- Reaction score
- 2
- Points
- 410
Operation Killer Jan - Feb 1951
http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/korea/ebb/ch16.htm
Gen. Matthew Bunker Ridgway
http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/ridgway.htm
http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/korea/ebb/ch16.htm
Evidence available by evening of 18 February, not only from the results of the IX Corps advance but also from the lull and lack of contact in the X and ROK III Corps zones, made clear that the Chinese and North Koreans were retiring from the salient they had created in the central region. The withdrawal fit the pattern of enemy operations observed before, especially Chinese operations, in which assault forces were obliged to pause for refitting after a week or so of battle.5
During the evening of the 18th Ridgway planned an advance designed to deny the enemy any respite in which to prepare new attacks and, in particular, designed to destroy those enemy forces moving north out of the Chech'on salient. He intended that two principal thrusts by American forces, up Route 29 from Wonju beyond Hoengsong and up Route 60 from Yongwol beyond P'yongch'ang, would block the main paths of enemy withdrawal. (Map 25) Other forces were to move through and clear the adjacent ground. Given the particular purpose of the attack, he called it Operation KILLER.6
Intelligence Problems
Ironically, as Ridgway developed the concept of Operation KILLER with confidence in the spirit of his line units, he found reason still to question the attitude of principal members of his own staff. On 18 February he received the staff recommendations he had asked for in late January on the terrain lines the Eighth Army should attempt to occupy during the spring and summer months. In sum, the staff proposed that the Eighth Army abandon offensive operations, defend in place until spring, then voluntarily withdraw to the old Pusan Perimeter.
Gen. Matthew Bunker Ridgway
http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/ridgway.htm