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Who should own CAS & why it can't be trusted to an Air Force (from A-10 retirement thread)

Also shows you how much the cost has gone up. I have always said get 80 fighters, 2 types, 40 of each. In a perfect world each fleet would be about 15-20 years different than the other, so you are only replacing 40 at one time. You are also not so much at risk of your entire air force fighter fleet being grounded by technical issues at the same time. so i hope they keep a number of the CF-18's flying beside the F-35 to get this number. I also know that as new issues come up in the F-35 over the first 5-7 years of operations, the other fleet should still be flyable.
 
SupersonicMax said:
Multi-fleet is not the solution.  More expensive as you double everything (there are many significant difference between training and operational training)

40 JSF is not enough for NORAD+NATO

I make no claims of expertise in this area so I'm asking to be educated.  Multi-fleet may not be ideal, but are we not already multi-fleet?  We have the Harvard (T-6) and the Hawk as trainers and the Hornets.  Reducing the proposed F-35 order but adding some armed Harvards (AT-6...with 85% parts commonality with the T-6 according to the Beechcraft website) and armed jet trainers (FA-50 if we go with the T-50 trainer also presumably with significant hardware commonality) would be less of a support burden than adding a completely different airframe type.

As far as the differences between training and operational training goes, do not the same general techniques apply whether you're dropping a precision guided weapon from an F-35 or an AT-6?  Since we're going to have fewer F-35's than Hornets regardless would that not allow pilots to begin training in these techniques earlier in their careers while they're waiting for one of the limited F-35 positions to be open?  Could having AT-6s and/or FA-50's open up the possibility of keeping pilots that leave the CF for higher-wage civilian jobs involved by opening up some of these positions to Reserve pilots? 

You may be absolutely right that 40 JSF alone are not enough to support our NORAD+NATO requirements but some of those requirements would be filled where possible by the AT-6s and FA-50s.  Ideally you'd be able to have a fleet of armed aircraft larger than the proposed F-35 fleet if you substituted some cheaper aircraft for a portion of the F-35s.  Could you get 1 x FA-50 AND 1 x AT-6 for the price of a single F-35 and have enough money left over to cover the increased support costs?  At that breakdown you could have 40 x F-35s, 24 x FA-50's and 24 x AT-6's (84 total combat aircraft) available instead of just 65 x F-35's alone. 

Again, I'm sure that there are definite drawbacks to this kind of proposal (as there are plusses and minuses to any choice we have to make due to our limited financial resources), but are there enough problems that this is kind of solution can't even be considered as a possible option?  I look forward to hearing what much more knowledgeable minds have to say.
 
recceguy said:
There is a biiiigggg difference between firing a rocket from a pod on the outside of the aircraft and firing a shoulder mounted M-72 out of the side door.

Anything combustible in the back blast area is going to ignite.;)

I saw "84mm mount for the Griffon" and envisaged a strut-system and fixed forward firing. I missed "so they can fire it out the side of the chopper", thinking "from the side".

I thought that it would be an awful weight of weaponry - a whole bank of Carl Gustafs - for little weight of fire. Or somebody has to lean w - a - y out to reload.

I took neither the suggestion, nor my thoughts on it, seriously.
 
CBH99 said:
We purchased 120 CF-18 aircraft.

137, I believe, of which 54 were based in Germany to hold back the godless communist hordes while keeping local breweries in operation.
 
The Hawks and Harvards are owned, managed and maitained by a civilian company.  We do not have any maintenance personnel working on them. 

Also, even if we were to have the same overall amount of aircraft, you need to increase the overheads (essentially tripple if you add 2 fleets)...
 
Or you can change the way you do things to reduce those overhead costs, I know crazy talk. The CF somehow managed to live with dual fleets of fighter aircraft before, mind you they weren't blessed/hamstrung by everyone having more computing power in their pockets than NASA had to send people to the moon.

One thing I note here on this site is the "Abused spouse syndrome" We say thank you when the beating stops and have a difficult time thinking about how to do things to meet the missions rather than to appease the abuser. I suspect that having senior leaders that attempt to appease to much only encourages the politicians and senior civil servants to abuse the military more.
 
SupersonicMax said:
The Hawks and Harvards are owned, managed and maitained by a civilian company.  We do not have any maintenance personnel working on them. 

Also, even if we were to have the same overall amount of aircraft, you need to increase the overheads (essentially tripple if you add 2 fleets)...

Interesting.  I suppose we could simply extend the contract for maintenance to the additional aircraft but that would likely have significant implications on our ability to deploy them outside Canada.  I've seen references to a plan for Canada to purchase new jet trainers to replace the Hawks.  Will this be an actual purchase (meaning we'll take over maintenance for the new trainers), a purchase with the maintenance contracted out to a civilian company, or a contract like the Hawks for a civilian company to own and maintain the new trainers?
 
Colin P said:
The CF somehow managed to live with dual fleets of fighter aircraft before,

Up to four, in my time - F5, F101, and F104 simultaneously and then F18 began to creep in.

And it cost. There was a training squadron for each of them. There were parts supplies for each of them. More were required overall because no one could do the jobs of the others.
 
I am not educated on things air force, so I will stay in my lane, but since they have been canceling the replacement of the MLVW/LSVW for years, combined with the fact they canceled the new armored vehicles and are now divesting most of our B fleet...(our unit is losing 7 of 9 HLVWs alone)

I'm thinking we won't really be seeing new jets for a while.

Christ...I put in an order for 20 pairs of mechanics gloves for my guys and it was canceled because even they were too expensive.
 
pancakes said:
I am not educated on things air force, so I will stay in my lane, but since they have been canceling the replacement of the MLVW/LSVW for years, combined with the fact they canceled the new armored vehicles and are now divesting most of our B fleet...(our unit is losing 7 of 9 HLVWs alone)

I'm thinking we won't really be seeing new jets for a while.

Christ...I put in an order for 20 pairs of mechanics gloves for my guys and it was canceled because even they were too expensive.

Makes sense to me.  Why would you need mechanic's gloves if your mechanics don't have anything left to fix?  :P
 
Loachman said:
Up to four, in my time - F5, F101, and F104 simultaneously and then F18 began to creep in.

And it cost. There was a training squadron for each of them. There were parts supplies for each of them. More were required overall because no one could do the jobs of the others.

Before integration and the establishment of Mobile Command the RCAF ignored air support of the ground forces. From the NATO set up forward it was an air superiority and air defence organization, first with Sabres and CF100s and then with CF104s and CF101s. There was some attempt to keep the skills alive and CJATC Rivers used to run FAC courses and had a flight of T33s to simulate fighter bombers and Sabres (being phased out) flying out of Chatham did some missions in the early 60s. I do suspect there was gnashing of teeth when the CF5s were added to the inventory, especially as Canada was unable to get manufacturing rights for Canadair to build the F4s.

However the RCN operated Banshee fighter-bombers from HMCS Bonaventure up to about 1962. The gunners had a Ground Liaison Officer (GLO) and a FAC posted to the carrier to work with them. I remember standing on a ridge at the south end of the Gagetown ranges and looking down at two Banshees flying north up the Nerepis River. I also remember fighting a humungous range fire in Shilo started by the Banshees in 1961 when I was an officer cadet.
 
Old Sweat said:
From the NATO set up forward it was an air superiority and air defence organization, first with Sabres and CF100s and then with CF104s and CF101s.

CF104s were actually bought for the nuclear strike role in Germany, and later used for ground attack.

And I'm not quite sure of your wording, but the CF101s worked for NORAD vice NATO.
 
Loachman said:
CF104s were actually bought for the nuclear strike role in Germany, and later used for ground attack.

And I'm not quite sure of your wording, but the CF101s worked for NORAD vice NATO.

You are correct. I was too concise in trying to describe the situation.. The point I was trying to make was that the RCAF thought offensive air support sucked.

My apologies!  :salute:
 
Loachman said:
Up to four, in my time - F5, F101, and F104 simultaneously and then F18 began to creep in.

And it cost. There was a training squadron for each of them. There were parts supplies for each of them. More were required overall because no one could do the jobs of the others.
Don't forget the Clunks in the bay for ECM and the Sabres for fun.
 
Getting away from "platformism" for a moment, I amm thinking the real reson that the Army believes the air Force can't be trusted to do CAS has more to do with availability, timeliness and accountability.

When *we* want to engage a target with our own weapons, it is quite easy; issue a fire control order and engage the target with our own weapons. The fire comes moments after the order, and if there is no or ineffective fire we will know why right away (and often be able to correct it). Even Combat Teams and formations can bring fire "on call" quite quickly through artillery, since *we* own it. Not so much for CAS, since the aircraft might not be in the area, might not have the proper munitions loaded for the support we want and might be tasked by outside agencies on missions we know nothing about. Since things can go south quite quickly if the requested fire does not arrive, it leave a bad taste in the mouth.

IOT regain the availability, timeliness and accountability, the Army needs to re-invest in its own integral fire support. ATGMs like Javelin and Spike provide a means at platoon and company level (especially Spike since it is a FOG-M and can have a man in the loop to identify difficult targets and make the strike/no strike decisions if needed). Mortars with skilled crews and MFC's can provide not only a weight of fire, but also have a much higher ability to hit difficult targets than ever before (especially if technologies like mortar rounds with seeker heads become more available). And the number of actual guns in the artillery park need to grow as well, to provide overlapping coverage and service more targets more rapidly. If UCAV's can be small, smart and cheap enough, using them to identify targets and perhaps deal with them on their own is also a future option.

Some classes of weapons even overlap to an extent. Spike covers an entire family of FOG-M weapons (mini Spike has a range of 1300m, while at the other end Spike-ER can reach out to 8000m, and Spike NLOS is an artillery weapon that has a range of 25km). Since they are ATGM's, they can deal with hardened targets like bunkers, fortified buildings and other difficult targets in addition to tanks. Their "man in the loop" capabilities let you use them "danger close" and as a bonus they also have some ability to discourage armed helicopters. Our procuremenrt system needs to be overhauled as well. Modern electronics are cheap (the real cost of an iPhone or Android device is in the $4-600 range retail), so there is quite a bit of scope for thinking smart weapons can come down a lot in price (imagine if Excalibur rounds cost $7000 instead of $70,000 apiece). This might mean long production runs to gain economies of scale, but having lots of these weapons also means more rounds for training, increased proficiency etc.

As for CAS, if *we* can cover off more tasks with our own integral firepower, then aircraft can be assigned to higher priority missions which play to their strengths (mostly being able to strike deep targets far beyond the range of our weapons, and the flexibility to add a *lot* of weight of fire when the commander needs it.)
 
So take the money saved by retiring the A10 from the USAF and plow it into company level support weapons and munitions, I love it.  :nod:
 
I think that Colin has inadvertently brought the real defense for the A10 and for current systems to the fore.  Right now, they have the A10 close air support system.  The army can count on it because supporting the army is the only thing that it is good for.  If the money for the A10 disappears it isn't going to be plowed into the purchase of an improved army owned system: it will go to the air force to enhance their very new and very expensive shiny new toy or to the navy to finance a new carrier or it will vanish from the military budget entirely.  It won't go to the army.  If I were an army general I would hold on real tight to the assets I have until I can actually reach out and touch and use the new system.  A promise to provide doesn't give me a warm fuzzy feeling inside at all. 
 
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