USS FITGERALD Collision: June 17, 2017

[jollyjacktar]

Without a doubt, never another command slot.  This would be the coup de gras, if that was necessary.

 

[FSTO]

FITZ OOD first to fall. More to follow.

I'm hoping that CRCN and DNP&T (Directorate Naval Personnel & Training) are taking a very close look at what happened in WESPAC and do a review of our training regime. I fear that we are travelling down the same path.

http://cdrsalamander.blogspot.ca/2018/05/fitzgeralds-ood-pleads-guilty.html

https://blog.usni.org/posts/2018/05/09/1-watch-2-hours-7-shamrocks

As the wheels of military justice slowly grind on, more and more information about the WESPAC collisions of 2017 are coming in to the open.

There is not a lot of commentary required here, the summary provided by Sam LaGrone yesterday provides everyone a lot to think about with how we train, run, and provide for our warships … and if you’re not concerned, you’re not thinking.

Lt. j.g. Sarah B. Coppock was contrite and quiet when she pleaded guilty on a single criminal charge for her role in the collision between the guided-missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) and a merchant ship that killed seven sailors.
Before a military judge and almost a dozen family members of the sailors who died, she pleaded guilty to one violation of Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
Coppock was the officer of the deck when Fitzgerald collided with ACX Crystal off the coast of Japan on June 17.
…
In her plea, Coppock admitted that she violated ship commander Cmdr. Bryce Benson’s standing orders several times during the overnight transit off the coast of Japan, violated Coast Guard navigation rules, did not communicate effectively with the watch standers in the Combat Information Center, did not operate safely in a high-density traffic condition and did not alert the crew ahead of a collision.


That was not an empty bridge. That was not an empty sea, and yet …

When Fitzgerald collided with Crystal, the malfunctioning SPS-73 bridge radar was tracking more than 200 surface tracks – a mix of large merchant ships and fishing vessels near the coast of Japan, according to the findings of fact in the trial. Coppock was under orders for the ship to cross a busy merchant shipping lane – a so-called traffic separation – that wasn’t labeled on the charts provided by the navigation team. She was also ordered to keep the ship moving at a high-rate of speed during the transit – 20 to 22 knots. The high speed lowered the time the crew could react to ships around them.


This and the following reads like it was a specifically designed scenario to force a collision;

In her plea, Coppock admitted that she violated ship commander Cmdr. Bryce Benson’s standing orders several times during the overnight transit off the coast of Japan, violated Coast Guard navigation rules, did not communicate effectively with the watch standers in the Combat Information Center, did not operate safely in a high-density traffic condition and did not alert the crew ahead of a collision.


Coppock said she didn’t rely enough on the officers on watch in the ship’s combat information center (CIC) to help keep track of the surface contacts as a back up to her crew on the bridge.
…
“Being complacent was the standard on USS Fitzgerald.


Complacency? It is a lot more than that. How long had the WESTPAC surface navy been soaking in an atmosphere that thought that all this was OK? Who set that tone? Who rewarded taking this level of risk for a nation at relative peace at sea?

… the ship had been without a chief quartermaster for two years before the collision, and the SPS-73 navigation radar was unreliable, defense attorney Lt. Ryan Mooney said, quoting from the Navy’s investigation into the collision. The watch stander in the CIC who operated the SPS-67 search and surveillance radar was unfamiliar with the system.


LTjg Commock’s story is not done here, it seems. It looks like she will have a staring role in upcoming trails.

While not specified in the trial, the nature of the plea agreement suggests Coppock will likely be a prosecution witness against the upcoming courts-martial of then-Fitzgerald commander Benson or the two other junior officers who have been charged, two military lawyers told USNI News last week.
The two watchstanders who were in the CIC during the collision will face a judge on Wednesday for preliminary hearings on criminal charges for their roles in the collision that include hazarding a vessel and negligence.


When all is said and done, this has the whiff of being more damaging to the Navy’s professional reputation than Fat Leonard.

 

[tomahawk6]

She plead guilty so that probably ends her career.

 

[FSTO]

She plead guilty so that probably ends her career.

She's done, the junior OOD is done, the officers in charge of the CIC are likely done as well.

 

[Cloud Cover]

Since sailors were drowned or crushed to death, the outcome of careers should be at the bottom of lists of concerns?   

 

[FSTO]

Since sailors were drowned or crushed to death, the outcome of careers should be at the bottom of lists of concerns? 

Yes, but the reasons for the collisions are far deeper than just the incompetence of the officers in charge.

 

[Cloud Cover]

Nobody disputes that.  Here's some questions though:

If the issues are so grave such that the incompetence of not only the officers in charge, but likely some other institutional aspect, why would a ships CO put to sea if not 100 percent confident of the standard of care of the crew or the ship?

What exactly is the marked departure from the norm in this case for a Commanding Officer?

Is the incompetency so prolific that no objective standards are applicable such that the commanding officer of a ship or the Captain of a squadron of ships is not being allowed (authority), or not able (not enough information to determine) or not proficient (competent) enough to make decisions (if any are made at all) about the fitness for duty and navigational conduct of a billion dollar warship at sea with more than 300 hundred souls aboard?       

 

[Blackadder1916]

Seems like the former CO of Fitzgerald will be taking a bit more aggressive approach in his defence.


Former USS Fitzgerald CO Benson Vows to Take Collision Case to Trial
https://news.usni.org/2018/05/16/former-uss-fitzgerald-co-benson-vows-take-collision-case-trial

By: Sam LaGrone

May 16, 2018 6:25 PM • Updated: May 16, 2018 9:40 PM

This post has been updated with a statement from the Navy.

The former commander of the U.S. warship involved in a fatal collision off the coast of Japan last year is vowing to take his case to court-martial and is accusing Navy leadership of trying him in the press before his trial.

Former USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) commander Cmdr. Bryce Benson will not seek a plea deal on charges of hazarding a vessel, dereliction of duty and negligent homicide and intends to take the case to court-martial, according to a statement from his attorneys provided to USNI News.

“Cmdr. Benson was the Commanding Officer—and rightly understood the accountability that is the historical burden of command at sea. As such, following the collision, he declined his right to appeal both his non-judicial punishment and his detachment for cause by commander, U.S. 7th Fleet,” read the statement.
“A fair court-martial will expose the facts of the collision’s causes and Cmdr. Benson’s actions.”

According to Navy investigation summaries, Benson was sleeping when the bow of ACX Crystal smashed into the side of the ship, bending the metal of his stateroom leaving him clinging to the side of the ship for 15 minutes before the crew rescued him.

“Cmdr. Benson commanded Fitzgerald a mere five weeks, and irrefutably was in his stateroom when the ship collided with ACX Crystal,” the statement read.
“It has also been clearly established that he was never alerted his ship was in danger, in direct contravention of his standing orders.”

Benson was given an unspecified penalty following a non-judicial punishment hearing and was removed from his position as ship commander by then-commander of U.S. 7th Fleet Vice Adm. Joseph Aucoin several weeks following the collision, but before the fatal Aug. 21 USS John S. McCain (DDG-56) collision. Following the McCain collision, Aucoin was removed from his position and forced to retire early.

Following the McCain incident, Navy leadership appointed Adm. James F. Caldwell, director of Naval Reactors, to serve as the Consolidated Disposition Authority to oversee accountability actions related to the Fitzgerald and John S. McCain collisions. Caldwell’s decisions would supersede any previously made accountability actions, and in January Caldwell elected to bring the much more serious criminal charges of hazarding a vessel, dereliction of duty and negligent homicide against Benson and three junior officers who were on duty during the collision.

The officer in charge of the bridge during the June 17 collision has already pleaded guilty as part of a plea arrangement. Lt. j.g. Sarah B. Coppock, the officer of the deck at the time of the collision, pleaded guilty to a single charge of dereliction of duty as part of a deal that could include testifying against Benson or the two other junior officers on duty who were charged: Lt. Natalie Combs and Lt. Irian Woodley.

Combs and Woodley appeared in court as part of an Article 32 preliminary hearing last week before a hearing officer who will offer a recommendation to Caldwell whether or not to proceed with the trial.

Benson waived a similar hearing on his own criminal charges. In his statement, his lawyers said the decision was to spare the families and the crew “any unnecessary recitation of events and circumstances surrounding the tragic collision.”

In addition to pledging to go to trial, Benson’s statement accused Navy leaders of waging a public relations campaign that would hurt his case.

“Cmdr. Benson’s approach to accountability stands in stark contrast to the Navy’s method of litigating this case through the media and other out-of-court opinions and declarations from senior Navy leaders,” the statement read.
“As Cmdr. Benson recuperates from his own debilitating injuries and proceeds through the institutional, administrative and disciplinary procedures triggered by the collision, senior Navy leaders have repeatedly used public forums to assign guilt, foreclose legitimate defenses, and cast unwarranted aspersions.”

For example, shortly after Benson was removed from command in August, 7th Fleet issued a statement saying the ship suffered poor leadership.

“The collision was avoidable and both ships demonstrated poor seamanship,” read the statement.
“Within Fitzgerald, flawed watch stander teamwork and inadequate leadership contributed to the collision that claimed the lives of seven Fitzgerald sailors, injured three more and damaged both ships.”

The Navy issued a response to the statement to USNI News.

“These earlier administrative actions are separate and distinct from the ongoing criminal proceedings convened by the CDA,” read the statement from the service.
“The Navy’s public discussion of earlier administrative actions does not imply guilt of [Uniform Code of Military Justice] charges. Those accused are always presumed innocent unless proven guilty, and our communication of the status of criminal proceedings have been fact-based and in accordance with service regulations.”

With Benson electing to waive his Article 32 hearing, he will now wait for Caldwell’s determination on which charges he may face at trial. His hearing would have been on May 21, and it is now unclear when Caldwell will make a determination.

The following is the complete May 15, 2018 statement from Cmdr. Bryce Benson’s Attorney.

As always, Commander Benson’s first thoughts remain with the families of the fallen FITZGERALD Seven, the crew who continues to recover from the tragic collision at sea, and their families. Every day, he grieves for his seven brave Sailors who lost their lives.

Yet, even as Cmdr. Benson recuperates from his own debilitating injuries and proceeds through the institutional, administrative, and disciplinary procedures triggered by the collision, senior Navy leaders have repeatedly used public forums to assign guilt, foreclose legitimate defenses, and cast unwarranted aspersions. This effort includes last week’s Navy press release containing the callous implication that by declining to plead guilty at court-martial, Cmdr. Benson refuses to “accept responsibility.” Nothing could be further from the truth.

Cmdr. Benson commanded FITZGERALD a mere five weeks, and irrefutably was in his stateroom when the ship collided with ACX CRYSTAL. It has also been clearly established that he was never alerted his ship was in danger, in direct contravention of his standing orders. Nevertheless, Cmdr. Benson was the Commanding Officer—and rightly understood the accountability that is the historical burden of command at sea. As such, following the collision, he declined his right to appeal both his non-judicial punishment and his detachment for cause by Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet.

He has also taken every opportunity to spare the families of the fallen, and the Fightin’ FITZ crew, any unnecessary recitation of events and circumstances surrounding the tragic collision—including by unconditionally waiving his right to a preliminary hearing at court-martial.

Cmdr. Benson’s approach to accountability stands in stark contrast to the Navy’s method of litigating this case through the media and other out-of-court opinions and declarations from senior Navy leaders. Rather than achieving accountability, the Navy’s strategy harms the very system of justice that is designed to protect Sailors. Congress enacted the Uniform Code to provide every service member a constitutional framework to separate fact from fiction—so justice can prevail. A fair court-martial will expose the facts of the collision’s causes and Cmdr. Benson’s actions. Subverting this time-tested process through extra-tribunal statements only undermines fundamental fairness and erodes public confidence in the entire military justice system.

Despite the Navy’s prejudicial public affairs approach, Cmdr. Benson awaits the outcome of his law-bound, fact-finding tribunal, and hopes for a swift and just conclusion to these proceedings.

 

[tomahawk6]

The judge found that undue command influence by the top two officers in the USN was minimal and the trial would continue. He chastised both Admirals.


https://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/no-dismissal-in-court-martial-of-uss-fitzgerald-commander-1.561838

 

[tomahawk6]

The not so secret report of the Fitzgerald collision.

https://www.stripes.com/news/close-call-before-uss-fitzgerald-s-fatal-collision-went-unreviewed-report-says-1.564794

https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2019/01/14/worse-than-you-thought-inside-the-secret-fitzgerald-probe-the-navy-doesnt-want-you-to-read/

 

[FSTO]

The not so secret report of the Fitzgerald collision.

https://www.stripes.com/news/close-call-before-uss-fitzgerald-s-fatal-collision-went-unreviewed-report-says-1.564794

https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2019/01/14/worse-than-you-thought-inside-the-secret-fitzgerald-probe-the-navy-doesnt-want-you-to-read/

Those reads were eye opening. I had an inkling that things were bad, but I had no idea they were that bad.
I forwarded this article to a colleague of mine who just arrived from the coast. She told me that she is seeing the inklings of the same issues popping up in the RCN.
It's minimal right now and can be fixed but our leadership needs to be able to tell the senior leadership NO every once in a while.

 

[Retired AF Guy]

In the last couple of days Propublica has published two reports looking into the USS Fitzgerald and USS John S. McCain collisions.

The first report looks at the events leading up to of the USS Fitzgerald collision and how undermining, long hours and poor training contributed to the collision. The report also details the crews reaction to the collision. 

The second report looks at how the USN and its political masters neglected the 7th Fleet and allowed manning levels, training and maintenance to fall to dangerous levels and how they refused to heed warnings about these shortcomings.

Very sobering.

 

[Navy_Pete]

Those reads were eye opening. I had an inkling that things were bad, but I had no idea they were that bad.
I forwarded this article to a colleague of mine who just arrived from the coast. She told me that she is seeing the inklings of the same issues popping up in the RCN.
It's minimal right now and can be fixed but our leadership needs to be able to tell the senior leadership NO every once in a while.

Nope, now is the time to do more with less. Our 30ish year old ships with the new subwoofers and ground effects can maintain the same high tempo with less maintenance than ever.

/s

 

[tomahawk6]

Looks like Lt Woodley will get to stay in the Navy but will he ever get another promotion ? All charges had been dropped.

https://www.stripes.com/report-no-basis-found-to-separate-lieutenant-in-uss-fitzgerald-collision-1.572225

A Navy board of inquiry found no reason to remove from the service a lieutenant charged last year in the fatal collision of the USS Fitzgerald, according to a report Monday by U.S. Naval Institute News.

Lt. Irian Woodley was accused of failing in his duties the day the guided-missile destroyer collided with a Philippine-flagged container ship in the waters south of Japan on June 17, 2017. Seven sailors died as a result of the collision.

After an Article 32 hearing in July, the charges against Woodley — dereliction in the performance of duties through neglect resulting in death, negligent hazarding of a vessel and negligent homicide — were dropped. In an Article 32 hearing, like a preliminary hearing in civilian court, a military court rules whether enough evidence exists to take a criminal case to trial.