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Navy removes USS Theodore Roosevelt captain

https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/19/navy-fires-brett-crozier-aircraft-carrier-coronavirus-329716

The US Navy has released its investigation into the TR incident that led to Capt Crozier's relief.  The CNS has decided to uphold the relief, stating that if he knew then what he knows now, he wouldn't have recommended returning him to command of the carrier.

https://www.secnav.navy.mil/foia/readingroom/HotTopics/TR%20INVESTIGATION/TR%20CI%20Report%20with%20CNO%20Endorsement%20(Redacted%20for%20release).pdf

The investigation is worth reading, and I recommend it to anyone here in a leadership position.  As Paul Harvey's says, you get "the rest of the story."  Indecisive actions before landing at Guam and while in Guam, allowing relationships with senior staffs to deteriorate, not sufficiently mentoring subordinates, and going around the chain of command with the now famous letter all added up.  His boss is now also in the hotseat, with his promotion on hold pending a separate investigation.

Of the recommendations, I found this the most interesting.

7.  Navy leadership use this case study to emphasize the Navy's recent lesson learned from the USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) and USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) collisions of 2017, in that Navy leaders are willing to listen when commanding officers have concerns about mission readiness or need additional assistance. CPF spoke with CCSG-9 and the TR CO on the phone immediately after the CO's email was sent. In this call, CPF laid out all the actions in progress, and at the end of the conversation, asked CCSG-9 and the TR CO what else they needed. With no additional requests made, CPF considered the matter closed. CPF did not make any notifications up to the CNO/VCNO level until some 30 hours later when it became apparent media had a copy of the letter, and that a story based on the letter, which contained inaccuracies, would soon follow. CNAP's immediate response was “thank you for the red flare… we'll escalate work... immediately.”

The lessons should also reinforce that although the TR CO's intentions were pure, his method of transmitting his concerns did not display good judgment. Further, the lesson should emphasize some fundamental points if in the position of needing to bypass your immediate superior(s) in command:

a. First, review your actions and check your facts. The Navy's culture prides itself on an open and candid exchange between seniors and subordinates. Look at yourself with a critical eye and make sure you are not missing some key information.

b. Ask yourself why you are there - have you done all you can to communicate your case in clear and unambiguous terms? Just as you would do for a subordinate, you owe that senior an opportunity to correct the situation.  Talking to the senior's staff is not a substitute for addressing them directly. A staff representative may not be capable of relaying your case with the detail, rigor or passion that only you can provide.

c. Finally, if you must bypass that senior, recognize this should be considered a last resort. Use a private means of conveying those concerns, such as a phone call or an in-person office call with the next superior, if possible. This allows face-saving opportunities on both sides. The boss's boss may have key information or context that makes you realize you had it wrong.
 
Infanteer said:
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/19/navy-fires-brett-crozier-aircraft-carrier-coronavirus-329716

The US Navy has released its investigation into the TR incident that led to Capt Crozier's relief.  The CNS has decided to uphold the relief, stating that if he knew then what he knows now, he wouldn't have recommended returning him to command of the carrier.

https://www.secnav.navy.mil/foia/readingroom/HotTopics/TR%20INVESTIGATION/TR%20CI%20Report%20with%20CNO%20Endorsement%20(Redacted%20for%20release).pdf

The investigation is worth reading, and I recommend it to anyone here in a leadership position.  As Paul Harvey's says, you get "the rest of the story."  Indecisive actions before landing at Guam and while in Guam, allowing relationships with senior staffs to deteriorate, not sufficiently mentoring subordinates, and going around the chain of command with the now famous letter all added up.  His boss is now also in the hotseat, with his promotion on hold pending a separate investigation.

Of the recommendations, I found this the most interesting.

Quite the interesting read and a great case study that can be applied across the board for how to deal with hard issues as a leader
 
I just read the report in full.


Honestly, in my own opinion - poor guy.  Seems like he was making sound decisions, which seemed logical and prudent at the time.  His concern was with the well being of his crew, enhancing social distancing, disembarking his crew in a RESPONSIBLE way - and not just unleashing 5000 sailors into Guam - and adapting to a rapidly deteriorating situation the best he could.  A situation which nobody had previously encountered.


Sounds like a lose / lose for him.  Could certain decisions have been made differently, in hindsight?  Ofcourse. 

Were his decisions irrational or irresponsible, especially from his perspective at the time?  I'd say not. 



Seems like a good man who ended up in a crap situation.  I understand that due to processes, there must be some form of official accountability.  Just a shame it comes across as finger pointing  :2c:
 
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