South Alberta Light Horse Regiment to amalgamate with larger reserve force

[dapaterson]

Another consideration: Res math counts individuals not yet DP1 qualified; Reg F units generally do not. So even the occasional Res F unit with 200 on paper has about 150 trained. Which in turn is subject to the "available and motivated" factors.

The math does not work to produce LCols and CWOs from a pool of 200 on a three year cycle of there is a desire for them to have experience, and to be able to apply a filter for quality. Last person standing should not be the main selection criteria.

 

[Remius]

Allotments are what they are I suppose. But the ammo depot in Shilo is far from dry. What actually drives ammunition use is training area restrictions, and willingness to ask for it.

I would argue we get told no a lot despite asking. We’ve been told that we have only enough ammo for 1 IBMG course next year. All ammo would be for IT courses only. Maybe there is lots of ammo. That isn’t translating into us shooting any of it.

2 VP is sitting around 400 people (so are 1 and 3, and 1 RCHA before you go that direction), if you can show me a reserve unit at that manning I’ll be stunned. I’d even doubt the 100 plus people, because we both know that of that 100 maybe 75 show up at one time, and realistically it’s more consistently 50. Even if it is 100, that’s and under strength company and should be organized as such.

I don’t think anyone will deny that some units are struggling. But there are units that are stronger than the 100 you doubt. I agree though that isn’t likely the norm and is limited to urban units. The problem is that those « stronger » units are getting over worked to compensate for the lack in other units. Not just that but several units have very high class B types that can’t or won’t commit to being burned out by adding more class A work to their schedule.

Because that doesn’t work. And hasn’t worked. The recent discussions held by the infantry corps
Point that for JRTC / JPMRC pulling in reservists to fill spots required a monumental amount of administrative work, and for JPMRC it was aggravated by each reservists wanting a bespoke time to arrive. Now I certainly understand why that is, these folks have lives and jobs and want to be able to plan around that. However suggesting it’s a quick solution is absurd. If you mean for deployments there’s already a 25-30 percent augmentation happening.

Ref Depoting kit - that’s precisely how shit gets broken, total lack of ownership. We’re already borrowing NVGs and sleds and everything else from each other across the army. We don’t have to stuff to pool regardless, and if we did it would have an adverse effect on it’s maintenance.

I think I can agree with that. Units are far more invested in their own kit. Every time we send kit off to RST or wherever it comes back busted up, I can’t imagine what a full time depot style system would do.

Who’s being gutted? Are there positions being reduced ? You said your self amalgamate where it makes sense. Clearly here it makes sense.

The point is that amalgamation and restructuring is window dressing unless the core issues are also adressed. I don’t think they are. Infrastructure, equipment and training. It’s all great that we just received the new pistols but then being told that ammo might be an issue.

And those young fellas would be rapidly pro which ever regiment they joined. If they turned all of Manitoba into the 3rd Hussars, in five years you’d have a bunch of rapidly pro Hussar young fellas. I fully appreciate the importance of esprit de corps, and I cut my teeth in a tiny reserve regiment that had little else. Let me ask you this though, is the purpose of the army reserve to preserve tradition or to contribute to operations ?

Absolutely. Troops are products of their environment. I’m pretty sure though that for some units, you would see an exodus commited NCOs and officers. But that would depend again on locations and unit.

 

[Brad Sallows]

By all means limit Res F COs to Maj. Almost no-one's numbers require anything higher.

Amalgamation might cause a few people to walk, but I can guess those are not the ones seriously aspiring to do whatever they can to learn soldiering and close as much as they can of the gap between Res F and Reg F standards.

Do all that, and the underlying problems that cause shrinkage are still going to be there. The "command teams" are still going to be going to a lot of mandated conferences; the number of Class A days expected of a CO are still going to be insanely high compared to 40 years ago; the administrative overburden is still going to be higher than anything I remember (and I thought it was too much in my last few years already); the meagre allotments of equipment will continue; in a few areas, the difficulty of accessing good training areas will still be a pain in the ass.

In short, we will use the problems created by policies to excuse some mostly cosmetic changes while continuing the policies.

 

[markppcli]

I would argue we get told no a lot despite asking. We’ve been told that we have only enough ammo for 1 IBMG course next year. All ammo would be for IT courses only. Maybe there is lots of ammo. That isn’t translating into us shooting any of it.

I don’t think anyone will deny that some units are struggling. But there are units that are stronger than the 100 you doubt. I agree though that isn’t likely the norm and is limited to urban units. The problem is that those « stronger » units are getting over worked to compensate for the lack in other units. Not just that but several units have very high class B types that can’t or won’t commit to being burned out by adding more class A work to their schedule.

I think I can agree with that. Units are far more invested in their own kit. Every time we send kit off to RST or wherever it comes back busted up, I can’t imagine what a full time depot style system would do.

The point is that amalgamation and restructuring is window dressing unless the core issues are also adressed. I don’t think they are. Infrastructure, equipment and training. It’s all great that we just received the new pistols but then being told that ammo might be an issue.

Absolutely. Troops are products of their environment. I’m pretty sure though that for some units, you would see an exodus commited NCOs and officers. But that would depend again on locations and unit.

I don’t see structure as window dressing. I said before that the biggest problem with the reserves is that it’s really impossible to task. Part of that is due to its organization, part is due to the nature of reserve service, and part is equipment. If we could reorganize into Bn size units, then we have something that’s much more usable from the Army perspective. Unfortunately we don’t control the second and third parts of this equation. However I’d argue that 10-12 reserve battalions who can form companies for Doms Ops have a much stronger bargaining position for equipment then 80 odd Regiments averaging 60 people each.

 

[Remius]

I don’t see structure as window dressing.

Structure isn’t. Structure without addressing core issues is.

 

[markppcli]

Structure isn’t. Structure without addressing core issues is.

Structure is a core issue. We spend millions of dollars, and thousands of PYs on a series of HQs that are managing minuscule amounts of people. You want to know where the reserve’s budget is? CBG HQs.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

By all means limit Res F COs to Maj. Almost no-one's numbers require anything higher.

Amalgamation might cause a few people to walk, but I can guess those are not the ones seriously aspiring to do whatever they can to learn soldiering and close as much as they can of the gap between Res F and Reg F standards.

Do all that, and the underlying problems that cause shrinkage are still going to be there. The "command teams" are still going to be going to a lot of mandated conferences; the number of Class A days expected of a CO are still going to be insanely high compared to 40 years ago; the administrative overburden is still going to be higher than anything I remember (and I thought it was too much in my last few years already); the meagre allotments of equipment will continue; in a few areas, the difficulty of accessing good training areas will still be a pain in the ass.

In short, we will use the problems created by policies to excuse some mostly cosmetic changes while continuing the policies.

Working to reduce the admin processes and providing more full time staff to deal with the day to day paperwork would make a big difference. That way the CO can concentrate on training and decision making and the troops files are up to date and paperwork submitted before the due date. My old office did 1800 files a year on complex stuff with 3 reviewing officers and 3 assistants. The assistants did all the paperwork and file administration and we did the reviewing and decision making, man it was wonderful. Very few things were missed that way as well.

 

[dapaterson]

There are multiple problems that need to be addressed. But saying "unless we can fix absolutely everything all at once we shouldn't do anything" is the road to where we are today...

 

[Brad Sallows]

I don’t see structure as window dressing. I said before that the biggest problem with the reserves is that it’s really impossible to task. Part of that is due to its organization, part is due to the nature of reserve service, and part is equipment. If we could reorganize into Bn size units, then we have something that’s much more usable from the Army perspective. Unfortunately we don’t control the second and third parts of this equation. However I’d argue that 10-12 reserve battalions who can form companies for Doms Ops have a much stronger bargaining position for equipment then 80 odd Regiments averaging 60 people each.

Unless the battalions are concentrated geographically as well as on paper (shut down the outposts and increase recruitment ceilings in concentrated communities), we still have a bunch of 60-person detachments composed of the same people. Is a Dom Ops "company" formed from a single (on paper) unit better than one formed from platoons of 3 units superior in some measureable way? Is it easier for the member to get time off work? Do they keep up on their personal fitness so that they can quickly "DAG green"?

How does administrative restructure materially change the individual augmentation nature of the Res F?

 

[markppcli]

Unless the battalions are concentrated geographically as well as on paper (shut down the outposts and increase recruitment ceilings in concentrated communities), we still have a bunch of 60-person detachments composed of the same people. Is a Dom Ops "company" formed from a single (on paper) unit better than one formed from platoons of 3 units superior in some measureable way? Is it easier for the member to get time off work? Do they keep up on their personal fitness so that they can quickly "DAG green"?

How does administrative restructure materially change the individual augmentation nature of the Res F?

I personally feel centralizing units where possible, and shifting to two weekends a month to facilitate travel time makes more sense but I’ve heard opposition to it.
Getting members time off work is always going to be outside the scope the Army, it’s a legislative problem with some pro’s and cons. A company coming out of a single Bn vs advocates out of 5 Bns means you

a) don’t have to transfer them to a new UIC,

b) don’t have to interface between 5 difference pay cells,

c) have a command structure already in place, and finally

d) it’s much easier to keep a “high readiness” list internal to a Bn than have 5-7 units provide it to a Bde who then holds it and has to ask units to provide starting the process above.

Honestly the fact we can’t rely on people to stay fit enough to DAG green says a great deal.

 

[Brad Sallows]

There are multiple problems that need to be addressed. But saying "unless we can fix absolutely everything all at once we shouldn't do anything" is the road to where we are today...

Correct. But we shouldn't fool ourselves into believing that changes proposed are likely to fix things that the changes are unlikely to fix. No "selling point" that isn't reasonably demonstrable is acceptable. If the message "Change X will solve problem Y" is what people hear and change "Y" doesn't result, basically it makes the proponents look like liars. Credibility is lost and the next round of change becomes harder to sell.

Reducing CO rank to major isn't going to fix anything substantial. The same people are still going to be selected and serving as COs. They'll still have to travel to all the conferences. A little bit of Class A money will be saved. The rank will be closer to being commensurate with the responsibility. That's about it.

Amalgamating units on paper isn't going to fix anything substantial. Some CO and RSM positions will be eliminated. A little bit of class A and TD money will be saved. The same people are still going to be sharing the same facilities, equipment pools, and access to the services of full-time staff. A more substantial amount of money will be saved if some RSS positions are eliminated, but unless those people were under-employed, it means remaining staff will end up over-worked. There is some tangible benefit if the head count of RSS is retained and become of "one unit" working more closely together. If the unit is capable of routinely collectively training as a sub-unit, a training benefit emerges. If it simply can't progress beyond platoon - even if it now has 3 or 4 instead of 1 or 2 in each of two different units, not so much.

 

[markppcli]

Correct. But we shouldn't fool ourselves into believing that changes proposed are likely to fix things that the changes are unlikely to fix. No "selling point" that isn't reasonably demonstrable is acceptable. If the message "Change X will solve problem Y" is what people hear and change "Y" doesn't result, basically it makes the proponents look like liars. Credibility is lost and the next round of change becomes harder to sell.

Reducing CO rank to major isn't going to fix anything substantial. The same people are still going to be selected and serving as COs. They'll still have to travel to all the conferences. A little bit of Class A money will be saved. The rank will be closer to being commensurate with the responsibility. That's about it.

Well no that’s misunderstanding what’s being said. It’s not saying we’ll have 80 odd majors vs 80 odd LT Cols. It’s saying we’ll go from 80 unit COs and UICs and BORs and all of that to 10-12. It means maybe 2-3 CBGs vs 10, employing a reasonable number of people vs the several thousand now.

Amalgamating units on paper isn't going to fix anything substantial. Some CO and RSM positions will be eliminated.

60 odd yes

A little bit of class A and TD money will be saved. The same people are still going to be sharing the same facilities, equipment pools, and access to the services of full-time staff. A more substantial amount of money will be saved if some RSS positions are eliminated, but unless those people were under-employed, it means remaining staff will end up over-worked.

If you form them into single Bns, you can have an actual HQ and then the RSS Ops WO isn’t the Ops WO, Trg WO, Transport platoon IC, recruiting Sgt, and CSM.

There is some tangible benefit if the head count of RSS is retained and become of "one unit" working more closely together. If the unit is capable of routinely collectively training as a sub-unit, a training benefit emerges. If it simply can't progress beyond platoon - even if it now has 3 or 4 instead of 1 or 2 in each of two different units, not so much.

I think making units group together will mean more company level training. If we keep, say 5 odd sets of RSS, that’s all the key Bn HQ positions filled out and you’ll probably see an improvement in planning that training.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Well no that’s misunderstanding what’s being said. It’s not saying we’ll have 80 odd majors vs 80 odd LT Cols. It’s saying we’ll go from 80 unit COs and UICs and BORs and all of that to 10-12. It means maybe 2-3 CBGs vs 10, employing a reasonable number of people vs the several thousand now.

Agreed, but I was responding to the idea that we shouldn't avoid piecemeal change just because we can't eat the whole loaf in one bite. Reducing ranks without amalgamations is one such piecemeal change. Large-scale amalgamations are a different kind of change.

I suppose that if there are no under-worked people in BORs now, none of them are going to magically go away if units amalgamate without reducing the number of people to be supported. If a Res F BOR is really a COR and is needed for that, then an amalgamated battalion of three companies will still need the staffing of three ORs. We can pretend that there are only a few BORs on paper, but if there are a bunch of detachments consisting of a Reg F Sgt and a couple of Class B Cpl/MCpl for each company, I foresee not much savings there. Alternatively, it would have to be true that Res F OR staff are not as busy as everyone was led to believe, and that they can all stand to have their work loads increased.

Similarly, each part of an amalgamated battalion that has its own facility (armoury) and holding of stores is likely to need a full-time quartermaster, unless that turns out upon serious evaluation to be another example of feather-bedding.

For the Res F members, I suppose that if there are fewer LCol and CWO positions, there will just be fewer people promoted too quickly to those ranks. The people who would have been promoted are still going to stick around, unless they're released as superfluous majors and MWOs. If they're still serving, the savings is only the difference between rank levels, not the elimination of entire soldiers. Maybe we'll save enough to pay for the government's mandates for equipping washrooms - one relatively trivial cost offset by one relatively trivial savings.

Reducing the number of Res F formation HQs shows promise - again, provided most of the full-time people are dramatically underutilized. If one HQ in Edmonton turns out to be intolerably overworked doing everything the units in BC and SK and Thunder Bay need done on their behalf, well, then...

Any of these things might be doable. Amalgamation doesn't require any of them to be doable, but claiming some efficiency as a benefit of amalgamation does require it. The idea of diligence suggests it be done up front. If change is implemented with the assumption the efficiency will be realized and we proceed accordingly - eliminating capabilities we think we won't need - damages will result.

 

[Brad Sallows]

I think making units group together will mean more company level training. If we keep, say 5 odd sets of RSS, that’s all the key Bn HQ positions filled out and you’ll probably see an improvement in planning that training.

Picking this one out because it's important - how realistic is it to expect any Res F "role" (inf, armd, arty, engr, CSS, etc, apologies to anyone not mentioned explicitly) to attain Level 3 (do I have that right?) BTS yearly? If we reset the expectation to a 3-year cycle?

 

[markppcli]

Agreed, but I was responding to the idea that we shouldn't avoid piecemeal change just because we can't eat the whole loaf in one bite. Reducing ranks without amalgamations is one such piecemeal change. Large-scale amalgamations are a different kind of change.

I suppose that if there are no under-worked people in BORs now, none of them are going to magically go away if units amalgamate without reducing the number of people to be supported. If a Res F BOR is really a COR and is needed for that, then an amalgamated battalion of three companies will still need the staffing of three ORs. We can pretend that there are only a few BORs on paper, but if there are a bunch of detachments consisting of a Reg F Sgt and a couple of Class B Cpl/MCpl for each company, I foresee not much savings there. Alternatively, it would have to be true that Res F OR staff are not as busy as everyone was led to believe, and that they can all stand to have their work loads increased.

Similarly, each part of an amalgamated battalion that has its own facility (armoury) and holding of stores is likely to need a full-time quartermaster, unless that turns out upon serious evaluation to be another example of feather-bedding.

For the Res F members, I suppose that if there are fewer LCol and CWO positions, there will just be fewer people promoted too quickly to those ranks. The people who would have been promoted are still going to stick around, unless they're released as superfluous majors and MWOs. If they're still serving, the savings is only the difference between rank levels, not the elimination of entire soldiers. Maybe we'll save enough to pay for the government's mandates for equipping washrooms - one relatively trivial cost offset by one relatively trivial savings.

Reducing the number of Res F formation HQs shows promise - again, provided most of the full-time people are dramatically underutilized. If one HQ in Edmonton turns out to be intolerably overworked doing everything the units in BC and SK and Thunder Bay need done on their behalf, well, then...

Any of these things might be doable. Amalgamation doesn't require any of them to be doable, but claiming some efficiency as a benefit of amalgamation does require it. The idea of diligence suggests it be done up front. If change is implemented with the assumption the efficiency will be realized and we proceed accordingly - eliminating capabilities we think we won't need - damages will result.

What capabilities would be lost ? I’m curious.

Wrt to the Bde staffs, if a full Bde staff in Bancouver is struggling to manage the 1500 reservists in 39 CBG we have serious problems. Then again they have to manage 9 major unit head quarters so I’m sure thst doesn’t help.

 

[Brad Sallows]

What capabilities would be lost ? I’m curious.

Wrt to the Bde staffs, if a full Bde staff in Bancouver is struggling to manage the 1500 reservists in 39 CBG we have serious problems. Then again they have to manage 9 major unit head quarters so I’m sure thst doesn’t help.

I don't know what capabilities would be lost. Either the full-time staff currently working to support the Res F are working as much and as diligently as can reasonably be expected, or they are not and they are taking a lot of breaks and stretching hours worth of work out into days. Someone will have to tackle that one with a proper operational analysis.

I never felt the HQ was doing a lot to manage the units, until after the medical branch spun off. (Then it became obvious that the people in higher HQ had a lot of time on their hands, because they had no trouble reaching down into the the unit to micro-manage to a degree I'd never experienced before. Before someone goes off on a tear, whether that was helpful or not is beside my point, which is that they had the time and staff to do it.) Back to the local formation HQ, though, it didn't seem to me that making demands of units for short-fuse responses was made any harder by the number of names on the email distribution list. There ought to be fewer TSRs provided the detachments don't work on separate days and weekends, so a reduced work load may result for that. There may be more, but who has numbers that break down how HQ staff spend their time so that an informed decision could be made?

I'll stipulate that a lot may have changed in 20 years, and units may have deteriorated to the point they simply can't manage themselves as well (a relative measure) as they once did and need more help from higher.

 

[McG]

Another consideration: Res math counts individuals not yet DP1 qualified; Reg F units generally do not. So even the occasional Res F unit with 200 on paper has about 150 trained. Which in turn is subject to the "available and motivated" factors.

The math does not work to produce LCols and CWOs from a pool of 200 on a three year cycle of there is a desire for them to have experience, and to be able to apply a filter for quality. Last person standing should not be the main selection criteria.

Do we fix anything if we drop our preference for COs to be LCol? Establish the ARes unit as a single company under command of a major with a smaller breadth of responsibility. Instead of a CWO there is one MWO.

Units still need to generate someone able to be a CO, but they don’t need to generate someone ready to be a LCol.

 

[dapaterson]

We permit experience to accrue to individuals at lower ranks. That should improve outcomes.

Moving recruiting and pre-OFP training to a national Army Reserve Training Brigade would also remove stressors from units - they would have a narrower focus and more clearly delineated set of deliverables.

 

[markppcli]

Picking this one out because it's important - how realistic is it to expect any Res F "role" (inf, armd, arty, engr, CSS, etc, apologies to anyone not mentioned explicitly) to attain Level 3 (do I have that right?) BTS yearly? If we reset the expectation to a 3-year cycle?

I can’t speak to BTS standards outside of the Infantry, for whom it should be a reasonable goal to get a platoon live and company dry done every Bde exercise.

 

[Eaglelord17]

Maybe drop the 3 year cycle part of being CO for the Reserves. Most civilian employers have higher up bosses (superintendents etc.) sign 5 year contracts minimum, and many stay on longer.

3 years might make sense for the Regs which is constantly needing to generate higher level leadership as well as give command experience to those officers. Being a CO is basically the peak for most Reserve officers, do we really need to intentionally inflict this 3 year burden on ourselves?

Getting rid of that would mean more time to generate competent officers as it isn’t just forcing someone through for the sake of forcing them through as well as giving more experience across the board as now there would be more time developing skills at lower ranks/positions.