Excellent discussion and I commend all for the good input on the various topics. Some thoughts/clarification:
1. The notion of marksmanship that I first mentioned is starting to get a little clouded. I was not referring to the ability to see a target or not or if it is a suspected or confirmed enemy position, which is where the conversation went. My critique was against two things that seem to happen often, despite the amount of time Western armies dedicate to training. The first is something like this:
http://www.strategypage.com/military_photos/20100902214645.aspx
Obviously, he isn't going to hit anything and is wasting ammo.
The second type is rapidly putting rounds down range in a manner that is ineffective - the famous Kesterson video has a good example at the 58 second mark:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B2r3C0PJ1LM
This video (despite the lame music) also has some example at the 1:10 mark and beyond:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K-wHaPl7Ibo
I don't know how people expect to hit something by taking up a hasty sight picture and loosing off 5-10 rounds. The rifle is not meant to create a beaten zone.
Undoubtably, this phenomenon likely occurs due to the stress of battle. Remember the one note from the Storr article which pointed out that seasoned Marine squads would only expend 3-4 mags after long TICs - once soldiers (and leaders) become more accustomed to battles and recognize when they are taking effective or ineffective fire, they can get into the right zone (to take a page from Grossman) and start acting effectively. So, if we know this happens, we should try our best to "train it out" of guys in training - this likely means evaluating training to make sure we are not conditioning bad drills that lead to wasted shots and higher ammo consumption (hence my mentioning of the run down).
2. That being said, it is hard to get around the stressors of combat - as Haligonian correctly surmised, the rifle isn't much of a decisive factor on the battlefield due to the the "rifleMAN" and not the "rifle". This doesn't excuse poor marksmanship training, and we still need to train to avoid the things I listed above (if anything, to avoid wasting rounds) - I don't disagree with Technoviking at all when we still need top notch individual rifle skills, especially at the 0-100m fight where the rifle will be more of a factor.
The real point is that we need to recognize the limitations of the individual rifleman. He isn't going to kill much when he's doing things properly, taking aimed shots at known or suspected enemy - but he still contributes to the fight, and his key ability is to move that rifle onto the enemy when he has to. He isn't going to kill anything if he's just rattling rounds off for the sake of shooting back. I've spoken to some Marines about their facination with Marksmanship - apparently there is some contention in the USMC as the "Mafia" that controls the doctrine/school system and some pointy end guys don't agree on what's important. 500m with an iron sight seems like a waste of time and effort to me.
3. On the ineffectiveness of the C9, I've never heard of any real complaints either, but have we ever really objectively tested the thing? After reading that test results show it scored poorly in the section context, I thought for a bit on the weapon; it's a machinegun, but we employ it like a rifle. Why don't we just give the guy a rifle (which the USMC did)?
4. Moving on, some have discussed the nature of firefights in Afghanistan and the "shoot and scoot" tactics of the enemy. The salient points that I think that have fallen out of the contributions are:
- It is very hard to locate the enemy (he moves, like we do);
- The firefight must be constantly won and re-won; and
- the insurgent's primary TTP is to shoot and get out of dodge when our firepower comes on line; I haven't seen very many cases of "hold to the last" since 2006 - the good ones learned and know things like CAS response times, etc, etc
The two "so what's" that come out of this to me are maneuver and cut-off. To the first point, there is certainly nothing wrong with using CAS/Air/Arty to pound the enemy, but we must remember that it isn't an end in itself (shock only lasts for a while) and that firepower is only good if supports maneuver; some of the historical examples provided here show how hard it is to kill people in strong defensive postions and Afghanistan is one big defensive position. Aggresive maneuver will undoubtably be better than stopping and waiting for enablers to stack up. As to the second point, much of what I've seen (AARs/Lessons Learned/Reports/Etc) show that cut-offs are effective killers. I tried cut-offs lots both in work-up and in theater, but it always seemed like they weren't out when the enemy decided to make an appearance. It was frustrating, but its something we must continue to try to get better at. A good "play-book" of getting various types of cut-offs into play at various phases of the battle is a must have and a must rehearse.
5. Finally, we need to recognize what is unique to our collective experience and what is generally applicable. We fight and low-quality insurgent with minimal equipment in a dense, rural floodplain. Some Americans I speak to recount battles in the rugged mountains of RC East that show some similarities but some vast differences in the way the enemy fights. We need to be concious of this; the Korengal Valley and the grapefields of Panjwayi are two different fights.
Anyways, my 2 cents.