capital Branch, Canadian International Council (CIC)

About the CIC (www.canadianinternationalcouncil.org)
The CIC is a non-partisan, nationwide research council established to strengthen Canada's foreign policy. It promotes research and dialogue on international affairs issues through a network that crosses academic disciplines, policy areas and economic sectors.

About the FES (www.fes.de / www.fesdc.org)
The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is Germany’s oldest and largest non profit political foundation committed to advancing social justice, promoting peace and shaping globalization in the spirit of the basic values of Social Democracy through education, research and international cooperation.

Agenda:

http://www.canadianinternationalcouncil.org/download/calendardo/nationalca/agendaen_may25pdf?attachment=1

4:00 pm  Welcome by Colin Robertson, President, National Capital Branch, CIC, and Meike Wöhlert, Canada Liaison Officer, FES

Introductory Remarks by His Excellency Dr. Georg Witschel, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to Canada

4:15 – 6:00 pm Discussion, followed by Q & A

Keynote:

Hans-Ulrich Klose, Member of German Parliament, Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Coordinator of German-American Cooperation

Speakers:

Niels Annen, Former Member of German Parliament, Foreign Policy Expert, Senior Resident Fellow with the German Marshall Fund in Washington, DC

Paul Dewar, Member of Parliament for Ottawa Centre, Member of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, Foreign Affairs Critic for the New Democratic Party

Laurie Hawn, Member of Parliament for Edmonton Centre, Member of the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and of the Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence (invited)

Brian Katulis, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress in Washington, DC

Hon. Bob Rae, Member of Parliament for Toronto Centre, Member of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development and of the Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan, Foreign Affairs Critic for the Liberal Party

6:00 pm Reception

Somewhat related:
http://afghanistan-canada-solidarity.org/events

...
The Canada-Afghanistan Solidarity Committee is holding events across Canada...

CASC Event in Halifax on May 16...

CASC Event in Montreal on May 17...

CASC Event in Winnipeg on May 18...

CASC Event in Regina on May 20...

Mark
Ottawa
 
Afstan: Dutch courage
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/05/afstan-dutch-courage.html

Looks like for real. Further to this post,

"Afstan: Prime Minister as, er, brave (or is that principled?) as his Dutch counterpart?"

the CBC's Brian Stewart goes into an issue that most of our major media appear pretty determined to avoid (via Blue News):

"Afghan pullout
The Dutch, it seems, are having second thoughts. Will we?
"..

Mark
Ottawa
 
US set to take over Dutch ISAF mission
http://www.rnw.nl/english/article/us-set-take-over-dutch-isaf-mission

...

The Dutch mission in the Afghan province of Uruzgan which is due to end this year is likely to be taken over by the US army.

Commander of the Dutch armed forces Peter van Uhm told a late night talk show that Singapore [?!?] and Australia will join the Americans in the ISAF mission in Uruzgan. NATO still has to approve the move.

Withdrawal

General Van Uhm hopes the Americans will take over Dutch equipment which is being left behind in the Camp Holland and Camp Hadrian at Tarin Kowt and Deh Rawod. For instance, the thousands of armoured shipping containers which the troops use to sleep in for extra protection against attacks and hundreds of vehicles. Facilities for water and energy will probably also be taken over.

The military presence at Chora will be taken on by the Australians [more here]
http://www.defence.gov.au/op/afghanistan/index.htm
and smaller posts will be handed over to the Afghan army. The Dutch ministry of defence will negotiate the terms for the acquisition of Dutch facilities, which it hopes will bring down the cost of the departure from this part of Afghanistan.

The withdrawal operation, which is currently estimated to cost 200 million euros, will be carried out by a Redeployment Task Force. The operation will begin in August and be completed by December. The Redeployment Task Force will stay on into 2011. The Dutch ISAF mission in Uruzgan, which began in 2006, has cost 1.4 billion euros...

Development projects

Even after the Dutch armed forces have withdrawn, some Dutch military personnel will be left behind to serve with ISAF forces [emphasis added]. Development projects will also continue. In addition, the Dutch government is considering sending a small police training mission with army protection to Afghanistan. This mission may even be located in the province of Uruzgan [emphasis added]...

Mark
Ottawa
 
Sure is complicated being a soldier these days--an awful lot being asked (start of lengthy Washington Post piece):

War of persuasion: The modern U.S. officer emerges in Afghanistan
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/15/AR2010051503645.html

NARAY, AFGHANISTAN -- Lt. Col. Robert B. Brown could hear the fear in his 24-year-old lieutenant's voice on the patchy radio. "We have enemy inside the wire. It is really bad here," 1st Lt. Andrew Bundermann said. "We need those [expletive] birds now."

Just before 6 a.m., more than 300 insurgents launched a massive attack on Bundermann's remote outpost in the Kamdesh district of northeastern Afghanistan. By 6:30 three of Bundermann's soldiers were dead, and the Apache attack helicopters he desperately wanted weren't going to arrive for another half hour.

Brown, who was at his base about 30 miles away, grabbed the radio handset from one of his sergeants. "You are going to be all right," the 41-year-old officer told his young lieutenant. "We are going to get you as much help as possible."

Bundermann made a wrenching decision. Unable to control the entire outpost, he ordered his remaining troops to collapse around a small cluster of its 23 buildings. Twelve of his 53 soldiers, pinned down by heavy enemy fire beyond those inner defenses, would have to fight on their own until the attack helicopters arrived.

One was a 21-year-old soldier from Loudoun County, who had been wounded in his leg and hip. Bleeding, he crawled on his elbows behind the base's latrine for protection. "Help me," Spec. Stephan L. Mace called out to his fellow soldiers. "Help me, please."

Eight U.S. troops were killed in the Oct. 3, 2009, battle at Combat Outpost Keating, making it one of the deadliest fights for Americans of the Afghan war. For soldiers, the harsh reality of combat has scarcely changed in the decades since Vietnam. To survive, the outnumbered Keating grunts relied on their mutual devotion and marksmanship.

What makes Keating different from past battles is what happened afterward. A decade of fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq has forced battlefield commanders to accept that victory in today's wars is less a matter of destroying enemies than of knowing how and when to make them allies. This new kind of war has compelled midlevel officers such as Brown to take on new roles: politician, diplomat, tribal anthropologist.

"My goal is to get people to stop shooting at my soldiers and support government," said Brown, a wiry, quick-talking officer whose three combat tours have imbued him with modesty, skepticism and a little self-doubt.

After the Kamdesh battle, an insurgent leader known as Mullah Sadiq sent word to Brown that he wanted to drive his more radical Taliban rivals from the area around the Keating outpost. Sadiq, who had been on U.S. kill-or-capture lists for five years, needed money and Brown's help brokering a peace deal with Afghan government officials in Kabul. The offer was Brown's chance to ensure his eight soldiers didn't die in vain.

"We don't think Sadiq is a Jeffersonian Democrat," Brown wrote of Sadiq in a February e-mail from Forward Operating Base Bostick in Naray. "But he is rallying public support to the Afghan government and against the Taliban. . . . And frankly, that may be good enough."
In the Dixie cup

Three months before the attack, Brown and his brigade commander, Col. Randy George, had petitioned Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top U.S. general in Afghanistan, for permission to close the Keating base and withdraw from the surrounding Kamdesh district.

The outpost, surrounded by soaring mountains on all sides, was isolated and hard to defend. "It felt like we were living in the bottom of a Dixie cup," one of Brown's soldiers said.

Attacks on U.S. forces had increased every year since Keating was established in 2006, and by summer 2009 Brown concluded that the presence of U.S. troops was feeding the insurgency.

His study of the local rebel factions had led him to believe that a U.S. withdrawal from the area would split the insurgency. Most of the powerbrokers in Kamdesh were affiliated with Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin, or HiG, an insurgent group that had formed decades earlier to repel the Soviets. Although HiG fiercely opposed the U.S. presence in Afghanistan, there were signs that its local leadership was willing to work with the Afghan government.

The other branch of the insurgency was loyal to the Taliban and opposed any Afghan government presence.

As long as U.S. troops remained, HiG commanders wouldn't push out the Taliban leadership from the area. "The HiG and Taliban were competitors," Brown said, "but they could agree to hate us."

Brown was commissioned as an armor officer in 1991 just months after U.S. tanks sliced through Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard in a demonstration of the post-Vietnam Army's raw power.

Two Iraq tours in 2004 and 2007 opened Brown's eyes to the limits of his Army and himself. He avoided "we can do the impossible" pep talks that other commanders used to fire up their troops. His goal was to build the Afghan government and bring his soldiers back alive.

The vast majority of his time was spent quizzing Afghan elders and officials on decades-old tribal disputes and intrigues. In the evenings he scoured the Internet for information on the HiG and its history in Nurestan province during the Soviet era. "There is so much here that is opaque to us," he said...

Part one of two. Story continues Monday.

Mark
Ottawa
 
"Canada seeks U.S. protection in post-2011 Afghanistan"/Our Afghan Sphynx
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/05/canada-seeks-us-protection-in-post-2011.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
Canadian to be deputy commander new ISAF RC South (East)/Brits to Kandahar 2011?
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/05/canadian-to-be-isaf-deputy-commander-rc.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
Afghan exit strategy a non-starter
Martin Regg Cohn
Charlottetown - The Guardian
20 May 10


A truce has been declared in Parliament's war of words, sparing our politicians an election battle over who tortured whom in Afghanistan four years ago. Now spare a thought for the Canadian soldiers still fighting on the front lines and the Canadian aid workers in the trenches, virtually forgotten.

Canada's body politic is transfixed by torture. What truly excites the opposition and the press is the classic Watergate formulation: what did the minister know and when did he know it?

It matters less that the Afghan security services blindfolded Taliban prisoners than that Ottawa's bureaucracy turned a blind eye to it. Fair enough, for we are a nation of laws, even if some feign surprise that not every other nation is. Doubtless we could have, should have, done more to bind the hands of Afghans before letting them slap around the prisoners we handed over.

More puzzling is why our focus on events in 2006-07 has crowded out intelligent discussion of any other aspect of Canada's involvement in Afghanistan in 2010-2011. Obsessed with the fate of a few dozen Taliban prisoners, we've become oblivious to the future of 30 million Afghan souls and the roughly 3,000 Canadians on the ground helping them.

Thankfully, we have gained a brief respite from Torturegate while MPs pore over the tortuous memo traffic buried in the bowels of our bureaucracy.

That presents an opportunity for the rest of us to take our eyes off the rear-view mirror and look ahead to the deadline that is rapidly approaching for Canada to withdraw its combat troops from Kandahar starting in mid-2011.

The same MPs who are taking an oath of secrecy to parse four-year-old diplomatic cables have until now taken a virtual vow of silence about the urgent, real-time message traffic on the tough question of who does what next in Afghanistan.

Prime Minister Stephen Harper has set the tone. It came through loud and clear during his trip to the Netherlands earlier this month when he once again closed the door to any debate on our future role in Afghanistan.

Harper restated the fiction that his hands are tied by a parliamentary resolution dictating that he begin withdrawing our troops a little over a year from now - case closed.

That may play well with Canadians suffering from combat fatigue, donor fatigue and torture fatigue. But it didn't play well in the Netherlands during Harper's visit. The Dutch know a thing or two about the politics of pulling out of Afghanistan, ever since their coalition government collapsed last February over whether to extend the mission of their 2,000 troops in Southern Afghanistan.

Unlike the Canadians, the Dutch have come to realize that pulling out is hard to do. Even with an election campaign underway, a consensus is emerging to continue supporting the fledgling Afghan police force with a contingent of 50 police trainers on the ground, backed by a protection force of perhaps 300 troops.

That's a far cry from the Canadian context, where talking about post-Taliban Afghanistan has become taboo.

In 2008, the House of Commons adopted a resolution saying that "Canada will end its presence in Kandahar as of July 2011 . . . so that it will have been completed by December 2011."

Nowhere does it say all Canadian troops must leave Afghanistan entirely, only that our front-line contribution to the Kandahar counter-insurgency should come to an end by the end of 2011. Harper's determination to shut down the debate is a matter of expediency by a prime minister unwilling to risk any political capital on the mission.

Our troops are weary and Canadians are wary. But for all the fury of the opposition critiques in Torturegate, the Liberals have sent out feelers to the Conservatives that they would welcome a constructive dialogue on who does what next in Afghanistan.

Will we continue our police training presence in Kandahar? Follow through with our major polio eradication program and the Dahla Dam project? Protect Canadian aid workers and diplomats in Kabul? After all our squawking about torture, will we maintain a strong presence in Afghanistan's penal system to press reforms?

For all the talk of winning hearts and minds in Afghanistan, Harper's government has to make the case in Canada, too: why we went to Afghanistan (to help our allies stabilize the country post-9/11, after the Taliban were toppled and al-Qaida terrorist bases destroyed); why there's work still to be done on development and training; that we are there under a continued UN mandate; and that any serious polling shows the Afghan people very much want foreign forces to stay for as long asit takes to keep the Taliban at bay.

It's easy to find fault with the fog of war. Easier still if no one speaks out to explain what we're doing there.

Martin Regg Cohn is a foreign affairs writer with Torstar Syndication Services.
 
Afstan: Brits going wobbly/Not shifting to Kandahar
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/05/afstan-brits-going-wobblynot-shifting.html

What's a poor Afghan to think?

"Liam Fox flies to Afghanistan seeking to speed up troop withdrawal

The Government hopes to speed up withdrawal of thousands of British troops from Afghanistan and has ruled out any move from Helmand province to neighbouring Kandahar..."

Mark
Ottawa
 
Stupid hyperbole about forthcoming Kandahar ops (and a bit of orbat fun)
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/05/stupid-hyperbole-about-forthcoming.html

This really is over-the-top on the part of the US Marine Colonel and can only lead to misinterpretation and disappointment:

"Upcoming Afghan battle is 'our D-Day'..."

Mark
Ottawa
 
Aussie special forces at Kandahar/The silence of the Canadians
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/05/aussie-special-forces-at-kandaharthe.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
Afstan: Continuing CF presence?  Well, well, well, one does wonder why Matthew Fisher (more here and here)
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/05/kaf-attack-or-enemy-within-notably.html
http://www.nationalpost.com/todays-paper/story.html?id=3067325
of Canwest News buried this at the very end of story on another sad matter--good on Norman Spector's assiduous reading :
http://www.members.shaw.ca/nspector4/MIND.htm

...
More bets here

--What Canwest is reporting
   

Road bomb fells 'gentle giant'
http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/Road+bomb+fells+gentle+giant/3066518/story.html

Harper has said that all Canadians troops will leave the country by the end of next year.

However, talks are ongoing with NATO about whether a smaller number of Canadians might participate in a new, much less risky mission that would begin next year...

Now surely anyone talking with NATO has some sort of government blessing?

Mark
Ottawa
 
This was the Taliban's Tet Offensive.....militarily a failure, but a PR coup as far as confirming the western populace's distaste for the war......
 
Afghanistan: “This is a bleeding ulcer right now”
http://www2.macleans.ca/2010/05/26/afghanistan-this-is-a-bleeding-ulcer-right-now/

A post by Paul Wells of Maclean's magazine, one of our few pundits who make a serious effort to understand things Afghan rather than treating them merely as a sub-set of Canadian politics:

Gen. Stanley McCrystal checks up on the progress in Marja and discovers, in extraordinarily frank language, that there hasn’t been enough.
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/05/24/94740/mcchrystal-calls-marjah-a-bleeding.html#ixzz0oyXg8C2L
Marja is intended to be a prelude to the push in Kandahar that will be the last major Canadian operation [more here]
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/05/stupid-hyperbole-about-forthcoming.html
before the bulk of our military engagement there ends. And Marja is not going well at all.

Mark
Ottawa
 
Although "Marja is not going well at all," this from the Associated Press, shared in accordance with the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright  Act, suggests building a new local government could take 3-4 months:
A senior NATO general in Afghanistan says it will probably be months before Afghans in Marjah shun the Taliban and form a strong local government.

British Maj. Gen. Nick Carter tells reporters Wednesday that the 3-month-old, U.S.-led NATO operation in the southern region has been a military success. But Afghans in Marjah have been reluctant to form a strong government capable of shaking off Taliban influence.

Carter, who is NATO's commander in southern Afghanistan, acknowledges that the process of building a new local government could take 3 to 4 months. Carter said a second major offensive in Kandahar was on schedule to ramp up this summer.
 
US MPs working with ANP in Kandahar City/Field reporting
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/05/us-mps-working-with-anp-in-kandahar.html

David Zucchino of the LA Times again gives on-scene reporting, including on CF, that our major media seldom do (but see below)...

Mark
Ottawa
 
Yup a Multi National Viet Nam.
We won't win this conflict, and what for it our Gov. will come up with a excuse to stay.
 
US soldiers ask 'who is the enemy?' in Kandahar
Article Link
By Claire Truscott (AFP) – 7 hours ago

BERLANDAY, Afghanistan — As Afghan village leader Gul Agha pours another cup of tea for American soldiers sitting under his grape trellis, they get to the point of their visit: they don't want him to quit.

As the US military leads a massive build-up of forces in Kandahar, southern Afghanistan's most important battle ground where the outcome of America's longest war overseas may be decided, the toughest job is knowing who to trust.

When 1st squadron 71st cavalry regiment arrived in the province last month, outgoing Canadian soldiers told them that as an ex-Taliban, the village head was their best source of intelligence on the bombs being laid in their path.

Unfortunately, as they tried to build bridges, Gul Agha quit.

"We have no informants right now, we're still working on it. We have been here a month," said Lieutenant Joe Theinert, 24.

"They'll eventually come around. They don't know you. They don't trust you when you first arrive," he said.

The fight for Kandahar is seen as crucial to a US strategy to end the nearly nine-year and costly conflict against the Taliban.

In December, US President Barack Obama ordered 30,000 extra American troops into Afghanistan, where the vast majority are disembarking in the south, and pushing the total nationwide NATO deployment to 150,000 by August.

The US force in Afghanistan has roughly tripled since Obama took office in January 2009 and at 94,000 has now exceeded the 92,000 based in Iraq.

But public support is dwindling. Obama wants US troops to start leaving from July 2011 and has limited the objective to securing key population centres from the Taliban and prepping Afghan government forces to take over.

The counter-insurgency doctrine means that in Kandahar's Dand district, as in countless areas of Afghanistan, troops are working on security and development in a bid to win over Afghans and leave secure structures in place.

US Captain Jon Villasenor, 36, said the toughest aspect was knowing who to trust on the battlefield of a guerrilla war.

"We don't know who the enemy is," he said.

"I don't feel I'm fighting Taliban, I feel I'm maybe fighting a criminal element or maybe a disenfranchised element that may be influenced by Taliban.

"I wish he'd wear a uniform and a name plate that said 'enemy'. Once I understand his motivations and ideology I can target that and leverage that against him.

"Until then I'm kind of fumbling around," he said.
More on link
 
Marja: "...a bleeding ulcer right now”'? (McClatchy reporting)/Taliban--and Afghan--thinking
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/05/marja-how-bleeding-ulcer-right-now.html

Further to this post based on a McClatchy story,

Marja: '...“This is a bleeding ulcer right now”'

an exchange of messages between ISAF (headline below a bit off) and McClatchy Newspapers...

Regardless of the merits of the above dispute, readers might be interested in this post of Babbling's that recounts an encounter Torch contributors, and another Canadian milblogger, had with a McClatchy reporter in January this year...

Mark
Ottawa
 
GAP said:
When 1st squadron 71st cavalry regiment arrived in the province last month, outgoing Canadian soldiers told them that as an ex-Taliban, the village head was their best source of intelligence on the bombs being laid in their path.

"Building trust" 

Here's a radical idea.  When you are trying to cultivate an informant whose life is forfeit for cooperating with you, perhaps putting his name into international news as someone you are trying to flip isn't the greatest idea. 

But I'm no professional....
 
Afstan: Battle of the bucks
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/05/afstan-battle-of-bucks.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
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