Rfn said:
I don't know much beyond hearsay about the live fire trace. I hope THAT sucker gets investigated and resolved...
But I can say that the logistic side of the ex utterly sucked. It was very disorganized from the beginning Somebody at battle group HQ and/or the composite Western Svc Bn (WSB) dropped the ball in a big way. Sometimes DPs didn't even show up, and troops went hungry when IMPs were not delivered...not that the troops had anything to heat them with, naptha was in short supply for most of the ex. And no hot rats were a problem, because it rained for most of the exercise
There were a lot of excuses flying around. One of my favorite was that the supply trucks that travelled in the exercise area needed an escort (a cougar or an infantry section in another vehicle) to get through hostile areas. The MPs wouldn't let unescorted vehicles through. So when the escort and the trucks failed to marry up, the supply guys simply turned around and when back to their comfy mod tents in their bivvy, content with letting the troops go without. And the higher ups never intervened to get the DPs out to the troops, until the ex was half over.
The saving grace was the troops, didn't hear much complaining about the situation at all
I think some key people on that ex needed to be fired/kicked in the ***.
There were a lot of problems. Admittedly however most of the training was good. The big problem with the training was the powers that be forgot to set aside time to zero weapons prior to the platoon live fire shoot.
Anyway, see you all at Active Edge 05! :dontpanic:
RFN, you do have some very legitimate complaints from the Service and Support perspective. Very early in the ex problems were identified in the WSB ops. With all due respect to Combat Cook, the individual troops from WSB appeared to be performing their jobs. I believe that the problems were at a higher leadership level within WSB. This was identified early in the ex, and discussed with the leadership elms of WSB. Needless to say by about the end of the day Tuesday the discussions between HICON and WSB on this issue began to become predominately 'one-way conversations' if you get my drift
Things did improve somewhat after that, but were still lacking to say the least. Service & Support issues are a major part of the overall Ex AE 04 PXR.
For those who state that the Inf should adapt and overcome if they can't get a meal delivered to them, I do have a point with this. Should R23/31 types, or any combat arms troop be able to function without a meal, or a day's worth of meals - YES. Should they have to go through over 24hrs without rats during a peace time ex, as one element did on Ex AE 04 - generally NO. This was a WSB error, plain and simple. It doesn't take a genius figure out what are the two types of items you should through in the truck for Inf types - IMPs and ammo. We can live without everything else if required for durations. As for coordination with the MPs for escorts - a) what were the orders given - all convoys require prior arranged escort; and b) can you say 'ananticipation future tasks / constraints at all levels'?? The WSB leadership elm dropped the ball here, plain and simple. Poor planning can, and often does, lead to piss poor results.
As for the MPs, yes they were overtasked, but they were very responsive to short turn around requests. Case in point - a call came to HICON in the middle of the night indicating that a Padre's services were required for a troop deployed forward in one of the inf coys. When WSB was contacted by HICON for a vehicle / driver, the responses were 1) 'all we have is an ILTIS' (err, its a Padre, not 150,000 rounds of 5.56mm ball !); and my favourite 2) 'the driver is asleep' :rage: . Well, after a few choice words were stated (not fit to repeat here!), the MPs were contacted. Within 10 minutes the MPs were on the road, and delivered the Padre to his tasking (the troop and family was ok by the way).
As for escorts for convoys, training value, and their need - see US experiences in Iraq at the moment. Militants are waiting for the lightly escorted or non-escorted convoys, and passing on the 'cocombatms' convoys. The ex was based on an ascasymmetricttlefield scenario, like Iraq. Thus, the usefullness and the training value of escorted convoys was high. The MPs were instructed that the only vehicles allowed beyond their checkpoints without escort were: a) combat arms vehicles (ie LAVs, troop convoys); Ex Obs / Controller vehicles, and non-Ex AE 04 vehicles (ie the Brits). Just as the Exercise Commander - he was held up at a MP checkpoint for 30 minutes, and praised the troop for following his orders and not allowing a Col to 'talk' his way though the check point. That said, I am aware of at least one enterprising MLVW driver who spent four hours 'cloverleafing' on black tracks trying to get around the MP check point on the MSR to get food to the troops
All the points above being said, I am aware that all of these issues are being taken seriously in terms of the planning on the next ex. As for the live fire trace incident - shot, over! - wait for it. Some one is going to held responsible for that incident.
Rapid rate, fire!
and I think at least my brigade is focusing the year on whatever the current acronym for FIBUA is. Does that mean that the area ex could be a giant urban operation?
