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Lebanon (Superthread)

Yea indeed that was what I was posting about. The Silkworm is based off of the Russian SSN-2, which is a behemoth of a 3000kg, early 50's technology missile.

globalsecurity tells me that the C-802 is fairly recently developed and weighs about 715kg....

This is important because the SSN-2 would be largely ineffective and I'd classify it more as a fluke that it was able to hit the vessel, not to mention seriously question the Barak system. The missiles were almost completely ineffective by the 70's.

The C-802, is a different story, so it's important to distinguish which one it is. Other reports are going with C-802 SACCADE.

So, as I said, once again attack of the Bison MBT's.
 
In among this story the following news:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5184428.stm

The Israeli military recovers the bodies of three sailors missing after their ship was hit by a Hezbollah missile on Friday, bringing the number of Israeli troops killed in the Lebanon offensive to 12
 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5184974.stm

Israel's Hezbollah headache 
By Jonathan Marcus
BBC diplomatic correspondent 


The confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah is clearly unbalanced. Israel is a significant military power with sophisticated land, sea and air forces at its disposal.

Hezbollah rocket attacks on Israel have multiplied

Hezbollah began as a guerrilla force but over the years it has evolved a complex military infrastructure. Nonetheless it has few of the types of weapons available to the Israelis. Its only long-range punch comes from an assorted arsenal of missiles.

Most of these are relatively short-range systems, generically known as Katyushas, capable of striking targets out to about 25km (16 miles).

But the Hezbollah missile strikes on Israel's northern port city of Haifa demonstrate that it also has an unknown quantity of longer-range systems in its arsenal.

Most of these are Iranian-manufactured systems like the Fajr-3, with a 45-km range; the Fajr-5, with a range of some 75km; and the more potent Zelzal-2 with a range of up to 200km.

This would bring much of Tel Aviv - Israel's largest population centre - within range.

None of these are guided or accurate systems but if the target is an urban area, accuracy is not needed.

In addition, as the successful attack on an Israeli naval vessel demonstrates (an Egyptian freighter was also hit and abandoned by its crew), Hezbollah also has relatively sophisticated Iranian-supplied anti-shipping missiles at its disposal.

Air war limitations

This missile build-up has worried the Israeli military for some time.


Israeli strategists know an air war has its limits

No surprise then that Israeli leaders have taken the opportunity of the Hezbollah raid which captured two of their men, to set about the full-scale weakening of Hezbollah's infrastructure.

Headquarters, television stations, and missile storage bunkers have all been hit.

But the Israelis have also sought to blockade Lebanon - closing Beirut's airport, striking the Beirut-Damascus highway, and hitting various key transport links, especially bridges.

The Israelis explain all this by saying that they are acting to prevent Hezbollah bringing in or moving up additional missiles to the border. Inevitably, such attacks, however precise, cause civilian casualties.

Israel's long-term goals are obvious. It wants to end the cross-border missile threat to its towns and cities by applying a blunt lesson in deterrence.

It would like to see Hezbollah disarm and the Lebanese Army extend its control down to the international frontier. That is what UN Security Council Resolution 1559, of 2004, also demands - but it is hard to see how it can be enacted.

Israel's tactics are to some extent puzzling. The bludgeoning of Lebanon's transport infrastructure will hinder, but will probably not stop, missile movements.

Indeed, Hezbollah has shown remarkable resilience, and the rockets are still flying across Israel's northern border. It is very hard to deliver a body blow to Hezbollah from the air.

So is this all a prelude to some significant Israeli incursion on the ground?

On the face of things Israel has not yet mobilised sufficient troops for such an operation. And a comprehensive assault on Hezbollah would require a move into the strategically important Bekaa Valley, a step that would send alarm bells ringing in Syria, risking an even wider confrontation.

Dangers of complacency

Israel's own military performance raises several questions.


A deadly missile attack on one of its warships shocked Israel 

Even Israeli commentators have pointed to the fact that the capture of Israeli soldiers, first by Palestinian militants and now Hezbollah, shows clear signs of laxness and a lack of vigilance on the part of the reserve units involved.

Hezbollah has clearly signalled its desire to carry out such operations and it has attempted similar things in the past. Has reserve training been reduced too far? Has a certain complacency set in?

The attack on the Israeli missile boat - one of its most sophisticated warships, a Saar-5 class corvette - also raises many questions.

It was hit by a Chinese-made, radar-guided C-802 missile.

Did Israeli intelligence not know that these anti-shipping missiles had been given to Hezbollah by Iran?

Israel's naval electronics and defensive systems are among the best in the world, defensive systems intended to counter just such a threat. Some reports suggest that they were not even operating on board the vessel that was hit.

Proportionality

But most of all there is the question of the new Israeli government's relationship with the military.

Much has been made of the limited military experience of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defence Minister Amir Peretz.

Mr Olmert is in a tight spot. He has to act to protect Israel's citizens. But ask a general what action can be taken in response to a threat and he will generally supply a long list of targets.

Israel seems to be working through just such a list. But the real strategic calculation is to weigh up military advantage against wider political and diplomatic considerations.

Has Israel got the balance right?

Clearly there are many views. But the overwhelming international consensus - not least from the G8 summit in St Petersburg - is that disproportionate military force has been used.

President George W Bush - who has strongly backed Israeli action - nonetheless put this point rather neatly.

"Defend yourself," he said, "but be mindful of the consequences."

 
IDF mobilizes reserve division. The Syrians are mobilizing as well.

http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?apage=1&cid=1150886004129&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
 
The inference they are trying to get across is that if the Shiite terrorists have a weapon that can hit a moving target at sea, the will not find it hard to reach any part of Israel including Tel Aviv

According to x-lebanese army general Yassein Suwayed , Hezbollah possess a variant of Shahab-3 (Zelzal-1) Iranian missiles which has a range of 150-200km and can hit Tel Aviv. He also mentioned that Hezbollah has between 5,000-15,000 rockets, but most are classical 20-50km range (Fajir-1/2).
 
big bad john said:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5184974.stm

Israel seems to be working through just such a list. But the real strategic calculation is to weigh up military advantage against wider political and diplomatic considerations.

Has Israel got the balance right?

Good Risk Management says....

Israel has had so many plans and variants for this over the years.

I would think they know exactly what, who, where and... um.. WHAT they are doing.  ;)

They know Syria would mobilize and they're not afraid of it.  They have to be pretty confident to
have done what they have.  If Israel fails.. it could result in there being NO Israel at all, thus, I really
think they've thought this through.
 
Iran is playing all of this very cool.

http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/I/IRAN_NUCLEAR?SITE=ORROS&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT

TEHRAN, Iran (AP) -- Iran said Sunday that Western incentives to halt its nuclear program were an "acceptable basis" for talks, and it is ready for detailed negotiations...

...Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi told reporters in Tehran that, "We consider this package an appropriate basis, an acceptable basis (for talks)."

"Now is an appropriate opportunity for Iran and Europe to enter detailed negotiations," he said. "Sending the dossier to the U.N. Security Council means blocking and rejecting talks."

The entire article is well done, give it a read.

They must realize the thin leash they are on and the consequences of any actions on their part. They are consequently trying to milk the situation for their benefit.
 
Brace yourselves - someone suggesting that the BAD guys should be held accountable by the UN  :o

http://www.tribstar.com/news/feeds/apcontent/apstories/apstorysection/D8ITM3NO2.xml.txt/resources_apstoryview

British Prime Minister Tony Blair and U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan called Monday for the deployment of international forces to stop Hezbollah from bombing Israel, an issue that has overshadowed the summit of world leaders.

President Bush, not realizing his remarks were being picked up by a microphone, bluntly expressed his frustration with the actions of Hezbollah, a militant Islamic group believed backed by Iran and Syria that is engaged in escalating warfare with Israel.

"See, the irony is what they really need to do is to get Syria to get Hezbollah to stop doing this (expletive)," Bush told Blair in a discussion before the Group of Eight leaders began their lunch . . . .


 
IGF ground forces now in southern Lebanon. Its the only way to stop the rocket attacks and to root out Hezbollah.

http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1150886020269&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
 
I'm not sure what is up, but an Arabic news channel, Al Alam is repeatedly showing what appears to be a shootdown of an aircraft in Southern Lebanon.

CNN earlier this morning briefly reported that Hezbollah is claiming to have shot down an Israeli aircraft, but Israel is stating that NO aircraft have been lost.

However, Al Alam has been continually showing what appears to be an aircraft falling from the sky and crashing into some buildings. It does not appear to be Beirut but a smaller southern town. The live video was caught by a Arabic news team shooting from a hill a short distance away.

I cant get an accurate translation of the reporters but the video shows a slender white spiralling smoke trail rising up from the ground (probably a shoulder fired SAM) and striking something at quite a low altitude. Moments later something plummets to the ground in flames while out of control. It does appear to be an aircraft from what I saw.

This just may be total misinformation but it looks real enough.

Does anyone know anything about this??
 
Sounds like it might just be a leaflet container.

http://www.israelnationalnews.com/news.php3?id=107606

Various media reports identified the object as a “type of balloon”, according to Lebanese sources, a “leaflet container” according to the IDF or a “surface to air missile”, according to Hizbullah.

The IAF spokesman added that the leaflet container was hit by a surface-to-air missile fired by Hizbulla and that the container accidentally scored a direct hit on a truck carrying a Katyusha launcher. He added that it appeared that one of the missiles bounced out of truck as a result of the impact and was launched in the direction of Beirut.
 
Just as an FYI, in case some of you are wondering where the hell I saw this channel, over 3 dozen Arabic and Farsi (Iranian) channels are available to North America totally FREE.

The satellite known as Intelsat Americas 5 (formerly Telstar 5) is located at 97 degrees West Longitude. There are about 100 international TV channels and many radio channels on this bird. In addition to the Arabic and Iranian stuff, there are many Chinese, Thai, Laotian, Turkish, Polish, Romanian, African, etc., etc.. Reception requires a 30" Dish at minimum with a universal type LNB and a DVB satellite receiver. This stuff would cost about $200 not including a pro install. Installation is not easy like Expressvu type installs and can be VERY tricky.

Check out this link for channel listing. Scroll down to the transponders that begin at 11,000. Everything noted  in a light yellow colour is Free in the Clear with the right gear noted above.

http://www.lyngsat.com/ia5.html

This has NOTHING to do with satellite hacking. Reception of this satellite is perfectly legal. I will not respond to questions about getting this. If you are interested, call a satellite installer familiar with this programming in your area.
 
Good article about the current situation in Lebanon and Iran's grand plan to dominate the region through its proxy Hizbollah.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2092-2281184_1,00.html
 
More on the reach and methods of Hezbollah

http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=OWJmNDJiODlkMmI5MjkzNmJiZDJhZGI0MDA4YmNkNTE=

Terror in Buenos Aires
A lesson in Hezbollah terror.

By Aaron Mannes

Last Tuesday morning, a siren sounded in Buenos Aires to mark the 12th anniversary of the bombing of the AMIA building, the chief offices of Argentina’s Jewish community. The bombing killed 85 people and injured over 250. It was the largest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust. It was the work of Hezbollah, working closely under Iranian sponsorship, and it perfectly illustrates Hezbollah’s intentions, capabilities, and modus operandi. As the West hurtles into a confrontation with Iran, sparked by the current Israeli-Hezbollah conflagration, it is worth examining this deadly effective attack in Argentina over a decade ago.

The AMIA bombing was not Hezbollah’s first strike in Argentina. Two years earlier, a Hezbollah suicide bomber hit the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, killing 29 and wounding over 200. This attack was in retaliation for Israel’s assassination of Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Abbas Musawi. His replacement was Hezbollah’s current leader Hassan Nasrallah.

Two years later, Hezbollah, under orders from the Iranian leadership, struck again in Buenos Aires. Israel had just captured a senior Hezbollah leader, Mustafa Dirani, who had helped capture Israeli airman Ron Arad. At the same time, Israel had recently bombed a Hezbollah training base, killing over 20 Hezbollah fighters. Finally, Argentina’s President Carlos Menem, had, under U.S. pressure, reneged on deals to provide ballistic-missile and nuclear technology to Syria and Iran. Argentine intelligence believes that the orders for these attacks came from the very top of the Iranian regime. Both of the Buenos Aires terror attacks illustrate how Iran and Hezbollah play hardball with their opponents.

Terrorism requires organization and logistics. Hezbollah’s ability to carry out an attack in Buenos Aires, halfway across the world from their primary base in Lebanon, is impressive. One factor in the AMIA bombing’s success was, according to Argentine intelligence, the support from the Iranian embassy. Mohsen Rabbani, the “cultural attaché,” coordinated the operation. Reportedly he purchased the Renault van used in the bombing. This pattern of Iranian-Hezbollah cooperation is not unique to the Buenos Aires operations. Hezbollah carried out a series of bombings in Paris from December 1985 to September 1986. These bombings were linked to a translator at Iran’s embassy in Paris and led to a diplomatic standoff between France and Iran.

Another factor explaining Hezbollah’s long reach is the organizational genius of Hezbollah’s security chief, Imad Mughniyah. A former gunman with Yasser Arafat’s elite Force 17, Mughniyah is on the FBI’s most-wanted list for his role in the 1985 hijacking of TWA 847 in which a U.S. Navy diver was tortured and killed. Linked to numerous terrorist attacks, including suicide bombings and hostage taking in Lebanon, and the Buenos Aires attacks, Mughniyah is currently believed to be coordinating Iranian and Hezbollah support for Palestinian terrorists. He also met with Osama bin Laden in the early 1990s to forge an alliance between al Qaeda and Hezbollah. Wanted by several governments, Mughniyah keeps a low profile. However, he is believed to have appeared publicly, for the first time in over a decade, with Iran’s President Ahmadinejad at a meeting in Damascus in January.

Finally, the AMIA attack had consequences beyond the mayhem of the bombing itself. The AMIA bombing created an open wound in Argentine politics that has festered for a decade as the investigation has been mired in corruption, cover-ups, and incompetence. This aftermath is typical of Hezbollah terrorism. Time and again, Hezbollah terror attacks have had a profound strategic impact. Hezbollah’s first attack in April 1983 against the U.S. embassy in Beirut wiped out the Beirut CIA station — a blow from which the agency has yet to recover. The double bombing of the U.S. Marines barracks and the French barracks led to the withdrawal of the U.S. led multinational peacekeeping force from Lebanon, leaving Lebanon to the tender mercies of the Syrians and Iranians. Hezbollah’s hostage taking in the 1980s led to secret negotiations by the American and French governments with Iran. These negotiations triggered the Iran-Contra scandal in the U.S. and a similar scandal in France.

The AMIA bombing was the epitome of an Iranian-Hezbollah terror attack. It was a sophisticated act of mass murder that sent a brutal message to Iran’s enemies, while leaving deep political scars.

As the fighting increases, Hezbollah may again turn to international terror. Besides Latin America, Hezbollah has carried out attacks across the Middle East and Europe. Hezbollah cells have been found in the Far East, North America, and Central Asia. It is very likely that Hezbollah retains a formidable international network — and if pressured will use it. In a recent interview with al-Jazeera, Hezbollah Secretary-General Nasrallah stated that Hezbollah was going to take “the initiative” and “offer some surprises.” The AMIA bombing was one Hezbollah surprise and remembering it is a reminder of the danger Hezbollah poses, not only to Israel, but also to the world.

— Aaron Mannes, author of the TerrorBlog and Profiles in Terror: The Guide to Middle East Terrorist Organizations, and he researches terrorism at the Maryland Information and Network Dynamics Laboratory at the University of Maryland. Opinions expressed here are his own.

 
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1153291993055

Interesting revelations about captured Iranian surveillance equipment and other material.
 
Deja vu.

http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1153291996766&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull

The IDF Intelligence Branch had comprehensive dossiers on the Hizbullah positions in the border village of Maroun a-Ras and in other villages in southern Lebanon, but in many cases this information wasn't passed on to the field commanders in time for the ground fighting over the last week.

A number of battalions and brigades complained over the last few days that they hadn't received sufficient intelligence before their soldiers engaged with Hizbullah fighters. The forces were surprised at the extent of the Hizbullah fortifications and had to improvise methods of dealing with them, including blowing up bunkers with the Hizbullah inside. A senior IDF commander said on Tuesday that he didn't "know why the commanders weren't given the dossiers on time."

Military Intelligence had prepared the dossiers over the last few years on the 170 towns and villages that serve as Hizbullah strongholds throughout southern Lebanon. The dossiers include details and maps on the number of fighters, their firing positions, fortifications and underground bunkers and quantities of armaments. The Hizbullah strategy since the IDF withdrew in 2000 was to concentrate arms and fighters in the south to counter an IDF attack, and their defense structure is based on fighting from within the villages. To prepare the IDF's combat units for such a scenario, a mock-up version of such a village was set up at the Northern Command's training base in Elyakim, but not all the combat units had time to train there due to their duties in the West Bank and around the Gaza Strip. The IDF also developed a virtual version of a Hizbullah village to train the units.

The IDF commander said that due to the sensitivity of the intelligence sources used to make the dossiers, they were withheld from the units themselves and were shown only to the intelligence officers at the divisional level and a few at the brigade level. None of the battalion intelligence officers who are supposed to prepare the units before combat saw the dossiers. The commander wasn't willing to say whose responsibility it was to make sure that the relevant information was brought to the attention of the commanders in the field, only saying that "It's a part of the meeting between intelligence and operations and the abbreviated preparations for battle in an operation of this kind."

Senior intelligence sources stressed on Tuesday that so far, the battle has been going on exactly as they predicted, and Hizbullah is operating according to the plans that they knew in advance. The source said that so far, Hizbullah had lost "many dozens of fighters, and probably more than that."

According to the IDF's estimations, more than 120 rocket launchers of various sizes have been hit by the air attacks. Despite reports in the media, the IDF has not taken any Hizbullah fighters prisoners, the main reason being that, unlike Palestinian terrorists who usually give themselves up quickly, the Hizbullah fight to the death.

Despite not having succeeded in eliminating Hizbullah chief Hassan Nasrallah in an air-raid last week, Nasrallah has admitted to his members that "Hizbullah has been hit hard," that "there is low morale and we need encouragement" and that "we are on our own now."

Despite the IDF bombings, Syria is continuing to ship arms, mainly rockets, to Hizbullah, using smugglers' routes after the air force bombed the roads connecting Syria and Lebanon. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards are encouraging Syria to ship the arms and have been active in helping Hizbullah. According to the intelligence, Iranian officers were directly involved in shooting the missiles that hit INS Hanit killing four sailors a week and a half ago.

Also despite the operation, Hizbullah's 1800 unit, which has Palestinian agents in the West Bank, is still active in financing terror operations.
 
The US Army has had similar type of intel issues in the sand box. We collect so much information and sometimes it just doesnt get to the troops who need it. We are doing better but its still a problem.
 
Hezbollah is formenting violence and fanning the flames of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Its bloody track record makes it a natural target in the war on terror, but the USA's only option is to confront Hezbollah indirectly: by getting its backers, Syria and Iran, to help change its focus from militancy to politics.

In my opinion, any war on terror must target Hezbollah and that military action be considered against the movement's state sponsors, Syria and Iran.
Given the organization's record of bloodshed and hostility, the question is not whether Hezbollah should be stopped; it is how. A campaign against it similar to the US effort against al Qaeda -- killing the group's leaders and ending its haven in Lebanon -- would probably fail and might even backfire. Syria and Iran openly support it, and much of the Arab world regards it as heroic, for its successful resistance against the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon( might add, the only time that Arab arms have forced Israel to surrender territory :o), and legitimate, because of its participation in Lebanese politics. Its no secret that western officials have acknowledged the value of its social and political projects.

The upshot is that although Washington should indeed confront Hezbollah, it should do so indirectly. However morally justified an all-out attack would be, reducing Hezbollah's terrorist activity requires avoiding the temptation to overreach. Instead, our friends to the south must apply pressure through Syria and Iran. Only Damascus has the necessary intel assets and force on the ground in Lebanon to shut down Hezbollah's militant activities.
Pressure on Iran, meanwhile, would help cut off hezbollah's global network and might persuade it to focus on Lebanese politics rather than anti-Western violence.
With skill, Washington can transform Hezbollah into just one more Lebanese political faction -- one that continues to be hostile but no longer poses a major threat to the US, its neighbors, and its interests.

At home, Hezbollah is as much a social and political organization as it is a terrorist or guerrilla movement; abroad, its violence serves the interests of Tehran and Damascus, both of which helped create it and still actively back it. It is embedded in Lebanese politics and society and, unlike al Qaeda, is a stakeholder in the existing regional order, not a force bent on destroying it. This position has made Hezbollah stronger but has also forced it to become more cautious, cunning, and subtle.
Iran and Syria use Hezbollah operations to further their foreign policy objectives, but their close ties to the group make them responsible for its trespasses.When Tehran and Damascus feel threatened by the possibility of retaliation, they do not hesitate to rein Hezbollah in.

If the West can successfully defuse Hezbollah's militant activity, the organization might well move more squarely into the political arena. Such a shift would set off a cycle, as Hezbollah's continuing political success would depend on its ability to bring stability and prosperity to its Lebanese constituents instead of on its violent efforts against Israel and the US. Hezbollah would remain a force in Lebanon, but it would no longer be a "terrorist group of global reach." Given the moral rhetoric of the war on terror and Hezbollah's bloody history, this outcome may not be entirely satisfying -- but appears to be the only realistic option available.
 
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