Your thoughts on this: The Leapord C2 is not a Tank

[Infanteer]

Ok, I spliced out the topic of the subs and sent it off to the Navy forum.

Good rant Lance, I've got my own ideas, let me develop them and add them to what you've said in a bit.

 

[12alfa]

I agree with CFL; perhaps one of you tankers around here (or a collaboration) can put your experience into writing a rebuttal; if anything to encourage a thought-provoking environment.

Well if i could write (and i can't re;GW) I would if the time was on my side, for i have nothing to lose. Now on the other hand the reg force people here have that PER to worry about, and well a anti-MGS will not do them much good would it?

To go against the flow is not the way to get ahead, we all know this.And they at the top don't want to hear this for the same reason, promotion, or a job  when they leave the forces with (a certian AFV/fcs/comms/pr or manufacture) a civie company.
Ther is no way out of this, except if the US does not buy them....maybe.

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

I thought the US had them in Iraq already?.
P.S.  by going against the flow what are they going to do, take away my birthday.

 

[Lance Wiebe]

The US has not deployed the MGS.  They have been placed in very low rate production, for onguing unit evaluation.  Thusfar, they have failed most of the tests, and has not been accepted as of yet.  I doubt that would stop us from acquiring them, though.

BTW, they will not be manufactured in Canada.  GD has decreed that one of their idle plants in Alabama (IIRC) will produce them....

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

I believe what your saying but I thought I heard that they had a Stryker Brg over there.

 

[DOOG]

CFL..
Remember, the "Stryker" is actually a family of vehicles vice one type of vehicle. They have deployed some of the APC variant (basically a turretless LAV III).

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

Actually I did know that but I guess I assumed incorrectly that they had employed the MGS.

 

[12alfa]

Actually I did know that but I guess I assumed in correctly that they had employed the MGS.

That would be a good thing. It would show the wankers who think this is a good veh for our needs, inside the forces and out :threat:. To have a few of them burning on the nightly news would be great. Without the crew being hurt mind you, shown trembling and scared to their wit's end would be a good sight also :crybaby:, ahhh the media, where r they when we need them,.....oh ya on Dan Rathers back, LOL ;D

 

[Lance Wiebe]

As was proven from the US civil war through to WWI, firepower without mobility equates a war of attrition, not a war of manouever

I must admit that I was surprised that I have not been either challenged by this statement, or others commenting on this.  This statement was made after quite some thought, and while I may have read it somewhere, all of my reading on battles throughout the ages have suggested this is true.  And now that I have thought about it even more, I think I was wrong, or rather, thinking in too narrow a box.  I think that a case can be made that throughout history, war without mobility equated in to a war of attrition. 

Maj Atkins, and others, seem to be equating road speed with mobility and flexibility on the battlefield.  This seems to be very flawed thinking, to me at least.  Many of us that have tried maneuvering wheeled vehicles through mud, snow, rocky terrain, and so on.  It would appear that most of us would agree that in marginal terrain, nothing beats tracks.  Who really believes that the LAV III has better cross country mobility than a M113 in February, in the middle of the training area?  Or in northern Ontario, for that matter?  It matters not that your vehicle can do 100 km/hr on the road if it is stuck in a ditch, the winch overwhelmed, waiting recovery.

I may have to sit down and write out some of my thoughts in a more cohesive manner, if ever I get the time.  These disjointed musings don't seem to be getting my point across........

 

[redleafjumper]

Oh there is no question that the leopard is a tank.  I have vivid memories of one of them roaring down a ditch (C1 Leopard then) at me in the 1980 Fall ex in Germany.  :warstory:  I must say that I was very impressed with its high speed and very fast braking system (not to mention the driver's reaction to this piece of potential track butter doing the "please stop!" wave with the 105mm rocking over my shoulder!).
The claim is now made that the CF must position itself for the type of warfare that must be conducted in the future, and that Canada having expensive tanks doesn't fit into that picture.  Hhmmmm.  It is true that it's a lot of money to spend on a weapons system that is vulnerable to hand held weapons that cost a lot less, but that is a problem of tactical deployment and training. 
What really needs to be done in this country is to examine who our potential enemies are and decide what sort of a military we need to deal with those enemies.  The sacred cow of peacekeeping is really more of a make work project in place of true defence policy, it has very little to do with national defence.  The flavour of the decade, terrorism, has really been around for a long time in various forms but the funny thing is that these little wars often grow into larger ones and in larger wars tanks are pretty darned handy.  Liddell Hart and Heinz Guderian had it right - tanks are very effective weapons if employed in large numbers in conjunction with other arms.  For Canada the problem is that a real national defence capability is expensive and Tommy Atkins and company go poor while the public is concerned about such matters as hockey strikes and health care (probably in that order). 

 

[Garry]

Lance,

Well said.

Historically, Tanks provided Mobility, armour protection, and firepower. Mobility and armour protection were always a trade off, as the earlier tank power trains and suspension couldn't move a very heavy platform effeciently.

The Leopard was one of the first tanks to have a really fast cross country mobility. The armour wasn't great, but it was felt that the mobility of the platform was such that with good tactics the tank wouldn't get hit. I've spent a little time in the field, and imho the tactics I was taught would allow me to deploy my gun withoiut taking hits. Tactics.

The 3rd gen  tanks (m1, Leo 2) finally allowed no compromise between mobility and protection. This allowed a change in tactics where tanks rolled straight to the enemy, trading shots.

As for the efficacy of the 105- try apfsdsdu- I wouldn't care to be in anything that round hits.

Fire and movement, overwatch, hull down fire positions, drills....these and all the other tactics employed by well trained troops will allow mastery of the battlefield. Where it gets tough is when CC vision (and hence situational awareness) is impaired, the rate of fire is low, the rounds available before resupply is small, the cross country mobility low, and the armour protection flimsy- these are not characteristics of our Leopard- nor any tank- but do (I belive) accurately describe the problems of the mgs.

"Army vehicles have tracks" ( willingly plageurized)

Cheers-Garry

 

[Fishbone Jones]

The whole MGS\ Stryker thing reminds me of the Kelsey Grammer movie "The Pentagon Wars" about the Bradley development.

In a nut shell, it's not a tank, can't do what a tank can, and can't replace it in any way, shape or form. Period.

 

[McG]

Leopard C2 not a tank?  Well, let me share a story with you:

http://www.deadtroll.com/video/liltank1.html

 

[Lance Wiebe]

Cute!

 

[Lance Wiebe]

Allright, here is my rebuttal to Maj. Atkins letter to the editor.  I have had some assistance in finishing this off, my thanks to all those who helped!  I will be sending this off tomorrow morning, additional thoughts/suggestions are welcome! 

Dear Editor:

Is the MGS Really the Answer?

There has been much ongoing discussions involving the acquisition of the MGS.  However, Major Atkins published letter seems to skirt around many of the issues that concern me.  I would like to address a few of these issues regarding the MGS.

Maj Atkins stresses the fact that the MGS and the Leopard C2 have virtually the same gun.  This is true, and give both vehicles the same capabilities. These capabilities include the defeat of any second-generation tank. However, even if the threat is increased, we know that the C2 can be upgraded to a 120 mm cannon.  The Germans have developed the Leopard 1A6, complete with Turret Electric Drive, 120mm cannon, and hunter killer capability with a new PERI sight for the commander.  The Leopard C2, with these upgrades, would be quite capable of taking on, and defeating, any perceived future threat.  The MGS cannot be upgraded to anything beyond the 105, indeed, the argument can be made for mounting a smaller calibre cannon!  This, in itself, defeats all of his arguments about the Leopard not being capable of being a tank killer.  Such an upgrade would also be significantly cheaper than the MGS would be!

Maj. Atkins is correct in his assertion that tanks have superior tactical mobility, and the MGS has superior operational mobility.  While operational mobility is good to get the equipment to the threat, it is not very useful once it arrives in the threatened area.  The Leo C2 is far more agile cross-country than the MGS. This would be especially true in extreme climatic conditions, such as deep snow in the winter.  The cross-country mobility of the Leopard C2 gives the commander a huge edge, primarily because it gives him more options. The MGS will not allow the commander the same options, for it does not have the tactical mobility, agility and flexibility of the C2.  By flexibility, I mean the capability of firing accurately on the move, in both offensive and defensive operations.  When we look back at history, we would find that battles where the commander lacked the options of mobility, battles of attrition were the result.  I would argue that mobility, combined with firepower, allows one to defeat a less mobile enemy without the same personnel losses that can be expected in a static battlefield.  We could also address strategic mobility, we simply cannot transport the MGS by air. Therefore, it would be shipped the same as the Leopard would be, by sea and rail.

Maj. Atkins also appears to be giving the impression that the Leopard is going to be replaced by the MGS, when in fact it is going to be replaced by three vehicles, the MGS, the MMEV and the LAV TUA.  While LCol Petit in a separate article derides the 120mm turret mounted breech loaded mortar as â Å“unproven technologyâ ?, despite the fact that it is being fielded in several armies, the same organization is pushing ahead with the MGS and MMEV, which is most definitely unproven technology.  So, one vehicle is being replaced by three, with a much greater manpower, support and logistical burden.  This would obviously affect immediate battlefield resupply!  The Support echelon would therefore have to be much busier and larger.  So, despite the MGS having one less crew member, the direct fire squadron would have to be several times larger than the present tank squadron, in terms of fighting vehicles, manpower, logistical vehicles, supply and maintainers.

There is a further issue that bothers me the most.  The crew of the MGS will not have the same tactical awareness as a crew of the C2. The MGS has the commander and gunner hatches on each side of the gun, and the gun obscures the view to the opposite side. So the commander can see from 12 to 6 o'clock on his side, the gunner the same on his side, but neither can see beyond 12 o'clock on the opposite side of the gun.  This hardly enhances survivability!

Maj. Atkins also confuses survivability with armour protection.  Certainly, armour protection is one aspect of survivability, but by no means the only one.  The Fire Control system, amount of ammunition, mobility and crew awareness all play a part in survivability.  Not only that, the MGS will require additional, as yet to be manufactured, protection against RPG style weapons, where we have already bought additional armour packages for the C2 that provides more than ample protection against these types of weapons.

I am also confused by Maj. Atkins statement about the Leopard C2  â Å“The Canadian Forces cannot continue to invest in an outdated piece of kit unsuitable for the role it was originally designed for.  The MGS is being brought into service and will be used in an appropriate role: that of a direct fire weapons platform.â ?  Cannot equipment be used in roles it was not originally designed for?  Can the Leopard C2 not do the task?  Of course it can. 

I suppose I am also wondering why a few short years ago, over one hundred million dollars was spent on upgrading the Leopard to its present C2 standard.  In Dec 2004, the Minister is apparently ordering an initial buy of 16 vehicles â Å“off the shelfâ ? for a purchase price of some 30 million dollars.  These vehicles will not be â Å“Canadianisedâ ? in that they will not have the MBGD, C6 mounts, TCCCS radios and so on.  No, these are going to simply be test beds to determine how to make these vehicles compatible with the rest of the Canadian fleet.  Is this value for our dollar?  One would think that if a manufacturer is wanting to sell vehicles to us, then they would make them to our standard. 

I suppose that there is one irony in all of this.  A successful argument could be made for the MGS to augment the Leopard.  It can certainly take over some of the traditional roles of a tank, and would be a welcome augmentation to convoy escort, flank and rear area security, and other uses its wheeled mobility would be useful.  But replace the tank, the MGS cannot do.  Not even an obsolescent tank.

My final question would be; what, exactly, has changed in our defense policy within the last few years?  Just how does the expenditure of so much of our limited budget on an unproven vehicle make sense?  This vehicle has failed many US Army trials, and may yet prove to be another example of other US weapons, such as the infamous Sgt York or Bomarc Missile!  Yet we seem bound and determined to buy this unproven, and in many ways, inferior vehicle.

Our army, it seems to me, lacks direction and focus.  Someone has decided that we require a direct fire vehicle for peacekeeping missions, and that we would no longer equip to operate in anything higher than a low intensity conflict.  This despite what it says the military is to be capable of in the latest White Paper!  The White paper, we all can agree, is outdated, but it has yet to be superseded by anything else.  Should we not be fighting to retain combat capabilities, instead of voluntarily giving up capabilities without government direction? Should we not be arguing for equipment that would allow us to meet our written mandate? Is it not the responsibility of the military senior leadership to allocate the dollars given them in order to best meet the mandate of the military as stated in the Defense Policy?  An expensive vehicle can do the job of a less complex vehicle, but the opposite is certainly not true!  I would think that the military hierarchy should be fighting for the best equipment for its military personnel, and settling for what the government gives them.  Not arguing for an unproven vehicle that reduces our already limited capabilities, is not to be built in Canada, and has limited commonality of parts with the present wheeled fleet. 


WO Lance Wiebe (Ret'd)
Lincoln NB

 

[George Wallace]

Is it a coincidence that we are approaching the centennial of the Ross Rifle?  Again, Lance, a very timely article. 

GW

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

Its doubtful anything will result from this but nothing definitely would have happened if everyone stays quite.

 

[12alfa]

We are being told by our leadership "to get over it", "suck it it", "it's the new army"," we don't need tanks", "do more with less", "fleet management,and on and on...

And oh ya   "can't have our leaders fallin on their swords", we may need our swords, but not a MBT.

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

Its a new army alright where the troops potentially have as much education as the officers and life experience as the NCO's.  This creates a peculiar paradigm in which the troops can see through the bullshit being feed to them at all levels and may be more inclined to "call" them on it when given the opportunity.  I believe in the chain of command however when there are serious questions being raised about the future and safety of our troops, sometimes it is necessary to send grievances right to the top without stopping at all levels of management.

 

[Lance Wiebe]

I received a response from the good Senator today!

Hi,
 
There is obviously a lot in what you say and it is clear you have a lot of experience to back it up.

As a Senator, I am generally reluctant to get involved with professionals regarding kit. Just don't have enough of the right sort of experience. There have been a few exceptions, but it takes so long to get up to speed that the Committee risks taking it's eye off it's main task which is National Security and Defence policy in a broader sence.

What we have noticed is that it has been a very long time since we have been able to use the Leopards in operations and currently it is very difficult to get them anywhere.

I know that there are answers to these points but i am really not equipped to debate them.

What I can assure you is that we have just commenced a comprehensive defence review and I will make sure the points you have raised are asjked at the appropriate time.

Many thanks for writing,

Colin Kenny

Now, the Senator is obviously a very bright man.  I wonder how he got appointed as a Liberal?