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New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy

  • Thread starter Thread starter GAP
  • Start date Start date
Far too much combatant in the Hamina class, when something like the Orca needs to focus on its primary goal as a training platform.
I would argue the opposite, that the Orca is too much of an unarmed trainer. A 57mm is probably overkill on a ship like that, but being at least fitted for but not with items like something larger than a .50 would be quite useful.
 
Agreed. We need the AOPs for now. They are serviceable and able to provide sea time.

I can see them being TX'd to the CCG, if their function and fit changed, once the RCDs and MCDV replacements come online though.
I’d like to see them be operated by the CCG for OP Caribe. Then it’s CCG working with USCG.
I’ll take a lot of flak for this I’m sure, but CCG works with USCG and RCN works with USN. Peer to peer.
 
I would argue the opposite, that the Orca is too much of an unarmed trainer. A 57mm is probably overkill on a ship like that, but being at least fitted for but not with items like something larger than a .50 would be quite useful.
Hamina is a fully fledged missile boat with anti-ship missiles, light anti-aircraft missiles, a substantial main gun and a full suite of sensors/decoys. This kind of combatant is utterly useless for the Royal Canadian Navy and is a substantial waste of time, effort and money. The Orca's entire purpose is to act as economic training platforms for our personnel, we should be looking to have them be more effective in this role and not be turned into bootleg patrol craft and be removed from said duties. If the Orca's were actually capable of leaving coastal BC, this would have happened already.
 
Would there be any benefit of building something less than a PC2 but more than a AOPS in terms of icebreaking capabilities - say a PC3?
Not particularly, given that such a vessel doesn't need those polar classes for its designated roles. One has to understand that the higher polar class that is integrated into a design, the more rigid of a traditional icebreaker it becomes. AOPS is able to operate abroad due to its lower ice rating and specific design requirements to do so, but fundamentally there is many tradeoffs required by heavy icebreakers that makes them only suited to those roles.

Higher polar class ratings drastically increase the complexity, build time and cost of designs, so it should not be applied recklessly.

In all seriousness a big F-off icebreaker doing a similar job to this, giving arctic BMD is an interesting concept. Or at least carrying a well heeled sensor package to augment airforce assets in NORAD. I don't see either, but I'm pushing envelopes and buttons here. Outside the box thinking may be coming down the line.
Arctic BMD Polar Icebreaker is an immensely silly and costly program that I hope the Govt would steer far away from, unless they've all fallen to the brain worms.

I’d like to see them be operated by the CCG for OP Caribe. Then it’s CCG working with USCG.
I’ll take a lot of flak for this I’m sure, but CCG works with USCG and RCN works with USN. Peer to peer.
Fundamentally, the USCG and CCG are different organizations with different mandates. The constant comparisons aren't really useful or much appreciated by the CCG staff themselves. In order to do what the RCN does, you'd need some weird DFO/CCG/RCMP crewed hybrid vessel, which is an immense amount of work compared to what we're doing now.
 
Not particularly, given that such a vessel doesn't need those polar classes for its designated roles. One has to understand that the higher polar class that is integrated into a design, the more rigid of a traditional icebreaker it becomes. AOPS is able to operate abroad due to its lower ice rating and specific design requirements to do so, but fundamentally there is many tradeoffs required by heavy icebreakers that makes them only suited to those roles.

Higher polar class ratings drastically increase the complexity, build time and cost of designs, so it should not be applied recklessly.


Arctic BMD Polar Icebreaker is an immensely silly and costly program that I hope the Govt would steer far away from, unless they've all fallen to the brain worms.


Fundamentally, the USCG and CCG are different organizations with different mandates. The constant comparisons aren't really useful or much appreciated by the CCG staff themselves. In order to do what the RCN does, you'd need some weird DFO/CCG/RCMP crewed hybrid vessel, which is an immense amount of work compared to what we're doing now.
I guess we'll have to wait and see if Carney's talk yesterday about expanding their mandate turns out to be something of substance or not.
 
The expanded mandate (I think) will be limited to contributing to the Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP). Which is actually a huge plus and may just require some communications upgrades to the current and future CCG fleet.
 
I guess we'll have to wait and see if Carney's talk yesterday about expanding their mandate turns out to be something of substance or not.
I think if someone thinks that the CCG is about to be turned into some mirror of the USCG they'll going to be disappointed. Like others have alluded to perhaps more sensors and perhaps the ability to be armed in case of conflict but no 4th arm of the military. Although I would love for that to get out that he's considering turning them into just that, the unions would be in an uproar.
 
Agreed. We need the AOPs for now. They are serviceable and able to provide sea time.

I can see them being TX'd to the CCG, if their function and fit changed, once the RCDs and MCDV replacements come online though
I remember numerous times there were calls for the Kingston Class to be transferred to the CG and never came to anything. The simple truth of the matter that AOPS like them or hate them play a significant part of our strategy in the Arctic and everything else we do. We need them and more than ever. Even if we were able to build the RCD and Corvettes we would still need the general low level capability they bring and as build times go decades before we'll ever get a significant amount of ships.
 
Having noted that even a small boat can be a well rounded boat is it more appropriate to have a well-rounded boat/ship/vessel or a well-rounded task force.

The army doesn't have the luxury of equipping all vehicles with everything (LAV and Bradley experiments notwithstanding). It needs a mix of specialist vehicles task-tailored to the situation.

I'm not sure what you're on about now.

I'll gather my thoughts and try again later. Cheers.


I've got nothing against the NSM as a common munition for the RCN, RCAF and CA. I just think the likelihood of there being a situation where we'd be using them as coastal defence missiles protecting Canadian territory is pretty slim.

Even if we needed to defend the Arctic the RCAF would be much better positioned to respond to an incursion. To cover the vast area of the Arctic with LRPF's you'd have to pre-station a large proportion of our launchers across a wide area in case an enemy force comes into range which takes them away from other potential, more traditional uses. If you plan to rather just deploy them by air after a threat is detected, an F-35 could respond much more quickly (and with stealth).

Now using the NSM for precision land attack in support of our ground forces is well within the realm of possibility.


....

Trying to tie my thoughts together rationally.

The AOPS. Widely considered to be under armed with its 25 mm gun.
The MMCV. Discussions as to how big it needs to be in order to carry a useful suite of weapons.

The 270 ton Hamina, to my mind, presents an example of even a small vessel being equipped with an array of weaponry that allows it to answer to threats in all aspects, or multiple domains. And it does it with a very small crew.

That leads me to as why the Hamina's suite of systems, or modern NATO equivalents, could not be transferred to a 1000 ton (light) vessel, broadly comparable in size to the MCDVs, that would conform to the 1000 ton NSS class of vessels.

Further to that, assuming sufficient residual buoyancy and adequate stability could not the AOPS be beefed up to manage a similar suite of systems.

Finally, given the advent of containerized systems giving even small platforms 1500 km reach how does that figure into the design calculus.

Even an MCDV with a 40 ft container on its stern (if it will fit - IDK) could launch both SM6s and Tomahawks, both of which have long range over the horizon anti-ship capabilities. For that matter, if the AOPS were to limit itself to UAV and light helicopter operations perhaps it could carry a pair of Mk70 PDS on the helideck for launching those longer range missiles.

And I appreciate the discussion about the lack of on board targeting capabilities but with Cooperative Engagement I understand that the eyes on the target are as likely to be a satellite or an RPAS as someone on the bridge with a pair of binoculars.

For those types of engagements putting a 4 pack or two of NSMs on board seems reasonable. Moreso than employing them trying to defend our 243,000 km of coastline.

....

Given all that when is it appropriate to arm a vessel to conduct a unitary patrol, and when is it appropriate to equip it as part of a task force? And with modern modular systems, LCS experience aside, can we have our cake and eat it too?
 
I remember numerous times there were calls for the Kingston Class to be transferred to the CG and never came to anything. The simple truth of the matter that AOPS like them or hate them play a significant part of our strategy in the Arctic and everything else we do. We need them and more than ever. Even if we were able to build the RCD and Corvettes we would still need the general low level capability they bring and as build times go decades before we'll ever get a significant amount of ships.

AOPs play a significant part in pretending we have an Artic strategy.

I don't hate them, I just think they detract from what is the RCNs main reason to exist. And I think they are the physical manifestation of how unserious our Gov and Nation take not only the Arctic but National Security.

They exist for a constabulary force and that is a role for the CCG.
 
I remember numerous times there were calls for the Kingston Class to be transferred to the CG and never came to anything. The simple truth of the matter that AOPS like them or hate them play a significant part of our strategy in the Arctic and everything else we do. We need them and more than ever. Even if we were able to build the RCD and Corvettes we would still need the general low level capability they bring and as build times go decades before we'll ever get a significant amount of ships.
and, without significant changes they are really not set up for coast guard operations i.e.buoy tending, science
 
AOPs play a significant part in pretending we have an Artic strategy.

I don't hate them, I just think they detract from what is the RCNs main reason to exist. And I think they are the physical manifestation of how unserious our Gov and Nation take not only the Arctic but National Security.

They exist for a constabulary force and that is a role for the CCG.
There is an arctic strategy. Its very clear in the recently released Arctic Foreign Policy document. AOPS is the RCN's contribution. The subs and the undersea sensors are likely the next step from the RCN.

But its a WoG effort. This is a 10 year lift to start.
 
I would argue the opposite, that the Orca is too much of an unarmed trainer. A 57mm is probably overkill on a ship like that, but being at least fitted for but not with items like something larger than a .50 would be quite useful.
The Orca's CONOPs is to provide an unarmed trainer, so it's exactly what it should be.

Also, 50 cals on a fixed mounted pintels are pretty much useless for actually hitting anything, especially on a small boat getting bounced around (they suck on the CPFs as well). That's why for FP they use LMGs and C7s, with the 50 cal being more of a visual deterrent and pucker factor.
 
AOPs play a significant part in pretending we have an Artic strategy.

I don't hate them, I just think they detract from what is the RCNs main reason to exist. And I think they are the physical manifestation of how unserious our Gov and Nation take not only the Arctic but National Security.

They exist for a constabulary force and that is a role for the CCG.
The RCN's main reason to exist is what the GOC decides. We've been doing the same stuff which includes constabulary work since the cold war. You very well know and this has has been talked about over and over again about the CCG and how unless there is a major paradigm shift will never be the same as the USCG. I maybe wrong and Carney may very well declare it so. I'm betting its never going to happen and AOPS will be part of the RCN carrying out the same missions they are doing now for the next 25 years if not longer. Like others have mentioned more sensors, perhaps set up for armament to provide the illusion we are spending more for NATO, no mandate change.
 

The RCN's main reason to exist is what the GOC decides. We've been doing the same stuff which includes constabulary work since the cold war. You very well know and this has has been talked about over and over again about the CCG and how unless there is a major paradigm shift will never be the same as the USCG. I maybe wrong and Carney may very well declare it so. I'm betting its never going to happen and AOPS will be part of the RCN carrying out the same missions they are doing now for the next 25 years if not longer. Like others have mentioned more sensors, perhaps set up for armament to provide the illusion we are spending more for NATO, no mandate change.
I'm going to ask a question that may be self evident to you RCN folks and possibly to the other branches of the CAF, but here goes.

On OP Caribe I have seen that its standard practice to have a USCG boarding party (maybe not the correct term) imbedded with our RCN ship and it seems like its the USCG that does the 'actual take down' of the drug runner. That its the USCG that is boarding the drug running ship. that is armed for this scenario and that apprehends and arrests the individuals found on board the drug running ship.

So my question is this - why can't a CCG ship have a USCG boarding party imbedded with them and have the CCG ship participate in OP Caribe? What does the RCN ship bring to the table that a CCG ship not bring?
 
There is an arctic strategy. Its very clear in the recently released Arctic Foreign Policy document. AOPS is the RCN's contribution. The subs and the undersea sensors are likely the next step from the RCN.

But its a WoG effort. This is a 10 year lift to start.

Let's pick this up in 10 years and see where we are.

Deeds not words.
 
The RCN's main reason to exist is what the GOC decides. We've been doing the same stuff which includes constabulary work since the cold war. You very well know and this has has been talked about over and over again about the CCG and how unless there is a major paradigm shift will never be the same as the USCG. I maybe wrong and Carney may very well declare it so. I'm betting its never going to happen and AOPS will be part of the RCN carrying out the same missions they are doing now for the next 25 years if not longer. Like others have mentioned more sensors, perhaps set up for armament to provide the illusion we are spending more for NATO, no mandate change.

I have no idea what Carney will do, but I will say it sounds lik the wants to put some teeth on the CCH, and that's probably a way up our defence spending. But this is a campaign, let's see what actually happens.

I feel sorry for the crews that may have to sail an AOPs into harms way in the near future.
 
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