Infanteer said:
https://coloneltedcampbell.blog/2018/07/07/bait-and-switch/
Our own Edward Campbell as made a compelling case as to why we need to increase our capability and capacity (and thus our budget) in the future. If we accept these reasons as valid, then we need to figure out what the military needs to be able to do within what Edward as termed a AAA+ context (search it).
This is what we should be talking about, rather than simply bleating "2%!"
Agree fully that this is what we should be talking about. I don't see politicians coming up with defence solutions on their own; all they can produce is budgets and (on rare occasions) a policy paper.
What has been missing for a long time is a structure that can make use of the entire force and not just little battlegroups that need the better part of a year to be put together. The last sixty years have lulled us into the belief that we will never have to deploy a major force again and have structured ourselves accordingly. Our allies (much less our adversaries) aren't fooled for a moment that we actually have four divisions.
As a starting point I want to compare us to three other force structures. (I'll keep myself concentrating on the army as I have no expertise respecting the Navy and the Air Force [with the exception of a superficial knowledge about aviation])
The US basic building block is the Brigade Combat team (which comes in several varieties, infantry, Stryker and armored) It is a self sustained deployable organization with integral logistics, engineer and artillery battalions over and above its reconnaissance, infantry and (in the case of the armored BCT) combined tank and infantry battalions. Generally three BCTs belong to one of 1 armored division, 1 cavalry division, 15 infantry and 2 airborne divisions. Each division also has a divisional artillery headquarters battery, an aviation brigade and a sustainment brigade. Additional resources such as air defence, additional artillery, logistics and engineers, military police, medical units, etc etc are kept outside of the divisional structure and assigned as required.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brigade_combat_team
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_current_formations_of_the_United_States_Army
Let's look a some other forces that are a bit more at our scale (both larger and smaller). Specifically lets look at the UK and Australia. We compare as follows (all numbers appx):
UK: population 65 million; budget CAD81 billion; Reg F Army 81k; Res F Army 27k
Canada: population 35 million; budget CAD19 billion; Reg F Army 23k; Res F Army 18k
Australia: population 24 million; budget CAD 35 billion; Reg F Army 31k; Res F Army 15k
The UK has chosen to reorganize under Army 2020 into two divisions which hold the infantry and armored brigades and units and a divisional level Force Troops Command which holds brigades and units of artillery, engineers, air defence, medical, MP, etc etc. In addition there is an airmobile bde and aviation resources.
1 (UK) Div is termed an "adaptable Force" and has six infantry bdes and a logistics bde
3 (UK) Div is termed a "Reaction Force" and has four armored/mech infantry bdes and a logistics bde
Force Troop Command has some 10 assorted brigades holding dozens and dozens of assorted battalion level units
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Administrative_structure_of_the_field_forces_of_the_British_Army
Australia has two divisions.
1 Div is a deployable divisional headquarters with no permanently assigned units. All units fall under Forces Command which consists of 2 Div (an administrative and home defence headquarters that has 6 Res F bdes and some additional units assigned) In addition there are three deployable Reg F infantry brigades (each with its own signals, arty, engineer and logistics battalions) as well as an aviation bde, CS bde and CSS bde.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australian_Army#Current_organisation
I have left out of the mix that each of these countries also has various special operations forces.
Generally speaking, the US structure is the most versatile as there is little distinction between regular and reserve elements. Army National Guard and Army Reserve formations and units (regardless of whether combat arms or support) are generally manned and equipped similarly to their Reg F counterparts (albeit standards of training and readiness) necessarily vary. Nonetheless ARNG and USAR formations and their units have deployed as complete formations and units to both Iraq and Afghanistan and not merely as individual augmentees.
Despite the number of bdes and units, the UK is structured to project only two divisional size forces while Australia is limited to one division for deployment (the other for home defence service).
The general condition of the reserves in the UK and Australia is not dissimilar to ours. Reserve units are undermanned and ill equipped. Funding and training is limited and turnover is high. In short while both, like us, provided individual augmentees to round out Reg F units in recent operations, Res F units are not capable of deploying as units and do not constitute a strategic reserve.
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/28394/futurereserves_2020.pdf
https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House_of_Representatives_Committees?url=jfadt/army/armych7.htm (somewhat dated)
The question that I keep coming back to is why can the US have reserve units and formations that are capable of deployment when Britain, Canada and Australia don't? I sometimes think this is a function of reserve units fighting tooth and nail to keep their regimental affiliations and thereby tolerating having many small, under-strength units rather than fewer fully manned ones. This leads to (or, at least, is coupled to) a general disdain amongst the Reg F leadership respecting the value of reserve units and formations and a commensurate lack of funding for reserve equipment and training.
US units on the other hand are frequently deactivated, reactivated or re-rolled to meet the requirements of the field force. While they have history and tradition, unit identities are not inviolate. They are generally more fully manned and equipped. Just as importantly there are different standards of employment legislation, basic training standards, ability to serve out Active Duty enlistment contracts in the reserves and command acceptance of risk on deployment.
Looking simply at the numbers (and leaving aside the special operations forces) Canada should have no more than two divisions and six BCT equivalents (three Reg F and three Res F). In addition there should to be an additional administrative "Force Troops Command" (of modest divisional size) to hold various deployable add-on combat enabler brigades and battalions: artillery, AD, medical, engineer, logistics etc. This organization should be largely Res F and would require an increase to the Res F establishment over our current levels.
The potential threat in NATO is that, at worst, we may need to face a modern mechanized enemy. Since that threat is at the extreme end of the scale, it is logical (if distasteful to the Reg F leadership) that our heaviest forces be reserves and that our Reg F be the more agile rapid deployable forces. In short, there should be a Reg F division with LAV based brigade groups and a Res F division of heavy mechanized equipment (and let me go out on a further limb and suggest that if we really want to suck up to the Americans then equip it with Abrams, Bradleys and Palladins, as well as HIMARS and Avengers (these are all weapon systems used by ARNG units - for that matter there are ARNG aviation units flying all types of helicopters) I bet that if we were to go to Trump today and commit a mechanized division to be forward based in Europe the US would provide the equipment and infrastructure at cut rate prices if not for free out of their surplus holdings)
Let's be real. At this point many of you (if not most) are saying this is mostly pie-in-the-sky bullfeathers. The problem though is that we (like the Australians and even the Brits) are accepting a status quo which makes much of our force incapable of fighting a modern war. If we have a force structure that is not usable in a major campaign then we are depriving our leadership of viable options and blowing lots of good money on very little capability. While we can be justifiably proud of many of our individual soldiers, it's about time that we expressed some outrage at just how low our capability as an organization actually is.
I've said this many times before; we can't fine tune the current CF structure anymore. It's already broken beyond repair and needs to be radically reworked from square one with all sacred cows that don't produce a capable force being killed off. Is there a cost? Off course there is. Is it 2% of GDP. Who knows? Unless we sit down with a sharp pencil and look at some of the options we'll never know. We need to look at overarching legislation, terms of service, streamlining regulations and administration, capital acquisition, developing defence industries (such as ammunition and equipment) and a whole host of other things before we even start to cost equipment and O&M. (Along the way let's fire 80% of Res Force LCols and CWOs and redeploy a battalion or two of Reg F NDHQ cubicle warmers).
The one thing we definitely shouldn't do is just up our spending for the sake of upping it. Strong, Secure, Engaged states we'll have expenditures of $32.7 billion (cash basis) by 2026-27. The vision for the Army is:
The Canadian Army (CA) will undergo a recapitalization of much of its land combat capabilities and its aging vehicle fleets, while modernizing its command and control systems. Additionally, it will expand its light forces capability which will allow it to be more agile and effective in complex operational theatres, such as peace operations.
http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/canada-defence-policy/docs/summary.pdf
That folks is fine tuning and sounds more like capability down-sizing. Our military leadership needs to do better in explaining our very real shortcomings to the political leadership and selling a much better vision for a more capable CF. They need to do much better. :2c:
[cheers]