Why Arabs Lose Wars

[Blindspot]

Although I've always maintained if you could raise an entire unit of Arab soldiers on modern training, tactics and equipment you would find they'd be an awe inspiring fighting force, it's an interesting thought experiment but realistically would probably create more politicall fallout than the CF can handle.

After reading this post from Che, I recalled an interesting article I read where the author would likely say the above statement would not be possible. I thought this might make for an interesting discussion in of itself.

Here is the article:
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_17/articles/deatkine_arabs1.html

Here is Che's original post:
http://army.ca/forums/threads/21612/post-112205.html#msg112205

 

[48Highlander]

This isn't something that's limited to Arab forces.  Basically, the main problems as the author lists them are secrecy, over-centrilazation, no concern for the well being of soldiers, and lack of initiative/leadership.  These things have nothing to do with the arab religion.  They are caused by poverty, and a dictatorial style of government.  The Russian and Chinese armed forces had very similar problems during the last few decades, and in some ways still do.  Only a democratic country would be foolish enough to arm and train 700,000 people, and then tell them to think for themselves

 

[pbi]

Interesting piece (I can hear the PC whiners now: "Racism!, Racism!"). Reminds of two things I've seen.

First, on my serial at USMC C&SC Quantico in 1997-98, there were five Arabic officers (amongst 24 foreign students in a body of about 200). Although each was from a different country, their performance was equally bad, as particularly exemplified during the final CPX, in which tey did nothing except sit, talk, smoke and drink coffee. Of course, they all graduated.....

Second, in Cyprus in 1991 I attended a luncheon given for the Greek Mayor of Nicosia. A very interesting fellow (excellent English spreaker) he told us of recent conference of  Middle Eastern mayors he had just attended. When they were discussing responses to disasters, the Mayor of Cairo reportedly stated that he made a habit of not showing up at any incident with less than 200 casualties.

These would tend to support some of the contentions in the Atkine article. He makes an additional good point when he mentions the hideous effect the Russians had on the already dysfunctional Arabic C2 culture-you can see this effect lingering on almost wherever the Russians went, along with piles of their rusted, broken, discarded equipment. Cheers.

 

[winchable]

The key words I've noticed in that article were "leadership" the author definetly takes aim at the political leadership of Arab countries. Which is something I support. Arab leaders are awful and with some very bright exceptions, always have been, and it seems (if the article is taken as true which it shall be) that this has been passed downhill and the officers of the Arab armies emulate said trait.

The author also appears to be using Arab as a political and cultural term, not a racial term, so I assume he uses "Arab" for lack of a better descriptor.

But I think there are some things which we can take from the article and use to support my argument. Most notably is the story of the Egyptians marching a parade of soldiers to block the sand from hitting the other soldiers.
A small example I know, but it is a fine example of just what you can do with a well motivated group of Arabs. Now if we were to put this kind of dedication of the NCO towards another task, imagine the results. Officers aside, my statement doesn't need much refinement.

My statement was that you would train them on "modern training, tactics and equipment" the authors argument is based on current systems of training in predominately Arab countries, which are quite obviously antiquated.

So I would like to refine my statement somewhat, with a proper introduction into Modern Tactics, training (Which presumably encourages free thought and outside the box thinking) you could raise a very successful modern Arab regiment, largely due to their intense loyalty and passion if rightly motivated.

This is unlikely to happen however and the authors sentiments will ring true for a long time to come:

Examining Arab warfare in this century leads to the conclusion that the Arabs remain more successful in insurgent, or political, warfare

Which is true, if you can motivate them into small groups(presumably for your own cause) they will fight a successful insurgency. The only one I can think off the top of my head which is a good example is the Arab revolt against the Ottomans. What was notable about that was A)Once they had defeated the Ottomans, and a modern parliamentary style of system was thrust upon them, it was entirely incompatible with the extremely diverse Arab culture (an argument which is still true today) as a result the infighting led to colonisation and B)It is a good example of what properly (by your definition) motivated Arab warriors can do against a larger force.

Kind of lost it there sorry.
This whole argument I'm making actually disgusts me because it's turning Arabs into tools to defeat our enemies, which is...conflicting for obvious reasons.

 

[QORvanweert]

The key words I've noticed in that article were "leadership" the author definitely takes aim at the political leadership of Arab countries. Which is something I support. Arab leaders are awful and with some very bright exceptions, always have been, and it seems (if the article is taken as true which it shall be) that this has been passed downhill and the officers of the Arab armies emulate said trait.

Well if it cheers you up, our political leaders aren't that much better either .... I believe that any group of soldiers can be motivated into becoming a very effective fighting force and this ability has nothing to do with nationality. The strength of ideology is far stronger, to believe in an inherent genetic gift is a huge mistake. in my opinion at least. If anything, I think that their upbringing(Arabs) is what makes them so susceptible to being tools of ideology.

 

[Spr.Earl]

Hmmm, this can be debated if we look at history.

 

[Kirkhill]

In support of Che's position I think that consideration of the record of some of the following forces might be interesting:

The Arab Legion
The Trans-Jordanian Field Force
The Firqats of Oman (tribal militias essentially that were organized in company sized forces)
The Senussis (spelling?)

All of these Arab forces from the colonial period and early post-colonial period were well thought of by the westerners they served with.  The problem is not with the Arab on the ground.

As to Sapper Earl's suggestion you look to history... Mohammed's followers didn't spread the word selling flowers and doing Hare Krishna chants.  And Saladin's armies were pretty capable as well.

 

[Kirkhill]

Point taken S_Baker.  You're right.  I was wrong.  However his armies included Arabs. I don't know the ratio of Kurds to Arabs to other types of Muslimns.

 

[Infanteer]

As to Sapper Earl's suggestion you look to history... Mohammed's followers didn't spread the word selling flowers and doing Hare Krishna chants.   And Saladin's armies were pretty capable as well.

I think the important distinction is to discern the difference between the Warrior cultures that did the Islamic societies of the Middle East so well (horse culture of the Turks, Janissaries, Mamelukes) and the lens of the professional fighting force that we are trying to view them through now.

PBI's example is great in underlying this fact.   In that most Prussian of professional pursuits, a CPX, the soldiers from Arab societies were quite poor at it.   I remember reading an article in which an Officer from an African country, who was a student on a US Company Commander's Course, nearly failed because each attack was a head-on disaster - flanking attacks were not in his psyche.

In essence, when societies that attempt to pick up a style of fighting that the west seems to have done so well with, they do poorly.   I think it is because they are attempting to graft a full time, professional force drawn from society on a culture that isn't set up to deal with it - think of the social triggers that are part of this ideal; relatively free and open society, solid professional grounding, social mobility within the Army (ie: promotion).

Thinking that any culture can pick up a way of fighting that is so different then the way they've done it (well) for centuries is like thinking you could take some tribal Bedouin man and throw him into a GAP store to make a 9-5 living.

 

[QORvanweert]

In John Keegans 'On War', he mentions during the excerpt of the seige of Constantinople that the Janissaries employed were infact so called 'Christian' kids taken from the Balkans and trained. I can't prove this unless you read the story, but, if this were true then wouldn't that suggest a link to Europe?

 

[winchable]

I've been contemplating this topic a bit as of late and I agree with Infanteer quite a bit but thought I'd add something.

Traditionally the Arab peoples are divided, tribes etc. While the actual layout of the land was a big sweeping borderless thing, the people occupying it shared commonalities but for the most part, despite whatever empire came along, have been made up of smaller (sometimes larger) pockets of people.

Now, not claiming to be an expert on warfare, it would mke sense to me that any fighting force imposed (adopted) on or by the Arab peoples that requires large sweeping uniformity etc. Would not last long and would not neccessarily be as successful as a force that was successful in other regions.
So, following this logic (which I hope I'm getting across) the ideal Arab fighting force woud be made up of small but tight groups of fighters.
So the most successful Arab army wouldn't be a large one made of battalions which were responsible to a single command, rather they would be largely autonomous guerilla style forces attempting victory with many, many smaller victories rather than large battles and offensives.
So hit and run tactics are ideal providing that the many smaller forces recognise a common goal which would override the relatively liberal autonomy each individual force is given.
Though I should add this might not be what has happened historically in all cases.

It actually pains me to admit that this is a result of the fragmentation of the people (TE Lawrence, whos philosophy I share regarding the Arabian peninsular was quite critical of the Arab peoples lack of larger unity) and goes against my idealistic pursuit of a unified Arabian peninsular.

Just snowballing ideas there.

 

[Blindspot]

So, following this logic (which I hope I'm getting across) the ideal Arab fighting force woud be made up of small but tight groups of fighters.
So the most successful Arab army wouldn't be a large one made of battalions which were responsible to a single command, rather they would be largely autonomous guerilla style forces attempting victory with many, many smaller victories rather than large battles and offensives.
So hit and run tactics are ideal providing that the many smaller forces recognise a common goal which would override the relatively liberal autonomy each individual force is given.

It would be true then to say that such a force would be required to fight in terrain that is most advantageous to that style of warfare, ie. urban, mountainous, etc. To fight a cohesive, modern, western division, for example, elsewhere would not be to the advantage of groups of smaller, autonomous units. Also this would suggest, I would imagine, a defensive posture rather than offensive.

This also brings to mind the degree of resolve to achieve the greater political objective. Is it within the Arab psyche to do anything it takes to achieve victory? We see everyday in the news acts that the West considers barabaric and beyond its desire to perpetrate. I believe it was Bill Maher who got into a lot of trouble for suggesting that compared to the Islamic terrorist, the western powers were cowards. In other words, the west is afraid to do what it really needs to do to win.

 

[winchable]

It would be true then to say that such a force would be required to fight in terrain that is most advantageous to that style of warfare, ie. urban, mountainous, etc. To fight a cohesive, modern, western division, for example, elsewhere would not be to the advantage of groups of smaller, autonomous units. Also this would suggest, I would imagine, a defensive posture rather than offensive

.

Yes, keeping with the tradition of guerilla warfare it would be neccessary that they would fight on their own kind of turf and within their own communities almost.
Guerillas have to fight in the territories they know to give them the added advantage over a presumably larger force.

However they would need to adopt a very, very offensive posture. An almost incessant number of small attacks on a larger force would presumably be the equivalent of a large offensive no?
Guerilla warfare has it's strengths in it's unpredictability I believe. Hit and runs of supply convoys (See Arab Revolt in ww1 and the current Iraq situation) have been effective in guerilla warfare over the centuries.
But you are correct in assuming that the fight would have to be on home turf as a key strength to guerilla warfare is what the guerillas lack in firepower they make up for with absolute familiarity with the terrain.
In some ways it is a defensive posture that relies on attrition of the offensive movement and then moving to an offensive.

Is it within the Arab psyche to do anything it takes to achieve victory?

I would say historically yes, we are proud to the point where it is a flaw and I believe would rather go down in a hail of gunfire or shrapnel than say "Right then you've got it."
I think Kissingers goal when mediating between the Israelis and Egyptians was to make it seem like the Egyptians won because he knew that they would choose death over defeat and that would have been a step in the wrong direction. And I'm pretty sure it worked because they were still celebrating that victory recently, in fact I believe Nasser was assasinated in a parade to commemorate said "victory"

Ah what the hell do I know.

 

[winchable]

Also I've noticed I've completely revamped my original idea of an Arab force fighting on modern tactics and training.

 

[Blindspot]

In John Keegans 'On War', he mentions during the excerpt of the seige of Constantinople that the Janissaries employed were infact so called 'Christian' kids taken from the Balkans and trained. I can't prove this unless you read the story, but, if this were true then wouldn't that suggest a link to Europe?

The system of Devsirme would likely suggest that link be nullified. These youth were taken at a very young age and had all ties to their origins severerd. They became the "property" of the sultan and converted to Islam. However, the Ottoman Empire consisted of a multitude of ethnicities.

 

[Blindspot]

However they would need to adopt a very, very offensive posture. An almost incessant number of small attacks on a larger force would presumably be the equivalent of a large offensive no?

Upon reflection, I would agree. Perhaps I meant defensive goal; protecting territory using offensive tactics. Makes sense. 

 

[winchable]

A somewhat apt analogy might be a thousand wasps bringing down a pitbull isntead another pitbull fighting that pitbull.

 

[Kirkhill]

Che, are you factoring in the differences amongst different groups of Arabs, even those that are all Sunni.  For example those of the Hejaz, and the wandering tribes like the Bedu.  It seems to me that the strongest proponents of Wahabism, the traditionalists or Salafis seem to be either the Bedu or the newly resettled tribes such as those in Fallujah and Ramadi and the cities of the deserts below the Kurdish foothills and mountains.

Have these historically nomadic tribes adjusted to settled life and the imposition of borders which restrict their ability to roam?

It seems to this outsider that like most other peoples the Arabs, not to mention the Muslimns at large have a number of sub-cultures.  The Arabs of the Maghreb, and of the Hejaz as well as those of Oman and the Gulf States seem to have a different outlook than do the Arabs of Najd and the Yemen.

Or am I totally off track here?

 

[winchable]

Nope you're on track I think I tried to take that into account and that would be a gamble you'd have to take if you were in reality trying to raise such a force. That kind of shows up in the idea of many small moderately autonomous forces with a common goal, the goal would be fairly simple as anything more complicated would bring out those many schisms which divide a peoples.
Arabs and Muslims are anything but monolithic.

The heart of Arabia (look around the countries bordering Saudi Arabia) is still operating with undefined borders however and it is my belief that the tribal spirit still lives on even if only a little.
It would take a good leader to incite said spirit etc. etc. we've all heard me rant before.

Of course I wouldn't base a big gamble on something as subjective as spirit and I wouldn't expect anyone else to.

But My mind wanders to the World War 1 Arab revolt once again, bit of a gamble, many gambles, payoff was good too.

 

[Infanteer]

I think when looking at links between culture, war, and doctrine it is important to appreciate the different levels.

There seems to be a macro-cultural level.  This is what authors like John Keegan and Victor Davis Hanson love to focus on.  Looking at it from this level looks at big picture things (geography, climate, religion) - Western shock vs Central Asian and Arabian skirmish.

There is also a micro-cultural level - this is what Kirkhill is referring to, local differences within the cultural monolith (which is never truly monolithic).  Looking at it from this level forces one to consider more temporal, finer details (tribalism, state, ideology) -  Although both modern, professional Western armies, why did the French opt for methodical battle while the Germans strive for decisive operational battle?

As with almost everything, I think any answers are going to be a mixture of both of these concepts.