Using our military muscle - from the front page of the Globe and Mail

[The Bread Guy]

Yet another bit of public debate fodder from the Globe:

Across the country, the 23 Canadian Forces bases and a host of stations, posts, and support units are what connect men and women in uniform to the society they defend. For small towns and rural areas, they are a key driver of the local economy; for regions, part of the community. And for politicians, they're a way of life they're wary of messing with.

Some former military figures argue the Canadian Forces could get by with as few as a dozen bases. But can Stephen Harper's  minority government, always facing a nearby election, risk the politics of closing bases such as CFB Borden in Simcoe County, Ont., where former Tory Helena Guergis is running as an independent?

The conundrum is that if Canada's military doesn't cut bases, it will have to trim people, or training, or planes, or ships. All the plans, including expanding the forces and purchasing a shopping list of equipment - fighter jets, navy ships, maritime-surveillance planes and more - can't be paid for with the money now set aside. Operating costs - personnel, training, maintenance, buildings, and bases - will eat away money to replace equipment.

"It's a sure-fire route to obsolescence, irrelevance, and rust-out," says retired Navy Commodore Eric Lerhe, now an analyst critical of the Forces' overhead costs.

After deep cuts in the 1990s when equipment aged and the forces were downsized, Canadians have seen defence spending increase substantially - up 40 per cent since 2004. But hard long-term choices still have to be made. The Forces will have to cut infrastructure and administration. Even so, buying the fighters the air force wants now might mean passing on ships the navy needs later.

Deficit pressures and a slow economy loom. Those who call for vastly increased spending are unlikely to be satisfied. Barring a major public shift, the political reality is we're unlikely to spend much more. Mr. Harper's pro-military Conservatives trimmed spending-increase plans in their 2010 budget.

In 2008, the Conservative government set out its Canada First Defence Strategy with a plan to replace and add fleets of planes and ships and expand the Forces' numbers, with rising defence spending that would total $490-billion over 20 years. But the 2010 budget confirmed not only that the extra sums allocated for deployment to Afghanistan will end in 2011, it cut back base-spending increases by seemingly minor annual amounts that will add up over time. Under current projections, there will be $44-billion less than under the 2008 defence strategy - a shortfall greater than the entire sum of $35-billion the government set aside to replace and upgrade the major fleets of ships, planes and vehicles.

Even with the bigger sums planned in the defence strategy, analysts worried the 12 per cent of funding set aside for all capital spending on equipment was far from the 20 to 25 per cent typically required to update. Now, Canada's military faces the task of cutting operating costs to buy equipment, when half of defence costs are for personnel, and the Forces' numbers are supposed to grow.

"The larger you grow the Canadian Forces, the less equipment they're able to buy, and they already can barely buy the equipment they need," says University of Ottawa defence analyst Philippe Lagassé.

The Canadian Forces have appointed a chief of transformation, Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, to trim about $1-billion from overhead and operating costs in the $19-billion base budget and devote it to things that fly, sail, roll, or shoot. But the shortfall means that over time, more than $2-billion a year would have to be trimmed from the plans to pay for all the equipment.

The military will have to become leaner. The 69,000 men and women in the uniforms of the regular force include only 46,000 in its main fighting forces - 22,000 in the army, 14,000 in the air force, 9,000 in the navy, and about 1,000 in the special forces. About 10,000 are in basic training. Another 12,000 are at headquarters, in national commands, recruitment, personnel, information and medical staff, and the defence department also has 28,000 civilian employees ....

More here.

 

[pbi]

It seems to me that every time we go somewhere unpleasant and dangerous, there is a national reaction (led by various folk in the media and chattering classes) along the lines of "Oh my God that was a disaster that violated all our national principles and we'll never do that again" (or words to that effect).

I distinctly recall that type of feeling being widely expressed in response to our involvement in FRY (esp Bosnia before IFOR), Somalia (especially Somalia...), Kosovo (despite very high support at the outset) and now Afghanistan. It spiked every time we killed/were killed. IMHO Canadians, perhaps understandably, struggle with the idea of other Canadians going somewhere and killing/being killed. (Unless of course it happened 50 years ago, in which case it is recalled with fitting pride and reverence, as something "in the history books")

But, strangely enough, just as surely as we have these periodic national cold-feet episodes, the next conflict we get into is almost always meaner and nastier and more dangerous than the one before. And we go in bigger and better equipped. At least, when I compare my time in Cyprus in 1991 to my time in Croatia in 1994 to Afghanistan in 2004/2005, and all we have done there since, this is what I see. When I look at pictures of us rumbling around the Dalmatian hills in 1994 with old M113s, tinpot helmets, Vietnam-style flak jackets and blast blankets under the seat as "armour", it seems to me to be 100 years ago. But, funnily enough, we thought ourselves far better equipped and trained than we had been went we went to Cyprus, and facing a much more dangerous situation. Our ROE were light years beyond Cyprus (in UNFICYP we couldn't even put on helmets or fit magazines to weapons without specific orders...)

All this rambling is to say that despite the blowback (the natural product of a free society in which there is a diversity of opinion and unrestricted access to expression of same), I believe that we are actually growing up as a nation, and realizing that if we want a world free of dangerous, murderous ***-holes we might have to actually get out there now and then and do something grim about it. Not in a warmongering, "imperialist" sort of way, but more like the old time town cop who, after trying to reason  patiently with a trouble maker, finally sighs, pulls out his billy and gives him a few smart cracks on the head and a swift one in the ribs.

The challenge, as has been ably pointed out here, is for the Govt of the day to explain very clearly to Canadians just exactly what the "whys and wherefores" are, from the get go. All the blood and sacrifice of some very brave and dedicated Canadian soldiers can't redeem what I think has been a dismal effort (by two different Govts) to do so.

Cheers

 

[Edward Campbell]

...
The challenge, as has been ably pointed out here, is for the Govt of the day to explain very clearly to Canadians just exactly what the "whys and wherefores" are, from the get go. All the blood and sacrifice of some very brave and dedicated Canadian soldiers can't redeem what I think has been a dismal effort (by two different Govts) to do so.

Cheers

Very true. In fact the previous (Martin) government was more forthcoming than the current (Harper) one. Prime Minister Martin was, indeed, Mister Dithers but all that dithering did, now and again produce useful results. I fear that such a clear, lucid expression of Canada's foreign policy goals and methods is quite beyond the capacity of Prime Minster Harper and his 'team' which is all about partisan, political tactics and never about a national strategy.

It takes both courage and brains to recognize the need for a coherent, productive (likely to succeed) national strategy and even more courage to enunciate it. Harper has lots of brains ...

 

[pbi]

ERC: I've been a Tory all my life but I am in exact agreement with your take on the current govt. In the last few years that I was in the RegF, I began to become aware of the very restrictive, "information is power" sort of approach that the current incumbents take towards informing the public, particularly where Afgh was concerned. I was reliably informed at one point that the PM, early in his tenure, was quite uncomfortable with the CF's very liberal and open media and public engagement approaches. (Note that no other Fed Govt dept or agency came even close to us in this respect, even after OGDs were deployed into theatre). It's my impression that the level of openness, particularly engaging very junior folks on camera, has been cut back somewhat.

I have also at times been uncomfortable with what I perceived as "hiding behind the troops" as a justification to avoid being forthcoming on Afgh-related issues that were unpleasant. There is a place in a free and civil society for public debate: questioning Govt policy during a conflict might be ill-informed, but to me it does not automatically equate to a treasonous or disloyal act toward the country. The problem with people hiding behind you is that sometimes you end up taking the "bullet" that was meant for them.

Cheers

 

[Kirkhill]

I won't disagree with the perceptions of Messrs Martin and Harper but in this whole sad tale I personally find the role of the Globe and Mail disingenuous to say the least.

For them to proclaim themselves "Opinion Leaders" and arbiters of the social conscience and then bemoan the fact that Canadians have a poor understanding of the world around them and the needs of that world is pretty base.

If they were "Opinion Leaders" rather than pimps, panderers and profiteers then they might start pointing out that: nobody gets out of this world alive and consequently infinite spending on health care will not change that reality;
governments do not create treasure, wealth or jobs and thus much of the bureaucratic effort is wasteful if not counter-productive;
Uncle Sam will only protect us as long as it is in his interests and he is able;
Canada is a ridiculously rich and spoiled sliver of humanity sitting on a disproportionate share of the world's resources.

Further to that last - we will only survive as a nation as long as we are seen to be distributing those resources at fair market value.  One of the ways in which we compensate for our privileged position our position which allow us to live in the style to which we have become accustomed, is to rebate to the rest of humanity services which we in our idyll/idleness, can afford.

If we don't contirbute to the common good in a manner that the market believes is acceptable then they will devalue our products or come to get them themselves...... at which point a larger commitment to defence of the national treasure may become demonstrably necesssary.

Edit to add:

In my opinion the biggest single contributing factor to Canadians failing to come to grips with the need for the Afghanistan operation and future similar operations was the common position espoused by all parties in parliament that Afghanistan was a mission of choice and not necessity and that, consequently, we could leave anytime we liked because: "IT JUST DOESN'T MATTER".  Just as Americans were taught by their politicians and that Vietnam just din't matter.

Why is Britain different?  Because that attitude has never been as pervasive there. 

Why was Tony Blair so dangerous?  Because he and that socialist git of a Fly Fifer he gave the keys of the Treasury damnear wrecked that.

 

[brihard]

The Globe has in fact posted the original article online.

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/time-to-lead/military/using-our-military-muscle/article1768703/comments/

The comments, of course, are rather predictable.

 

[ArmyRick]

This very interesting thread to read. To think Canadians have really woken up to what our military does and that Pearson age peacekeeping aint going to happen. I think many canadians have gotten a deeper understanding, especially in the last 4 years of what we do.

Another person brought up the point about wining the fights in A-stan but not winning agaisnt the insurgency. I beleive that to truly defeat the insurgency, you will really need to know them. In other words it will be the Afghans who will do it but it will take serious political will to make it happen. I am not going to comment on the state of Karzai government, I simply haven't done enough research to form a half intelligent opinion.

As far as an insurgency. Imagine a class of grade 2 kids. The teacher knows them and knows who the smart ones are, the apple polishers, the trouble makers, the slow ones, etc, etc. Now she is is sick for a week and in comes the supply teacher. The supply teacher will teach the material and she will enforce the rules but she will not truly have an understanding of who is who, until she spends some serious time interacting with them. AT first, all she will see, is a classroom full of smiling faces.

That is very simplified but I see counter insurgency as similar to that.

 

[The Bread Guy]

The comments, of course, are rather predictable.

I'm intrigued by the results of the unofficial online survey:

Will having a strong military be more or less important in the future?

    * More important
    * Less important
    * Same importance as today

More important
48% 5181 votes

Less important
27% 2874 votes

Same importance as today
25% 2739 votes

 

[Journeyman]

This very interesting thread to read. To think Canadians have really woken up to what our military does and that Pearson age peacekeeping aint going to happen.

From a quick reading of the comments that follow the article, one of the recurring rants is, "how dare the Globe denigrate 'Romantic notions of Pearsonian peacekeeping'!"

I'm afraid those chanting the Military as Peacekeeper mantra are still out there.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Can we “use our military muscle” if most Canadians are too timid? Yet more, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from the Globe and Mail, on that topic:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/time-to-lead/military/selling-conflict-to-a-skeptical-public/article1772740/singlepage/#articlecontent

Selling conflict to a skeptical public

JEREMY TOROBIN

Ottawa— From Tuesday's Globe and Mail
Published Tuesday, Oct. 26, 2010

It seemed straightforward in the days after terrorists smashed jetliners into the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon.

Leaders of NATO countries knew they had to stand by their traumatized ally. For a time, their voting publics understood this too.

But nine years since the invasion of Afghanistan, Americans wonder why more of their blood and treasure should be spent on what seems like a failing venture. As a result, President Barack Obama has scaled back U.S. ambitions for success in Afghanistan and put the world on notice that there is a time limit to the U.S. commitment.

Waning support from Canadians helped prompt the Harper government to agree to a 2011 end to our combat presence.

Britons, skeptical about the shape-shifting rationales for invading Iraq and Afghanistan, have stopped buying the argument that Britain's overseas entanglements are reducing, rather than fuelling, extremism at home.

The Netherlands, which saw a government fall over the mission earlier this year, kept a promise to withdraw all 1,950 Dutch troops in August.

Welcome to the dilemma facing leaders in the 21st century. The conflicts of the future will likely be smaller-scale versions of the messy affairs of the past decade: long, complicated, with goals that are hard to define and harder to achieve.

At some point, Western governments will be urged to act, whether to try to untangle the tribal complexities in Afghanistan, getting between rival factions in Congo or prodding authorities in Yemen, Somalia or the Philippines to root out Muslim radicals plotting attacks on U.S. soil.

The question for leaders after Iraq and Afghanistan is this: Can you sell a war that no one wants? And if you can't,, how does that affect global security?

"The bar is probably higher now," says Eugene Lang, a former adviser to two Liberal defence ministers and co-author, with Janice Gross Stein, of The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar.

"After 9/11, the bar was pretty low, because you'd had a really game-changing event, people believed the world had changed fundamentally overnight, and on top of that you had relatively strong economies."

All of the advanced economies face years of high unemployment, tepid real-estate markets and belt-tightening measures that aren't conducive to expensive military adventures, where casualties and strategic missteps are visible to voters.

But those dynamics may be most acute in the U.S., exacerbated by feelings that America's traditional allies are cutting defence budgets to the point of uselessness, and that emerging powers should step up and do more.

"Americans will say, 'Why should it be us?' if it is truly a post-American world, or a post-Western world," says Christopher Coker, a professor of strategic studies and international relations at the London School of Economics.

"They will be looking at the cheaper options more and more, as the politically sustainable ones, and the economically sustainable ones."

That means responses could be "much more minimalist" for the foreseeable future, Prof. Coker said: unmanned drones for things such as targeted assassinations; quick special forces operations on the ground as needed, and no drawn-out attempts at "nation-building under fire" by large numbers of conventional troops.

More than 40 countries, including Canada, are investing in drone technology. The United States alone has quadrupled drone strikes in the tribal areas of Pakistan since Mr. Obama was elected, and the military plans to double production of them next year.

"They can endure strategically, and so can the country, because the country isn't asked to make any sacrifices," Prof. Coker said.

The irony, however, is that by heeding the lack of public appetite for a heavy ground presence - which many experts still insist offers the best hope of keeping local populations onside - politicians might end up making things worse.

Drone strikes in the tribal areas of Pakistan, for example, appear to have done little in the battle for hearts and minds. It's unclear how many civilians the drones are killing, or whether new recruits are being driven into the arms of the Taliban as a result of the thunderous Hellfire missiles crashing around them.

But what is clear is that the relentless drone campaign is creating an atmosphere of fear and paranoia among citizens.

A recent poll by the New America Foundation, a Washington think tank, of residents in the tribal areas of western Pakistan found 38 per cent feel the United States is the biggest threat to their personal safety, compared with 16 per cent who said it was the Taliban. The study also found 76 per cent oppose the drone attacks, and 77 per cent believe the U.S.-led war on terror's real purpose is to weaken and divide the Muslim world to ensure American domination.

Is it possible that a decade of favouring quick fixes such as drones to appease a generation of war-weary Western voters could burden the next generation with costlier conflicts to undo the damage?

"Minimal strategies are affordable," Prof. Coker says. "Whether they're effective or not is a completely different matter, but they're the ones that will be most attractive, at least in the short to medium term."

Stephen Saideman, a political science professor at McGill University who specializes in international security, questions whether drones are necessarily the way of the future.

"Drones have utility, but they can only work if we have people on the ground gathering intelligence."

After all, if the real ticket out of Afghanistan and other failed states is to train local armies so they can fight insurgencies themselves, that requires years of side-by-side nurturing and teaching. That means boots on the ground - not just drones in the air.

"The standard language is they can fight their wars better than we can," Prof. Saideman says. "But they can't get there until we train them. That involves infantry, special forces, guys on the ground with guns."

But short-term pain for long-term gain no longer seems an acceptable argument, for voters or for the governments they elect - and turf out.

"It's going to be really hard to do anything like Afghanistan again in the future, because all these countries are stretched, and burned by it," Prof. Saideman argues. "Politicians paid a lot of cost for it domestically, and we still don't know where it's all going."

Nevertheless, he predicts voters could still be galvanized to support interventions in the case of "a humanitarian crisis that is so clearly one-sided that the publics of NATO countries become so motivated to say, 'Afghanistan was hard, but we're going to do this because what we see here in country X is so awful.' "

Indeed, though polls show Canadian politicians could face voters' wrath if they authorized another overseas mission in the next while, some observers say our self-image as an outward-looking, benevolent force for good in the world will ultimately prevail.

With so many foreign-born Canadians, internationalism is increasingly becoming "part of our DNA," or our "new nationalism," says Norman Hillmer, a Carleton University professor and leading authority on Canadian military and political history.

Plus, starting in the late 1990s and through the Afghanistan mission, he notes, Canadians have become more at ease with and "more respectful" of our military past, and less attached to the idea that we should be peacekeepers.

None of that means selling future wars to Canadians will be easy, with today's battles fought in a 24-hour, real-time media environment where "every death and every setback gets sensationalized," Prof. Hillmer says.

Elsewhere I recommended a book by Michael Mandelbaum that makes the point that the world, including Canada, will have to get used to idea that America will not, because it cannot afford to, underwrite global peace and security. That leaves some stark options:

1. Accept, live with, a much less safe and stable world; and/or

2. Pick up some of the load.

Canadians, like the Europeans, fear 1 (how many more 9/11s must we endure?) but hate 2 for its expense.

This may be the key article in the Globe's ongoing series.

 

[PanaEng]

From a quick reading of the comments that follow the article, one of the recurring rants is, "how dare the Globe denigrate 'Romantic notions of Pearsonian peacekeeping'!"

I'm afraid those chanting the Military as Peacekeeper mantra are still out there.

I used to be alarmed about the comments on articles in both the CBC and G&M until I realized that the opinions tend to change depending on the time of day:  (these are my unscientific generalizations)

• early in the morning: very conservative - the lefties were still sleeping while the older people got up early to start their day and check out the stories before heading to work or do their gardens and stuff
• mid day: left - the lefties are at work using their office computers to post drivel (i'm on my coffee break, ok)
• evening: conservative or balanced - the extreme-left are out smoking it out while the people with jobs go home, spend time with family and then catch up with 'stories'

in the end it doesn't matter; you have the same small set of people commenting on every article over and over again.

/rant

 

[OldSolduer]

Clear this up for me:

Is the Globe and Mail left leaning or right leaning or somewhere in the middle?

 

[The Bread Guy]

Clear this up for me:

Is the Globe and Mail left leaning or right leaning or somewhere in the middle?

Generally left-of-centre, but its new Publisher, Phil Crawley (bio, PDF), has a history of working for more right-of-centre papers elsewhere in the Commonwealth, and beyond.

 

[observor 69]

In Toronto...TO Star definitely left, National Post definitely right, G&M centre and prides itself in taking a pragmatic informed stand.
How'd you guess I subscribe to the G&M? 

 

[The Bread Guy]

Interesting....  This appears to be an intriguing article that should be visible somewhere at the G&M site (from Google search)....

Replenishing Canada's reserves
Globe and Mail - David Pratt - ‎1 hour ago‎
Canada's often-neglected army reservists have been tested under fire and in floods and the verdict is in: These guys and girls are pretty damn good. ...

.... but the link doesn't work (yet?)

Looking forward to seeing what it'll have to say.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Interesting....  This appears to be an intriguing article that should be visible somewhere at the G&M site (from Google search)........ but the link doesn't work (yet?)

Looking forward to seeing what it'll have to say.

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from the Globe and Mail, is the article by former Liberal defence minister David Pratt:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/opinion/replenishing-canadas-reserves/article1773976/

Replenishing Canada’s reserves

DAVID PRATT

From Wednesday's Globe and Mail
Published Tuesday, Oct. 26, 2010

“Weekend warriors” are what they used to be called – but not so much any more. Canada’s often-neglected army reservists have been tested under fire and in floods and the verdict is in: These guys and girls are pretty damn good.

About 20 per cent to 30 per cent of Canada’s brigade group in Afghanistan are reservists. As one serving general told me, “We couldn’t have done what we’ve done in Afghanistan without the reserves. We would have crashed and burned.” The “we-them” mentality that once marked the relationship between the regulars and Canada’s part-time soldiers has virtually disappeared. “When we hold a ramp ceremony at Kandahar,” the general said, “nobody asks if the soldier was ‘reg force’ or reserves.”

The reservists’ performance shouldn’t come as a surprise. For years, they’ve soldiered on with little fanfare in Canadian peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations. But it’s not just on foreign deployments that the reserves are getting positive reviews. Recently, the Defence Minister showered praise on more than 200 local reservists involved in Canadian Forces’ relief efforts in Newfoundland and Labrador after Hurricane Igor.

With Afghanistan winding down, it’s time to rethink the role of Canada’s army reservists and the support we provide them. The reserves currently have three tasks: a base for full mobilization, augmentation of the regular forces, and the army’s footprint in communities across Canada.

Many who speak for the reserves see mass mobilization as the raison d’être of the institution. But how relevant is that role today? While predictions are tricky, few strategic analysts see any possibility of major state-to-state warfare in the coming years. More likely threats include terrorism, insurgencies, ethnic conflict, failed states and piracy.

In other words, we are likely to be in “nasty little wars” such as Afghanistan, not big ones. That’s not to say we don’t need to plan for army expansion. It just means our plans need to reflect current realities and not a Second World War-sized army. As one retired officer told me, “Total mobilization is a total waste of time.”

The other two reserve roles – augmentation and footprint in the community – have proved their worth. Our army is simply too small to be able to fill all its needs using the regular forces, and the reserves are an important reservoir of critical skills from combat to civil-military co-operation, public affairs, logistics and geomatics.

The reserves ensure that the connection between the army and its citizens remains strong. So it’s vital that our army be present throughout the country as it is in the 130 reserve units in 110 communities across Canada. An army garrisoned on a few large bases loses contact with the people it’s intended to protect.

So it’s time to have reservists step more fully into the role of homeland security with the regular forces involved largely in expeditionary efforts. The reserves have distinguished themselves in ice storms, floods, hurricanes and other natural disasters. And there’s every reason to believe they would do equally well if faced with non-traditional threats from pandemics to attacks on critical infrastructure.

But if the reserves are going to be able to do what we ask of them, they’ll need more resources and support than they’ve received. The Harper government’s Canada First Defence Strategy flatlined reserves growth over the next 20 years and was silent about future roles. Recent defence cuts are likely a harbinger for what’s ahead. Long-standing problems exist in recruiting, retention, training, equipment, post-deployment care and employer support. And there’s no overall strategy to fix them.

Canada’s reserves have done all we’ve asked and more. It’s time we paid some attention to this venerable Canadian institution to ensure they’ll be well-trained and well-equipped when we need them – and there’s absolutely no doubt we will.

David Pratt, a senior research fellow at the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, was minister of national defence from December of 2003 to July of 2004 and served as a special adviser to the Canadian Red Cross from 2004 to 2008.

It seems to me that every attempt to define some very specific role for the reserves has foundered in a storm of vested interests and headquarters over-reach.

 

[Edward Campbell]

And yet more, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from the Globe and Mail, as it (the Globe) conducts a fairly detailed examination of national defence and the military:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/time-to-lead/military/how-much-is-arctic-security-worth/article1774292/singlepage/#articlecontent

How much is Arctic security worth?

JOSH WINGROVE

Cold Lake, Alta.— From Wednesday's Globe and Mail
Published Wednesday, Oct. 27, 2010

The "Q" is a lot like any other office: There's cake today (an unspecified occasion), coffee is brewing, and sports highlights play on a big screen in a lounge.

Just another office - except for the siren. And the top-secret maps. And the stable of fighter jets waiting just outside the door.

A bunker in the heart of rural Alberta, the Quick Reaction Area, or Q, is a staging ground for one of Canada's two fighter jet squadrons. From here, CF-18 Hornets patrol half of Canada, from Vancouver Island up to Baffin Island, and everywhere in between. When Russian bombers brush up against Canadian air space (three or four times a year), it's these pilots who go to meet them - on this recent fall day, cake day, pilots are returning from doing just that. It's known as Northern Sovereignty Operations, and it's one of their two current mandates. The other is anti-terrorism under Operation Noble Eagle - if an airliner were hijacked, the Q would respond.

INFOGRAPHIC
Canada's line of defence
Globe and Mail

"The aircraft are put up to be ready on short notice, or a no-notice situation," explains Major Travis (Brass) Brassington, the deputy commanding officer of Cold Lake's fighter squadron. "We're here to do whatever we need. I think what I'm getting at is, we don't just do Russian bombers."

For more than a decade, they didn't do Russian bombers at all - The Tupolev "Bear" bombers were mothballed at the end of the Cold War. But in August of 2007, they began flying sorties once again. Many describe the flybys purely as a propaganda tool, sabre-rattling by Russia to show its deterrent credibility in light of the U.S. missile-shield plan.

Nevertheless, with a warming climate opening the Northwest Passage and rich oil fields of the Arctic, there's been hot talk of who-owns-what and a chill about Moscow's plans. Cue Canada's Northern security blanket: its CF-18s.

Major Brassington's team is the most pointed part of a multi-pronged Canadian government presence in the North. There's the Aurora maritime surveillance planes, the Twin Otter utility and search-and-rescue planes, the Coast Guard, the Navy, a small Canadian Forces detachment (200 soldiers who make up Joint Task Force North in Yellowknife), and the Canadian Rangers, who are effectively reservists scattered across 57 far-north communities.

Altogether, they're tasked with four key jobs: basic military defence; preventing or intercepting terrorists or other unwanted interlopers; affirming Canadian sovereignty amid border disputes; and responding to disabled planes or ships to rescue those aboard.

As Ottawa looks to ramp up its presence in the North, it has to make choices. The CF-18s need to be replaced. But aging too are the Otters, Auroras, and many of the Coast Guard's ships (five of its six largest are at the end of their lives; not one of its 33 biggest ships were built after 1996). Canada's North is served by aging hardware in pressing need of replacement at every turn, and funding is tight. For instance, a $3.1-billion deal to buy six new Arctic offshore patrol ships for the navy may be revisited - Canada will either need to pledge more money, buy fewer ships, or buy poorer quality.

Despite those needs, Ottawa is set to pledge $16-billion - at least - in an untendered contract to replace the 80 or so remaining CF-18s with 65 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, to the development of which it contributed $150-million (U.S.) eight years ago. It's a top-end aircraft being used by many of Canada's allies.

Defence analyst Steven Staples calls the single-source contract purchase "fundamentally flawed." Some wonder if it's too much plane, and suggest a cheaper fighter augmented with unmanned aircraft for surveillance.

"The big question is, who is your enemy? The idea that Russia will invade Ellesmere, go down to Baffin and into Northern Quebec is preposterous," says Ken Coates, an arctic historian and dean of arts at the University of Waterloo. "What we're really trying to do is prove to all that we have a presence in the area and are capable of putting our feet on the ground almost anywhere, almost any time."

Ottawa could seek less costly planes, sacrificing bells and whistles to free up cash for buying more day-to-day hardware. A competitive bidding process might result in a cheaper options - European, Swedish and French jets or the SuperHornet, the successor to the CF-18 - all capable of intercepting a hijacked jet or escorting a Tupolev. Some argue that Eurofighter Typhoons cruise faster and are more manoeuvrable for air-to-air combat, and the F-35's real advantage is dodging anti-aircraft fire and other defences in a bombing campaign overseas. The F-35 isn't an ideal Arctic plane, because it has only one engine. The CF-18 has two, leaving pilots with a way to get home if the other quits above unforgiving Arctic terrain.

Every dollar saved could be devoted to other critical needs in the north, including ships, satellites and new search planes.

But it would leave Canada well short of the most advanced options. The alternative fighters are often characterized as being between fourth and fifth-generation. The F-35 is an elite plane. It's one of the world's two fifth-generation fighters, and the only one that's for sale. Since Ottawa plans to keep these planes for decades, it wants to buy the best. But it may be overkill - the F-35 is a stealth fighter. The Bear bombers, with their massive frames, couldn't be any less stealthy.

Colonel David Wheeler - the commanding officer of the Cold Lake air base, known as 4 Wing - says his fliers "absolutely" need new fighters and the F-35 is the best choice.

"Bottom line is there's a number of nations buying it, it is a new aircraft, so it will allow us to keep this aircraft for - what'd we keep the Hornet for? 40 years? - probably another 40 years," he says.

"It's to ensure that we are secure, that we are comfortable with our sovereignty, and that we're about to be interoperable with our allies. Without a fighter - and specifically this fighter - that would be very difficult to do."

Lieutenant-Colonel Rob Carter, 4 Wing's operations officer and one of its three pilots to have dropped a live bomb in combat, thinks the new fighters need to be able to do anything, as Canada's future military role is unclear. Stealth, as such, is useful.

"A lot of people may not buy into that," he acknowledges. "But I'm sure most people have life insurance. And the reason you have life insurance is just in case something bad happens."

The fighter decision comes as the world's five Arctic Ocean nations - Canada, the United States, Russia, Denmark and Norway - continue to firm up borders, mapping parts of the continental shelf so that disputes can be resolved through international law. Canada and Russia continue to debate where to draw the line on an underwater Arctic shelf between the two countries.

A nation can claim a shelf if it proves it is a part of its land mass, and in doing so gets everything under the shelf. In this case, a country would own any oil discovered below. Surveying looks promising, but it's impossible to tell what reserves lie below.

Canada also continues to claim the Northwest Passage as its own internal waterway, while the U.S. and many other nations insist it's an international strait, and they have a right to sail through it without asking. The new Arctic ships would help patrol the waterway as it continues to open - though traffic is currently light and only a few dozen ships have so far navigated its waters - to regulate future traffic and deter interlopers.

Many say the boundary disputes are often over-emphasized. "Frankly, virtually all the claims have been settled," says Peter Harrison, a Queen's University professor, northern sovereignty expert and former senior associate deputy minister in Canada's Department of Indian and Northern Affairs.

It will be diplomatic negotiation through the United Nations that will settle the Arctic shelf issue with Russia, "and it could take a long, long, long, long time," he says.

So, without threat of a Russian invasion and boundary disputes largely solved, there's less domestic footing to defend the blind buy of top-tier fighters. What role they could play internationally remains unclear. The fliers at the Q will take what they get, but insist a multi-role fighter is a necessity.

"If they want to do surveillance of the North, I'm sure we can have satellites, [unmanned planes], stuff like that. But that's not what the mandate is," Major Brassington says. "If you're going to protect your sovereignty, if the protection of your border is that important, you can't protect it by looking at it."

The Arctic has its own special place in Canada’s political mythology – something Stephen Harper has noted; he visits and talks a lot and spends next to nothing, which appears sufficient for the overwhelming majority of Canadian voters.

But: kudos to the Globe and Mail for this series. 

 

[Edward Campbell]

In addition to LGen Leslie’s comments about forthcoming cuts, the Good Grey Globe also offers this, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from the Globe and Mail, as more in its ongoing series about Canada’s defences:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/time-to-lead/military/canadas-navy-force-of-the-future-ships-from-the-past/article1775775/

CANADA'S NAVY
Force of the future, ships from the past

ROBERT MATAS

Aboard HMCS Winnipeg— From Thursday's Globe and Mail
Published Thursday, Oct. 28, 2010

HMCS Winnipeg, designed in the Cold War days for anti-submarine warfare, has an arsenal at her disposal that includes a 20 mm Gatling gun, a Bofors 57 mm gun, an evolved Sea Sparrow missile system and SSM harpoons to engage any challenge to Canada's sovereignty.

But these days, the guns typically are silent: On a routine training exercise on calm waters off Vancouver Island, the ship recently responded to a mayday call from Barkley Sound. A small fishing vessel called Tagoola with three people aboard was taking on water. HMCS Winnipeg arrived around the same time as the local Coast Guard . While the Coast Guard towed them to safety, the navy made sure everyone was all right and then carried on.

INFOGRAPHIC
Canada's naval fleet
Globe and Mail

The 15-year-old frigate is rarely idle. The warship was used this summer to help the RCMP and Canada's border services bring a boatload of Tamil men, women and children to shore. Last year, it was part of an international anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden.

The world has changed since HMCS Winnipeg was commissioned in the mid-1990s, and the navy has changed with it. Military analysts say Canada's highly flexible and mobile navy is now particularly well suited to promote the country's interests in a world where terrorists, migrants and pirates have replaced Cold Warriors. Whether that potential can be realized depends on whether, in an era of restraint, Ottawa comes through with plans to upgrade and expand the naval force.

Some might still view navies as the military tool of the past, harking back to gunboat diplomacy and the battleship buildups before the Second World War. But surprisingly, navies are the force of the future, especially for countries such as Canada. When there's a problem, we often send a ship.

The navy has some unique advantages: It can deploy almost immediately, without necessarily relying on infringing on the sovereignty of other nations or requiring establishment of a base overseas. Its vessels can be active in an area without putting people on solid ground. Its entire fleet can be moved within a week to 10 days, can be self-sufficient for as long as two weeks and can be withdrawn as fast as it came. In sharp contrast, an army formation requires 30 days to move; the air force  needs a field to land in, often requiring a round of high-level diplomatic negotiations to clear the way.
In Haiti, Canadian navy ships delivered aid, equipment and engineers; in the Gulf of Aden, they policed pirates. Canada may also have a role as China and other Asian nations expand their Pacific navies. If those powers clash at sea, Canada's military may not have a big impact on a war - but a Canadian navy task force, along with those of other nations, could play a big role in keeping them from coming too close at tense moments, while keeping key shipping lanes open.

Canada's ships and crews have shown what they can do, whether in Newfoundland, Somalia or Haiti. But after decades of neglect, does the navy have the boats to do the job?

The multibillion-dollar Canada First Defence Strategy announced in May, 2008, held out fresh promise for a modern navy that would have new Arctic patrol ships and 15 upgraded warships to replace the fleet's backbone of destroyers and frigates over 20 years. But current projections for defence spending are far less than that strategy proclaimed.

The plans to build three new multipurpose supply ships have been whittled down to two basic oilers to replace the aging HMCS Protecteur and HMCS Preserver, which provide at-sea support for refuelling and resupplying naval task groups and helicopter operations.

Canada First also calls for spending $3.1-billion on the acquisition of six to eight Arctic patrol ships capable of breaking one-year-old ice, starting in 2013. But the project is being trimmed to fit the budget and the first ship won't be ready by then. The strategy pledged new ships to replace the navy's three aging destroyers, which go out of service in 2017, and its 12 frigates in the next decade - but it's not clear whether there will be enough money to pay the more than $40-billion needed to replace those 15 warships.

David Zimmerman, a military historian at the University of Victoria, says the navy could fulfill its mission with the fleet at its current strength, but only if the government carries through with its commitment to replace and upgrade the supply ships and frigates, and acquire the Arctic patrol ships. "The real issue," he says, "is will the government actually come through with this multibillion-dollar commitment?"

Canada's track record does not bode well. "The history of the Canadian navy has been boom or bust - and more bust than boom," Dr. Zimmerman says.

Peter Haydon, at Dalhousie University's Centre for Foreign Policy Studies in Halifax, says the navy needs to expand as well as upgrade and modernize its current fleet.

The navy needs possibly two more patrol vessels to keep watch on the oil rigs in the Grand Banks and the increased oil traffic along the sea lanes from B.C. to Asia. The ships could provide the necessary command-and-control centres and medical facilities that are not available on the Coast Guard ships, he says.

Another supply ship in rotation on short notice is essential for overhaul, he also said, pointing to the navy's recent experience in New Orleans and Haiti, when a support ship was in overhaul and not available for the forces that were sent.

He also suggests two more submarines. "You can put it out to sea for 35 to 50 days, it can do surveillance missions or provide force-protection for a multinational force," he says. Prof. Haydon is emphatic about the requirement for more submarines, which some say should be scrapped to free up funds for other uses in the navy. "Submarines can do many things surface ships can do with far fewer people," he says. "Subs have better ears than any other ships."

Canada's fleet currently includes 33 ships: three destroyers, 12 frigates, two supply ships, four submarines and 12 coastal defence vessels. But the numbers do not tell the tale. The fleet is punching far below its weight, with 13 ships out of service for maintenance and upgrading.

Only one of four submarines in the fleet is currently in the water. Meanwhile, the navy's three destroyers are close to 40 years old and must be replaced within the next few years.

The supply ships, which are just a few years younger than the destroyers, may soon be banned from some ports on environmental grounds. With single hulls, the decrepit ships may not be allowed to dock. Yet it could take at least seven years before they are replaced and possibly longer.

And that is not all. The frigates, which came into service almost 20 years ago, require a major overhaul, especially of their antiquated weapons system. The ships will be going through a modernization program in overlapping fashion for the next six to eight years. Four frigates are currently in for refits.

Times are tough now for the navy. And with so many ships wearing down around the same time, the navy may be especially challenged to maintain capabilities in the middle part of this decade.

It took years for the navy to arrive at this state of neglect.

Rear-Admiral Nigel Greenwood, commander of the maritime forces in the Pacific, is cautious in his choice of words as he speaks about attitudes to Canada's maritime force. The navy has suffered from "maritime blindness," he said in a recent interview.

"Ignored might be too strong a word," he said. "That's a pro-active word that assumes people know about their navies, and then they chose to turn their back on them.

"I think to a large extent - and this is our experience here in Canada - people do not have a lot of opportunities to see their navies because we are over the horizon. Even when we are working in home waters, we are out of sight."

Regardless of that low profile, Ottawa repeatedly looks to the navy first to respond to a crisis. "We have a problem, send a warship" has become a common refrain as the federal government tries to exploit the navy's significant advantage, as it did in providing aid after the earthquake in Haiti and Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans.

Recent missions for the maritime forces offer a glimpse what the Canadian military may confront in the future. Canada's warships have been involved in several international initiatives in recent years responsible for escorting merchant ships along designated sea lanes, inspecting ships for terrorists and munitions, and responding to acts of piracy in the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somali and the Arabian Sea. Canadian warships were also involved in escorting the U.S. war machine during its invasion of Iraq. The same vessels patrol the coasts of Canada, asserting Canadian sovereignty and helping other government departments monitor activities at sea and along the shore.

I think the Navy poses a unique strategic challenge. We can, as we have just demonstrated, take a less than well equipped, somewhat disorganized, traditionally indifferently led army and make it into a first rate fighting force – using only our own (limited) resources - in a very short space of time because, at bottom, the army is all about people. But the navy is different it is about ships and people, in an extraordinarily complex relationship, and I am not convinced that a navy can respond as our army did and “come from (too far) behind” to win.

Navies are, also, hideously expensive and, unlike either armies or air forces, the ‘return’ for the cost is hard for the citizen/taxpayer to see.

 

[Edward Campbell]

There is, now, a series of five videos on the Globe and Mail web site that are worth a watch:

• Has Canada failed in Afghanistan?
• Is the Canadian peacekeeper dead?
• Is Canada susceptible to attack?
• Does military spending need to increased [sic]?
• What does the future hold?

 

[Kirkhill]

Full marks to the Globe and Mail for running this series.

I think the Navy poses a unique strategic challenge. We can, as we have just demonstrated, take a less than well equipped, somewhat disorganized, traditionally indifferently led army and make it into a first rate fighting force – using only our own (limited) resources - in a very short space of time because, at bottom, the army is all about people. But the navy is different it is about ships and people, in an extraordinarily complex relationship, and I am not convinced that a navy can respond as our army did and “come from (too far) behind” to win.

Navies are, also, hideously expensive and, unlike either armies or air forces, the ‘return’ for the cost is hard for the citizen/taxpayer to see.

I was going to disagree.  And then thought better of it.

But I am still going to take issue.

In the CH-47 thread I took issue with the value of establishing an O&M budget.  I still do.  It is just too difficult to determine if China is going to increase the demand for titanium plate heat exchangers in 10 years time thus increasing the price of replacement landing gear.  But after capital planning and O&M planning there is a third part of the budget, the labour budget, that is actually very easy to quantify and plan.

The Navy, like the Air Force, is a classic example of the value of spending now so that you don’t have to spend later.

Productivity is regularly cited as a virtue.  I agree. It is.

Many folks fear productivity because they fear redundancy: the loss of jobs.  But productivity is actually about more than just doing what you are doing with fewer people.  It can be about doing more with what you have.  In a world of a shrinking population (the non-Islamic worlds of the West and China) that ability to do things with a minimum level of staffing becomes critical.  The Navy and Air Force can’t find the bodies they need now and the Army is trying to figure out how to keep the ones they have.  Replacing people with Programmable Logic Controllers, electric motors and generators (and fuel tanks) is key to maintaining/enhancing capability.

The Navy and the Air Force, because of their reliance on platforms that supply capability, are uniquely placed to take advantage of these technologies.  They “Man the Weapon”.  They don’t “Arm the Man”.

This distinction means that they are the first to be able to take advantage of / feel threatened by UnMANNED Systems.  Just as it is possible to envisage a platform in the sky with nobody at the controls (Satellites and Hybrid Air Vehicles and Reapers come to mind) it is also possible to envisage a big floating barge in the middle of the ocean with nobody on board but held in place by a PLC, GPS sensors and some azipod thrusters.

Now all of these capabilities do drive up the capital cost of acquisition (resulting in sticker shock from the taxpayer).  But savings to compensate for the capital increase can be “reliably” generated from reduction in labour costs.  Those costs not only include salaries and benefits but often, more importantly, “hotel” costs and training costs.

Hotel costs are the costs of accommodation.  In a ship that means space and tonnage dedicated to bunks, messes, galleys, heads, showers, water treatment, heating, waste disposal, recreation.  A smaller crew reduces all those requirements leaving space for other capabilities and a more liveable environment for the remaining crew.

The bigger benefit though is in training.  Fewer people means reduced training facility requirements.  Technology, with the twin advantages of built in simulation and the Nintendo generation, actually creates the possibility of reducing training requirements further. 

In the bad old days we had plant loaded with hand-set valves and physical gauges.  It required one man to read the gauge, another to turn the valve, a third to decide if the valve should be turned and a bunch of people in between yelling instructions down the passages.    This required a highly trained decision maker and a lot of training of the team to get things done efficiently.  Placing the gauge, the valve and the decision maker in the same place cut down much of the teamwork problem but still demanded a highly trained decision maker who was also a highly trained mechanic.

So along come computers, or to be precise, the Programmable Logic Controller.  And we, the industrial design community screwed up.  We sought to replace the highly trained decision making mechanic operator with the PLC.  Consequently we built programmes to control the plant in every foreseeable eventuality.  And when the unforeseen occurred we cursed the operator and added a new layer to the programme.  And the unforeseen occurred again....... 

The problem of course is that the PLC is little more than a digital clock.  It does everything to a fixed schedule.  This created the situation where the operator had to become even more skilled than before and arguably the plants became less efficient with more unforeseen down time as the operator tried to puzzle out what the black box was trying to do when the real world intruded on it.  Kind of like the opening days of World War I when I think about it, with mobilization decisions being driven by the railway schedule. The results were certainly similar if less catastrophic.

But now, I believe, we have learned that there is a certain irreducible requirement for the “Man in the Loop” and that the “computer” should be used as an aid to the operator: a combination of valve turner and secretary. 

The best designed systems run plants with the PLC but when the schedule encounters the real world and the PLC boggles, the computer informs the operator what the PLC was trying to accomplish, what it has encountered and, most importantly, what the operator’s options are.  No more hunting through manuals at Oh Dark 30 or trying to remember IAs after being out of your bunk for the last 54 hours – Your IAs and Stoppages are presented on the screen in front of you in Multiple Guess format. Pick one.  (Final choice: call tyour supervisor).

Sorry, I drifted off course onto a tangent of detail (par for the golf course and me – but it is an area that I believe in strongly and with which I have a degree of familiarity)

This control architecture mimics the Nintendo system.  The kids learn as they play.  They don’t read the manuals.  They learn by doing.  But instead of the monitor showing blood and guts spewing when they fail a simple “You can’t do that” from the Nanny in the Box will probably suffice.

All this is to drive home a point:  Capital investment in the Navy and Air Force will Quickly generate capability precisely because the capabilities are technology dependent.

Conversely the Army, despite its increasing use of technology will never remove the need to train soldiers that fill boots and Advance to Contact – make personal face-to-face contact to uncover the nature of the other and determine if its capabilities and intentions represent a real threat or only a potential threat – also known as a fear.

We should be investing in the Navy. 

It is, as noted in the article, above all other things flexible.  And if the Navy builds spare people carrying and connections capacity into all there platforms then the Canadian Government can advance soldiers to contact that 80 to 90% of humanity that live within helicopter range of the coast.