Teddy Ruxpin said:
You're obviously missing the point. The politicians will often set artificial limits on manning that has a dramatic impact on how we generate organizations. For instance, the PM will blurt out a number (say 1000) that bears no relationship to what the actual requirement is on the ground. Then, after the recces go in, and the actual requirement is validated (typically with the force generators saying "I told you so"), there's a mad scramble to generate the additional forces. The current ARCHER deployment is a perfect example: artificially limited (in this case by the Managed Readiness Plan) to 1 light and 1 LAV company with a Coyote troop, it was far too light to conduct operations in Kandahar province and required an additional company at the last minute.
We're barely at the point now where we can barely generate effective companies without mixing and matching. The problem isn't with the soldiers when dealing with mixed structures, the problem is with training and force generation. Moving battalions may be of limited visibility to a Cpl/Pte on the line, but creates havoc with the force generation process, as Areas are forced to transfer sub-units out of their normal chain of command, retrain them (as they are - more than likely - from a lower readiness formation), and then integrate them into new units. Add the fact that this can only really be done between the RCR and PPCLI (due to language difficulties) and you run out of options mighty fast.
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The Army is already divided up in a, more or less, rational manner. Brigade Groups having Battalions with associated support (forming Battle Groups). These cohesive Battle Groups should be the basis for Task Force deployments, and when they're not - it strains the system. So I agree with much of the point being made.
Perhaps the Army could be restructured better but, given the available resources, the same problem would exist:
- There is no magic orbat that would accommodate every contingency, every transport limitation, or every feckless decision maker.
If we accept that the Army's basic formations in Canada are structured correctly (though too small) for mid/high intensity conflicts (Korea/WWII), it shouldn't mean that we can't accept dynamic force structures being formed to deploy overseas to the nearly endless no/low intensity conflicts.
More resources should be concentrated on keeping as many units as possible in higher states of readiness, and in being able to work together with short notice. I think this would be more cost effective than adding additional units.
Teddy Ruxpin said:
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Again, this has nothing to do with professionalism at the soldier level. We've taken a system that has worked for many, many years, shattered it, and replaced it with a pretty coloured Excel spreadsheet that has never, ever worked.
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This Army is no more than a Division in size (okay, Div+) so no matter how things are cobbled together we're still operating with units of the same Division. But somehow we've managed to end up with no more across-the-board cohesion than we would with any random coalition partner - the system might have worked for many years but it has been detrimental in at least this aspect.
Given the limited size of the Army we shouldn't be falling apart from a lack of cohesion, or from differing training methods/standards. It should be a natural fit to have a Task Force comprised of sub-units from across Canada, Reg and Reserve, English and French. This can't be accomplished by wishful thinking, but I think it can be done.
Teddy Ruxpin said:
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Finally, you can't compare the way the Navy and AF force generate with the way the Army does; it's totally different: no one suggests taking the Engineering Division from HMCS Halifax and tranferring it to HMCS Vancouver and sending the new crew to the Gulf with zero notice, yet that's what the Army constantly does.
No analogy survives first contact.
