- Reaction score
- 10,639
- Points
- 1,260
A few thoughts:
1. The relationship is more than just "America pays to defend Europe." There is some quid pro quo: I've heard senior US military officials state that the U.S. political/strategic center of gravity is its allies and the access they bring. Yes, the U.S. bears a large proportion of NATO's defense, but in return for this it is supplied the access by allies that it needs and wants to enable it to maintain its global presence.
2. Of course, global presence may not be what the current administration cares for. If that's so, then maybe countries like Germany are better off saying adieu to U.S. forces, even if they only move to Poland, and through limiting engagement reducing the ability to get politically browbeaten.
3. Is 2% even a realistic or required norm in the post-Cold War World? Most countries sought their peace dividend and cut defence budgets as the Soviet threat is gone. Does Europe even require 2%? The Russian Army cannot reasonably be expected to project itself too far into Europe. The U.S. only took a partial peace dividend, and then invaded Iraq. As was indicated earlier, EU countries outspend Russia (the only real threat), Europe possesses a nuclear deterrent with France and the UK.
4. The real reason, it seems to me, that the U.S. has tolerated under-spenders for the last 30 years is that it was the price to pay for continuing to lead the bench. If the current administration casts off the collective defence paradigm that has governed the West since the 1940s, then US engagement and reach would be curtailed and the ability for the U.S. to influence decision making is reduced. New defensive arrangements would be crafted and perhaps Germany would seek its own nuclear deterrent.
1. The relationship is more than just "America pays to defend Europe." There is some quid pro quo: I've heard senior US military officials state that the U.S. political/strategic center of gravity is its allies and the access they bring. Yes, the U.S. bears a large proportion of NATO's defense, but in return for this it is supplied the access by allies that it needs and wants to enable it to maintain its global presence.
2. Of course, global presence may not be what the current administration cares for. If that's so, then maybe countries like Germany are better off saying adieu to U.S. forces, even if they only move to Poland, and through limiting engagement reducing the ability to get politically browbeaten.
3. Is 2% even a realistic or required norm in the post-Cold War World? Most countries sought their peace dividend and cut defence budgets as the Soviet threat is gone. Does Europe even require 2%? The Russian Army cannot reasonably be expected to project itself too far into Europe. The U.S. only took a partial peace dividend, and then invaded Iraq. As was indicated earlier, EU countries outspend Russia (the only real threat), Europe possesses a nuclear deterrent with France and the UK.
4. The real reason, it seems to me, that the U.S. has tolerated under-spenders for the last 30 years is that it was the price to pay for continuing to lead the bench. If the current administration casts off the collective defence paradigm that has governed the West since the 1940s, then US engagement and reach would be curtailed and the ability for the U.S. to influence decision making is reduced. New defensive arrangements would be crafted and perhaps Germany would seek its own nuclear deterrent.