Rick's Napkin Forces Challenge

[QV]

That's concerning.

The JAG does give legal advice to the CoC though. Some of that advice has been absolutely deplorable.


Everyone still has the right to Self Defense - at times, the CoC, the UN etc all where failing miserably in that - and the explanation of what that actually allowed soldiers to do.

Consider this scenario: Circa 1994-5
Hostile Individual shoots at you -- turn to run (still with weapon).
I actually had a CF Maj (JAG) tell me it was unlawful to shoot that person, because their back was turned, and we could only engage if he turned around and was shooting at us again.
I had a Capt (PPCLI) actually think the JAG was correct.
**Neither appreciated my acerbic comments, or questioning the validity of the JAG's LLB...
Additionally neither could explain what was wrong when I told them I could shoot that guy in Canada under Self Defence provisions of the CCC, I'm so going to blast him into next week in XYZ country, other than "the ROE doesn't allow for that".

IMHO the JAG's Office often tends to look for the most restrictive interpretations - as opposed to the lawful options.

While the soldier on the ground just needs to know what his left and right of arc are.
When overly restrictive policies that make no sense are put into place - people step outside those - but when you create a culture of stepping outside - bad things follow.

The JAG's office also gave incorrect advice on the use of OTM ammunition for snipers and sharp shooters in 2004-2006 saying it was prohibited under the LOAC, without seeing that it was already approved in other parts of the CF, and coalition forces.

I have some other interesting tidbits - but I'll save those for over a beer

Agree. Reminds me of a use of force scenario for LE where the perp arrives at an apartment with a rifle and states he's going up to kill his spouse then starts walking towards the apartment door. The DS answer was to shoot him in the back before he got to the door. AIM was met, he had the ability, intent, and means to carry out the murder and once he got in the apartment the door would lock behind him which would delay police ability to stop the threat inside.

In your scenario the bad guy may turn his back momentarily, but he is likely just moving to take up another fire position. So threat of death or GBH is always there.

 

[Kirkhill]

Can't help but wonder what the point of Her Majesty's Commissions and Warrants are. I thought they required of the holders that they take responsibility for interpreting the laws of Her Majesty's Government. Thus the OiC ordering a soldier under his command, issuing a lawful order, absolves the soldier of responsibility for the action taken.

 

[Kirkhill]

Back to the Napkin Army for a moment and trying to do for the Navy what was attempted with the Air Force

The RCN payroll

4000 Civilians
3700 Reservists
8500 Regulars

Civilians transferred out to Public Safety, PSPC and the Civil Defence Force.
Reservists transferred out to the Civil Defence force taking with them their MCDVs and their 564 sea berths.

8500 Regulars retained by Ordnance Canada for the RCN

MCDV	Vessels	12​	Crew	47​	Reserves	564​
Orca	Vessels	8​	Crew	5​	Reserves	40​
					Ttl Res	604​
iAOR	Vessels	1​	Crew	150​	Regulars	150​
CPF	Vessels	12​	Crew	225​	Regulars	2700​
SSK	Vessels	4​	Crew	53​	Regulars	212​
					Ttl Regs	3062​
CSC	Vessels	9​	Crew	157​	Regulars	1413​
AOPS	Vessels	6​	Crew	65​	Regulars	390​
T218SG	Vessels	12​	Crew	28​	Regulars	336​
					Ttl Res	2139​

Current fleet (iAOR/CPF/SSK) assigns 3062 of the 8500 Regulars to sea-berths.

Proposed fleet (CSC/AOPS/SSK-T218) assigns 2139 Regulars to sea-berths, including allowances for rotations.

2139 is 70% of 3062 or 923 berths fewer.

At the very least I should be able to reduce the RCN by 923 from 8500 to 7600 or so.

Being agressive I could reduce the 8500 to 70% or 6000 or so.

If I took the aggressive route

That would leave me with an RCN of 6000
From the RCAF reckoning an RCAF of 6000

Between the RCN and the RCAF that eats up 12,000 of Rick's 15,000

With the remaining 3,000 I have just enough to retain the CANSOFCOM of 2500
And a conjoint RCE/RCA Corps of 500.

Total Force

RCN 6000
RCAF 6000
CANSOFCOM Fusiliers 2500
RCE/RCA 500

Total 15,000


RCMP and the Civil Defence Force (Rangers, Militia, Reserves) Coast Guard with SAR Assets under command responsible for the Security and Emergency Management.

 

[KevinB]

Can't help but wonder what the point of Her Majesty's Commissions and Warrants are. I thought they required of the holders that they take responsibility for interpreting the laws of Her Majesty's Government. Thus the OiC ordering a soldier under his command, issuing a lawful order, absolves the soldier of responsibility for the action taken.

I was only following Orders hasn't worked since Nuremberg...
The onus gets put down onto the Soldier for knowledge if the order is lawful or not...

 

[Kirkhill]

Actually I can thin out CANSOFCOM a bit more by transferring CJIRU to the Civil Defence Force and removing 427 SOAS as I have already counted it under 1 Wing of the RCAF.

Without knowing those numbers I am going to suggest a combined 500 PYs.

Total Force

RCN - 6000
RCAF - 6000
CANSOFCOM - 2000
RCE/RCA - 1000

 

[Kirkhill]

I was only following Orders hasn't worked since Nuremberg...
The onus gets put down onto the Soldier for knowledge if the order is lawful or not...

Seen and understood.

Again though, what is the point of the Commission?

Personally I think that Nuremberg was an exceptional circumstance that made bad law.

The whole point of being a trusted Lieutenant of Her Majesty is that you are in place to represent her and manage the situation in a manner with which she would concur. It originates in an amorphous world with no borders where the Lieutenant, riding under Her Majesty's banner, applied Her laws as he saw fit. And was personally accountable for the interpretation.

The soldiery under him were subject to his control and discipline.

I appreciate that Nuremberg moved the world on past that. I am not convinced that it was an unalloyed good.

 

[Good2Golf]

Not exactly 100% - there where a bunch of folks who went to England to learn the trade from the Horses Mouth on top of that.
Additionally SERT had some issues with some aspects of ROE that come with NLI HR missions.

Yup. There were definitely some funny accents in the 92-93-94 timeframe (and one in particular that stayed longer…)

 

[KevinB]

Seen and understood.

Again though, what is the point of the Commission?

Personally I think that Nuremberg was an exceptional circumstance that made bad law.

The whole point of being a trusted Lieutenant of Her Majesty is that you are in place to represent her and manage the situation in a manner with which she would concur. It originates in an amorphous world with no borders where the Lieutenant, riding under Her Majesty's banner, applied Her laws as he saw fit. And was personally accountable for the interpretation.

The soldiery under him were subject to his control and discipline.

I appreciate that Nuremberg moved the world on past that. I am not convinced that it was an unalloyed good.

I think the world has come a long way (or some parts of it) since Feudal Knights and Officer Nobility, and the unwashed peasants for troops.
We (as Civilized westerners) have come to expect that people are (mostly) responsible for their actions - and that checks and balances need to occur, as not everyone is infallible. Issue like this needed to be viewed from the totality of circumstance to see if the action was reasonable or not, and if the order was lawful (or not).

As a young boy I read about the Mỹ Lai 4 (and Mỹ Khe 4) massacre, it was clear then that Command Guidance cannot be viewed as absolute, and individual soldiers need to be held accountable for their actions when they stray off the accepted Rules of Land Warfare.

Yup. There were definitely some funny accents in the 92-93-94 timeframe (and one in particular that stayed longer…)

A Lot longer IIRC

 

[lenaitch]

That said the RCMP, OPP, and some Crown Prosecutors where superbly educational on how to articulate the rational for lethal force inside Canada. I learned more from an OPP OIS Investigator and Crown in two days on the articulation of lethal force justification than any other period in my life - which includes dedicated courses on that, LE certification, and LE classes across this continent.

And therein lies one of the ongoing challenges. Training in 'articulable cause'; knowing your grounds and being able to justify them to whomever needs them justified' remains a challenge in law enforcement. It's not limited to specialty team or use of lethal force, but extends to road members exercising their various authorities on day-to-day basis. At least specialty teams work and train in cohesive teams generally get to brief. first.

 

[Kirkhill]

I think the world has come a long way (or some parts of it) since Feudal Knights and Officer Nobility, and the unwashed peasants for troops.
We (as Civilized westerners) have come to expect that people are (mostly) responsible for their actions - and that checks and balances need to occur, as not everyone is infallible. Issue like this needed to be viewed from the totality of circumstance to see if the action was reasonable or not, and if the order was lawful (or not).

As a young boy I read about the Mỹ Lai 4 (and Mỹ Khe 4) massacre, it was clear then that Command Guidance cannot be viewed as absolute, and individual soldiers need to be held accountable for their actions when they stray off the accepted Rules of Land Warfare.







A Lot longer IIRC

The difference, Kevin, is that every member of the regiment of dragoons known as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police is warranted as a Constable as is every other Law Enforcement Officer in Canada. Note the Officer reference. That puts them in the same space, based on my historical understanding, as Warrant Officers like CSMs and RSMs and Commissioned Officers. All of them act in lieu of the Crown.

The private soldier never signed on for that responsibility. And doesn't get paid to take on that responsibility. He gets paid to act in support of the Warranted and Commissioned Officers.

 

[KevinB]

The difference, Kevin, is that every member of the regiment of dragoons known as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police is warranted as a Constable as is every other Law Enforcement Officer in Canada. Note the Officer reference. That puts them in the same space, based on my historical understanding, as Warrant Officers like CSMs and RSMs and Commissioned Officers. All of them act in lieu of the Crown.

The private soldier never signed on for that responsibility. And doesn't get paid to take on that responsibility. He gets paid to act in support of the Warranted and Commissioned Officers.

Maybe in 1914 - or even 1960, but these are the days of the Strategic Corporal - and a Privates actions will be judged regardless of whom they are commanded by.

 

[Kirkhill]

I know they will.

But I don't know that that is a good thing.

 

[Kirkhill]

If they are going to do that perhaps they should be commissioning privates. Or making lieutenant or warrant the lowest rank.

For historical consistency.

 

[FJAG]

That's concerning.

The JAG does give legal advice to the CoC though. Some of that advice has been absolutely deplorable.

Law isn't always black and white

Everyone still has the right to Self Defense -

Yes they do

at times, the CoC, the UN etc all where failing miserably in that - and the explanation of what that actually allowed soldiers to do.

The thing about orders is that right or wrong, they are orders and unless they are telling you to do something that is patently unlawful, you are bound to obey them. In short, you are only allowed to do what you are ordered as being allowed to do and not what you think you are allowed to do.

Consider this scenario: Circa 1994-5
Hostile Individual shoots at you -- turn to run (still with weapon).
I actually had a CF Maj (JAG) tell me it was unlawful to shoot that person, because their back was turned, and we could only engage if he turned around and was shooting at us again.
I had a Capt (PPCLI) actually think the JAG was correct.
**Neither appreciated my acerbic comments, or questioning the validity of the JAG's LLB...

The point here is that when he is running away you are no longer in a self defence mode and there were (and still can be) ROEs that only allow engagement when the individual is actually committing a hostile act like shooting at you. Once the act ceases the permission to engage under the ROE also ceases. (its a bit similar to cops not being allowed to shoot a fleeing suspect/perpetrator in the back)

The trouble that many soldiers have is understanding where in the full war scenario killing any enemy who is not actually surrendering is perfectly permissible while with a lower than full war scenario where deliberate limitations are put in place for whatever reason the CoC sees fit.

Additionally neither could explain what was wrong when I told them I could shoot that guy in Canada under Self Defence provisions of the CCC, I'm so going to blast him into next week in XYZ country, other than "the ROE doesn't allow for that".

Actually you couldn't once the individual disengages and is running away. I'll let a LEO answer that one.

IMHO the JAG's Office often tends to look for the most restrictive interpretations - as opposed to the lawful options.

All Leg Os are people who interpret things with their own bias. I know some timid Leg Os and I know a whole bunch who are very pragmatic when it comes to balancing competing interests in their advice.

While the soldier on the ground just needs to know what his left and right of arc are.

The ROE are your left and right of arcs.

When overly restrictive policies that make no sense are put into place - people step outside those - but when you create a culture of stepping outside - bad things follow.

Sometimes perfectly reasonable things make no sense to some people.

The JAG's office also gave incorrect advice on the use of OTM ammunition for snipers and sharp shooters in 2004-2006 saying it was prohibited under the LOAC, without seeing that it was already approved in other parts of the CF, and coalition forces.

I'm not familiar with this opinion even though I was in Ottawa at that time. I can see where the term "Open Tip Match" can get confused with "hollow point". I've seen it considered legal and non legal for both military and hunting purposes in different circumstances. The Hague Convention prohibits "bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope which does not entirely cover the core, or is pierced with incisions." Personally I wouldn't form any opinion on it until I've seen terminal impact effects studies on it (which I haven't) in order to determine if it falls inside or outside the prohibition. I can see where its high level of accuracy would make it a very desirable round for snipers.

Whether a round is acceptable to coalition forces is informative but not determinative. If it had previously been approved within DND, that's another thing although its not unknown that requests can come from separate sources and be handled by two different Leg Os. Differing opinions shouldn't happen but I can see it happening especially if there has been a time interval and the usual posting shuffle has moved folks around.

I have some other interesting tidbits - but I'll save those for over a beer

I'd like that. I prefer a good Pilsner. You could probably help me out a lot with some of the novels I write. With luck I'll get back down to the States when this plague is more under control.

 

[FJAG]

Can't help but wonder what the point of Her Majesty's Commissions and Warrants are. I thought they required of the holders that they take responsibility for interpreting the laws of Her Majesty's Government. Thus the OiC ordering a soldier under his command, issuing a lawful order, absolves the soldier of responsibility for the action taken.

Superior orders defences have been dealt with extensively in war crimes law in many jurisdictions. In Canada the definitve statement comes from R v Finta as follows:

The defence of obedience to superior orders and the peace officer defence are available to members of the military or police forces in prosecutions for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Those defences are subject to the manifest illegality test: the defences are not available where the orders in question were manifestly unlawful. Even where the orders were manifestly unlawful, the defence of obedience to superior orders and the peace officer defence will be available in those circumstances where the accused had no moral choice as to whether to follow the orders. There can be no moral choice where there was such an air of compulsion and threat to the accused that he or she had no alternative but to obey the orders.

Whether or not there was a sufficient "air of compulsion and threat" is a question of fact in the particular circumstances.

 

[Kirkhill]

Superior orders defences have been dealt with extensively in war crimes law in many jurisdictions. In Canada the definitve statement comes from R v Finta as follows:



Whether or not there was a sufficient "air of compulsion and threat" is a question of fact in the particular circumstances.

Thanks FJAG. Is there case law managing the issue of imminence or timeliness? In a fast moving environment it seems to me instinct, training, and muscle memory are likely to have as much, if not more, impact than rational calculation.

 

[FJAG]

Thanks FJAG. Is there case law managing the issue of imminence or timeliness? In a fast moving environment it seems to me instinct, training, and muscle memory are likely to have as much, if not more, impact than rational calculation.

Killing someone (likely a non combatant) in a situation of imminence or instinct is separate issue from killing a non combatant deliberately as a result of an illegal order.

There is case law on both issues but I've long ago gotten rid of my material. I think for most of us westerners the My Lai massacre is probably one of the most demonstrative examples. It is a bit confusing because of the coverups prosecutions came a long time after most of the perpetrators were out of the military (draftees) and there was no jurisdiction at the time to try them. The Matchee/Brown murder case law is fairly well reported and available.

 

[Kirkhill]

Back to Ordnance Canada's Royal Canadian Air Force

Now that we have got rid of the Rif RAF the RCAF's 6000 are responsible for the following fleets:

In support of the RCN - 12 Wing and its CH-148s

In support of the Army (aka the CANSOFCOM Fusiliers and the RCE/RCA) - 1 and 8 Wings with their motley assortment of CH-146, CH-147, CC-130J, CC-177, CC-150, CC-144

And finally, in support of NORAD and Northcom - 22, 3, 4, 14 and 19 Wings and their CF-188s and CP-140s.

The RCN and Army Co-Op inventory I would leave alone just now.

The NORAD inventory is where I would focus my attention.

And just to sweeten the pot I would add the RPAS project to the NORAD issue


We have, I believe, 76 CF-188s and 14 CP-140s.

Although the emphasis is on the Hornets I would be focusing on the RPAS and the Auroras.

The 14 Auroras should be turned into a mixed fleet of P8 Poseidons and E7 Wedgetails and the numbers increased somewhat to something like 18 total, 12 Poseidons and 6 Wedgetails perhaps. The Poseidons not only function as patrol and surveillance platforms but also as missile trucks over land and sea for missiles like Harpoons, SLAM-ERs and JSMs as well as torpedoes and other underwater weapons and sensors.

The Wedgetail is interesting in that it is unarmed and so could be considered and intelligence asset and thus a civilian asset and outside of the 15,000 limit. But I decided to keep it inside the limit because of the airframe commonality with the Poseidon and the relatively small crew numbers, together with the tactical command and control platform it offers.

Similarly the RPAS project could be a civilian intelligence project if it was unarmed. It might be possible to consider splitting the fleet after the fashion of the AOPS/MPV split between the RCN and the CCG. In which case there might be a case made for the STOL Gray Eagle variant that can be launched and recovered from 800 ft gravel strips while carrying up to 16 Hellfires.

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www.realcleardefense.com

Beyond that I become really confused as to where the RCAF ends and the RCA begins

It is bad enough when aircraft deploy missiles, loitering attack munitions and UAVs (or even UUVs) but what are we supposed to make of Optionally Manned Hornets and these? UTAP-22 Mako - 1400 NM range




How does that differ materially from these? Nemesis NSM - 100 NM

Or these? PrSM (not MLRS - HiMARs with PrSM) - >250 NM

All of which deliver munitions to a designated target like an aircraft, but could be launched from any of the 45 fixed installations associated with the airport and harbour defences. (And that is as close to cheating as I am going to get GR66).


As for the F-35s to replace the Hornets. I still see jobs for then as Multi-Role Combat Aircraft. Both as missile trucks in the Air-to-Air, Air-to-Surface and Air-to-Ground modes as well as Recce assets over land and water. Perhaps matched with unmanned Hornets and Valkyries

 

[dimsum]

First, the CP-140 flies more in support of the RCN than for NORAD/NORTHCOM. It's an ASW platform that also does ISR, and realistically that ISR mission only started in Afghanistan. Depending on nation, those types of aircraft are either operated by their air forces or navies.

Second, the RCAF RPAS will be armed.

Finally, RCAF is in charge of the space domain. It doesn't launch anything (yet) but it's definitely critical for operations.

Re: The dividing line between RCAF and arty - I don't see a split. Cruise missiles/HIMARS/etc can be arty. Similarly, the RCN CSC is supposed to carry Tomahawks. I don't think any of those conflict with the RCAF's roles.

Edit to add: I personally see the RCAF dealing with things that fly (and are supposed to return). Of course, with the CA/RCN/SOF flying small-ish UAS, that vision is a bit skewed, but I don't think that every ship or troop needs an RCAF SUAS operator detachment.

 

[Haggis]

Not exactly 100% - there where a bunch of folks who went to England to learn the trade from the Horses Mouth on top of that.
Additionally SERT had some issues with some aspects of ROE that come with NLI HR missions.

SERTs issues with the use of lethal force as a first resort was, as you stated below, the primary catalyst for the creation of JTF-2.

Hostage Rescue is an area where a lot of LE Team have issues, especially if there are multiple hostage takers, because when you do make an entry - the goal isn't minimal use of force - the goal is to preserve the hostage lives - and neutralizing the threat of the hostage takers.
There is zero attempt to resolve an encounter with less than lethal force once the entry goes

That said the RCMP, OPP, and some Crown Prosecutors where superbly educational on how to articulate the rational for lethal force inside Canada. I learned more from an OPP OIS Investigator and Crown in two days on the articulation of lethal force justification than any other period in my life - which includes dedicated courses on that, LE certification, and LE classes across this continent.

I'm quite familiar with the RCMP articulation model and have successfully used it in court.

I will disagree there entirely - Cyprus gave the CF the belief they knew what their where doing with ROE - how screwed up that was, was only really identified in FYR deployments - and Somalia. I still believe to this day, that there are many members of the CAF who doesn't truly understand what self defense is, and what their legal rights are under that from an ROE standpoint.

Up until I retired, I believe we taught ROE poorly at the soldier level, which is where things are most likely to go wrong. Since then, have things changed?

Suspension of Disbelief - you need to accept the DS conditions

I worked at NDHQ. Suspension of Disbelief was a lifeskill.