• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

Afghanistan: Why we should be there (or not), how to conduct the mission (or not) & when to leave

Canada may have painted itself into corner in Afghanistan
Article Link
By Matthew Fisher, Canwest News serviceMarch 12, 2010

One of the principal reasons Canada ended up in a shooting war in Kandahar was the Martin government dithered for so long about what to do in Afghanistan that when it finally made up its mind about what to do in 2005, all the soft spots in the north and west of the country were grabbed by European allies such as France, Spain and Germany.

History looks set to repeat itself.

As Canada retreats from its biggest foreign commitment in more than half a century, European allies whose role in Afghanistan the Harper government has often strongly criticized, have quietly volunteered for nearly 600 relatively safe, non-combat positions as mentors to Afghanistan's burgeoning security forces.

Everyone of those jobs would seem to be a perfect fit for Canada's relatively small but highly professional army and for a country that has grown weary of combat.

There have been 130 Canadian soldiers killed in Kandahar since the Martin government sent troops to the heart of the war in 2006. Over the past four years, Canada has spent billions of dollars fighting the Taliban.

Notwithstanding this loss of blood and treasure, or arguably because of it, the Harper government has confirmed a decision Parliament made two years ago to stop combat operations in Kandahar in 2011.

But the Harper government has gone much further than Parliament did, loudly stating that other than a few embassy guards, no Canadian troops would remain anywhere in Afghanistan beyond the end of next year.

It is a position complicated by the fact the government has declared its intention to continue its massive diplomatic and aid effort in Kandahar, without providing any hint of how the Canadians who do this work are to be protected.

At the same time, Ottawa has rejected a military training mission the Europeans have been signing up for.

The intent of that hugely ambitious program is to triple the size of the Afghan National Army to 300,000 and nearly double the size of the Afghan National Police to about 130,000.

Canada has been silent although NATO has declared mentoring is fast becoming its top priority and the best way for the alliance to achieve an orderly, rather than a premature exit strategy from Afghanistan.

Ironically, every one of the 200 Canadian mentors working closely with the Afghan security forces in Kandahar will be sent home at the very time when the need for such advisers is peaking as a result of a highly successful recruiting campaign backstopped by a steep increase in salaries for soldiers and police.

There are still about 700 NATO mentoring spots available, but most of them are expected to be spoken for by the time the traditional Afghan fighting season reaches its peak again this summer.

Military officers and civilians working for NATO in Kandahar and Kabul have said Canada has the resources to provide at least 400 experienced mentors and, if it did so, they would most likely be assigned work to a training academy, perhaps in Kabul, where they would be at low risk.

Hans Fogh Rasmussen, the NATO secretary general, and senior NATO commanders have publicly implored Canada to keep some forces in Afghanistan.

Behind their polite, well-mannered words has been a growing frustration at Ottawa's decision to cut and run at the moment when the war enters what NATO's top commander, U.S. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, has called a decisive phase.

The Dutch have announced that its troops are leaving, too. But their departure later this year is not regarded as a serious blow because they have had far fewer forces and have done far less fighting than Canada. The unspoken fear in Kabul and Brussels is if Canada walks away, other nations that have done far less may use this as a pretext to get out, too.

Despite what the Harper government has said, the expectation in NATO circles here is that Ottawa will eventually conclude it should continue to have some kind of military role in Afghanistan.

However, if as happened in 2006, the government waits much beyond this summer before putting up its hand, the soft spots will once again be taken and Canada's options will narrow greatly.
More on link
 
This, from the news section:
The U.S. government will ask Canada to keep as many as 500 to 600 troops in Afghanistan after this country’s military deployment in Kandahar ends in 2011.

Sources inside and outside the government say the formal request is expected toward the end of this year through NATO. The troops would act as military trainers and would most likely be located in Kabul. The deployment would not involve putting Canadian troops in harm’s way, but could nonetheless set off a rancorous national debate among Canadians and especially within the Liberal Party.

No specific request has been raised in meetings between Defence Secretary Robert Gates and Defence Minister Peter MacKay. But officials in the departments of State and Defence have advised their Canadian counterparts that an “ask” is coming.

To fulfill the terms of the parliamentary resolution that Canadian Forces leave Afghanistan, any troops would have to be outside the Kandahar region, and not engaged in military operations.

Trainers stationed in Kabul would fulfill those requirements, and it is what Canadian officials are expecting.

Whether Canada complies with the request may well depend on how Liberal Leader Michael Ignatieff responds to it. The Conservative government submitted its plans to deploy troops in Kandahar to Parliament, and has committed to abiding by the 2008 parliamentary resolution ordering them out next year ....

And even a columnist in the Mop & Pail realizes an important point:
.... If our troops are serving as military trainers, sooner or later they will have to accompany the Afghan troops they are training into combat operations. Which means they will be in harms way ....
Well, maybe they don't have to head into the breech with the troops, but that's only if they don't want to be as credible as some, right?
 
THE AFGHAN MISSION - This U.S. plea is a Harper saver
Being pressed to keep 600 Canadian troops in Kabul would give the PM a way out of his 2011 exit vow

David Bercuson
The Globe & Mail
26 Mar 2010

DAVID BERCUSON Director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary *** The United States, according to The Globe and Mail, is going to ask Canada to retain some 600 soldiers in Kabul to help train Afghan National Army troops after the Canadian mission in Kandahar ends next year. If this comes to pass, it will give Stephen Harper a way out of his rash promise - made during the 2008 election - to leave Afghanistan completely.

It also will force Parliament to have a very significant debate over Canada's role in Afghanistan. And it will force the Liberal Party - Canada's other national governing party - to choose between a foreign and defence policy made primarily by former NDP premiers and one that puts the Liberals back where they belong, in the political centre.

In the midst of this country's last federal election, Mr. Harper saw his government's polling numbers crater in Quebec. With that collapse went the fate of his majority. These are facts. It seems, then, it was no coincidence that the Tory demise in Quebec came just ahead of the Prime Minister's sudden declaration that Canada would leave Afghanistan lock, stock and barrel in 2011. Mr. Harper said he was merely reiterating the essence of the 2008 parliamentary motion that extended Canada's mission to 2011 but that also called for an end to combat operations in Kandahar at that time.

In fact, he was fudging both the wording and intent of the 2008 parliamentary motion. It literally called for Canada to deploy out of Kandahar but left other options wide open. But having declared an absolute end to the mission during the 2008 election - for whatever reasons - Mr. Harper's word became holy government writ.

The Prime Minister is now in a box of his own making because the Americans are not happy with Canada's intent. A complete Canadian withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2011 will be read in Washington as abandonment of the U.S. in the midst of a war and abandonment of NATO. If Canada pulls out of Afghanistan entirely next year, it won't matter how many Canadians have been killed there. In Washington, history is nothing more than a rationale to be used to make or break policy; history does not substitute for politics.

A Canadian government that leaves Afghanistan in the middle of a fight will find very few friends in the State Department, the Defence Department, the White House or on Capitol Hill.

A U.S. request to Canada to keep 600 or so troops in Kabul for training purposes fits both the wording and the intent of the 2008 parliamentary motion. If made, Mr. Harper would be entirely within the parameters of that motion to simply agree to the request. He could explain to Canadians that the U.S. wasn't asking for more than Parliament had already agreed to, that Canada simply had to support an ally in the middle of a war to achieve a goal that so many Canadians had already died fighting for, and that 600 or so troops in a training role in Kabul was the least Canada could do for its allies.

If Mr. Harper has a majority by the end of this year, that would be a likely option perfectly within his mandate. If he still has a minority when such a U.S. request is made, he probably would seek a new parliamentary mandate. He could tell Canadians he is merely asking Parliament to decide, as Mackenzie King would have done.

After all, few Canadians can have much of an argument about one last parliamentary debate on Afghanistan. In fact, many might believe it would be right and proper to have such a discussion before Canada quits the fifth most costly military mission in our history.

As things stand now, there are loose ends that really ought to be debated. Who, for example, will protect Canadian aid and reconstruction workers after Canadian soldiers leave? In any such debate, Michael Ignatieff can only lose. He has effectively allowed the Liberals' foreign and defence policy to be captured by Bob Rae and Ujjal Dosanjh.

These two men - and the small but highly vocal left wing of the Liberal Party - simply don't see the world the way Liberal centrists such as Paul Martin, Bill Graham and John Manley do. Thus Mr. Ignatieff would have to cope with a nasty split in Liberal ranks.

Washington may well have weighed the political importance of keeping Canada involved in Afghanistan against Mr. Ignatieff's neck and decided to sharpen the axe. But it will be up to Mr. Harper to swing it or not.

David Bercuson is director of programs at the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute.

... and more ...

Afghanistan Honouring Canada's commitment
Editorial
Globe & Mail
26 Mar 2010

Canada should look favourably at any NATO request to keep some soldiers in Afghanistan, in a training capacity, beyond the 2011 end to the mission in Kandahar. Conservative and past Liberal governments have shared a commitment to the process of nation-building in Afghanistan, as well as a complementary interest in preserving Canada's national security and that of our allies. Some continuing training role would adhere to those objectives and honour the enormous sacrifices made by Canada's servicemen and women in pursuit of them.

The Globe and Mail reported on Thursday that the size of the commitment sought by NATO, expected to be formalized later this year, would be in the order of 500 to 600 troops. That is a substantial reduction from the current strength of 2,300, but is a number high enough that it is expected to provoke opposition within Liberal ranks.

The Liberals, when in government, committed Canada to the Afghan campaign, and subsequently upgraded that commitment to involve front-line fighting in Kandahar, but the costs of the fighting in human terms and the intractability of the enemy have soured some in the party to any military involvement past 2011, even a low-risk training role in Kabul that appears tailor-made for Canada.

Such a failure of resolve would reflect poorly on the Liberal Party, but it also has the potential to hurt Canada, as it may be seen from abroad as a Canadian retreat, not a Liberal one. The timing - just when the benefits of the U.S. surge would start to become apparent - could erode the goodwill Canada has built up since 2002 with the U.S. and other NATO partners, international relief agencies, and the Afghan people.

In some small way, it could also undermine what Canada has achieved in the country. A well trained and equipped national army is critical to the future stability of Afghanistan and its fragile democracy.

It is necessary to protect the advances made in human rights and the status of women. It is true that some other ally, perhaps once again the U.S., would move in to fulfill that role. But Canada has an ongoing stake in the country and the ultimate triumph over the Taliban, and should be on the ground in order to assert as much.

Once the expected formal request for a training mission after 2011 is received, Prime Minister Stephen Harper should seek parliamentary endorsement. His government should be able to anticipate the support of the Loyal Opposition.
 
Based on this exchange in the House of Commons this week, Terry Glavin divines what our post-2011 mission will look like:
.... Ignatieff's version of the question 'What am I thinking?' elicited this weird response from Cannon: "Canada will continue to maintain diplomatic relations and monitor development through its embassy in Kabul, as we do in other countries."

This isn't a decision, you should realize. It's the consequence of the absence of a decision. It's the direct result of the absence of any Parliamentary debate, the non-existence of any consideration or resolution or motion about what Canada should be doing in Afghanistan after 2011 - which is next year, remember.

(....)

The Canadian people never decided this. We were never asked, never consulted. We are simply instructed that Canada's role in Afghanistan will be reduced by accident of Parliamentary paralysis to "diplomatic relations," and our embassy will "monitor development." We will have someone sitting in a wheelchair, perhaps wearing a toque, looking out an embassy window, while soldiers and specialists from the great powers of the 43-nation ISAF alliance - Montenegro, Latvia, Jordan, Slovenia, Luxembourg, Macedonia - do all the work.

(....)

If this is what Parliament wants, then this is what Parliament will get. if this is what our political leaders want, then they should bloody well come right out and say so. If it isn't, then they might show us the courtesy of telling us what they propose. Is this what you want, Mr. Ignatieff? Mr. Harper? Mr. Duceppe? Mr. Layton?

Well said, Terry!
 
A generally anti-PM screed, but not entirely without merit:
.... The desire for Canada to continue its presence in Afghanistan is not limited to our NATO coalition partners; Family members of soldiers killed in Afghanistan are also questioning Harper's arbitrary withdrawal date, fearing that not seeing the mission through to the end will mean their loved ones died in vain.

Myles Kennedy, the father of Pte. Kevin Kennedy who was killed in a roadside blast on Easter Sunday in 2007, believes "we came in to do a job, and our job will not be complete if (Harper) pulls out the whole group." Kennedy's faith in the success of the mission is strong, a CTV report noting "(Kennedy) was amazed at the scale of NATO's buildup for this spring's planned offensive in Kandahar, and for the first time since his son's death...he's optimistic that war can be turned around."

Canadians need an open, honest debate about the possibility of remaining in Afghanistan post 2011, and Parliament should revisit the 2008 motion for troop withdrawal to discuss the merits and drawbacks of either extending, or ending, the Afghan mission. It's clear that the expertise, tenacity, and effectiveness of the Canadian Forces has had a positive impact on our NATO allies; Their request for our continuance in Afghanistan demonstrates their belief in Canada's importance to the ultimate success of the mission ....
I'm guessing, though, that pro-continuation editorials will remain the "winning lottery ticket" level of minority at rabble.ca.
 
I believe that the PM is waiting for Iggy to bring to the floor of parliament a motion to remain in Afghanistan in some way. That way he can point to the LPC. If Iggy thinks he can get anything out of such a motion (i.e. abortion/foreign policy) he will.

We will see if Iggy falls into the trap.
 
Terry Glavin et al. on Afstan (further links in quote at original): 
http://transmontanus.blogspot.com/2010/04/moral-dimensions.html 

...
I was on Rex Murphy's Cross-Country Checkup today [see April 4 here,
http://www.cbc.ca/checkup/archives.html
audio here].
http://www.cbc.ca/checkup/archive/2010/100404CC.mp3
So was Bob Rae, the Liberal Party's foreign affairs critic, whose declaration that Canada must re-dedicate itself to Afghanistan was a delight to hear, as I'm sure Laurie Hawn will agree. Richard Gordon of Books With Wings called in, as did the indispensable David Bercuson, and we also heard from Cheshmak Farhoumand-Sims, who was tremendous. Only a couple of the usual stoppist crackpots called in...

Mark 
Ottawa
 
Afstan and our hopeless media
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/04/afstan-and-our-hopeless-media.html


Now it's the National Post's turn to bugger things up...

Mark
Otawa
 
I see no mention of our Police coming back as well.  We have members of the RCMP, Provincial and Municiple forces training the ANP.  There are also members of CBSA, Corrections officers and other security agencies working in Afghanistan.  Are they staying or coming back as well?
 
George Wallace said:
I see no mention of our Police coming back as well.  We have members of the RCMP, Provincial and Municiple forces training the ANP.  There are also members of CBSA, Corrections officers and other security agencies working in Afghanistan.  Are they staying or coming back as well?
Good question.  Here's what's out there right now:
- The latest messaging (from the PM 30 Mar 10 in the House of Commons) states:
Canada's military mission in Afghanistan will end in 2011, in accordance with a resolution adopted by Parliament.  We plan on remaining involved in Afghanistan in terms of development, governance and humanitarian assistance.
Good question - here's what we hear for now:
- According to the GoC's web page, any benchmarks for AFG police training end as of 2011, and is considered "security" assistance.  If the "military" component ends, it's possible only Cdn police mentors will stay.
- Prison reform is also covered under "Security" benchmarks, but since we're only hearing about an end to "military" involvement, Cdn prison staff should be staying.
- I'm guessing CBSA staff would be most involved with the "Border" benchmarks, which to this point allocate $ only to 2011.  If this is considered a "governance" issue, they should stay.

My tea-leaf-reading :2c: barring anything firmer from the Government (anyone?  anyone?).

Rifleman62 said:
I believe that the PM is waiting for Iggy to bring to the floor of parliament a motion to remain in Afghanistan in some way. That way he can point to the LPC. If Iggy thinks he can get anything out of such a motion (i.e. abortion/foreign policy) he will.  We will see if Iggy falls into the trap.
Bob Rae, the Liberal Party's foreign affairs critic, whose declaration that Canada must re-dedicate itself to Afghanistan was a delight to hear, as I'm sure Laurie Hawn will agree.
Based on this transcript of a speech he made in the House of Commons last October during debate (3 pg PDF), Rae sounds like he gets the nuance better than Iggy (low bar that it is).
 
Afstan: German views on ANP--and the Bundeswehr
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/04/afstan-german-views-on-anp-and.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
This, from the Canadian Press:
Canada will send an additional 90 troops to Afghanistan to help train both the fledgling army and local police forces.

Defence Minister Peter MacKay made the surprise announcement in Kabul, only one day after Prime Minister Stephen Harper unleashed blistering criticism of President Hamid Karzai .... Ottawa stepped forward with the extra soldiers, answering a call from NATO to boost training of Afghan security forces.

"The Government of Canada is proud to contribute additional Canadian Forces personnel to prepare Afghans in order to build a stable, strong and peaceful nation, which they deserve," MacKay said in a statement.

Some of the reinforcements will be sent to the NATO training centre in Kabul, while others are expected to bolster training forces in Kandahar and help at the Canadian task force headquarters.

The additions bring the number of Canadian troops and aircrew in Afghanistan to almost 3,000.

MacKay says the trainers will stay until Canada begins drawing down its forces, starting in July of next year ....
Cool - so, what happens AFTER 2011?
 
Not news: PM Harper "an Afghan skeptic"/"Hurl time"
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/04/not-news-pm-harper-afghan-skeptichurl.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
The US "drone" campaign is doing a stand up job across the border in Pakistan. Disrupting leadership, training, logistics and recruiting in the "safe zone" should have some tangible benefits in Afghanistan itself:

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htterr/articles/20100407.aspx

The Great Fear

April 7, 2010: In North Waziristan, a section of Pakistan's tribal territories that borders Afghanistan, there is growing fear among the Islamic militants who have long used the area as a base area and refuge. So far this year, there has been at least one missile attack a week, leaving more al Qaeda or Taliban, usually leaders, dead. American UAVs, often operating in pairs, or packs of four, roam the skies almost constantly. Terrorist leaders are now terrorized, and have cut back on travel, and use of satellite phones. When terrorist leaders do travel, they use public transport, surrounded by women and children. The terrorists know that American ROE (Rules of Engagement) discourage "collateral damage" (civilian casualties), so the terrorists try to have women and children around at all times. But the locals know that the ROE doesn't absolutely forbid civilian casualties, and either refuse to rent rooms in their compounds to al Qaeda or Taliban leaders, or flee if the terrorists insist on staying.

The Arabs and Afghan tribesmen have long been impressed by Western technology, and tend to exaggerate its capabilities. After you've handled an iPhone for a few minutes, that's not hard to do. So the continuing accurate missile attacks have the terrorists imagining all manner of capabilities for the UAVs and missiles.

Meanwhile, the Pakistani Army division stationed in North Waziristan, is receiving reinforcements, and apparently preparing to seize known terrorist camps and urban bases (Taliban, al Qaeda and the Haqqani network). The Taliban have been trying to intimidate local tribes by murdering hostile tribal leaders. The message is that an anti-Taliban stance can get you killed. It's clear that, since the Taliban can't face the army in battle, they are attempting to terrorize a frightened (of the Taliban) population that is trying to protect itself. This terror campaign is the last straw for many tribesmen. Although inclined to support the Taliban and al Qaeda, the Islamic radicals have abused their hospitality with arrogant behavior, and periodic attempts to impose unwelcome lifestyle rules on the locals. Seeing how visibly frightened the terrorists are, the locals are less intimidated. Many locals see the occasional civilian casualties as a bearable loss if it means getting rid of all the Islamic radicals.

The American UAV campaign against the Taliban and al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan began in 2008, and has killed about a thousand people so far. Some 30 percent of the dead were civilians, largely because the terrorists try to surround themselves with women and children. The Taliban and al Qaeda don't like to discuss these attacks, even to score some media points by complaining of civilian casualties. But the U.S. and Pakistani intelligence services do monitor radio and email in the area, and believe that about 700 terrorists, including two dozen senior al Qaeda and Taliban leaders, and nearly a hundred mid-level ones, have died from the UAV missile attacks. Civilian deaths are minimized by trying to catch the terrorists while travelling, or otherwise away from civilians. Journalists visiting the sites of these attacks later, find few locals claiming lots of civilian casualties. Unlike Afghanistan, the Pakistani Pushtuns tend to avoid criticizing their government, for fear of retribution from tribal leaders or the government itself.

While the terrorist groups are concerned about the losses, especially among the leadership, what alarms them the most is how frequently the American UAVs are finding their key people. The real problem the terrorists have is that someone is ratting them out. Someone, or something, is helping the Americans find the terrorist leaders. That would be Pakistani intelligence (ISI), which promptly began feeling some heat when the civilians were back in power in 2008. After the purge of many Islamic radical (or pro-radical) officers, the information from the Pakistani informant network began to reach the Americans.

This Hellfire campaign is hitting al Qaeda at the very top, although only a quarter of the attacks so far have taken out any of the most senior leaders. But that means over half the senior leadership have been killed or badly wounded in the last two years. Perhaps even greater damage has been done to the terrorist middle management. These are old and experienced lieutenants, as well as young up-and-comers. They are the glue that holds al Qaeda and the Taliban together. Their loss is one reason why it's easier to get more information on where leaders are, and why rank-and-file al Qaeda and Taliban are less effective of late. The deaths of so many bodyguard and aides has rank-and-file terrorists thinking that the Hellfire missiles are actually being fired at any al Qaeda or Taliban, no matter what their rank.

While al Qaeda believes local Pakistanis are responsible for leaking location information to the Americans, it's a bit more complicated than that. First of all, the U.S. does have an informant network in the Pakistani tribal territories, especially, during the last few years, in the Taliban heartland of North and South Waziristan. This is a relatively small area (11,500 square kilometers) of mountains and forests along the Afghan border. The people living here are very wary of outsiders, so it takes years to develop local informants.

Over a decade ago, U.S. intelligence operatives returned to the Afghan border area, and began developing an informant network inside Afghanistan, using tribal connections on the Pakistani side. This was a tedious business, especially in Waziristan. After September 11, 2001, this network was worked with greater urgency. The growing force of Predator (and later the larger Reaper) UAVs were available to run round-the-clock surveillance on what was going on down there. The main obstacle to using all this information was the Pakistani president (Pervez Musharraf), an army general who did not want to anger the tribesmen by letting the Americans launch a lot of Hellfire missiles from their UAVs. Musharraf insisted on personally approving each Hellfire strike, and he did not approve very often. Musharraf lost his job two years ago. The U.S. and the new civilian Pakistani government agreed that it was now open season on al Qaeda. The new Pakistani government asked the Americans to be as discreet, and accurate, as possible, and then hunkered down for the public outrage over this American "attack on Pakistan." But in fact, the Hellfire attacks were killing men who were responsible for terrorist attacks that had killed thousands of Pakistanis.

The U.S. intelligence network in Pakistan had connections everywhere. Even pro-Taliban tribesmen were willing to earn some money by informing on al Qaeda. That's because many Taliban do not like al Qaeda (most of them are foreigners) much at all. The Taliban has tried to maintain good, or at least civil, relations with al Qaeda. But that effort has frayed to the point where an al Qaeda big shot like Osama bin Laden spends most of his time staying hidden from U.S. UAVs, Pakistani troops and hostile Pushtun tribesmen.

Pakistani officials believe that the multimillion dollar rewards on bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders may now actually work. The problem has always been that you can't capture an al Qaeda big shot without the assent of local tribal leaders. For a large chunk of that reward, that assent may now be had from some chiefs, and bin Laden knows it. He also knows that he has lost an irreplaceable number of veteran leaders (and allies), to U.S. Hellfire missiles, in the last two years. Rumor has it that big money was paid for the information that made some of these attacks possible. It's bad enough that al Qaeda is losing senior people, it's worse that they are now seen, by local tribesmen, as a way to get rich. Al Qaeda leaders now know what it's like to be terrorized.
 
A bit of wiggle room in what CanWest is quoting the Minister saying:
.... MacKay, while speaking at the end of a conference call from Kabul, seemed to add an element of ambiguity to just what the Canadian role will be after its military has pulled out of Afghanistan.

"There are other ways that we will continue to contribute. Training is obviously one of those options, and I suspect there will be further discussion about what the mission will look like post-2011," MacKay said.

He did not elaborate, leaving it unclear whether he was hinting at a military role for Canada or simply referring to other, non-military forms of training assistance.

(....)

"We cannot be here promoting and protecting the democracy of Afghanistan and not respect the democracy of our own Parliament," MacKay said Thursday.

"That parliamentary motion has placed parameters around the military mission." ....

Hmmm - in Parliament last week, the PM was clear:  "The military mission will end in 2011."  However, if we're talking about "parameters" placed by the March 2008 motion, there are ways to continue a presence without CF troops in Kandahar.

1)  Civilian instructors + basing them in Kabul = no CF troops in Kandahar

2)  Civilian contractors + civilian spy planes over Kandahar = no more CF troops in Kandahar

Or was this, as some say, a trial balloon?
 
Afstan and the meaning of words (and lack of leadership)
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/04/afstan-and-meaning-of-words-and-lack-of.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
Afstan and the government: Politically craven and immorally audacious
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/04/afstan-and-government-politically.html

These people really do wrench one's guts. So RCMP and municipal cops can take the risks involved in training Afghans post-2011 but not the Candian Forces... 

The government is simply lying--there is sadly no other word--when it says the motion demands "the military mission will come to an end in 2011". Why, when doing stories like the Canwest News one above, do not our hopelessly lazy major media make the effort to point out what the motion actually says? Though here's an exception that proves the rule, good on Murray Brewster of CP--though even he suffers from terminological inexactitude...

Mark
Ottawa
 
Our vanishing Provincial Reconstruction Team at Kandahar?
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/04/our-vanishing-provincial-reconstruction.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
Interesting public meeting in Toronto, Saturday, April 17--from Terry Glavin, with more links:

Toronto, Taj Hall, April 17: Ending Afghanistan's Agony and Canada's Paralysis.
http://transmontanus.blogspot.com/2010/04/toronto-taj-hall-april-17-ending.html

TORONTO - Former United Nations’ deputy special representative in Afghanistan Christopher Alexander will join Liberal Foreign Affairs Critic Bob Rae and  Najia Haneefi, founder of the Afghan Women’s Political Participation Committee, in a public discussion this Saturday about Canada’s future role in Afghanistan.

Other speakers include Afghanistan’s Ambassador to Canada Jawed Ludin, Toronto coordinator for the Canada Afghanistan Solidarity Committee Babur Malawdin, and journalist Terry Glavin, a Solidarity Committee co-founder.

Macleans magazine columnist Andrew Potter will moderate a panel discussion with Alexander, Rae, Glavin and Haneefi that will focus on Alexander’s seven-point proposal for “ending the agony” in Afghanistan.
More here.

It's all about keeping our promises.

Mark
Ottawa

 
What's the difference between the Balkans and Afstan?
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/04/whats-difference-between-balkans-and.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
Back
Top