Your thoughts on this: The Leapord C2 is not a Tank

[Scoobie Newbie]

http://armyapp.dnd.ca/ael/adtb/vol_7/CAJ_vol7.1_e.pdf


Major J.A. Atkins writes...
THE LEOPARD C2 IS NOT A TANK
Dear Editor:
In his article â Å“The Medium Gun System is Coming!...Now What?â ?1 Major Senft continues to
perpetuate the myth that the Leopard C2 is capable of armour tasks on the modern battlefield.
The article repeatedly refers to heavy capability, ability to manoeuvre in the face of the enemy
and close with and destroy the enemy, all in the context of the Leopard C2. Meanwhile, it is
emphasized that the Mobile Gun System (MGS) is not a tank. The argument is summed up in
the statement, â Å“The MGS is not a tank killer, it does not have the armoured protection or stand
off range of a modern MBT to undertake this task.â ?2 I agree. Indeed, I have not met anyone
who disagrees, but the Leopard C2 is equally deficient in the role of tank killer. A modern main
battle tank is one that can effectively engage high-end threat tanks (e.g. T80/90 mounting a
125 mm gun). All western tanks in this category have a 120 mm gun and weigh more than
55 tonnes. The Leopard C2 is a medium weight vehicle effective in the role of the direct fire
weapons platforms as described in LCol Sherrard's article â Å“The Future Battlegroup in
Operations.â ?3 It cannot perform the tank tasks identified in the same article.4 Any differences
in firepower, survivability or mobility are insignificant and, taken as packages, the MGS and the
Leopard have very similar operational capabilities.
I have concluded that the mind-numbing track-versus-wheeled debate boils down to this: a
modern wheeled combat vehicle has very good cross country mobility, and our soldiers are
becoming expert at maximizing what the capability has to offer. Tracks do provide better
mobility in marginal terrain and have the edge in tactical mobility; advantage goes to wheels for
operational mobility. I have not seen any evidence that the difference in mobility between
wheeled or tracks is a decisive factor in the outcome of combat operations.
Firepower and survivability are the critical factors that should be discussed. Firepower is
equivalent: the MGS and Leopard have virtually the same gun. Having stated that the MGS and
Leopard C2 are not tank killers, the 105 mm gun is capable of defeating many in-service tanks
(T55, T62 and early T72s) at normal combat ranges. More modern tanks (T80/90), if
encountered, will be engaged by other elements of the direct fire systemâ ”light armoured
vehicle TOW under armour (LAV TUA) and multi mission effect vehicle (MMEV).
Most of the misconceptions have to do with survivability. The differences in protection levels
of the MGS and Leopard are not dramatic. The MGS will be fielded with rocket propelled
grenade (RPG) protection. The performance will be very similar to the Leopard protection
levels. Design features of the MGS that help improve survivability, such as a crew of three (one
less person at risk), low profile turret which puts the crew and ammunition low in the vehicle,
narrower turret and ammunition encased in a spall liner, all contribute to closing any survivability
gaps. The most important point, however, is that the Leopard C2 is as vulnerable to tank
rounds as the MGS.
The operational research war game CARRÉ DE FER,5 the favourite reference of MGS bashers, is
a study designed to examine and quantify the differences between a main battle tank, the M1A2
Abrams, and an armour combat vehicle (ACV), a wheeled vehicle with a 105 mm gun, in high
intensity engagements against a capable enemy equipped with T80Us and BMPs. Valuable
lessons were learned and are being applied in the development of appropriate doctrine for the
MGS and the direct fire system of systems. Often these studies are used to run â Å“what ifâ ?
scenarios. One such excursion in CARRÉ DE FER asked what if the ACV had more armour. The
model was adjusted to give the ACV enough protection to stop a 125 mm round fired at ranges
greater than 1000 m, a level of protection much higher than available on the Leopard C2. This
is the conclusion:
ô ‚? The improved armour protection proved insignificant because the ACV was still â Å“out
gunnedâ ? by the 125 mm sabot or the ATGMs [antitank guided missiles]. The extra armour was
inadequate and did not allow it to survive long enough to defeat the T80. Losses were similar
to those experienced by the baseline ACV, resulting in only marginal improvement in Loss
Exchange Ratio (1.1 vs 1.0). 6
The Leopard C2 does not have the required firepower or protection to be employed as a main
battle tank. Major Senft calls for a paradigm shift when the MGS is fielded. We should have had
a paradigm shifts years ago. The Canadian Army is, and has been for over ten years, a medium
weight army. We continue to go on exercise using doctrine and tactics inappropriate for the
weapon platform and the operations our army is expected to conduct, comforted by the fact
that the Leopard would rarely go on operations. I will take the liberty of paraphrasing the
infamous line from the CARRÉ DE FER Executive Summary: To employ the Leopard C2 â Å“as an
alternative to the MBT in warfighting would be morally and ethically wrong and courts defeat.â ?7
The Canadian Forces cannot continue to invest in an outdated piece of kit unsuitable for the role
it was originally designed for. The MGS is being brought into service and will be used in an
appropriate role: that of a direct fire weapon platform. It will be used on operations often,
employed in accordance with the Commander's intent for a transformed Army (See â Å“Punching
Above Our Weightâ ?8).
If one wants to induce a paradigm shift, take Leopard out of service and field the Mobile Gun
System.
Major J.A. Atkins
Project Director, Mobile Gun System Project

 

[devil39]

The C2 however can fire on the move, carries more than 18 rds (16 rds?), has enough barrel deflection to take a hull down position on a hill top firebase, etc, etc.

I have often argued that we should skip the interim stage of MGS and buy into the Future Combat system (FCS) which should only be 6-10 years down the road.

I don't know what we are going to deploy the MGS to do other than act as a dug in pill box at some camp or another.

Long live the "Son of Pumpkin Launcher".

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

In a related article I read the the Stryker was meant to by as one half of a 2 part system, however do to bureaucracy we didn't get the other half (namely a newer tank).   Plus the debate about wheeled vs track.   Why not utilize both in tandem.   I know that the LAV's aren't all they are cracked up to be across country and that when the Americans wanted to draw fire in Najaf they sent in an M1 then had the firepower in the rear watch for a flash.   There is a surplus of American, British and German tanks that would could get for dirt cheap and instead of trying to cram everything into a C130 we should also be investing in some heavy air lift.

 

[George Wallace]

Vol 7 No. 1 Spring 2004 edition of "The Canadian Army Journal" in which Maj Atkins writes is on the whole a PR exercise by the CF powers that want to side with the "Wheel" philosophy and roll over and play dead for their political masters.  The whole publication is revolting in its lack of hard knowledge of what tanks do, how they operate and how they are employed in a Combat Team.

If Maj Atkins truly believes that the Leo C2 is not a tank, then by logical deduction, Maj Atkins is not an officer, but a paid bureaucrat with little or no knowledge of how tanks work within a Cbt Team. 

How many times have we gone over this?  The demise of 4 CMBG under Mulroney has resulted in few Cbt Arms Officers having the knowledge and experience to have operated in a operational Cbt Team in a large scale NATO Exercise.  That lack of knowledge was evident in the 1980's at RV Exercises.  Today that lack of knowledge and experience has resulted in faulty decision making at the highest levels.

Maj Atkins argues that the Leo C2 is not a "Heavy" tank and will not be able to take on the more modern MBTs on the future battlefield, and therefore we don't really need it.  He argues that the MGS is also not able to take on those more modern MBTs, but it will be able to handle earlier models such as T 54/55, T 64, etc.  He totally disregards the fact that the Leo C2 is better suited to do that.  He totally disregards the fact that, although the Leo C2 is not a "Heavy" MBT, it is still a tank and can still be used to maintain "Tankers" skill levels for the intirum.  The lost of the tank is the death of the Cbt Team, and essentially the ARMY.

The loss of this "skill set" is a death knell to the Army.  Just as the loss of Submarines is a loss of skill sets to the Navy, although not as drastic as the complete distruction of the Combat Team.

GW 

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

Perhaps you can put pen to paper and offer a rebutal in the following Journal.  Does anyone actually like this as a stand alone wpns platform?  I see the elimination of the tank resulting in further need for American assitence and not less.

 

[Gobsmacked]

http://armyapp.dnd.ca/ael/adtb/vol_7/CAJ_vol7.1_e.pdf


Major J.A. Atkins writes...
THE LEOPARD C2 IS NOT A TANK
Dear Editor:
In his article â Å“The Medium Gun System is Coming!...Now What?â ?1 Major Senft continues to
perpetuate the myth that the Leopard C2 is capable of armour tasks on the modern battlefield.
The article repeatedly refers to heavy capability, ability to manoeuvre in the face of the enemy
and close with and destroy the enemy, all in the context of the Leopard C2. Meanwhile, it is
emphasized that the Mobile Gun System (MGS) is not a tank. The argument is summed up in
the statement, â Å“The MGS is not a tank killer, it does not have the armoured protection or stand
off range of a modern MBT to undertake this task.â ?2 I agree. Indeed, I have not met anyone
who disagrees, but the Leopard C2 is equally deficient in the role of tank killer. A modern main
battle tank is one that can effectively engage high-end threat tanks (e.g. T80/90 mounting a
125 mm gun). All western tanks in this category have a 120 mm gun and weigh more than
55 tonnes.
4 Any differences in firepower, survivability or mobility are insignificant and, taken as packages, the MGS and the Leopard have very similar operational capabilities.
Firepower is equivalent: the MGS and Leopard have virtually the same gun. Having stated that the MGS and Leopard C2 are not tank killers, the 105 mm gun is capable of defeating many in-service tanks
(T55, T62 and early T72s) at normal combat ranges. More modern tanks (T80/90), if
encountered, will be engaged by other elements of the direct fire systemâ ”light armoured
vehicle TOW under armour (LAV TUA) and multi mission effect vehicle (MMEV).

Major J.A. Atkins
Project Director, Mobile Gun System Project

I also agree with GWs comments that "Maj Atkins argues that the Leo C2 is not a 'Heavy' tank and will not be able to take on the more modern MBTs on the future battlefield, and therefore we don't really need it.  He argues that the MGS is also not able to take on those more modern MBTs, but it will be able to handle earlier models such as T 54/55, T 64, etc.  He totally disregards the fact that the Leo C2 is better suited to do that."

Maj Atkins MGS comments are directly contradicted by comments made by LCol Petit.
In 2003, LCol Luc Petit DLR3 confirmed, that "following the end of the Cold War, Western armies have been reduced in size but, elsewhere in the world, tank numbers have remained unchanged or have increased with the cascading of surplus tanks.  As an example, over 30,000 Soviet-designed T-72s have been built and some 8,000 have been exported worldwide.  Tanks will remain a threat for the foreseeable future, but western armies no longer expect to face them in large numbers. . . . Based on past and recent experience, armies have to be capable of defeating tanks with direct fire from protected platforms in the foreseeable future.  Doctrine and tactics of the US Interim Force clearly specify that the MGS is not an anti-tank platform but rather an Infantry support vehicle [it will not carry APFSDS ammunition]."

In same CAJ Vol7.1 - LCol Petit also indirectly trashes the argument for MGS as he notes that,
"The acquisition of 120mm turreted SP mortars would be very expensive and time consuming as vehicle/ammunition development and full type qualification must be completed prior to production."

Yet, as I noted in another thread on the Armour site - Strykers Weigh Too Much For C-130 Transport, GAO Says ( http://army.ca/forums/index.php?PHPSESSID=2e1e998db94a80437761db462be228a9&topic=18309.30 )
The initial 16 MGS will have "Minimal Canadian-Specific Equipment . . . almost identical to the U.S. model" - even though MGS remains at developmental prototype stage, per Recent 2003 SECRET level ANALYSIS 'Whether to acquire the Mobile Gun System for the CF'.
The Schedule calls for contracting of initial 16 MGS vehicles, "no later-than Dec 04" under MND C$30M authority (w\o ILS), for "January to June 2006 delivery" - with "No Canadian Acquisition Prior to U.S. Order for (initial 72 low-rate) Production Version", followed by Nov 05 Treasury Board Effective Project Approval [EPA - tentatively scheduled for May 05] of  C$661M balance of project for remaining 50 MGS for 2007-2009 delivery as MGS SOR does not even exist yet.
Acquisition of a 120mm turreted mortar system is discounted by LCol Petit, even though MGS is being acquired under same circumstances - MGS still developmental! until completion of LRIP build and testing by US Army!  Talk about putting the Cart before the Horse.  :


plus other ATI Cleared/Released comments Sept 16 on Pg 3 of GAO thread -
[I can provide ATI pg #'s where info is taken for any 'specifically identified' questionable 'OPSEC Concerns' so why is Army.ca acting like an extension of DND's MGS project office?]  :-X
NOTE: Edited for OPSEC Concerns....  Mods will review, and put back in if deemed OK
« Last Edit: September 17, 2004, 22:44:17 by muskrat89 » 

 

[Lance Wiebe]

Good arguments all.  Those who know me know that I am a strong advocate of the tank, and as well was involved in the Leo Thermal sight upgrade project.  The Leo C2 contains arguably one of the best FCS systems in the world, a system far superior to the one proposed in the MGS.

The Leo C2 is still capable of improvements.  Considered but rejected for cost reasons were TED (Turret Electric Drive)  and a Hunter Killer Commanders sight.  As well, our tank CAN mount a 120mm gun.  A tank was produced and modelled for us in Kassel, dubbed the Leopard 1A6, this tank had an independent commanders sight, a 120mm L44 cannon, TED and an improved power plant.  All of these upgrades can be done far cheaper than the purchase of an MGS!

I wonder if the fact that Major Atkins is employed in the MGS PMO shop has anything to do with his bias?

 

[12alfa]

Major J.A. Atkins
Project Director, Mobile Gun System Project

Can we really think that anyone in that program will say bad things about the  MGS?

Put him in his MGS, then place a LeoC2 at 2000m, he who comes out wins.

 

[George Wallace]

Put him in his MGS, then place a LeoC2 at 2000m, he who comes out wins.

Nothing like Combat Trials to assist in the decision making, eh!

GW

 

[Infanteer]

I agree with CFL; perhaps one of you tankers around here (or a collaboration) can put your experience into writing a rebuttal; if anything to encourage a thought-provoking environment.

 

[Franko]

Whats the use?

Rebuttals coming from the ranks, for the most part, never get published.... or the poor soldier gets berated by superiors in one form or another......

The decision has been made a LONG time ago...without consulting the guys who are going to DIE in those POS.

'nuff said

Regards

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

For us its comparable, you said it was not as drastic. My point was to show it is and how serious the navy views it.

 

[George Wallace]

Enough of all this.....put on your other Black Hat and tell me........Is a Leopard C2 a tank or not?

GW

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

*snicker* **goes digging** Is the LeoC2 a tank? Bloody rights it is. Those that say otherwise I think need their head examined.

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

Ex-Dragoon sometimes if you bang your head enough times against the wall you'll get through.  If those that are in the "know" sit back (I'm not saying they are or aren't) and not voice their concern loud enough and until threaten with DB then no one can complain when we get them.  I learned a long time ago that nothing in this Army is in stone and things tend to change with new gov'ts and political will.  That said I would write the bloody guy myself but I know I would come off as moron because the only thing I know about the tank is that they like to take off while your holding onto the phone in the back.

 

[SALH]

C2 a tank, ahhh appears to be a fine Med. Tank.  Is it a Hvy Tank?  clearly no, however did we not win WWII with a Med Tank force against a Hvy Tank force?  A Tank Yes, with a clear role and set of abilities and shortcomings but a tank yes.

 

[Lance Wiebe]

I don't really want to open up the can of worms about wheeled vs track, each have their own advantages and disadvantages.  But, I do have to bring up one thing from Maj Atkins rebuttal.  He says something along the lines of tracks having better mobility in marginal terrain.  I have a question for the good Major.  Has he seen a LAV Unit conducting cross country movement during the winter?  I have, and if it wasn't for the fact that it was our kit, issued to replace our tracks, it would have been funny.  Wheeled vehicles just don't go very good in snow.

One other point on the subject of survivability.  The tank is survivable, partially because of its armour, but also because of its mobility, agility, and the ability of the crew to react to seen and suspected threats.  The MGS, as designed, severely limits the ability of the crew to observe.  Because the commander and gunner hatches are seperated by the gun, neither can see past the barrel on the other side.  so, looking from one of the stations, you can see one side from 12 oclock to 6 oclock on one side only.  How does that facilitate situational awareness?  Aside from that, while cross country, the MGS is neither mobile nor agile, certainly not as mobile or agile as even a LAV is, due to the top heavy design of the vehicle.

The tank provides the necessary manouever arm to a commander.  As was proven from the US civil war through to WWI, firepower without mobility equates a war of attrition, not a war of manouever.  A manouever war gives a commander the flexibility to act, and react quickly and decisively.  Such manouevers would undoubtedly require the combination of fire and movement.  The Leopard C2 can give precise fire onto targets while moving at a reasonably high rate of speed cross country.  The three direct fire vehicles that are to replace the C2 have no such capability.  Rather than giving the commander choices, he is now severely limited in how he can react to perceived and known threats.

The final argument always thrown in, the one that states that politicians would never allow the Leopard to be deployed, but would allow the MGS, because it is wheeled.  Just what assurances are there of even that?  Both the Leopard and the MGS, as things stand right now, have the exact same strategic mobility.  That is, both require deployment by sea and rail to its objective.

The one thing that is true, that the Leopard C2 can easily take on and defeat ANY, and ALL of the exported Soviet tanks that we may have to face in the future.  There are no reports of T-80's or T-90's  exported to any potential enemy, so that argument is invalid.  The same cannot be said of the MGS.  It cannot take on and defeat even second generation tanks, except of course in a defensive role, and even then it would have to be massively supported by other weapon systems.

My final point.  When has the role of the army changed?  The White Paper on defense states quite clearly what the role of the army was to be.  When was this over written, and by who?  Just exactly is the role of the army, and how does the MGS enable us to meet that role, where the Leopard C2 does not?

 

[x westie]

I still to this day don't understand how General Hiller is not fighting against the MGS, haven;t heard a peep and he was RCD, maybe he is more interested in his pension and political correctness

 

[George Wallace]

I still to this day don't understand how General Hiller is not fighting against the MGS, haven;t heard a peep and he was RCD, maybe he is more interested in his pension and political correctness

Maybe, because he wrote a full page letter to the Ottawa Citizen praising the developement and purchase of the MGS?????

I lost a lot of respect for the man there.

GW

 

[Lance Wiebe]

How come it is that I wite a mini-rant, and all people talk about is subs? :rage:

How 'bout some feedback?