"Light Infantry/Airborne Capability" & "Canadian Airborne - a waste of $$$?"

[Brygun]

Thanks Brygun

I see you are also into history in fact you are more up on than I am in some cases.
I have this discussed this topic with senior officers in the Infantry and in fact written it out just waiting to see if an editor will print it or not.

Your welcome. Perhaps you can get permission to post the reply... or a jist of the conversation.

I view this mission a failure for the Light Infantry Concept as it proved that mech forces could do Light missions without a problem. If this mission were a true LIB mission then the extra company/manpower should have been drawn from one of the other two Light Infantry Battalions either RCR or VanDoo.
For OP ATHENA missions all the LIBs were using LAV and Iltis/G-Wagon. If LAV's were required then it is a Mech mission not a Light mission.

Two biggest differences between Light Infantry and Mechanized is first the presence of the vehicles and secondly the large differences in costs to operate and train in those vehicles.

It would be preferable if you could always have mechanized carriers for any mission for the infantry. I present to you instead that the OP ATHENA showed the adapability of LIB to become upvehicled. We had enough vehicles and funds for the vehicles to go so the vehicles should be there.

The question was more a matter of why the LIB infantry:

Many believe that the mission should have gone to Mech Battalion such as 2 PPCLI as they were back from Bosnia and still had a lot of troops. Instead 3 PPCLI an understrength battalion was sent and had to be augmented by the entire C Company 2 PPCLI as well as pers from Sniper, Recce and other organizations.

While the reasons for the choices you mentioned I dont know for sure it may have to do with that "back from". Some times force leaders rotate who is going out whether training or operational. Was there another full strength Mech Battalion available? Are you sure its available and not tasked to some major training exercise or on a stay-home cycle? The US 82 airborne for instance uses a rotation schedule where one battalion is always on 2-hour standby to be on planes (you basically dont leave the base). To achieve that the battalions of the 3 brigades each spend two weeks is at that readiness. At that moment that other battalions are at other stages, 5 hour response time, training or at "rest status" so they have time to be fathers and mothers to their families.

It would useful to your topic to list what else was available.

The other implication perhaps is to the unpopular idea of keeping the transport vehicles in a seperate organization from the infantry.  Namely you would shuttle into the situations the Mech Vehicles and attach the various LIB as needed. A true "battle taxi" service could in theory (not practice) pick up and move infantry force A then go get infantry force B. Nobody uses this approach as at least one infantry force should be intimately familiar with using the vehicles and the personnel operationg it. The only way to get the most out of the transports is to train regularily in using them. Temporary, such as what you describe, inserts of forces does happen when needed but not the whole infantry force swapping around.


For the other assets (sniper, recce) etc is it not the idea to assemble from our regular forces and reserves the right mission force.

 

[Brygun]

It seems he already has in the <a href=http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/33494/post-253349.html#msg253349>"Useful things to read before going to basic"</a> thread.

So far Michael is the only person to have asked about it nicely. So far in the army.ca the people demanding it where ones going on with a "you asked a question you are going to fail" or "how dare you recommend a book". Frankly with the bad attitude of those people (of which no one in this thread has been) is why I wont be adding any more profile information. Such people are only looking for something to take yet another cheap shot at someone over since they cant present a discussion.

Again, no one in this thread has shown that attitude but after the experiences with others with bad attitudes that also demanded profile information I wont be responding to general profile requests. To your credit Michael you are the first who wasnt also shooting mouth.

Agree or disagree with things posted or ask is what discussion forums are about. If someone has something better to say by all means go ahead and I'll learn something too.  

 

[Michael OLeary]

Brygun,

unlike some forums which are treated as a free for all in the conduct of posters, this board attempts to achieve and maintain a degree of credibility through its debate and emphasis on experience-based contribution, including the challenging (however politely) of posters' credentials to establish the veracity of the data they present as reasoned fact. That philosophy is well represented in Mike Bobbitt's Conduct Guidelines for the forums. I have pointed out that your posts, however detailed, appear to be in conflict with my experiences and training at the Army's Staff College. Because of that, I requested clarification of your background to help all readers place your comments in context. If your remarks are simply the result of your personal synthesis of material you have read, that is fine, but it allows the use of a different interpretive lens than if you were a Command and Staff Course qualified Maj or LCol talking about infantry employment in all types of operations (of which there are also some on the baord).

I am not looking for an argument, simply for a better standpoint from which to interpret your remarks.

 

[Brygun]

If your remarks are simply the result of your personal synthesis of material you have read, that is fine,

That would be the one.

I appreciate your approach, its rather refreshing and restoring a faith in the members of army.ca

 

[Brygun]

appear to be in conflict with my experiences and training at the Army's Staff College.

Will you, or are you permitted, to share these views? I am interested in what your view is.

 

[Michael OLeary]

You would have to be more specific. I'm not about to try and narrate the total of 26 weeks on course plus two years on the support staff of the Staff College bridging two fundamentally different doctrinal and technological eras. The aim of the Staff College is to teach the Operational Planning Process at battle group (task force) and brigade group levels in the full spectrum of operations to the Army's captains. It does so by starting with detailed examination and analysis of the doctrinal units and formation in use at the time of the course, which are used in all of the College's exercises and staff problems, leading up to the exercising of student staffed headquarters in fully supported computer simulations covering the full range of activities from peacekeeping to combat operations. The general principals taught are then used by the graduates adapted to whatever organization they are afterward posted. It's not a matter of it being too complex to deliver, it is a problem that the entire package is just that, a package of interlocking concepts and training objectives; which is dependent on the preparatory training and experience of the participants, as well as their mutual cooperation and expertise in their own specialist areas, to absorb at the level of detail and pace the College delivers.

 

[a_majoor]

I am unclear what is meant or implied by "failure of the Light Infantry concept"? The fact that the government does not provide enough funds to maintin battalions/regiments at full strength? If you look at where the 3 PPCLI battlegroup deployed, you will see very little opportunity to have used the LAV III platform at anywhere near its capabilities. It would be very difficult (if not impossible) to have driven a Mech battlegroup into the Sha-e-kot valley or up the "Whale's back" and fought as a mechanized formation. The choice to augment 3 PPCLI with a company from their own Regiment probably had a lot more to do with ATOF/managed readiness than any intrinsic desire to prove or disprove anything.

The other implication perhaps is to the unpopular idea of keeping the transport vehicles in a separate organization from the infantry. Namely you would shuttle into the situations the Mech Vehicles and attach the various LIB as needed. A true "battle taxi" service could in theory (not practice) pick up and move infantry force A then go get infantry force B. Nobody uses this approach as at least one infantry force should be intimately familiar with using the vehicles and the personnel operationg it. The only way to get the most out of the transports is to train regularily in using them. Temporary, such as what you describe, inserts of forces does happen when needed but not the whole infantry force swapping around.

Actually the Australians use this approach. There are links in several other threads to articles about how this is done and how well it works. In the past, the British army used to have "Motor Battalions", which provided transport around the AOR through the use of trucks, although never using trucks to deliver troops tactically into the fight.

WRT filling in your credentials, it is your choice, of course, but the rest of us do take what we see there into account when reading posts and assigning "value" to what the poster has to say.

 

[Kirkhill]

The issue Brygun is are you using the vehicle to transport the infantry and their kit to the field, or is the vehicle itself to fight on the field.

In the first case there is limited coordination required. In the second case there is intimate cooperation required.  Still more training and cooperation seems likely to be necessary if the vehicle and infantry are to assault as a team.

The Aussies, as a_majoor reminds us, have created separate M113 subunits and units that are composed entirely of crews.  The guys in the back are infanteers and come from attached units, much like they might be assigned to work with helicopters.  Although we had M113s integrated in the Mech battalions at the section level they too were essentially just transport with the section driver and the vehicle being removed from the line and lagered up at a Zulu location.  You could see the old organization as a light infantry battalion with an M113 platoon attached and integrated.

When the vehicles got a turret and the turret became more capable the vehicle ceased to be just transport for infantry, it became a fighting vehicle in its own right and too valuable to be left out of the fight.  This, along with the fact that the vehicle could not transport a full section of infantry in addition to the 3-man crew has forced the revision of TO&Es as well as TTPs which in turn means that the infantry in the back of the LAV has less in common with the infantry that fights dismounted, or light.

Which brings us all the way back to the beginning, in my view.  Can a common structure for Light and LAV infantry be found so that one type of infantry company or battalion can switch roles easily?  One day fighting on foot without vehicles.  The next day mounted and integrated with vehicles.

 

[Brygun]

In the past, the British army used to have "Motor Battalions", which provided transport around the AOR through the use of trucks, although never using trucks to deliver troops tactically into the fight.

Interesting. Wasnt aware of that. I will look into that. Thanks.

In the past, the British army used to have "Motor Battalions", which provided transport around the AOR through the use of trucks, although never using trucks to deliver troops tactically into the fight.

This type of "strategic" mobility I had heard about but as you say, not into a fight. Couldnt recall off the top of my head who.

 

[Brygun]

It would be very difficult (if not impossible) to have driven a Mech battlegroup into the Sha-e-kot valley or up the "Whale's back" and fought as a mechanized formation. The choice to augment 3 PPCLI with a company from their own Regiment probably had a lot more to do with ATOF/managed readiness than any intrinsic desire to prove or disprove anything.

Which reminds me... two "lightly equipped infantry on foot" scenarious I forgot where mountain, espically where caves are present, and huminatarian aide (tanks dont do so well and handing out foods though they do tend to keep the roads clear of fallen trees).

 

[claybot]

Well it seems this thread has generated some good discussion I was hoping for that.

I am unclear what is meant or implied by "failure of the Light Infantry concept"? The fact that the government does not provide enough funds to maintin battalions/regiments at full strength? If you look at where the 3 PPCLI battlegroup deployed, you will see very little opportunity to have used the LAV III platform at anywhere near its capabilities. It would be very difficult (if not impossible) to have driven a Mech battlegroup into the Sha-e-kot valley or up the "Whale's back" and fought as a mechanized formation. The choice to augment 3 PPCLI with a company from their own Regiment probably had a lot more to do with ATOF/managed readiness than any intrinsic desire to prove or disprove anything.

The Failure I implied is that the mission showed that Mech forces can do the Light Infantry work. If our Mech forces are capable of doing the work of the LIB whats the point in having the LIB. We could just make each LIB a Mech force or better yet disband the unit and use the troops to bring the understrength Mech battalions up to full strength.
AOTF/managed readiness is the same point I received from a now senior officer. To me thats an excuse we have other LIB's. With OP APOLLO being used to justify the LIB Concept then it should have been a pure LIB.
All it proved is that its easy to re-roll a mech force into a LIB.

As I've stated in other threads/posts we would just have one type of Infantry one capable of Light and Mech roles.

And yes I've updated my Profile a bit should show in the signature block

 

[a_majoor]

We cannot look at the soldiers in isolation.

A 600 man LIB will have a certain logistical footprint, transportation requirements (strategic i.e. how to deploy from Canada) and intrinsic abilities to work in close or restricted terrain. A fully developed Light Infantry doctrine would have a TO&E and TTPs reflecting the strengths of light infantry, rather than rehash the various arguments look at the "Towards a true Light Infantry" thread http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/32580.0.html

Similarly, a 600 man Mechanized Infantry Battalion would have a very different logistics footprint, transportation requirements and intrinsic abilities to operate in open terrain. The Mechanized TO&E and TTPs would reflect the fact that a section would be smaller due to the interior layout of the vehicle, but fighting in conjunction with the vehicle has a higher degree of firepower, far more than a comparable LIB section.

None of this should be taken to imply that dismounted infantry soldiers can or cannot do certain tasks, there is enough overlap in the common skill sets so an infantry soldier can fight in the Sha-e-kot, the Fulda gap or the streets of Fallujiah, but when looking at TO&E or TTP issues, a six or seven man section trained to employ the firepower of the 25mm chain gun and coax GPMG might require a certain degree of reorientation before leaving the LAV behind and climbing up the hills. Similarly, an eight man Light section (light infantry could potentially have as many as 12 men per section depending on organization and doctrine) will need to drop some soldiers to fit in a LAV, and get some orientation to understand how to employ the vehicle to its full effect.

OP Apollo really only proved two things: our system of training is flexible and comprehensive enough for infantry soldiers to take on different roles when required, and we haven't fully developed doctrines to really differentiate Light from Mech yet. I suspect in the fullness of time, composite Cavalry Regiments, such as those advocated by 2Bravo will evolve and take on what we now see as the Armoured role (but with the addition of a dismountable element for close protection and to deliver the assault), while LIBs may evolve into true light infantry with very restricted kit lists and small logistic footprints in order to deploy rapidly, operate in "stealth mode" and provide force projection capabilities in restricted terrain. Each type of capability is required, but in what ratio is an open question.

 

[Sapper Bloggins]

Nicely put Brygun.
Your posts have proven to be very informative. thanks

 

[Brygun]

In regards to the carrier in Mech Inf:

The worlds infrastructure is based around the width of a pair of horses. The roads that where wagon trails, with more than two horses being done in pairs sets of pairs, became our roads. This influence affect the design of the space shuttle as the rocket boosters where sized to be carried about on roads.

Military vehicles with the intention of driving down road lanes are also constricted to this. They also run into the width factor in not just roads but on air transport which most are fixed around the width of a care lane. This fix on width means that you have either height or length to increase volume.

To add more carried infantry by height is impractical. To increase volume to the point of fitting more people either you end up with a vehicle they height of double decker bus or at least some of the infantry are laying down prone inside the carrier. The latter delaying speed of deployment and mixed feelings on comfort going over rough terrain. Height also increases the profile greatly impacting hull down and spotting factors greatly.

This leaves length for the design of the carrier.To carry more infantry you need a longer vehicle. Its been commented already in the thread of the different squad sizes between mechanized and light infantry. Length does impact the size of the target while having a lesser impact on "hull down" or "stealth" factors. Length also impacts turning radius of which there will be an upper limit based on the turning radius that roads are designed for. Since a city bus can only awkwardly make the turn a military fighting vehicle needs to be something shorter than a bus, still leaving possible room for increasing lenght. (There may be other factors regarding the choice of length).

Part of the issues, as brought up, was the presence of stay-behind on the vehicle being drawn out from the infantry squad. A more comprehensive vehicle for being able to mech-the-light would be to have a longer carrier that could carry a full infantry squad in addition to the vehicle crews.

The other solution to picking up foot infantry is to increase the number of carriers. This leads to squads, platoons etc being split over multiple vehicles. This reduction of cohesion under fire is readibly apparenet as a drawback. Further it is likely that the "odd men out" dont equal a full vehicle load so somewhere there are carries with mixed load of infantry, some of whom belong to squad A and other who belong to squad B. So when carrier with squad A goes left and carrier with squad B turns right where does the A+B odds and end carrier go?

So what does all this have to do with the need for Light Infantry Battalion?
Well until we get longer carriers that carry "full" infantry squads the carrying limits make fighting with "reduced" squad sizes a type of speacilist skills. Similiar yes but not quite the same.
Further what if the terrain is, as mentioned, unsuitable for the transports (bog, swamp, dense forest, urban rubble, blocked roads, moutains etc)? If you only have mech-inf you are sending "reduced" size squads into action and without the fire support of  their carrier. A light infantry battalion can act in the area at "full" size with the full integration of its support weapons. Operators of the support weapons/systems are familiar and have trained with the foot infantry part of the force.

Again, my own feelings are that the Op Athena showed the adability of the infantry soldier.  :warstory: It was not a "perfect" match but thats what real life is about, getting things down with what you have.

What is needed, and to some extant exists now, is a range of possible forces to use. Like a tool box with a hammer, saw, screwdrivers, level and so forth we have/need a mix of solutions of armor warfare solution, mechanized infantry and as my first essay focused on is that there are many needs a "lightly equipped person on foot"... the light infantry battalion.

a_majoor touched on a very excellent point on the logistic side.   It enforces the need for different types of forces, of which light infantry battalion is one, on the cost per use. Not all missions require the same functions. You could build a hammer sized version of a multi-tool with a hammer, saw, screwdriver in it but how many could you afford to maintain and deploy? Using the multi-tool example there are some multi-tool jobs they can do but not so well... for example the length of the screwdriver bit may not reach well through and obstruction and on my own the knife has some cutting styles blocked by the width of the multi-tool handle. By having a set of tools you choose which one to use. Even with a multi-tool in my house its a big box of tools that goes with me to work on my car.

Getting back to Clauzwitz's "On War" (a book on the army's recommend reading list) there is a chapter of the "Relationship between the Branches of the Service" (pg 285-291 of the 1984 Howard and Paret). Bear in mind that he is in an age of musket infantry, wheeled cannon and horse cavalry. Stil the fundamentals and principles he discusses are important enough to keep the book on the reading list. Highlights of the chapter as follows:

pg 286:
1. Infantry is the most independent of the arms.
2. Artillery has no independence.
3. When one or more arms are combined, infantry is the most important of them.
4. Cavalry is the mosteasily dispensable arm.
5. A combination of all three confers the greatest strength.


Also pg 286:
"a squadron of 150 horses, a battalion of 800 men, and a battery of eight six-pounders cost approximately the same both for equipment and maintenance"

Today we have many more than three types of forces. The idea though he address is the same as a_majoor, the creation and operational cost of the forces.

On pg 291 the strongest support for the necessity of infantry is in his four conclusions to the chapter:
"1. Infantry is the main branch of the service; the other two are supplementary."

Today we think of an integrated force. Yet for all the missiles, armor plating, diesiel engines, smart bombs and so forth we still have that "lightly equipped person on foot".

 

[Brygun]

or at least some of the infantry are laying down prone inside the carrier. The latter delaying speed of deployment and mixed feelings on comfort going over rough terrain.

;D
I cant help but keep chuckling over the vision of the same prone positions when going on smooth terrain... nice little nappy time beds for the foot soldier. Imagine the squad running to remount and someone shouting "dibs on the top bunk!". :blotto: Wonder if they would SOP who it should go to  ??? 

A "second height" mech carrier just not going to happen.

 

[Brygun]

On infantry doing airbase defense:

The original post in the thread wanted non-WW2 information in which there where several examples of regular infantry defending airbases. One post-WW2 on infantry formations defending an air base includes the French and Vietnamese (not yet split North/South) forces in the battle for the Dien Bien Phu airbase. One formation involved was the 5th Vietnamese Parahcute Battalion. The reference also mentions "Thus only nine battalions remained for Dien BienPhu" but does state specifically if they are "light" or "line" infantry though the assorted photographs lacking tanks make it likely.

Khe San, US vietnam era, also bears consideration for infantry defending an airbase. The references I have on hand do not list the particular formations other than to address them as "four battalions" of "Marines". IIRC there was an air strip of some sort there but that is also proving difficult to find a confirmation as to the extent of the "airbase".

 

[1feral1]

Brygun,

I'm not sure where to begin. Perhaps you could enlighten me by defining your professional military background, because some of what you're expounding just doesn't seem to match the curriculum materials I remember from my experiences at Staff College, either as a student, or the past few years as supporting staff.

I too would like him to put his money where his mouth is, as I had asked him yesterday to fill in his profile, as we have all seen this way too often on here. Graphs, books, magazines, movies, the INet, and 'games' do not equal life experience and a condecending attitude to boot.

 

[Michael OLeary]

On infantry doing airbase defense:

The original post in the thread wanted non-WW2 information in which there where several examples of regular infantry defending airbases. One post-WW2 on infantry formations defending an air base includes the French and Vietnamese (not yet split North/South) forces in the battle for the Dien Bien Phu airbase. One formation involved was the 5th Vietnamese Parahcute Battalion. The reference also mentions "Thus only nine battalions remained for Dien BienPhu" but does state specifically if they are "light" or "line" infantry though the assorted photographs lacking tanks make it likely.

Khe San, US vietnam era, also bears consideration for infantry defending an airbase. The references I have on hand do not list the particular formations other than to address them as "four battalions" of "Marines". IIRC there was an air strip of some sort there but that is also proving difficult to find a confirmation as to the extent of the "airbase".

Actually neither Dien Bien Phu nor Khesahn are good examples of what you are trying to describe. Neither of these were established airfields/areodromes that subsequently needed "infantry" to defend them in order to continue their operations. In your orginal post you postulated:

Tanks and aircraft of today also require significant logistic support, supplies, fuel and down time for maintenance. When the tanks are being fixed who protects them and the front if not the infantry. Who protects the airbase... which for a flight of 100 planes could have 1,000 technicians, refuellers, ATC and other necessary personel if not the infantry.

In both cases the airstrips in location were developed/improved principally to support the troops in place, not vice versa.

Dien Bien Phu (March-May 1954) was selected by General Henri Navarre specifically to develop a strongpoint in order to draw the Vietmihn into a pitched battle. And the two airstrips were out of commision early in the battle, so the concept that the troops were there primarily to defend the airstrip is a weak argument. (See A Dictionary of Battles (1816-1976), by Brigadier Peter Young, D.S.O., M.C., M.A., , Mayflower Books, 1978)

Khesahn was a small US Special Forces camp that General Westmoreland decided to build up "as a springboard againt Ciommunist sanctuaries in Laos." In late 1967, in response to reports that the NVA was concentrating to attack Khesahn, westmorland reinforced it with 6000 Marines and developed a targeted bombing cammpaign to support the seige. With that reinforcement, the intent was not to "defend" the airstrip (which throughout the battle was the garrison's supply and evac route, not conducting independent operations) but to set a "trap" for the massed attacking Communist forces. (See Vietnam, A History, by Stanley Karnow, Viking Press, 1983)

For the record, AAP-6(V) NATO GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS (ENGLISH AND FRENCH) (1998) does not include the term "airbase". Applicable terms and definitions are:

aerodrome / aérodrome - An area prepared for the accommodation (including any buildings, installations and equipment), landing and take-off of aircraft.  Also called "airfield". 20/11/96

Note that "aerodrome, or airfield " infers the establishment of a semi-permanent or permanent installation for the support of flight operations.

air strip / bande d'atterrissage An unimproved surface which has been adapted for take -off or landing of aircraft, usually having minimum facilities. See also aerodrome. 1/2/73

 

[Unknown Factor]

Well I'm not going to venture down the arguement of 'uses of the infantry'.  But if the specific arguement is whether or not Canada needs this capability I'll bite!

Canada does need this capability and easily at the strength of 3 BN's spread accross the country.  I would even go further and suggest that these BN not only maintain 1 Coy each as jumpers but instead qualify the entire Unit, re-enforce the method of insertion as just that and get rid of the Maroon Berets in the units. I'm disapointed that particular discussions are (if only implied) based on personal feelings of units which may at times work in an 'elitist enviroment'.  The arguement that (and we are talking about todays mech bn's) Mechanized soldiers are capable of and ready to perform the tasks that 3 PPCLI conducted in Afghanistan is obviously based on pride and not on facts. I don't dispute that Mech Inf soldiers are capable of conducting the same type of operations however the whole basis of having light infantry is that they are ready at a moments notice and are trained specifically in the operations which they conduct 'before' they reach the theater of operations.

Additionally these Units also maintain the bulk of the Infantry soldiers accross Canada that are experts in LRRP's, Mountain Operations and small unit tactics to name a few.  In regions such as Afghanistan, the majority of operations that are being conducted are those of small unit tactics and SF, there has not been a build up of American or British soldiers at the mechanized level - airmobile is the order of the day.  If anything Canada has to further their lessons learned from Afghanistan and apply many to the defence of Canada.  With a land mass the size of Canada light infantry forces are much more flexable in the defence of the Nation, capable of massing all 3 bn in any region well before any mechanized forces.

With resructuring in the Army well underway, we should have done ourselves a huge favor and adopted the Australian concept.  As our army in small it would have created much more flexability for the commander on the ground.  I think that the idea of crewing the LAV with armoured trrops would have in the long run been a lot more effective than my fellow infantiers becomoing tankers.  They may disagree with me but with the attrition that BN in Canada face it is a struggle just to keep the crews together as well who now is the commander of the sect? the guy sitting under armour while his men are doing the dying? or the sect 2i/c?  Why not utilize the experience that or Armoured folks have and let them operate the Lav much like we used the tanks.  Get those Mech infantry soldiers back on their feet and give Canada the capability of fielding 9 inf BN regardless of what theater of operations they are in.  I remind everyone that Canada sent all of it's inf bn's including 3 which became reserve units to Korea all as light infantry. 

I would argue that their is in fact less justification in keeping Infantry soldier mech qualified.  It is a lot easier to get a infantryman to dismount from any mode of transportation than it is to teach him how to use and employ the method.  It to me anyway makes about as much sense as being given the key to the helicopter and told to fly myself.  Infantry soldiers are trained to 'close with a destroy the enemy' not become systems experts. If the infantry soldier you are training requires the amount of training that it currently takes to become a Lav gunner or Crew Commander then how is that position filled when Battlefield attrition begiins? If the basis of the infantry soldier becomes dependant on his qualification to operate a vehicle then his position has become a liability and too difficult to be filled by replacements.  The entire defence of a nation will be to a certain extent how quickly you can train basic soldiers - look at Russia for example during WWII.

We should not be so quick to assume that with modern systems comming on-line that we will be any more effective than we were with M113 w/ .50 cal.  Even an old mech inf soldier from that era will tell you that the amount of time the infantryman was mech was for less than 3 months of the year - hello RV's, the remainder of the time was spent on their feet conducting dismounted operations and winter ops.  So why re-invent the wheel and try to become something entirely different, I enjoy the company of Armoured Troops and have full faith in their abilityies to operate the LAV and provide me with the fire support that in require.

"Go light, it's right"

 

[Brygun]

I too would like him to put his money where his mouth is, as I had asked him yesterday to fill in his profile, as we have all seen this way too often on here. Graphs, books, magazines, movies, the INet, and 'games' do not equal life experience and a condecending attitude to boot.

That would be the thread where multiple persons where so blaringly rude over a simple book recommendation. It speaks volumes that the moderator stepped in and locked the thread. I support the moderators decision and have moved on. It would do as all good for any others stuck back there to also move on.