From Kirkus Reviews
A bold, revisionist history of Earl Haig, British commander- in-chief during WW I. Using British records that became available only in the 1960's, and comparing them to uncensored versions available in Canada, Australia, and the US, Winter subjects the authorized British version of the war to devastating analysis. For a variety of reasons, including Haig's close involvement with Britain's Official Historian of the war, it was Haig's view of the war that won acceptance, apparently sometimes by purging British records of any evidence to the contrary. Haig himself, far from being the most able soldier of his generation, is shown to have used his social connections to get unusually rapid promotion and to have excluded able subordinates. The picture of the British Army that emerges from the new documentation illuminates the reasons for the dreadful losses of the war. For all its courage and discipline, it was a badly organized, poorly trained, and ill-equipped force, supported by staff work of low quality and commanded by generals inadequate to the task. For example, by the end of the war the dominance of the machine-gun was clear; but where the French had one for every 12 men, the Canadians one for 13, and the Americans one for 27, the British limited their troops to one for 61. Winter analyzes Haig's command in each of the major battles of the war, from the Somme and Passchendaele to the final campaign of 1918, and this same inadequacy becomes apparent in each of them: attacks against the enemy's strongest point; the use of discredited tactics; persistence in attack long after all surprise had been lost. It was a performance notably inferior to that of the Germans, the French, the Canadians, and the Australians. Excellent, hard-hitting history. -- Copyright ©1991, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
Thucydides, sometimes you just get it totally wrong. ;D
"The picture of the British Army that emerges from the new documentation illuminates the reasons for the dreadful losses of the war. For all its courage and discipline, it was a badly organized," Stipulated
"poorly trained, " Stipulated
"and ill-equipped force," Stipulated
"supported by staff work of low quality" Stipulated
"and commanded by generals inadequate to the task" Modified agreement - Generals untrained in large formation warfare
I cheerfully accept all those caveats. In fact I said as much earlier in more words. Edit: if you want a common denominator to blaime, blame the usual culprit: The Politician - the one that supplied neither troops, nor gear, nor system, nor opportunity to train and that insisted 50% of the Army would be posted overseas keeping unruly Indians and Irishmen under control, not to mention having them chasing the Cornish countryside trying to catch Wreckers (people intent on attracting ships onto Cornish rocks so that they could loot them).
Given all those problems: how exactly was anybody supposed to put together an effective offensive force, especially one confronted with the world's longest, best defended siege lines?
World War 1 conformed to the ancient Northern Hemisphere timetable of fighting in the summer and holding in the winter.
1914 - Brits have no army (4 divs do not constitute a continental army). Germans jump out of the gate first but late in the year limiting the French's ability to respond in an effective manner. German's consolidate over the winter and from that point on have the upper hand in any peace negotiations. French badly beaten up in the early going.
1915 - Colonials and Territorials (many with some military training ) come to the fore. British, French and Germans. A year of holding and stunting - Gallipoli, East Africa, Salonika, Mesopotamia. Call this the Augmentation phase as civilian volunteers are organized, equipped and trained.
1916 - Germans jump off early to wear down the French at Verdun before the Brits can get their act together. Brits jump in before Kitchener's Armies can be turned into the grand offensive force that he dreamed of sending to Berlin. Time was not on their side.
1917 - Brits start to take the fight to the Germans using tools and tactics developed on the fly. Edit: Vimy was the one battle of 1917 where the Brits and the Canucks had the benefit of time to not just plan but also rehearse the battle in detail. All other battles were fought on the fly - just as all the battles of 1918 were.
1918 - Germans jump off early to forestall the American build up - but run into the same problem that the Brits ran into a Cambrai - inability to coordinate and support operations at long range. Once the plan came off the rails there was no ability to adjust the plan. Allies, Brits, French and Americans, as well as Canucks and Aussies jump in and assault against an over-stretched under-supported force.
Short of hiring Hindenberg or Von Falkenhayn or Ludendorff I can't think of anybody else that would appease the critics. Keep in mind that those worthies caused the German populace to rise up in revolt against their exemplary handling of the war.
The German Staff system could plan a battle like billy-be-dammed. But like Time Expired said, no general, or his brilliant staff, could control the battle or adjust the outcome once battle was joined. The OODA loop was measured in hours, if not days and weeks. Once the battle started the Generals were in much the same situation as Squad Leader players - waiting on the outcome of multiple throws of the dice to find out what happened.
(And as for the French Staff - their insistence on combat a l'outrance and the elan of the bayonet - they kept divisions in the line until there was nobody left - that resulted in wholesale mutiny - at the risk of sounding like a broken record Corrigan's analysis of units time in the line is instructive as to the maintenance of morale - Principle #2)
As to this:
"For example, by the end of the war the dominance of the machine-gun was clear; but where the French had one for every 12 men, the Canadians one for 13, and the Americans one for 27, the British limited their troops to one for 61"
I counter with this:
The Welsh Guards were issued 1, then 2, then 8, then 16, then 32 Lewis Guns between November 1915 and April 1918.
In that period they would have been re-org'd from 4x250=1000 to 3x250=750 troops.
750/32= 1:24
And ltMaverick25:
can anyone disprove that the Canadian Corps was the best allied army on the offensive?
You wish us to prove a negative?
I would be more comfortable accepting your position if you had more knowledge of allied and enemy forces and had come to your own conclusions rather than, apparently (and I will apologize again if necessary) accepting the word of others that "The Canadians Were Best Corps On The Front" and seeking to find new arguments to buttress an entrenched hypothesis.
There are Aussie nationalists that make similar claims about their troops (and they have a bigger cheerleading section in London than the Canadians ;D )