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U.S. Adapts Cold-War Idea to Fight Terrorists - N.Y. Times

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U.S. Adapts Cold-War Idea to Fight Terrorists

WASHINGTON — In the days immediately after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, members of President Bush’s war cabinet declared that it would be impossible
to deter the most fervent extremists from carrying out even more deadly terrorist missions with biological, chemical or nuclear weapons. Since then, however,
administration, military and intelligence officials assigned to counterterrorism have begun to change their view. After piecing together a more nuanced portrait of
terrorist organizations, they say there is reason to believe that a combination of efforts could in fact establish something akin to the posture of deterrence,
the strategy that helped protect the United States from a Soviet nuclear attack during the cold war.

Interviews with more than two dozen senior officials involved in the effort provided the outlines of previously unreported missions to mute Al Qaeda’s message,
turn the jihadi movement’s own weaknesses against it and illuminate Al Qaeda’s errors whenever possible.

A primary focus has become cyberspace, which is the global safe haven of terrorist networks. To counter efforts by terrorists to plot attacks, raise money and recruit
new members on the Internet, the government has mounted a secret campaign to plant bogus e-mail messages and Web site postings, with the intent to sow confusion,
dissent and distrust among militant organizations, officials confirm.

At the same time, American diplomats are quietly working behind the scenes with Middle Eastern partners to amplify the speeches and writings of prominent Islamic
clerics who are renouncing terrorist violence.

At the local level, the authorities are experimenting with new ways to keep potential terrorists off guard.

In New York City, as many as 100 police officers in squad cars from every precinct converge twice daily at randomly selected times and at randomly selected sites,
like Times Square or the financial district, to rehearse their response to a terrorist attack. City police officials say the operations are believed to be a crucial tactic
to keep extremists guessing as to when and where a large police presence may materialize at any hour. “What we’ve developed since 9/11, in six or seven years,
is a better understanding of the support that is necessary for terrorists, the network which provides that support, whether it’s financial or material or expertise,”
said Michael E. Leiter, acting director of the National Counterterrorism Center.

“We’ve now begun to develop more sophisticated thoughts about deterrence looking at each one of those individually,” Mr. Leiter said in an interview. “Terrorists don’t operate in a vacuum.”

In some ways, government officials acknowledge, the effort represents a second-best solution. Their preferred way to combat terrorism remains to capture or
kill extremists, and the new emphasis on deterrence in some ways amounts to attaching a new label to old tools.

“There is one key question that no one can answer: How much disruption does it take to give you the effect of deterrence?” said Michael Levi, a fellow at the Council
on Foreign Relations and the author of a new book, “On Nuclear Terrorism.”

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Why the West can't infiltrate al-Qaida

‘Cold War approach’ doesn't work with religious extremists, experts say

BARCELONA - A decade after al-Qaeda issued a global declaration of war against America, U.S. spy agencies have had little luck recruiting well-placed
informants and are finding the upper reaches of the network tougher to penetrate than the Kremlin during the Cold War, according to U.S. and European
intelligence officials. Some counterterrorism officials say their agencies missed early opportunities to attack the network from within. Relying on Cold War tactics
such as cash rewards for tips failed to take into account the religious motivations of Islamist radicals and produced few results.

Since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, officials said, al-Qaeda has tightened its internal security at the top, placing an even greater emphasis on personal and tribal
loyalties to determine who can gain access to its leaders. lain Chouet, former chief of the security intelligence service of the DGSE, France's foreign spy agency,
said it can take years for informants to burrow their way into radical Islamist networks. Even if they're successful at first, he said, new al-Qaeda members are
often "highly disposable" -- prime candidates for suicide missions. He said it might be too late for Western intelligence agencies, having missed earlier chances,
to redouble efforts to infiltrate the network. "I think you cannot penetrate such a movement now," he said.

Spies' cover blown

At the same time, those agencies have made their task harder by blowing the cover of some promising informants and mishandling others. In January, Spanish police
arrested 14 men in Barcelona who they suspected were preparing to bomb subways in cities across Europe. Investigators disclosed in court documents that the arrests
had been prompted by a Pakistani informant working for French intelligence.

The revelation infuriated French officials, who were forced to withdraw the informant -- a rare example of an agent who had successfully infiltrated training camps
in Pakistan. Spanish authorities expressed regret but said they had no choice; after they failed to find bombs or much other evidence during the arrests, the case
rested largely on the informant's word. "Suicide attacks don't allow for a lot of margin to make a decision," said Vicente Gonzales Mota, the lead prosecutor. "Acting
after an attack would be a tragedy."

Ten years ago, on Feb. 23, 1998, Osama bin Laden issued a fatwa declaring it "the individual duty of every Muslim" to kill Americans and their allies around the world.
Looking back, some U.S. and European intelligence officials said their governments had underestimated the enemy and thought they could rely on old methods to destabilize al-Qaeda.

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Acts of desperation when you dont know what to do arent quite the same as cold war theorum (mutually assured destruction and other concepts that are based on the opponent having a fixed and identifable location)...

 
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