Afghanistan - Latest Tours
- Thread starter APOLLOVet
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What is this "sandbox" shit, must we come up with stupid names for places,... The seven months I was there no one I worked with called it the sandbox, hell except towards the red sands desert, I saw far more shit rock then sand, the place is just a pile rocks of various sizes!
Sandbox my ass!
Sandbox my ass!
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It's a Yank thing that's crept in...like "down range"... Heard both ad nauseum on Apollo...
I would be excited to come across the rifle. That's an incredible find guys.
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returning to the thread...
Points made by Apollo, Teddy, et Co. are all good.
Some thoughts after seeing various levels of things working in AFG and how our assistance to AFG should continue:
- it must respond first and foremost to Afghans,
- pride is a big thing with Afghans, it must be absolutely clear it's their solution...we're just helping them,
- it must not be turned into a project that Candians can parade to feel good about ourselves,
- it is a long-term effort, 15-25 years easily,
- Afghans want SECURITY, not just physical, but food, infrastructure, culture,
- balance between DA and reconstructive ops...I too feel there is a bit more room for balance (both visible/press and actual)"
- ANA but even more so ANP are HUGE elem of the "feeling secure" thing, RCMP, ETT are excellent value added to the effort,
- Justice system, local gov't, etc... need continued assistance/pressure to clean up
- clear understanding of how fragile the hearts and minds is, and how quickly reversion to "old ways" will occur if Afghan men can't look after their families (i.e. real quick, yet still with a smile to your face)
- strive to not "equalize" Afghan society across the country, but reduce the "chasm" between Kabul and major cities, and the small villiages that are, as noted earlier, "thousands of years behind the present",
- disparity between city and villiage starts about a few hundred meters after the last "subdivision" in Kabul
- increased cultural awareness (not just the 1/2-day PTSC blurb) and consideration of it in operations and development activities.
- realization that at best, it will have an Islamic Republic structure with a democratic flavour, strive to maximize the flavour but not at the cost of threatening the Islamic mindset...this is without doubt probably the most delicate balance that must be made, it'll never be another Western country nestled within an Islamic region
...food for thought...
G2G
Points made by Apollo, Teddy, et Co. are all good.
Some thoughts after seeing various levels of things working in AFG and how our assistance to AFG should continue:
- it must respond first and foremost to Afghans,
- pride is a big thing with Afghans, it must be absolutely clear it's their solution...we're just helping them,
- it must not be turned into a project that Candians can parade to feel good about ourselves,
- it is a long-term effort, 15-25 years easily,
- Afghans want SECURITY, not just physical, but food, infrastructure, culture,
- balance between DA and reconstructive ops...I too feel there is a bit more room for balance (both visible/press and actual)"
- ANA but even more so ANP are HUGE elem of the "feeling secure" thing, RCMP, ETT are excellent value added to the effort,
- Justice system, local gov't, etc... need continued assistance/pressure to clean up
- clear understanding of how fragile the hearts and minds is, and how quickly reversion to "old ways" will occur if Afghan men can't look after their families (i.e. real quick, yet still with a smile to your face)
- strive to not "equalize" Afghan society across the country, but reduce the "chasm" between Kabul and major cities, and the small villiages that are, as noted earlier, "thousands of years behind the present",
- disparity between city and villiage starts about a few hundred meters after the last "subdivision" in Kabul
- increased cultural awareness (not just the 1/2-day PTSC blurb) and consideration of it in operations and development activities.
- realization that at best, it will have an Islamic Republic structure with a democratic flavour, strive to maximize the flavour but not at the cost of threatening the Islamic mindset...this is without doubt probably the most delicate balance that must be made, it'll never be another Western country nestled within an Islamic region
...food for thought...
G2G
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Apollovet: Glad you are safe back in Canada. Great posts. I must start out by saying that it is quite interesting to compare your observations to the perspectives of some of the very senior types we bring in as guest speakers here at CFC. All the things that you identify as what we should be doing all seem to be the things that they say(in more general terms) we actually are doing. And yet, we see almost nothing in the media about Canadian reconstruction efforts. To a certain extent this can be blamed on "if it bleeds it leads", but yet there are other kinds of stories that do come out of Afgh via Cdn media (Timmy's got quite a bit of coverage, for example, and I saw a piece on Cdns training the Afgh fire service). So, maybe we really aren't doing enough significant reconstruction. I'm not there right now, (last there in 04-05) so I don't know. And, like Teddy, I am very loath to second-guess the folks on the two-way range (there's another dumb term...).
Still, it's pretty clear to me that fighting, while necessary (hopefully to a declining degree over the next few years) is not the panacea in the long run. In fact, there probably isn't a panacea for Afghanistan. It will probably live with factionalism and political violence to some degree for a long time. But then, so did the UK, Spain, France, Greece, Italy and a lot of other places we have long considered relatively stable. The fix, if there is one, IMHO is to have the Afghan people choose peace and stability most of the time in most of the country, until it really takes root, and (cynically) personal prosperity, comfort and a desire for a better life overcome the desire to pick up an RPG.
I also share some of your concerns from what I can perceive about the course of events there, but in a slightly different way. I believe that the combat ops that have been conducted thus far were all necessary, even if they were surprisingly different from what we were all expecting to see in 3BW (One report I read compared Panjwai to fighting in the Normandy bocage, only worse). I think that the CF (esp the Army) is doing its part, and probably much, much more. What is missing is a really concerted and well funded effort by the other two legs of the "3D" tripod": DFAIT and CIDA. Now, I am hearing more and more that these two are gradually becoming more organized and effective, but IMHO they are just as important as the troops: perhaps even moreso in the long run. We are not going to significantly change Afghan culture, and we should not bother. Instead, we need to give the GOA the tools and infrastructure to run the country. I agree fully with your bottom up approach to rebuilding and improvement, but it cannot be confined to that, IMHO, or we will build a headless creature with no nervous system.
However, I will add this. I am on side with those who are uneasy with what sometimes seems to be a focus on body count, terrain "taken" and saying things like "we have the Taleban on the run", etc. No doubt these things are all factual, at the instant they are said and as far as they go. But, sometimes I wonder how far they really go. I do not like the historical echoes I sometimes think I hear. At the same time I have to wonder how much is coming through a mirror clouded by the media focus of the moment, and how much is well-intended as being for "home consumption", but tends to create a triumphalist impression that has no useful place in counter-insurgency and nationbuuilding in the face of a determined, fanatic and patient foe.
Cheers
Still, it's pretty clear to me that fighting, while necessary (hopefully to a declining degree over the next few years) is not the panacea in the long run. In fact, there probably isn't a panacea for Afghanistan. It will probably live with factionalism and political violence to some degree for a long time. But then, so did the UK, Spain, France, Greece, Italy and a lot of other places we have long considered relatively stable. The fix, if there is one, IMHO is to have the Afghan people choose peace and stability most of the time in most of the country, until it really takes root, and (cynically) personal prosperity, comfort and a desire for a better life overcome the desire to pick up an RPG.
I also share some of your concerns from what I can perceive about the course of events there, but in a slightly different way. I believe that the combat ops that have been conducted thus far were all necessary, even if they were surprisingly different from what we were all expecting to see in 3BW (One report I read compared Panjwai to fighting in the Normandy bocage, only worse). I think that the CF (esp the Army) is doing its part, and probably much, much more. What is missing is a really concerted and well funded effort by the other two legs of the "3D" tripod": DFAIT and CIDA. Now, I am hearing more and more that these two are gradually becoming more organized and effective, but IMHO they are just as important as the troops: perhaps even moreso in the long run. We are not going to significantly change Afghan culture, and we should not bother. Instead, we need to give the GOA the tools and infrastructure to run the country. I agree fully with your bottom up approach to rebuilding and improvement, but it cannot be confined to that, IMHO, or we will build a headless creature with no nervous system.
However, I will add this. I am on side with those who are uneasy with what sometimes seems to be a focus on body count, terrain "taken" and saying things like "we have the Taleban on the run", etc. No doubt these things are all factual, at the instant they are said and as far as they go. But, sometimes I wonder how far they really go. I do not like the historical echoes I sometimes think I hear. At the same time I have to wonder how much is coming through a mirror clouded by the media focus of the moment, and how much is well-intended as being for "home consumption", but tends to create a triumphalist impression that has no useful place in counter-insurgency and nationbuuilding in the face of a determined, fanatic and patient foe.
Cheers
Gentlemen,
Thanks for all the well thought out posts. Sorry about the long time between posts - was out of country for a while.
I recently had the chance to speak with another country that was doing PRT ops in another province in Afghanistan. They appeared to be approaching the problem in much the same manner as we are, but since their province is more secure than Kandahar, they are not so focused on DAs. It will be interesting to see how things transpire.
Since there seems to be relative consensus on the "way ahead" (another overused buzzword), I will not rehash everything again. I will add more thoughts if new items pop up. What I will say in response to some of the posts that I missed while I was away is that
1. Security is paramount, and security consists of physical security (ie fighting the TB/AQ to makew them go away), economic security (opportunity to provide for your family etc), religious security (we are not going to force the locals into Western behaviour patterns that will send them to Hell) etc
2. Western approaches to governance do exist in Kabul, but they have certainly not percolated down to the provincial level and lower. The institutions exist as shells, but there is no constructive work going on at the lower levels. This is why I believe that "bottom up" is required to meet the existing "top down" institutions
3. All efforts must be aimed at the local level of tech, education, etc (the sewing machine example is a good one). We have to remember that Afghanistan is DIFFERENT from Canada
4. We all have to remember that there is a big difference between what is happening at the tactical level and what is briefed to the honchos. Interpretation is everything, and nobody wants to be the one presenting bad news. If a fire department has one broken truck, and we fix it while giving them another we can then trumpet the fact that we have increased the fire department's capability by 200%. This is true, even if we have conveniently forgotten to mention that they cannot even crew the first one, and they are afraid to roll them to fire calls due to ambush. One interpretation does sound a lot better though.
Again, thank you all for your time and thought.
Thanks for all the well thought out posts. Sorry about the long time between posts - was out of country for a while.
I recently had the chance to speak with another country that was doing PRT ops in another province in Afghanistan. They appeared to be approaching the problem in much the same manner as we are, but since their province is more secure than Kandahar, they are not so focused on DAs. It will be interesting to see how things transpire.
Since there seems to be relative consensus on the "way ahead" (another overused buzzword), I will not rehash everything again. I will add more thoughts if new items pop up. What I will say in response to some of the posts that I missed while I was away is that
1. Security is paramount, and security consists of physical security (ie fighting the TB/AQ to makew them go away), economic security (opportunity to provide for your family etc), religious security (we are not going to force the locals into Western behaviour patterns that will send them to Hell) etc
2. Western approaches to governance do exist in Kabul, but they have certainly not percolated down to the provincial level and lower. The institutions exist as shells, but there is no constructive work going on at the lower levels. This is why I believe that "bottom up" is required to meet the existing "top down" institutions
3. All efforts must be aimed at the local level of tech, education, etc (the sewing machine example is a good one). We have to remember that Afghanistan is DIFFERENT from Canada
4. We all have to remember that there is a big difference between what is happening at the tactical level and what is briefed to the honchos. Interpretation is everything, and nobody wants to be the one presenting bad news. If a fire department has one broken truck, and we fix it while giving them another we can then trumpet the fact that we have increased the fire department's capability by 200%. This is true, even if we have conveniently forgotten to mention that they cannot even crew the first one, and they are afraid to roll them to fire calls due to ambush. One interpretation does sound a lot better though.
Again, thank you all for your time and thought.
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