- Reaction score
- 35
- Points
- 560
With the ideas of "Full Spectrum Operations" and the "Three Block War" now being the ideas of the day (remember Manoeuvre Warfare?), we need to look at the force structure to see how to best go about dealing with these operations. This is pulling together a lot of things from different threads, as well as some ideas of my own (you can read these here: http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_05/iss_4/CAJ_vol5.4_11_e.pdf).
The executive summary is simply this: we need to combine high levels of mobility to establish a presence, create a security "bulwark" for other government agencies and NGOs to operate behind, and also have enough combat power to take on all challengers, ranging from direct action against scattered Jihadis to being able to offer a creditable threat to a conventional force. From these requirements, we can derive the need for a force with the mobility of Cavalry combined with the fighting and staying power of Infantry, the traditional "Mounted Rifles". We can think of this almost in terms of speed ratios; a "Cavalry" unit from antiquity to the supercession of the horse in the 20th century had far more mobility than a column of marching Infantry (special cases like the Zulu Impis marching 50 miles a day or the 18th century "Chasseurs àpied"" are really the exceptions that prove the rule). In the past, many different armies came to the same conclusions. The United States Cavalry used troopers fighting dismounted with rifles and carbines from the Civil War until almost WWII, the British Empire spawned Mounted Rifles, Light Horse and assorted other units, even the French Foreign Legion moved from marching columns to "flying columns" mounted on camels in Africa and the near East.
We can use motorized Infantry units along the line of the current LAV or SBCT to provide the ratio compared to conventional Mechanized forces (in which case the organizational layout is mostly at issue, rather than any technical issues), or we can go even further and use air mobility to provide the speed difference between the motorized Infantry and the "Cavalry". Each approach has several advantages and drawbacks. A motorized force has more inherent protection and firepower, but is constricted by terrain. Airmobile forces are more terrain independent, and can substitute speed for mass, but have less inherent protection and staying power, and a higher logistical bill.
As a LAV mounted force, we are already in a good position to create "Mounted Rifle" style motorized units. I am a fan of combined arms units along the lines of the Marine LAV battalion or the US Army SBCT, and there are proper technical solutions available for the LAV chassis to provide mortar and direct fire support, as well as self propelled artillery. LAV based engineer or pioneer equipment might be more problematic, but certainly some form of LAV could serve as a section carrier. Armoured logistics vehicles sharing LAV components would also be a very useful addition to the force. Given the need for presence patrols and other dismounted tasks, the ratios of Infantry soldiers to the other arms will have to be carefully considered, and I would suggest traditional ideas of Infantry formations and employment might also have to be rethought (fight by envelopment or by fire supression rather than direct assault, companies with four platoons to deal with the need for extra manpower, there are lots of ideas to explore).
However, we should not be mesmerized by the idea that we can only use LAVs. From an expense perspective, LAV IFVs and various support vehicles might be substituted for Armoured Patrol Vehicles (APVs) like the Australian "Bushmaster". Similarly, there is a very stron case for sucking up the expense and going for an airmobile force to gain the advantages of speed, especially in constricted or complex terrain, or in areas with no reliable maps or infrastructure.
This could be the real template for the forces in the 21rst century
The executive summary is simply this: we need to combine high levels of mobility to establish a presence, create a security "bulwark" for other government agencies and NGOs to operate behind, and also have enough combat power to take on all challengers, ranging from direct action against scattered Jihadis to being able to offer a creditable threat to a conventional force. From these requirements, we can derive the need for a force with the mobility of Cavalry combined with the fighting and staying power of Infantry, the traditional "Mounted Rifles". We can think of this almost in terms of speed ratios; a "Cavalry" unit from antiquity to the supercession of the horse in the 20th century had far more mobility than a column of marching Infantry (special cases like the Zulu Impis marching 50 miles a day or the 18th century "Chasseurs àpied"" are really the exceptions that prove the rule). In the past, many different armies came to the same conclusions. The United States Cavalry used troopers fighting dismounted with rifles and carbines from the Civil War until almost WWII, the British Empire spawned Mounted Rifles, Light Horse and assorted other units, even the French Foreign Legion moved from marching columns to "flying columns" mounted on camels in Africa and the near East.
We can use motorized Infantry units along the line of the current LAV or SBCT to provide the ratio compared to conventional Mechanized forces (in which case the organizational layout is mostly at issue, rather than any technical issues), or we can go even further and use air mobility to provide the speed difference between the motorized Infantry and the "Cavalry". Each approach has several advantages and drawbacks. A motorized force has more inherent protection and firepower, but is constricted by terrain. Airmobile forces are more terrain independent, and can substitute speed for mass, but have less inherent protection and staying power, and a higher logistical bill.
As a LAV mounted force, we are already in a good position to create "Mounted Rifle" style motorized units. I am a fan of combined arms units along the lines of the Marine LAV battalion or the US Army SBCT, and there are proper technical solutions available for the LAV chassis to provide mortar and direct fire support, as well as self propelled artillery. LAV based engineer or pioneer equipment might be more problematic, but certainly some form of LAV could serve as a section carrier. Armoured logistics vehicles sharing LAV components would also be a very useful addition to the force. Given the need for presence patrols and other dismounted tasks, the ratios of Infantry soldiers to the other arms will have to be carefully considered, and I would suggest traditional ideas of Infantry formations and employment might also have to be rethought (fight by envelopment or by fire supression rather than direct assault, companies with four platoons to deal with the need for extra manpower, there are lots of ideas to explore).
However, we should not be mesmerized by the idea that we can only use LAVs. From an expense perspective, LAV IFVs and various support vehicles might be substituted for Armoured Patrol Vehicles (APVs) like the Australian "Bushmaster". Similarly, there is a very stron case for sucking up the expense and going for an airmobile force to gain the advantages of speed, especially in constricted or complex terrain, or in areas with no reliable maps or infrastructure.
This could be the real template for the forces in the 21rst century