Who should own CAS & why it can't be trusted to an Air Force (from A-10 retirement thread)

[a_majoor]

WRT looking at YouTube, news broadcasts (and expanding the search to include recent military history books) I have not come across high performance jets like F-16's doing gun runs on a ground target. Since this is a random search, I obviously have not seen every example, but the lack of actual gun camera footage in a random search indicates to me that using a 20mm cannon for ground attack by high performance aircraft must be pretty rare.

Whatever the potential advantages of using a 20mm cannon against a ground target may be, most air forces don't seem to be taking advantage of that. The fact that armed helicopters and low performance aircraft like Specter gunships and A-10's do use cannons against ground targets suggests that they may be better gun platforms for this task.

Perhaps to reinforce the point, the Iranian Air Force has just recently sent their SU-25 "Frogfoot" jets to Iraq to attack the ISIS forces on the ground, another low, slow gun truck.

 

[Good2Golf]

Anyone participating in Ex Final Drive who took away from the contrivances of a teaching tool that fixed-wing fast air was all that was needed to operate in the AO's airspace to create tactical, operational and strategic effects needs to actually attend the course...

If anything, this thread reinforces the truth that the 'light-blue' air force believes in the primacy of technology, while those on the ground depend on the cultivation and maintenance of trust amongst fellow soldiers.

Regards
G2G

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

:goodpost:

Anyone participating in Ex Final Drive who took away from the contrivances of a teaching tool that fixed-wing fast air was all that was needed to operate in the AO's airspace to create tactical, operational and strategic effects needs to actually attend the course...

If anything, this thread reinforces the truth that the 'light-blue' air force believes in the primacy of technology, while those on the ground depend on the cultivation and maintenance of trust amongst fellow soldiers.

Regards
G2G

:goodpost:

 

[brihard]

I have some perspective from the ground side.

"Some" is vague enough to describe anything from vast knowledge to a negligibly or even infinitely small amount. Nothing I've seen, nor, I daresay others here, suggests that you possess meaningful perspective from the ground side. I and most others will take the 'ground side' experience of those who have depended on air support for real on two way ranges where people really die over training exercises that are typically quite the artifice.

Air power as discussed here is nothing more nor less than a microcosm of what the military does as a whole- killing people and breaking their stuff in defence of the national interest. It's just another delivery method for fire support. I cannot speak to operational arts- I'm just an infantry sergeant. But there's no difference in principle between the Pl Comd stripping one or both of my C9s or M203s for the platoon fire base versus leaving the ability to kill people and break stuff organically within my fighting element. The discussion of air support is just the same thing writ large. Sure, some stuff can be more *efficient* when concentrated at increasingly higher levels- but the less is left organically, increasingly the less flexibility and exercise of initiative is going to be left/available to the guys who have eyes on the dude whom we wish to make die for their country. There's a diminishing rate of return in both directions in the concentration or decentralization or fire support. Towards either end of the spectrum the opportunity cost of stripping or concentrating that last bit of fire support outweighs the marginal incremental benefit to be gained.

All of which is an elaborate way of saying that yes, optimally at least some fire must be concentrated operationally at the highest levels. And optimally, some must be delegated as at least quasi-organic to the lowest applicable levels in a fight- that means air in a loiter, where the effect of fires is in the commander's holster, rather than each bomb being targeted strategically and from a distance. And simply the *knowledge* that you needn't borrow that pistol from someone who you hope doesn't need it more, but that it's in *your* holster is in and of itself an enabler.

The position you are arguing is one that is far enough towards the one end of the spectrum that incremental strategic gains have become outweighed by tactical opportunity cost. But you don't recognize that. And you really think you can put yourself in the head of the guys on the ground, but you can't, and if you're smart enough to fly a jet you sure as hell should be able to recognize that limitation in yourself. It's a huge deficiency on your part that you are blind to that.

 

[Baz]

What I noticed is a lack of perspective from their side on Air Employment. 

I started as infantry (albeit reserve), did Battalion level CP ex's, have been in the Air Force for twenty four years, have all the major Air Force courses in Canada and some abroad (including targeting and Collateral Damage Estimation, spent quite a bit of time at sea, and have two Joint International Postings (NORAD CSprings and NATO SHAPE); I can say without any hesitancy that the Air Forces, and particular the USAF and RCAF (outside of TacHel and MH) are the least Joint entities; although the RCN understands Naval Air less and less.

Assets in current theaters are already controlled by the ACC and it seems to be working.  If an asset is to be used for CAS and CAS only, maybe they should be given to the LCC (but even then, I have my reserves when for fixed wing aircraft).

It's (sort of) working for the limited scope of things like Libya, and we made it work in Afg.  It's not working in the bigger picture (my experience recently: Jointex, Steadfast Jazz).  Like any other military asset, the Commander should be (and is), free to assign assets to support whatever tasks he is currently conducting, but the Air Forces are the only ones who can't seem to understand that, and try to tie the Joint Commander's wrists with Air Doctrine.

Tasking priorities should be decided at the joint level and air apportionned according to priorities. ... This is the only way to assure an efficient and effective operation.

When it is appropriate to do so, completely agree.  However, if that is forcing you fight a certain way then change what you are doing, and give them to the people best able to use them.  The second statement sounds like you think Air Force Commander's are the only intelligent people around and the only ones capable of using your "incredible capabilities.

We need to keep flexible in order to achieve the "strategic", "operational" and "tactical" objectives (all of which a single fighter can affect).

Yes, we need to be flexible, we are an incredibly small Air Force (especially if we carved off TacHel and MH cause no when in the "real" Air Force wants them anyway).  But flexible doesn't always mean the Air Force way... sometimes flexible does mean chop them to the people who needs them.

By the way, because we are small, all of our aircraft can provide "strategic", "operational" and "tactical" objectives; C-17s in Mali and Katrina, SAR Griffins in Jamaica, Sea Kings on endless deployments showing Canadian presence (yes part of the ship, but the ship couldn't be there without them).  Oh, and look, at least two of those didn't need an ACC...

 

[KevinB]

Regardless of the nature, source, and ownership of the delivery platform there is going to be a wait involved.

How much of a visual assessment do you think happens as an aircraft whizzes in at 300 knots/560 km/hr and lets loose with a cannon burst from over a kilometre away (A10)? We lost Mark Graham and had another bunch of guys wounded in September 2006 when an A10 shot up their platoon.

WRT that issue -- the A/C had been called in and cleared hot by CANSOF entity.

Tan hat does not a FAC make...

Pilot realized the error and stopped firing -

In a jet going faster or using a released munition the effects would have been more devastating.

 

[Old Sweat]

It is my understanding, and I have interviewed the Bn Comd, BC and FOO*, that the FAC was in the back of the FOO's LAV, but could not observe the aircraft. When the burst hit the company, the FOO, who had his head out of the vehicle observing the objective area, dropped in and shouted "abort, abort, abort" which the FAC repeated over his net. This warned off the second A10, which was lining up, from engaging the company.

* I have also read the FOO's log, which also supports this version of events, as does Murray Brewster's book. It is possible there was SOF involvement, but this is the first I have heard of it.

 

[Kirkhill]

D&B -  yer aff yer gem.  That's already been posted and debated 
http://army.ca/forums/threads/22809/post-1312353.html#msg1312353

Meanwhile:

UK Parliamentary Questions: Afghanistan


(Source: House of Commons Hansard; published July 07, 2014)
 


Written answer provided by Mark Francois, MP, Minister of State for the Armed Forces:


Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many (a) precision-guided munitions and (b) gravity bombs of each type have been dropped in Afghanistan by British (i) fixed-wing aircraft and (ii) unmanned aerial vehicles since 23 March 2011. [200904]

Mr Francois: The number of precision-guided munitions dropped in Afghanistan in the period requested are shown in the following table. No free fall bombs have been dropped in this time.

-- Aircraft Type: /24 March 2011 to 16 June 2014 (inclusive)
-- Fixed Wing: 71
-- Remotely Piloted Air Systems (RPAS): 317

Use of force remains closely controlled and the avoidance of civilian casualties has been paramount. Professional crews carefully select the smallest warhead appropriate to the target being attacked to ensure they deliver the required effect, while minimising the risk to civilians.

All UK forces operate in accordance with International Humanitarian Law, following the principles of distinction, humanity, proportionality and military necessity. The UK’s clearly defined Rules of Engagement are formulated on this basis.

The same strict Rules of Engagement that govern the use of conventional military aircraft also apply to RPAS and targets are always positively identified as legitimate military objectives.

Reaper is the UK’s only RPAS with the ability to deploy precision-guided weapons.

-ends-

link

And

Crisis In Iraq Makes the Case for Expanded Sales of Light Attack Aircraft


(Source: Lexington Institute; issued July 7, 2014)
 


It is becoming abundantly clear that if the Iraqi government is going to have any chance of defending itself against the onslaught by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), it will be as the result of massive foreign assistance. In particular, the Iraqi military will need airpower and lots of it.

Nearly a month ago, Prime Minister Maliki requested massive air strikes by the United States on ISIS advances down the road to Tikrit and Baghdad. At the time and to this day, the White House has refused such requests although it is reported that some of the 700 troops deployed to Iraq since the current crisis began are working at various intelligence centers to develop the necessary targeting plans should President Obama change his mind.

Other nations have not been nearly so hesitant to throw their airpower hats in the ring on behalf of the beleaguered Maliki government. Iran has been operating both reconnaissance platforms, including drones, as well as strike aircraft in Iraqi airspace. Bashar al Assad’s Syrian Air Force also has begun to operate against ISIS targets in Western Iraq. Russia is reported to be deploying a dozen SU-25 Frogfoot ground attack aircraft, Moscow’s version of the U.S. A-10 Warthog. Some sources suggest that Russian pilots will be operating these aircraft until the Iraqis are recertified.

Iraq had agreed to acquire some 24 U.S. F-16 fighters as part of a larger package of aircraft and helicopters including C-130s, Bell 407s and even Apache AH-64s. Problems with payments, delivery schedules, and Iraqi capabilities to receive not only the aircraft but support equipment and training systems delayed the actual transfers. As a result, the Iraqi Air Force today has only a handful of light attack aircraft and helicopters available.

Meanwhile, next door in Afghanistan, the United States is moving forward with a program that seems tailor made not only for the situation confronted by the government in Kabul but that of the Iraqi government as well. Back in 2009, the Coalition in Afghanistan recognized that it would need to ensure that the Afghan Security Forces had a viable air force. The challenge was to provide the Afghans with a simple, easy to maintain and low cost, yet versatile and rugged strike aircraft. After putting two competing teams through an, even Byzantine, acquisition process, the Air Force finally settled on the A-29 Light Air Support (LAS).

The winning team, led by Sierra Nevada Corporation (SNC), is under contract to build and equip at least 20 LAS. Embraer will supply its proven A-29 Super Tucano aircraft (but these will be built in the U.S.) and SNC will provide mission equipment and perform the integration. The sturdy, propeller-driven Super Tucano is a perfect fit to the Afghan environment. It carries advanced electro-optical sensors, modern avionics, a laser target designator and a wide variety of precision munitions. In addition, the team will provide training devices, mission planning stations, mission debrief systems, long lead spares, Afghanistan base activation, site surveys and flight certification support. Moody Air Force Base, Georgia, has reportedly been chosen as the site where Afghan pilots and mechanics will be trained on the LAS.

In view of the explosion of Islamic insurgent groups across North Africa and the Middle East, the need for light attack aircraft can only be expected to grow exponentially. It would seem to make sense to turn out LAS like sausages for our various allies and anti-terrorist partners such as Nigeria, Mali, Libya and Yemen. Iraq, which also requires higher-end fighters such as the F-16 and attack helicopters like the AH-64 to provide border security, could also be well served by acquiring the LAS.

link

F-16s, A-10s, King Airs, Reapers, LAS or Helos.......Do you really care who chucked you a life ring when you're drowning?

 

[pancakes]

Cut the F-35 order by 12, since shiny jets won't do CAS, and buy scary attack helicopters.

Our solution may instead be some sort of an 84mm mount for the Griffon so they can fire it out the side of the chopper and redesignate it the new Griffon AH.

Then with the money they saved they can stand up yet another new headquarters element somewhere in the CF, cause you know....can't have too many of those.

 

[George Wallace]

Our solution may instead be some sort of an 84mm mount for the Griffon so they can fire it out the side of the chopper and redesignate it the new Griffon AH.

Then with the money they saved they can stand up yet another new headquarters element somewhere in the CF, cause you know....can't have too many of those.

A la Rambo firing the M-72 from inside an Iroquois.  AVGAS in the backblast makes a spectacular napalm run on enemy positions only a one time event.

 

[Loachman]

We had 2.75 inch Rocket Kits for the Kiowa.

Range was better than a Carl Gustaf.

Sight system was a pair of Chinagraph "X"s on the Pilot's windscreen bubble, one with a "3" beside it and the other with a "4" - for the range in kilometres.

Pinpoint accuracy was not expected.

Fires were sometimes started if the grass below a certain Pilot's helicopter (not mine) was dry, as he liked to be very low when he shot. No fuel was ever ignited.

Jet fuel and Avgas are not the same. The first is, essentially, diesel, and the second is gasoline.

 

[GR66]

Why does it have to be either F-35s OR a cheaper platform to deliver the HE?  To my understanding there are already plans to replace our Hawk trainers with something more suitable for training for the F-35...the KAI/Lockheed Martin T-50 might seem to be a logical choice since they are from the same manufacturer and have some sensor commonality.  Perhaps we could reduce the F-35 order to somewhere between 30-40 aircraft.  That should hopefully be enough to handle the high-end expeditionary requirements and distant NORAD intercepts.  We then supplement the T-50 trainers we buy with a dozen of the FA-50 light attack model.  These could handle both domestic air intercept duties and be a cheaper platform for CAS deployment in theaters where there is not a high air threat.  We could even maybe add a dozen AT-6 armed variants of our Harvard prop trainers for an even cheaper CAS alternative. 

The total air frames we purchase could still be in the 65 range, but we'd have a wider variety of capabilities that we could apply in various situations.  The overall cost would also be less.  There would be less issues of "orphan" fleets of aircraft due to the significant commonality between the training and attack versions of the aircraft.

 

[SupersonicMax]

Multi-fleet is not the solution.  More expensive as you double everything (there are many significant difference between training and operational training)

40 JSF is not enough for NORAD+NATO

 

[PuckChaser]

40 JSF is not enough for NORAD+NATO

At the end of the day, we have multiple fleets of vehicles and ships that are not enough for 2 major tasks at the same time. Why should the Air Force be any different?

 

[Transporter]

At the end of the day, we have multiple fleets of vehicles and ships that are not enough for 2 major tasks at the same time. Why should the Air Force be any different?

Asinine logic. Hey, those guys are f*****-up, so you should be too.

 

[PuckChaser]

Asinine logic. Hey, those guys are f*****-up, so you should be too.

So what you propose is we dump our entire procurement budget into one task, and $#@$@ everyone else? We need fighters, frigates, destroyers, AOPS vessels, sub refits, light and medium support vehicles, new small arms, new load carriage, new fighting order, etc etc etc. Money's not finite.

Personally, I think we should be buying the F-35, but I'm trying to play the devil's advocate here. However, its been said here before that the F-18s were extremely noticeably absent from basically the last 10 years of focus for the CAF. So why should they get topped up to 100% PML if we're not going to use it?

 

[SupersonicMax]

They were used, daily, for NORAD ops and in other conflicts.

Let's go with 40 JSF.  15 for OTU, 12 per Operational Sqn.  Of those 12, probably 8 or so are serviceable at any given time.  Then you have your NORAD commitment and your force generation. 

Then you have to give a 6 pack for NATO.  It's not enough.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

We had 2.75 inch Rocket Kits for the Kiowa.

Range was better than a Carl Gustaf.

Sight system was a pair of Chinagraph "X"s on the Pilot's windscreen bubble, one with a "3" beside it and the other with a "4" - for the range in kilometres.

Pinpoint accuracy was not expected.

Fires were sometimes started if the grass below a certain Pilot's helicopter (not mine) was dry, as he liked to be very low when he shot. No fuel was ever ignited.

Jet fuel and Avgas are not the same. The first is, essentially, diesel, and the second is gasoline.

There is a biiiigggg difference between firing a rocket from a pod on the outside of the aircraft and firing a shoulder mounted M-72 out of the side door.

Anything combustible in the back blast area is going to ignite.

 

[CBH99]

One question I have - and this is taking us way way back to the F-35 thread, but it also applies to the direction this thread is going, is...

Why is 65 the magic number??

We purchased 120 CF-18 aircraft.  I believe the upgraded/operational fleet right now is approx. 70 - 75 aircraft. 

Why is 65 the magic number??  Between NATO, NORAD, training, expeditionary roles, etc.  65 seems like an incredibly low number, regardless of what aircraft is selected. 

We live in the 2nd largest country on earth.  Our population now is substantially larger than what it was when the CF-18 was purchased.  Yet despite our larger population, we are shrinking our fighter force to a size that is arguably on the low end. 

Am I missing something?  Would we be purchasing larger numbers of aircraft if the purchase price was lower?  Or if the industrial benefits were larger & guaranteed?

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

One question I have - and this is taking us way way back to the F-35 thread, but it also applies to the direction this thread is going, is...

Why is 65 the magic number??

We purchased 120 CF-18 aircraft.  I believe the upgraded/operational fleet right now is approx. 70 - 75 aircraft. 

Why is 65 the magic number??  Between NATO, NORAD, training, expeditionary roles, etc.  65 seems like an incredibly low number, regardless of what aircraft is selected. 

We live in the 2nd largest country on earth.  Our population now is substantially larger than what it was when the CF-18 was purchased.  Yet despite our larger population, we are shrinking our fighter force to a size that is arguably on the low end. 

Am I missing something?  Would we be purchasing larger numbers of aircraft if the purchase price was lower?  Or if the industrial benefits were larger & guaranteed?

I would reckon part of the problem is more to do with manpower then anything else.  Do we have enough manpower to support anymore aircraft?  think tech's, support staff, pilots, etc... These are incredibly complex machines and while they may be expensive, so are the people req'd to maintain them.  Any more aircraft would probably require us to have more people and that's not an option.