Lance Wiebe said:
LOH's, as I know you know, are a great assett to recce. It's a shame we lost them, we lost a huge edge when they went.
We certainly need attack helicopters.
Why did we spend so much money buying the POS Griffin, and in such numbers? Stupid Air Force....... :threat:
Lance,
Some background for you from - wait for it! - Wait For It! - 1996's
'Tarnished Brass' of all places (and sadly Very Accurate). This time Not the Air Force's fault!
"Unfortunately, DND's procurement process is not so much a means for serving our own military's needs as it is a handy pot to curry national and international political favour. For the past 10 years, the senior command has realized that a replacement was necessary for their burnt-out, 35 year-old APCs. In fact, even before these old tracked vehicles started rattling themselves apart on constant peacekeeping patrols in Yugoslavia, they topped the Army's annual wish list at the procurement meetings.
Obviously, such a major program (LAV-III)
would require a large chunk of the Defence Department's annual equipment budget over the entire period of its implementation. Therefore, one would think that this would be actively planned for over time, and all available resources would be carefully husbanded during the preparation. Unfortunately, such was not the case. 
As the result of a whim decision taken by then defence minister Marcel Masse (the same Masse of the 1992 'lets pay my buddies the Quebec Nordiques C$250K for Centre-Ice logo and list this amount as part of the 'Cadillac' EH-101 program budget' - which incidentally included a C$400 Million Contingency that was shaved off as part of Kims C$1B reduction of 7 helicopters - and later turncoat Separatist :evil:, but I digress)
- and subsequently implemented by Robert Fowler (former DM, married to one of 'Zero-Helicopters' daughters, and still living 'high-off-the-hog' as Italian ambassador)
and his procurement directors - the APC replacement program was deplayed by three years.
Although seemingly unrelated, it was Masse's 1992 public proclimation that DND would purchase 100 new helicopters at a cost of C$1B (considering 13 of these relatively new platforms have been declared surplus to requirements - a C$156M waste)
that set back the armoured vehicles. Originally, it had been proposed that 50 of these utility choppers be purchased from Bell Helicopter in Mirabel, Que. However, given the proximity of the aircraft company to his own electoral riding, Masse took a personal interest in the project.
It was his idea to increase the number of helicopters and virtually double the cost, despite the fact that such a number of could not be tactically justified. Nevertheless, once the decision was made by Masse, Robert Fowler and his spin doctors were quick to lend it their support. In the public releases, the claim was made that these 100 new utility helicopters would be replacing 109 existing choppers in three different aircraft fleets. As the new 412s were a modernized version of the Twin Hueys already in service, it was easy to see how they would effectively replace this aircraft. However, DND's statement that the 412 could also replace the Chinook [heavy-lifting] and Kiowa [light recce] helicopters would not have withstood close scrutiny.
Fortunately for Fowler and Masse, the media (don't get me started on the pacifistic, Uncaring - unless they can garner a Sensationalist headline, anti-Defence bunch)
were already busy shooting down the EH-101 helicopters and this project proceeded unscathed. :-X :
For the Army, the bad news came when Marcel Masse proclaimed that the Bell 412 purchase was in fact an 'army program'. So, C$500M more than budgeted was spent on something the Air Force didn't need, and the Army ultimately paid the price through the delay to their much-needed APC project."
:sniper:
Matt_Fisher said:
Attack Helicopters, eh?
This thread reminds me of a conversation during a luncheon I was invited to at the Canadian Embassy in Washington DC during spring of 2001. I was spaking with an Air Command Major attached to the Defence Liason Staff at the embassy in Washington DC regarding the ISTARs package that was being proposed/developed for the Griffon at that point in time. I asked her what was involved in the "gunship package" for the Griffons and she curtly replied that ISTARs is not a "gunship package" and that Attack helicopters have no place in the Canadian order of battle as they only represent an aggressive posture.
When you get officers of the Armed Forces that are personally so distressed at the image of aggressiveness by their equipment/pers. you've got to wonder if you really want that kind of person in a leadership position in the profession of arms. :
Matt,
As previously stated, the AF has no communication with the Army, or even in the case you note within itself it seems. :
As noted in 2002
'Army Transformation',
"The priorities the Commander has set as for aviation support to the Army are reconnaissance, armed aviation and limited mobility. 1 Wing will begin receiving the Electro-optical, Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition [ERSTA] system in 2004. The CF will purchase 25 ERSTA systems and . . . CH146 ERSTA-equipped helicopters will work in conjunction with Coyote sensors and UAVs to provide target detection, recognition and identification. The next step will be to arm the recce helicopter, both for self-protection and to provide aerial firepower to engage targets." On 9 June 2003 DGLS BGen Macdonald reaffirmed that
"the Army position remains that the ERSTA capability as originally described (heliborne recce/surveillance)
remains important to a transformed Army." Therefore, with the
subsequent fall-2003 cessation of ERSTA development due to AF SCIP concessions the Army now has No helo-borne ERSTA ISTAR / firepower support. (See the ATI releases re: SCIP)
While the SCIP notes that
"the projected funds available . . . over a 15-year period this means a total of C$27.5 Billion available for investment in capital equipment projects",
a mere 14.4% of the projected future defence budgets for capital equipment procurement, under the SCIP
"the total planned investment exceeds the projected funding. The rate of Over-program varies from a low of 13% in the near term [and actually nearer 100% in 2003-04 as equipment funds were diverted to cover massive operational shortfalls] to more than 30% in the out years." Therefore, even
DND indirectly acknowledges that their truncated capital equipment program under the SCIP will fall short of adjusted requirements by over C$11.5B (at average 30% Over-program) at planned escalation
"rate of 1.5% a year" compared to C$1.489B in FY 03/04. Meanwhile, budget 2004 did not provide any base increase and therefore even the C$1.592B FY 04/05 capital (Equipment) procurement assumption is now suspect, let alone the wishful C$1.771B by FY 07/08.
An internal 12 Nov 2003 (post-SCIP finalization) memo to the Director-General Strategic Planning from Director Force Planning and Programme Coordination, re: SCIP continuing developments, focused on Over-program [OP] due to Current Demand and forced reductions as,
"in most years, OP exceeds 30% and climbs as high as 45% in some years. Assistant Deputy Minister[Material] is having a great deal of difficulty finding the C$120M in reductions [forced slippage] and believes that capital [E] will take a major hit. Second, there is more than a little speculation that a further reduction will be asked for before the fiscal year is over. Finally, the forced slippage being generated will drive OP levels through the roof. It is quite likely that approved program will exceed supply by over a Billion dollars in 2004/05. The C$120M reduction directed by Project Management Board nearly equals planned starts for next year. I built the SCIP on the assumption that capital [E] supply would be C$1.6B next year, but that a C$100M reduction would occur at some point in the year [reductions of at least this amount have occurred in each of the last 5 years]. . . . Indications are that capital [E] allocation could be as low as C$1.4B next year. Without directed program removal, OP levels will exceed 40%."
:fifty:
The 2004 'impact assessments' by the three service Chiefs (Air Force, Army and Navy) show they expected to be some C$739.476M short unless additional budgetary funding was forthcomming in 2004. Meanwhile budget 2004 provided Nill base budgetary increase, other than the previously announced C$800M top-up from budget 2003, with budget 2003s C$800M top-up only providing C$98.6M in relief compared to a FY 03/04 C$357M overall shortfall.
FYI, this was pointed out to
the Media, but they
just Don't Get It! and Don't Care! 
:crybaby:
My 2 bits worth.
