The RCAF's Next Generation Fighter (CF-188 Replacement)

[Old Sweat]

Two words:

Hong Kong.

And when circa 1970 the government announced it had accepted the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable (CAST) Combat Group role to reinforce North Norway in an emergency, the troops began to refer to it as Hong Kong Mark Two.

 

[Cdn Blackshirt]

Are there any rumours re:
1.  How the gov't plans to distribute the  18 new aircraft? 
2.  What variant of the SH they are negotiating for?  (Quietly hoping to hear we will be launch customer for ASH).

 

[Quirky]

Are there any rumours re:
1.  How the gov't plans to distribute the  18 new aircraft? 
2.  What variant of the SH they are negotiating for?  (Quietly hoping to hear we will be launch customer for ASH).

The government has no clue what they are doing. The USN and Kuwait aren't about to give up their spots for a measly 18 aircraft lease. We are about to be dumped with 18 aircraft we don't need and will just become a major headache for the RCAF. If these things actually show up at Canadian bases I can't see them standing up new squadrons. The personnel just don't exist. The more likely scenario is techs and pilots will just be qualified on both.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

The more likely scenario is techs and pilots will just be qualified on both.

Having lived thru some time on a dual-qual fleet,  this isn't easy as it sounds or appears for anyone who has not done it.  There's a big difference between  current and proficient with these scenarios.

 

[Old Sweat]

A flying Ross Rifle, anyone?

Seriously, how can this be made to work without screwing up the resources to support a finites number of flying hours with proficient* aircrew across the fleet? Without gutting the RCN and the Canadian Army that is.

* I wrote proficient without appreciating the difference between proficient and current implied in EITS's post.

 

[McG]

2.  What variant of the SH they are negotiating for?  (Quietly hoping to hear we will be launch customer for ASH).

Given that the government seems to have decided that the F-35 is just not ready, I suspect they will have little interest in a variant that is not already flying with somebody.  So, I would not bet on super-super hornets.

 

[PuckChaser]

2.  What variant of the SH they are negotiating for?  (Quietly hoping to hear we will be launch customer for ASH).

Which version of the ASH? The 2013 version with stealth features and desperately trying to keep up with the F-35? Or the 2016 version of the ASH that has some new sensors, but no approval from the USN on conformal fuel tanks, enhanced engines or updated cockpit?

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/boeing-resumes-advanced-super-hornet-push-as-us-navy-425221/

It terms of differences between the Advanced Super Hornet proposal put forward in 2013 – which included low-observable enhancements like an enclosed weapons pod – and the one presented to the media on 11 May, Gillian says “the biggest different is maturation of thought”.

“Twenty-thirteen was really about how great can we make Super Hornet in some of those stealth areas?" he says. "That was a little bit more of a head-to-head discussion [versus the F-35].

"Twenty-sixteen is about complimentary capability and what does the carrier air wing need given the other assets like F-35, [Northrop Grumman] E-2D and Growler that are going to be out there.”

Sounds perfect, we'll end up buying an aircraft for an "interim" basis that is only considered by its manufacturer as complimentary to the F-35, not able to stand on its own.

 

[Old Sweat]

Given that the government seems to have decided that the F-35 is just not ready, I suspect they will have little interest in a variant that is not already flying with somebody.  So, I would not bet on super-super hornets.

In the 70s the government direction to tDND and the CF was to not purchase anything that was not ready already developed, and thus had no risk involved. On the macro scale the direction was to only provide a minimal military capability, whatever that meant. A senior airman told me this used to cause the light blue community considerable angst whenever we won an international competition as it indicated we had excess capability.

However, it seems to me some people may be assuming that an inservice aircraft will be cheaper, besides allowing them to claim they filled a capability gap quickly and without risk.

 

[Cdn Blackshirt]

The government has no clue what they are doing. The USN and Kuwait aren't about to give up their spots for a measly 18 aircraft lease. We are about to be dumped with 18 aircraft we don't need and will just become a major headache for the RCAF. If these things actually show up at Canadian bases I can't see them standing up new squadrons. The personnel just don't exist. The more likely scenario is techs and pilots will just be qualified on both.

Thanks for bringing up the Kuwaiti and USN orders - I was wondering if those deals being signed on their own may have derailed Trudeau's end-around.

Does anyone have any idea about how those other orders are likely to delay first availability (as opposed to what availability would have looked like prior to the other signed deals and what Trudeau and team thought would be possible)?

Did first delivery get bumped by 18-months? 24-months? Or even more?

 

[HB_Pencil]

Thanks for bringing up the Kuwaiti and USN orders - I was wondering if those deals being signed on their own may have derailed Trudeau's end-around.

Does anyone have any idea about how those other orders are likely to delay first availability (as opposed to what availability would have looked like prior to the other signed deals and what Trudeau and team thought would be possible)?

Did first delivery get bumped by 18-months? 24-months? Or even more?

So it doesn't really affect us. No matter what, it will take us 24 months at a minimum from contract signature to the first delivery of aircraft. We will go through the traditional FMS process (if we go DCMS that is will be an epic disaster), which will entail US congressional appropriations process, that will likely add an additional year to the cycle, then it take two years for it to be manufactured. So we're probably looking at a 2020 initial delivery, and perhaps a one to two year delivery cycle.

Currently the St Louis Line operates at two aircraft per month, which covers what the current demand is (USN and Kuwait). Prior to 2015 they were at three a month, they restructured to two, but I believe they can spool up easily back to three if necessary. A lot of this depends on what the USN does... its been purchasing Hornets through the unfunded liabilities process, which circumvented the normal budget cycle. Whether that practice continues is a better question... but it won't materially affect the  Nevertheless, we're likely to see aircraft URF costs of about 85~95 million for a Block II F/A-18E/F, if not higher if diminishing manufacturing sources effects really start to take hold.

I think you nailed it on the spot.
The US Navy has mentioned this in one of their briefs about the shortfalls of the F35 and when they look to the future of Air platforms. Why they are hesitant to purchase more F35 if they even take delivery at all. It is interesting that they are looking past manned Jets in the near term, let alone 20-30 years from now. I believe they are already using unmanned refuelers on trial right now.

No... I think you have the wrong read on the US Navy. There is a heavy institutional bias against new aircraft, particularly if its a joint one. You saw it with the F-111B, the A-4 transition to the A-7, the A-7 transition to the F/A-18A, the F-14 transition to the F/A-18E and now the F/A-18 to the F-35.

And the UCLASS program was a very poorly run program... so much so that it was direct review by congress that required the Navy to report on its progress every month. The navy didn't know what it wanted, figured out that getting a high level capability was far too costly, so it opted for the most limited mission possible: air to air refuelling.

Where a doctrinal difference may emerge between the Navy and the USAF/USMC on the F-35 is what role that fighter will play in the overall operations. The USAF/USMC are increasingly looking at the F-35 as a key decision-making node on the battlefield, while de-emphasizing the role that widebodies and other traditional C2 nodes play. The USMC is actually further ahead in this thinking: they are looking at their burgeoning UAV fleet and will have the F-35B tie into them, partly because they don't have these traditional C2 nodes to rely on. They've been working on this for quite awhile: they had a number of personnel billeted with the F-22 community over the past decade to gain a fuller sense of how a fifth generation aircraft operates and how to apply that to the F-35B's operations.

The US Navy has been more reserved in its view, with the F-35Cs seen more as a strike-reconnaissance platform, while the E-2D and the Fleet will still have a stronger role to play in C2. Thus its need isn't there. However its an open question whether they will retain this view, or shift once they are exposed to the benefits of the USAF-USMC approach become apparent. 

 

[Retired AF Guy]

Thanks for bringing up the Kuwaiti and USN orders - I was wondering if those deals being signed on their own may have derailed Trudeau's end-around.

Does anyone have any idea about how those other orders are likely to delay first availability (as opposed to what availability would have looked like prior to the other signed deals and what Trudeau and team thought would be possible)?

Did first delivery get bumped by 18-months? 24-months? Or even more?

From DefenseNews (17 Nov 2016):

Presumptive purchases of the Super Hornet and E/A-18G Growler by the US Navy in fiscal years 2017 and 2018 and the FMS sale to Kuwait would extend production into the 2020s, allowing the company to keep the line open for future sales, Boeing officials have said.

From the same article:

The Kuwaiti deal is worth approximately $10.1 billion for 32 E-model Super Hornets, 8 F-models, their associated F414-GE-400 engines and spares, 41 AN/APG active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars and a slew of weapon systems, including 20mm guns, 240 guided missile launchers, 45 AN/ALR-67(V)3 radar warning receivers, 12 AN/AAQ-33 SNIPER advanced targeting pods, 48 Link-16 systems, eight conformal fuel tanks among others. The sale also includes associated support and logistics services.

Using the above figures as a guide, and making a WAG, it could cost the Canadian taxpayer as much as $6.5 billion CDN (based on todays exchange rate) for 18 F-18s SH, plus all the spare parts, weapon systems, etc. 

 

[Kirkhill]

....

Where a doctrinal difference may emerge between the Navy and the USAF/USMC on the F-35 is what role that fighter will play in the overall operations. The USAF/USMC are increasingly looking at the F-35 as a key decision-making node on the battlefield, while de-emphasizing the role that widebodies and other traditional C2 nodes play. The USMC is actually further ahead in this thinking: they are looking at their burgeoning UAV fleet and will have the F-35B tie into them, partly because they don't have these traditional C2 nodes to rely on. They've been working on this for quite awhile: they had a number of personnel billeted with the F-22 community over the past decade to gain a fuller sense of how a fifth generation aircraft operates and how to apply that to the F-35B's operations. ....

And, in there, you have "The All-Canadian Sales Point":  The F35 - Canada's Enhanced FWSAR Capability.  Finding Lost Snowboarders Faster.

 

[MarkOttawa]

Current US Navy Super Hornet thinking (Dec. 8 story):

Defense, Navy Secretaries Spar Over Budget
...
The Department of the Navy budget submitted Thursday afternoon [Dec. 8] to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is reportedly billions more than the marks set by Carter, sources told Defense News...

...the OSD source said...the Navy...[added] a number of items to its budget, including 58 F/A-18 Super Hornet strike fighters...

Although not speaking directly to the Carter-Mabus rift or the budget imbalance, Adm. Bill Moran, the vice chief of naval operations, might have given some insight into the Navy department’s thinking when he spoke Dec. 6 with a small group of reporters.

...In the strike fighter shortfall world, we need to keep buying Super Hornets to offset the delay in F-35 and the material condition of our current fleet.”..
http://www.defensenews.com/articles/us-lawmakers-rip-dod-over-125-billion-in-wasteful-spending

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Rifleman62]

Where a doctrinal difference may emerge between the Navy and the USAF/USMC on the F-35 is what role that fighter will play in the overall operations. The USAF/USMC are increasingly looking at the F-35 as a key decision-making node on the battlefield, while de-emphasizing the role that widebodies and other traditional C2 nodes play.

Does that mean all RCAF F-35 pilots (if we get the F-35) must be Colonels?  [

 

[PPCLI Guy]

Does that mean all RCAF F-35 pilots (if we get the F-35) must be Colonels?  [

What makes you think that Colonels are allowed to make decisions?

 

[MarkOttawa]

With Kuwait having ordered 40 Super Hornets, and if the USN gets anything like this from The Donald,

...the OSD source said...the Navy...[added] a number of items to its budget, including 58 F/A-18 Super Hornet strike fighters...

when might the RCAF start getting its 18?  The poor LPC's best-laid political plans might go astray as a result of unanticipated (if the Liberals were even aware of what others might do) sales to others .

Mark
Ottawa

 

[PuckChaser]

The Kuwaiti order pushes the Super Hornet line to close early 2020s. That means our order goes in after Kuwait, delivering planes probably 2023-2025, which is well after we'll have closed the contract on the real replacement. We might get the real planes before Super Hornets.

 

[dapaterson]

I've seen nothing said about the procurement strategy.  Perhaps there's no intent to buy at all, but merely to take 18 (slightly used) on loan from the USN.  There are multiple ways to address acquisition; the assumption that Canada will buy is not based on any Governmental announcement I have seen.

 

[PuckChaser]

I've seen nothing said about the procurement strategy.  Perhaps there's no intent to buy at all, but merely to take 18 (slightly used) on loan from the USN.  There are multiple ways to address acquisition; the assumption that Canada will buy is not based on any Governmental announcement I have seen.

The USN wants more Super Hornets than its currently getting. Why would they give us operational aircraft they need to keep their own squadrons going?

The reason we've seen nothing about the procurement strategy is because the government doesn't have one. They situated the estimate and picked an aircraft without even knowing if we could get them. Boeing can promise all it wants but it's largest purchaser in Uncle Sam controls their production lines.

 

[dimsum]

The Kuwaiti order pushes the Super Hornet line to close early 2020s. That means our order goes in after Kuwait, delivering planes probably 2023-2025, which is well after we'll have closed the contract on the real replacement. We might get the real planes before Super Hornets.

Now *that* is "kicking the can" level 2000 - it's so interim that the final solution was already there by the time it came out, therefore negating the need for the interim airframes.  Brilliant!  >