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Why does Haig get the shaft?

Tango2bravo,
                  Before you finish your paper on "Canadians, the Worlds Greatest
Fighting Men" you should check on what percentage of the Canadian Corps
were ex pat Brits.
                                    Regards
 
The arrival of the AEF and the industrial power of the US in the end forced the Germans to accept peace. By this time the continental powers were pretty much bled out victims of their own war of attrition. I do have to point out the difference between Haig's tactics at the Somme and the Canadians at Passchendaele Haig's was costly in terms of manpower whereas the Canadian effort was a success with a much smaller butchers bill - 10,000 casualties.Superior tactics keep casualties low.
 
Late coming to the fight (and yes, I only brought a knife  ;)), but I am in the "anti Haig" camp as well. The prime motivator for me is the book: Haigs Command: A Reassessment by Denis Winter, which comes to it's conclusions partially by comparing the then recently released British records to comperable ones from the Canadian, Australian and American archives, as well as a using the usual historiography tools.

As for the arguments about mass attacks against machine guns, there is a small point where this can be forgiven (at least at the start of the static war period in 1915). The argument rests on the introductin of rifled firearms in the 1870's, which meant that bullets followed a predictable trajectory for the first time. A rifle platoon firing in volley would create a cone of fire and a beaten zone, which could be avoided by advancing as rapidly as possible to escape the beaten zone and reach the relative saftey of the dead space under the cone of fire. Rifle platoons could not adjust their fire fast enough to follow a rapidly advancing force, and were left with the choice of retreat or hand to hand combat. Officers who learned their craft in the late 1800's knew for a fact that this was the way to defeat rifle armed opponents (many would have actually done this themselves as platoon or company commanders) and this was an article of faith in many war colleges. I suspect this was also one of the motivating factors behind the French cult of the offense and the formation of units like the Chasseurs à Pied (roughly "Hunters on Foot").

However the captains and majors of 1870 were no longer in touch with the first line infantry as colonels and generals in 1914 (or as war college instructors), so not only missed the signifigence of machine guns on fixed lines of fire, but also had no real way to understand how to deal with this. Crappy communications between headquarters and the front and lack of effective after action reporting also made understanding what to do difficult, but not impossible. After all, the Germans developed infiltration tactics, the Canadians developed close all arms coordination with the artillery and the British developed tanks as separate means of solving the problems.

Although Haig did support the development of the tank, in most other respects he learned little from his battles and certainly did not change his approach as the war evolved.
 
ltmaverick25 said:
During the 100 days offensive the Canadian Corps is credited with destroying over 40 German Divisions.  That is quite the tall order for 4 Canadian Divisions, granted they were much larger then conventional ones, so lets be generous and double the size.  8 Divisions destroyed 40, Im no mathematician but that looks pretty good to me.

Please state your source in that number..... 40 German Divisions????  That is a ludicrous assessment and I would love to know the source of that comment. I know 75% of all people are inclined to believe a statement that has percentages and numbers in them, but that figure is off the wall. 40 Divisions represents nearly half the German field Army on the Western Front, and there's no way they could mathematically have that number in the same sector as the Canadians. As well, you maintain that the Canadian Divisions were much larger than conventional ones.... not so. The standard of 4 Battalions per Brigade, with 4 Brigades per Division was reduced to 3 by the British and French as a means of getting more reinforcements to other units... in effect, robbing Peter to pay Paul. The Germans did a similar reorganization, but German units were larger than Canadian units. A German infantry regiment was roughly the size of a Canadian Brigade.
 
ltmaverick25 said:
and the Germans, although they displayed mastery of combined arms operations in their spring offensive of 1918, took the completely wrong approach.  They went for a breakthrough, and actually succeeded partially before it was brought to a stop, but that was their undoing.  By Contrast the Canadian Corps launched a series of successive, deliberate, limited aims objectives and systematically pushed the Germans back.  Not nearly as sexy as a breakthrough, and most costly in lives then a breakthrough (assuming the breakthrough succeeds anyway) but it did get the job done.

It wasn't that simple.... First of all, the Micheal offensive of early 1918 was an all or nothing gamble to win the war on the battlefield. The German leadership knew it. They took everything they had to the party in the hope's of achieving a decisive victory. Every unit that fought on the Eastern Front was brought west leaving only Landwehr and Ersatz (Over age reservists and second line troops) formations in the East to collect produce and other provender in conquered regions. They knew the US was coming en masse and this was a calculated risk to end it before the balance of power was irrevocably changed in the Allies favour. It also aided them greatly that the storm they unleashed broke over the British 5th Army, the smallest numerically of all British Armies, and moreover, an Army that was basically built from scraps of disbanded units and reinforcements from England.... added to this was Gen. Sir Hubert Gough was the overall Commander of 5th Army and had proven himself incapable as an Army commander. (Currie flat out refused to allow the Canadian Corps to serve in 5th Army for that very reason, and requested the Canadian Corps be assigned to Plumer's Second Army and he got it)

Now, when the German's launched the Micheal offensive, the British line broke. 5th Army was destroyed in the opening phase of the offensive. The German's problem was "Now we've broken through.... now what?" They opted for a drive to Paris..... the fatal flaw in this was Paris was purely symbolic..... the French would have merely moved their seat to Bordeaux and continued the war from there....  capturing it would not end the war. They chose the path of least resistance and it cost them the war. They SHOULD have taken the British Army in flank and rolled it up. They instead let events determine their course of action.... they punched a hole in the line and the open route to Paris beckoned, and they took it. They made the same fatal error in the opening phase of the war when mobility was still flowing. The Schlieffen Plan called for a massive pincer movement to move through Belgium and Luxembourg to come down and swing northwest of Paris and catch the French Armies in a cauldron battle AND capture Paris in one fell swoop..... it was plan to win the war against France in 40 days and it nearly worked.

 
time expired said:
Tango2bravo,
                  Before you finish your paper on "Canadians, the Worlds Greatest
Fighting Men" you should check on what percentage of the Canadian Corps
were ex pat Brits.
                                    Regards


It might be a little more difficult to determine what percentage were ex pat Brits at each stage of the War, particularly the later stages.

 
Indeed, Michael, indeed. The first contingent had a majority of members born in the UK, but that may not have held up for the duration of the war.

There had been a huge amount of immigration in the decades before the war and many of the troops would have been born in the UK or elsewhere. This did not mean that they did not consider themselves Canadians and certainly a good number would have had little to no recollection of the country of their birth. Others certainly came to feel Canadian during their service. The important thing to remember is that they were serving in the Canadian Expeditionary Force and strongly identified with it.

 
time expired said:
Tango2bravo,
                  Before you finish your paper on "Canadians, the Worlds Greatest
Fighting Men" you should check on what percentage of the Canadian Corps
were ex pat Brits.
                                    Regards

Time Expired,

I am not writing a paper on the Canadians. Perhaps you meant your remark for somebody else?

Cheers,

T2B
 
Tango2Bravo said:
Time Expired,

I am not writing a paper on the Canadians. Perhaps you meant your remark for somebody else?

Cheers,

T2B

I think he was directing that at me..

To answer the question, and I dont have the exact stats off the top of my head... roughly 60% of the initial levy of troops sent overseas were British born.  All Canadian mind you, but the majority were British none the less.

By 1917 that would change as a result of heavy casualties in the first few years and more enlistments being Canadian born then anything else.  I dont have the exact number as to what the Corps finished off with but it is safe to say the trend would have been reversed.

It should also be noted that, many Canadian scholars, and popular authors have argued that regardless of place of birth, everyone in the Canadian Corps considered themselves to be British when they signed up, after Vimy Ridge, everyone considered themselves to be Canadian regardless of place of birth.  This is not MY argument, but it is a popular one out there that continues to be debated back and forth.
 
reccecrewman said:
Please state your source in that number..... 40 German Divisions????  That is a ludicrous assessment and I would love to know the source of that comment. I know 75% of all people are inclined to believe a statement that has percentages and numbers in them, but that figure is off the wall. 40 Divisions represents nearly half the German field Army on the Western Front, and there's no way they could mathematically have that number in the same sector as the Canadians. As well, you maintain that the Canadian Divisions were much larger than conventional ones.... not so. The standard of 4 Battalions per Brigade, with 4 Brigades per Division was reduced to 3 by the British and French as a means of getting more reinforcements to other units... in effect, robbing Peter to pay Paul. The Germans did a similar reorganization, but German units were larger than Canadian units. A German infantry regiment was roughly the size of a Canadian Brigade.

40 is a rough estimate... But if you want a reference point try

Shane B. Schreiber Shock Army of the British Empire : The Canadian Corps in the Last 100 Days of the Great War. Praeger Series in War Studies, 1083-817. Westport, Conn. ; London: Praeger, 1997.

If you chose not to take Schreiber's word for it, you can consult various after action reports, war diaries, battledamage assessments at the archives ect...  But that would involve alot of leg work.

As for the size of the Corps, ie the size of the Divisions.  It is a well documented fact that the Canadian Corps was considered to be "overstrength" as compared to other nations Corps.

Reference for that..

Canadian War Museum and A. M. J. Hyatt. General Sir Arthur Currie: A Military Biography. Canadian War Museum Historical Publication. 2. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987.

Basically the Corps was originally going to be fliped into an Army because the 5th and 6th Divisions were forming up in Britain.  The British recomended to Canadian officials that trying to maintain an army would likely overstreatch Canadian resources and that it would be best to stay at Corps strength.  As a result the 5th and 6th Divisions were folded into the the other 4, their shells were also used as training base staff and that sort of thing for new recruits coming over.

Also important to note that alot of German formations were understrength at the time. 

I realize it is a large number to chew on, thats what amazes me about it, but based on what I have read, and the primary research I have done to date I maintain that the Canadian Corps really did dispatch that many German Divisions (roughly).

Something else I would recomend that you do if you are having a hard time wrapping your head around it, as I did originally...  Pull up some microfiche of the various Canadian, British, French and American newspapers shortly after Vimy Ridge, do the same thing afterwards for the timetable following each battle the Canadians participated in afterwards up until wars end. 

I promise you, the results will blow your mind.


 
reccecrewman said:
It wasn't that simple.... First of all, the Micheal offensive of early 1918 was an all or nothing gamble to win the war on the battlefield. The German leadership knew it. They took everything they had to the party in the hope's of achieving a decisive victory. Every unit that fought on the Eastern Front was brought west leaving only Landwehr and Ersatz (Over age reservists and second line troops) formations in the East to collect produce and other provender in conquered regions. They knew the US was coming en masse and this was a calculated risk to end it before the balance of power was irrevocably changed in the Allies favour. It also aided them greatly that the storm they unleashed broke over the British 5th Army, the smallest numerically of all British Armies, and moreover, an Army that was basically built from scraps of disbanded units and reinforcements from England.... added to this was Gen. Sir Hubert Gough was the overall Commander of 5th Army and had proven himself incapable as an Army commander. (Currie flat out refused to allow the Canadian Corps to serve in 5th Army for that very reason, and requested the Canadian Corps be assigned to Plumer's Second Army and he got it)

Now, when the German's launched the Micheal offensive, the British line broke. 5th Army was destroyed in the opening phase of the offensive. The German's problem was "Now we've broken through.... now what?" They opted for a drive to Paris..... the fatal flaw in this was Paris was purely symbolic..... the French would have merely moved their seat to Bordeaux and continued the war from there....  capturing it would not end the war. They chose the path of least resistance and it cost them the war. They SHOULD have taken the British Army in flank and rolled it up. They instead let events determine their course of action.... they punched a hole in the line and the open route to Paris beckoned, and they took it. They made the same fatal error in the opening phase of the war when mobility was still flowing. The Schlieffen Plan called for a massive pincer movement to move through Belgium and Luxembourg to come down and swing northwest of Paris and catch the French Armies in a cauldron battle AND capture Paris in one fell swoop..... it was plan to win the war against France in 40 days and it nearly worked.

I dont disagree with anything you are saying.  In fact I think I was pretty much saying the same thing, you just elaborated on it much further.  To put it simply, the Germans attempt at a breakthrough is what cost them the war.  It was a huge risk, just as you said and it did not pay off.  Granted one could argue that the writing was on the wall at this point but that is a whole other debate.

By contrast when examining the Canadian Corps, there was no similar breakthrough nor was there an attempt.  They used the same combined arms tactics that I have been posting about in this thread, the difference is the Canadian Corps pursued limited aims objectives or "bite and hold".  A much more cautious approach, and more costly then a successful breakthrough, but less costly then a failed breakthrough...
 
Michael O`Leary said:
This raises a curious point.  While you readily adjust the relative size of the Canadian divisions for being "larger than conventional ones", what was the respective size of those German divisions to your theoretical "conventional division"?

Have you considered conducting an analysis and comparison of actual combat power, rather then a simple numerical strength comparison?

You may find Trevor Dupuy's Numbers, Predictions & War a useful reference for such a comparison.

To answer your question... Yes.

Reference
Stephen Biddle Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004.

I have reviewed Dupuy's analysis, but I am of the school of thought that Stephen Biddle offers the best analytical framework for assessing relative combat power.  I could not possibly do Biddle justice by trying to explain it here, but I recomend anyone who is interested in force employment as opposed to numerical or technological preponderance to give this a read, it is an excellent piece of work in my humble opinion.

The article that I am working on right now deals with exactly that.  Biddle challenges preponderance theorists by presending force employment as a superior model.  Im superimposing Biddle's model on Vimy Ridge as an example of the modern system of force employment on the offence(limited aims) against a pre modern system of defence.

As an aside has anyone here read Biddle?  I would be curious to hear other peoples thoughts on his work.
 
INTERMAVERICK25
                          You are correct it was aimed at you,it was the "grumpy old
man" syndrome coming to the fore.The Canadian Corps was considered by
everyone who wrote about the war as brilliant soldiers however the idea that
they carried the rest of the BEF to victory in 1918 is something of an overstatement
of the facts.If one wishes to document the achievements of the Canadian Corps
in isolation one is bound to arrive at a somewhat slanted view of the 100 days
battle.The BEF did not merely follow the victorious Canadians into Belgium as you
seem to believe and you need to look at the achievements of some of the Brit.
formations to give you a more rounded view,the crossing of the St.Quentin canal
by the 46 South Midlands Div.is a case in point,this was a brilliant attack by a
division that was certainly not elite in any sense of the word,however it did its
duty as most of the non elite Brit. Divs. did with little or no fanfare to be largely
forgotten by historians.Just as today bad news sells more newspaper,books,and
this battle was largely forgotten, add this to the fact this was a battle that F.M.Haig
handled brilliantly and won it is easy to understand why.
I would like to reccommend a book that may help in widening your view of this
war winning battle-To Win a War, 1918 The Year of Victory by John Terraine.
                                            Regards
 
time expired said:
INTERMAVERICK25
                          You are correct it was aimed at you,it was the "grumpy old
man" syndrome coming to the fore.The Canadian Corps was considered by
everyone who wrote about the war as brilliant soldiers however the idea that
they carried the rest of the BEF to victory in 1918 is something of an overstatement
of the facts.If one wishes to document the achievements of the Canadian Corps
in isolation one is bound to arrive at a somewhat slanted view of the 100 days
battle.The BEF did not merely follow the victorious Canadians into Belgium as you
seem to believe and you need to look at the achievements of some of the Brit.
formations to give you a more rounded view,the crossing of the St.Quentin canal
by the 46 South Midlands Div.is a case in point,this was a brilliant attack by a
division that was certainly not elite in any sense of the word,however it did its
duty as most of the non elite Brit. Divs. did with little or no fanfare to be largely
forgotten by historians.Just as today bad news sells more newspaper,books,and
this battle was largely forgotten, add this to the fact this was a battle that F.M.Haig
handled brilliantly and won it is easy to understand why.
I would like to reccommend a book that may help in widening your view of this
war winning battle-To Win a War, 1918 The Year of Victory by John Terraine.
                                            Regards

I will be happy to read that book as well, so much for reading any star wars novels over the holidays :)

But in all seriousness, I am not trying to say the Canadian Corps won the war singlehandedly, nor am I trying to say that no other army had any success.  I think people are reading too much into what I am saying.  I maintain that the Canadian Corps was the best army on the attack.  That does not mean they are the only ones that attacked, nor that nobody else had any success, it just means that I think the Canadians were better at it.  I argue they played a huge and instrumental role far above its weight in the 100 days offensive.  I am NOT arguing that nobody else played decisive or important roles.

But lets try to play a different game for a bit.  Instead of trying to insist that other armies made a difference as well, to which I fully agree with by the way, can anyone disprove that the Canadian Corps was the best allied army on the offensive?  I mean that as a genuine challenge, not a mean spirited one.. if anyone thinks my arguments are not accurate, fair enough, offer evidence to the contrary.  Since we are talking about a Corps level formation, can anyone think of any other Corps that outperformed on the offensive from 1917 to the end of the war?
 
Less about Haig, but more specific to the Somme, check out this from Youtube (A BBC Documentary titled "From Defeat to Victory")
Once there, click the links for parts 2 and 3.  Very interesting.
 
Western Front 1916
wfsp1916.jpg


I wonder if an amphibious operation into Belgium could have broken the empass on the Western Front ? Although after Jutland the German Navy was still a threat I just wonder if the Brits had pressed the Germans back into their ports followed by landings. The allies lacked the options we have today in breaking a defense line but an amphibious op combined with an offensive along the entire front might have worked. Another option would have required the Netherlands to break their neutrality and invite an allied ground force into the country. Faced with the prospect of an offensive out of Holland the Germans might have sought terms. I doubt if they had enough reserves considering they were still tied down with the Russians on the Eastern Front.
 
tomahawk6 said:
Western Front 1916
wfsp1916.jpg


I wonder if an amphibious operation into Belgium could have broken the empass on the Western Front ? Although after Jutland the German Navy was still a threat I just wonder if the Brits had pressed the Germans back into their ports followed by landings. The allies lacked the options we have today in breaking a defense line but an amphibious op combined with an offensive along the entire front might have worked.

Thats actually not a bad idea.  I guess it would depend on weather the Germans had troops stationed along the channel in case of such an eventuallity.
 
I think that it was considered a non-starter by the Brits, in spite of their naval superiority.  If you look at the coast of Belgium, it is roughly 25 miles (according to a quick look at that map you posted).  The Netherlands were neutral, so landing there would also be a non-starter.  I also believe, if I'm not mistaken, that the land near the coast was lower than sealevel (reclaimed lands), thus making it possible for the Germans to flood it, making it impassable.  The Brits, and the French, were doomed to keep hitting the Germans via the frontal, though if you watch the documentary I posted, there were times and opportunities for the Brits to hit in one area, and then turn left/right and hit other areas in the flank.  In one instance, the Corps Commander decided against it, stating that it was too soon to change the plan (even though the Corps Reserve commander suggested it).  Instead, the Corps Commander decided on another frontal attack, even though a flanking, or even envelopment attack was quite possible given the success of one of the divisions.

As I watch more of this documentary (which I highly recommend to everyone), it seems that there were many more factors than simply Haig for the Somme battles going the way that they did.  British inflexibility, German initiative, etc, all seemed to add up to the failure of 1 July.  Though, as the documentary goes on to state, the battle did not end there, and in the end, was a British victory over the Germans.
 
Mortarman Rockpainter said:
I think that it was considered a non-starter by the Brits, in spite of their naval superiority.  

Actually if the 100 days had bogged down there was a plan for an amphibious operation to turn the German flank. An academic argument could be made to substantiate that the 100 days was just a diversion to keep German troops pinned to the existing front lines. The reason it did not go ahead was the 100 days was successful therefore it was not needed, according to one author. Composition of this amphibious assault was entirely British , I believe the 1st Divison. There are several journal references to this on the internet/university elibrary sources. Or pages 57/58 of The Defeat of Imperial Germany, 1917-1918 by Paschall. page 57 has an excellent map.
 
From Kirkus Reviews
A bold, revisionist history of Earl Haig, British commander- in-chief during WW I. Using British records that became available only in the 1960's, and comparing them to uncensored versions available in Canada, Australia, and the US, Winter subjects the authorized British version of the war to devastating analysis. For a variety of reasons, including Haig's close involvement with Britain's Official Historian of the war, it was Haig's view of the war that won acceptance, apparently sometimes by purging British records of any evidence to the contrary. Haig himself, far from being the most able soldier of his generation, is shown to have used his social connections to get unusually rapid promotion and to have excluded able subordinates. The picture of the British Army that emerges from the new documentation illuminates the reasons for the dreadful losses of the war. For all its courage and discipline, it was a badly organized, poorly trained, and ill-equipped force, supported by staff work of low quality and commanded by generals inadequate to the task. For example, by the end of the war the dominance of the machine-gun was clear; but where the French had one for every 12 men, the Canadians one for 13, and the Americans one for 27, the British limited their troops to one for 61. Winter analyzes Haig's command in each of the major battles of the war, from the Somme and Passchendaele to the final campaign of 1918, and this same inadequacy becomes apparent in each of them: attacks against the enemy's strongest point; the use of discredited tactics; persistence in attack long after all surprise had been lost. It was a performance notably inferior to that of the Germans, the French, the Canadians, and the Australians. Excellent, hard-hitting history. -- Copyright ©1991, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

Thucydides, sometimes you just get it totally wrong. ;D

"The picture of the British Army that emerges from the new documentation illuminates the reasons for the dreadful losses of the war. For all its courage and discipline, it was a badly organized,"  Stipulated

"poorly trained, " Stipulated

"and ill-equipped force,"  Stipulated

"supported by staff work of low quality"  Stipulated

"and commanded by generals inadequate to the task"  Modified agreement - Generals untrained in large formation warfare

I cheerfully accept all those caveats.  In fact I said as much earlier in more words.  Edit: if you want a common denominator to blaime, blame the usual culprit:  The Politician  - the one that supplied neither troops, nor gear, nor system, nor opportunity to train and that insisted 50% of the Army would be posted overseas keeping unruly Indians and Irishmen under control, not to mention having them chasing the Cornish countryside trying to catch Wreckers (people intent on attracting ships onto Cornish rocks so that they could loot them).

Given all those problems: how exactly was anybody supposed to put together an effective offensive force, especially one confronted with the world's longest, best defended siege lines?

World War 1 conformed to the ancient Northern Hemisphere timetable of fighting in the summer and holding in the winter.

1914 - Brits have no army (4 divs do not constitute a continental army).  Germans jump out of the gate first but late in the year limiting the French's ability to respond in an effective manner.  German's consolidate over the winter and from that point on have the upper hand in any peace negotiations.   French badly beaten up in the early going.

1915 - Colonials and Territorials (many with some military training ) come to the fore.  British, French and Germans.  A year of holding and stunting - Gallipoli, East Africa, Salonika, Mesopotamia.  Call this the Augmentation phase as civilian volunteers are organized, equipped and trained.

1916 - Germans jump off early to wear down the French at Verdun before the Brits can get their act together.  Brits jump in before Kitchener's Armies can be turned into the grand offensive force that he dreamed of sending to Berlin.  Time was not on their side.

1917 - Brits start to take the fight to the Germans using tools and tactics developed on the fly.  Edit: Vimy was the one battle of 1917 where the Brits and the Canucks had the benefit of time to not just plan but also rehearse the battle in detail.  All other battles were fought on the fly - just as all the battles of 1918 were.

1918 - Germans jump off early to forestall the American build up - but run into the same problem that the Brits ran into a Cambrai - inability to coordinate and support operations at long range.  Once the plan came off the rails there was no ability to adjust the plan.  Allies, Brits, French and Americans, as well as Canucks and Aussies jump in and assault against an over-stretched under-supported force.

Short of hiring Hindenberg or Von Falkenhayn or Ludendorff I can't think of anybody else that would appease the critics.  Keep in mind that those worthies caused the German populace to rise up in revolt against their exemplary handling of the war.  

The German Staff system could plan a battle like billy-be-dammed.  But like Time Expired said, no general, or his brilliant staff, could control the battle or adjust the outcome once battle was joined.  The OODA loop was measured in hours, if not days and weeks.  Once the battle started the Generals were in much the same situation as Squad Leader players - waiting on the outcome of multiple throws of the dice to find out what happened.  

(And as for the French Staff - their insistence on combat a l'outrance and the elan of the bayonet  - they kept divisions in the line until there was nobody left - that resulted in wholesale mutiny - at the risk of sounding like a broken record Corrigan's analysis of units time in the line is instructive as to the maintenance of morale - Principle #2)

As to this:
"For example, by the end of the war the dominance of the machine-gun was clear; but where the French had one for every 12 men, the Canadians one for 13, and the Americans one for 27, the British limited their troops to one for 61"

I counter with this:

The Welsh Guards were issued 1, then 2, then 8, then 16, then 32 Lewis Guns between November 1915 and April 1918.
In that period they would have been re-org'd from 4x250=1000 to 3x250=750 troops.
750/32= 1:24

And ltMaverick25:

can anyone disprove that the Canadian Corps was the best allied army on the offensive?
 You wish us to prove a negative?

I would be more comfortable accepting your position if you had more knowledge of allied and enemy forces and had come to your own conclusions rather than, apparently (and I will apologize again if necessary) accepting the word of others that "The Canadians Were Best Corps On The Front" and seeking to find new arguments to buttress an entrenched hypothesis.

There are Aussie nationalists that make similar claims about their troops (and they have a bigger cheerleading section in London than the Canadians  ;D )

 
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