Is it time to disband the Canadian Armed Forces?

[The Bread Guy]

Perhaps this isn't the time to disband the CAF.

While the Saint-Jean incident is pretty f**king bad, let's also be cautious about developing a military (or any capability) based on only one problem.

I always revert back to the Fire Department analogy.  Just because the town has not seen a fire in some time, does that justify they stop funding Firefighting training, selling off the firetruck, or disbanding the Fire Department?

100% - what's being discussed (a bit, anyway) is how much fire department we need, and how it would be operated.

 

[George Wallace]

100% - what's being discussed (a bit, anyway) is how much fire department we need, and how it would be operated.

That is the problem.  You can not predict what kind of fire your Fire Dept will be called out for, nor when.  Nor can one predict what equipment or training will be required to fight a fire.  Will it be a high-rise fire where you need a Ladder Truck?  Will it be a chemical plant fire where you need specialized equipment and training to fight?  Will it be a Prairie fire, a residential fire, automobile fire, etc.?  All requiring different equipment, supplies and training.  What about the other duties such as Fire Inspections or Arson investigations? 

We must be prepared for 'worse case' scenarios.  Only the imagination can perceive what those scenarios may be.  Reality, however, will dictate what measures we take to combat those scenarios.

 

[ModlrMike]

I think that farming off the military's responsibilities to other departments will not reduce costs. It will only change those departments into something they never were intended to become. The costs will just be shifted to OGDs who morph over time into an armed forces in fact if not in name.

 

[Edward Campbell]

...
... If the % of GDP one spends on defence matters because it is a symbol of resolve, what signal is sent to the world if you just take 2% of your GDP and pay it to the American (for instance) and tell them to defend us in exchange? In your theory, it shows our resolve to defend ourselves since it is the magical 2%, but in practice, any foe would look at it from either of two perspectives. 1) Do we think that American, as hired guns, have the resolve to defend Canada's territorial integrity to the point of taking many dead soldiers if need be? or 2) It's not Canada we have to deal with, but the US - Canada is merely the US's serf now.

Excellent point. If we value our sovereignty, as defined since 1648, then contracting out our national defence is, certainly, selling ourselves back into colonial status. That's why I, along with most others, have traditionally insisted that we ought to have an effective military ~ but not just for 'self defence,' we also need to promote and protect our vital interests wherever they are, around the world.

However, suppose the Peace of Westphalia is outdated. Maybe we don't have to 'respect' every artificial line in the sand - acknowledging that the 49th parallel is a 'line in the sand,' too. My sense of my fellow Canadians is that many (most?) of them are already willing to accept tacit quasi-colonial status for the purposes of national defence; they are willing to swap a bit of (nearly invisible in most cases) sovereignty for the 'price' of US defence guarantees. Maybe the people have already spoken.

 

[ModlrMike]

But Edward, I wager those same Canadians faced with the reality of foreign soldiers on our soil would lose their minds. Particularly if those soldiers were American. Saying "the Americans will protect us" and paying the price with boots on the ground are two different things.

 

[George Wallace]

Excellent point. If we value our sovereignty, as defined since 1648, then contracting out our national defence is, certainly, selling ourselves back into colonial status. That's why I, along with most others, have traditionally insisted that we ought to have an effective military ~ but not just for 'self defence,' we also need to promote and protect our vital interests wherever they are, around the world.

Slovenia has a paramilitary force, small army and small navy, but relies on Italy to patrol its airspace.  Although we have the RCAF, the USAF is also interested in patrolling the Arctic regions.  Contracting out defence to another nation is not unheard of.

My question is:  If we divert our 2% GDP to the US for our defence, what guarantee do we have that they will maintain their current level of GDP contributions to defence; or would they look at our contracting them to do our defence as an opportunity to cut their own budget?

 

[The Bread Guy]

Slovenia has a paramilitary force, small army and small navy, but relies on Italy to patrol its airspace. 

The question still remains:  is Canada willing to reel in its footprint in the world to that of Slovenia or Iceland?  I note it wasn't Slovenia or Iceland that chatted up Iraq about its ministerial line-up this week, dangling SAS trainers, for example.  I'm going to say "no" at least as long as a Conservative (even Liberal) government is around.  While the OP asks if we should replace the CF with a paramilitary police force, I don't see much proof that Canada would be willing to reduce its international footprint.

Which comes back to:  what do we want our "fire department" to do?  What threats should be ready for?  Until those questions are answered by government, we're just discussing what kind of firetrucks we get in isolation.

 

[GR66]

Excellent point. If we value our sovereignty, as defined since 1648, then contracting out our national defence is, certainly, selling ourselves back into colonial status. That's why I, along with most others, have traditionally insisted that we ought to have an effective military ~ but not just for 'self defence,' we also need to promote and protect our vital interests wherever they are, around the world.

However, suppose the Peace of Westphalia is outdated. Maybe we don't have to 'respect' every artificial line in the sand - acknowledging that the 49th parallel is a 'line in the sand,' too. My sense of my fellow Canadians is that many (most?) of them are already willing to accept tacit quasi-colonial status for the purposes of national defence; they are willing to swap a bit of (nearly invisible in most cases) sovereignty for the 'price' of US defence guarantees. Maybe the people have already spoken.

How many of these international conflicts are really internal conflicts involving neighbouring states?  Your previous examples of Ukraine, Scotland, Quebec, Iraq and Syria don't really fit the traditional concept of inter-state war.  Would Russia be in Ukraine without the sizeable dissatisfied Russian minority there as a "wedge"?  Would IS** be a threat in Iraq and Syria if they were not already torn apart by internal conflicts?

Maybe the "sanctity of borders" backed up by the security of nuclear deterrence by all the great powers DOES mean that "lines in the sand" are respected...just so long as those lines are agreed to by the citizens actually INSIDE those lines.  War (in the West at least) was once about expanding the power of the State by expanding your territory.  How many inter-state wars since WWII have been fought over conquest of territory that was not already in dispute between the opposing sides? 

Perhaps globalization, the UN, mass media, nuclear deterrence and integrated economies have stabilized MOST existing international borders.  Maybe the international wars we're dealing with now are for the most part really civil wars. 

If that's the case, then does the military we need for that look different than the military we'd need for a more traditional inter-state war?

 

[Edward Campbell]

...  What threats should be ready for? ...

Three kinds of threats:

    1. Symmetrical, e.g. Russia seizing territory in Europe and making mischief elsewhere. Conventional, expeditionary type forces are required;

    2. Asymmetrical, e.g. IS** et al. Special forces and non-military assets like special branch police, CSIS and CSEC are required; and

    3. Unknown, e.g. China waging a sort or 'war' that doesn't involve military force. Soft power assets are required.

 

[The Bread Guy]

Three kinds of threats:

    1. Symmetrical, e.g. Russia seizing territory in Europe and making mischief elsewhere. Conventional, expeditionary type forces are required;

    2. Asymmetrical, e.g. IS** et al. Special forces and non-military assets like special branch police, CSIS and CSEC are required; and

    3. Unknown, e.g. China waging a sort or 'war' that doesn't involve military force. Soft power assets are required.

Then can a Canadian Gendarme Service do all this alone, or even most of it?  Don't think so.  Keep in mind, though, that countries like Italy and France have both a highly-militarized federal gendarme force AND a conventional military.

 

[Haggis]

But Edward, I wager those same Canadians faced with the reality of foreign soldiers on our soil would lose their minds. Particularly if those soldiers were American. Saying "the Americans will protect us" and paying the price with boots on the ground are two different things.

Would they really be "American" boots on Canadian soil?  or would the US military simply subsume the CAF much as the OPP or RCMP subsumes small municipal police services when it assumes responsibility for community policing?  If not, what would happen to those 120,000 full and part time CAF members and the tens of thousands of federal public servants in DND?  Lay them off?

 

[Kirkhill]

Drifting even further  ff topic:  ...

I have a couple of concerns right now, things about which I am, possibly, rethinking my established positions:

    First: the very nature of the nation state, itself. OGBD talks about the "sanctity of borders," a concept that, in the West, dates, really, from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, and it is a concept that
    is, indeed, enshrined in the UN Charter. I'm not so sure that the "sanctity" of borders is something that we must or even can defend. Look, just for example, at what Russia did to Ukraine. What
    would have happened to the borders of the UK is Scotland had voted 'Yes,' or to Canada's in QC voted 'Oui,' for that matter? What is happening to the borders of Iraq and Syria right now?

    Second: the nature of war. We have, again since the 17th century, come to perceive 'war' as being symmetrical: one 'side' against another; friend and foe; we and they and so on. It now
    appears to me that war is between several 'sides' and allies might be both very, very temporary and ever changing, as might enemies. We do not, it seems to me, always know
    which side we are on.

    Third: the 'language' of war. It also seems to me that we, and China, for example, speak two different languages of war: ours comes to us from Clausewitz and was, perhaps, best spoken by Roosevelt
    and George C Marshall. In our language 'war' is, eventually, a clash of forces and one side always wins. China does not appear to have believed Clausewitz and they still think Sun Tzu was right:
    'war' might involve fighting and destruction but one's war aims can be achieved without fighting. I believe that China thinks that it is fighting World War IV right now. China doesn't want, ever,
    to engage the US in physical battles but it is happy to 'engage' in every other sphere. My guess is that China is 'happy' with the way the war is going; it hasn't won all the battles but it thinks
    that it is winning enough of the important battles to, eventually, win the war. I am also guessing that IS** war aims are less that Clausewitzian.

So, I wonder: what should Canada be doing? We have, I believe, vital interests beyond our borders and we need the capacity promote and protect those interests, independent of the interests and views of others. My own, traditional response to my own concern is to demand that we have bigger, better armed forces. But, is that, really, the best use of our resources?

At the time of the Peace of Westphalia gunpowder was relatively new on the battlefield.  Matchlocks were just being replaced by flintlocks. Swords were still part of most soldiers arsenals and standing armies were replacing mercenary bands and levies. 

The standing armies did not enjoy much of a technological advantage over the local baron's fighting tails, or even outlaws and brigands.

The relied on being able to concentrate available forces, generally small, at appropriate points in a timely fashion.  They relied on tactics, training and discipline to defeat their less organized foes.

That held until the 1880s when Maxim introduced his gun.  The Russo Japanese war and WW1 confirmed in the minds of many that technology was now the key to winning wars.  You could sweep up anybody from the street, give him 30 days training and sit him behind a machine gun and you were good to go.  WW2 confirmed the value of technology.  It also demonstrated that only the state had the ability to develop the high end technologies necessary to tackle the other guy's high end technologies.  And thus the arms race.

But while governments have been fascinated with 2 Billion Dollar Aircraft and 1 Billion Dollar Patrol Boats they have been ignoring the fact that the low end technologies have been evolving so that everybody and his sister can buy a Jeep Wrangler, a Cell Phone with local radio, any Small Arms you care to name, complete with picatinny rails and aimpoint ballistic computers, as well as a variety of explosive mixtures.  A little more hunting will find you machine guns of all calibers up to 14.5mm and RPGs.

The delta in technology between those working on the ground and their enemies - outlaws, brigands and state sponsored helpers - has disappeared. 

Governments are now back to the days when the army was the yeoman of England armed with his own longbow and the Border Reiver with his own horse and lance.  They were indistinguishable from the outlaws, both in appearance and individual skills.

Sun Tzu and Machiavelli offer more to the Prince than Clausewitz.

The state could not develop in that environment.  Can the state survive in that environment?  Or is it likely that we will revert to a system of City-States defining the places with untamed spaces in between?  Armed merchantmen?  Surface convoys under armed guard?  More reliance on air movements?

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

Drifting even further  ff topic:  ...

I have a couple of concerns right now, things about which I am, possibly, rethinking my established positions:

    First: the very nature of the nation state, itself. OGBD talks about the "sanctity of borders," a concept that, in the West, dates, really, from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, and it is a concept that
    is, indeed, enshrined in the UN Charter. I'm not so sure that the "sanctity" of borders is something that we must or even can defend. Look, just for example, at what Russia did to Ukraine. What
    would have happened to the borders of the UK is Scotland had voted 'Yes,' or to Canada's in QC voted 'Oui,' for that matter? What is happening to the borders of Iraq and Syria right now?

    Second: the nature of war. We have, again since the 17th century, come to perceive 'war' as being symmetrical: one 'side' against another; friend and foe; we and they and so on. It now
    appears to me that war is between several 'sides' and allies might be both very, very temporary and ever changing, as might enemies. We do not, it seems to me, always know
    which side we are on.

    Third: the 'language' of war. It also seems to me that we, and China, for example, speak two different languages of war: ours comes to us from Clausewitz and was, perhaps, best spoken by Roosevelt
    and George C Marshall. In our language 'war' is, eventually, a clash of forces and one side always wins. China does not appear to have believed Clausewitz and they still think Sun Tzu was right:
    'war' might involve fighting and destruction but one's war aims can be achieved without fighting. I believe that China thinks that it is fighting World War IV right now. China doesn't want, ever,
    to engage the US in physical battles but it is happy to 'engage' in every other sphere. My guess is that China is 'happy' with the way the war is going; it hasn't won all the battles but it thinks
    that it is winning enough of the important battles to, eventually, win the war. I am also guessing that IS** war aims are less that Clausewitzian.

So, I wonder: what should Canada be doing? We have, I believe, vital interests beyond our borders and we need the capacity promote and protect those interests, independent of the interests and views of others. My own, traditional response to my own concern is to demand that we have bigger, better armed forces. But, is that, really, the best use of our resources?

Edward, I don't think what you posted is drifting off-topic at all, in fact, I think it's very relevant to the topic at hand.  Particularly point #3 WRT to Chinese views on warfare.  With this in mind, I'd like to bring the discussion back towards privatization of military forces and the use of mercenaries. 

I am actually surprised this hasn't been posted yet but Erik Prince, the one time Chairman and CEO of Blackwater, has recently come out and criticized the Obama Administration for their "half-baked" foreign policy.  While Prince may be a man with a chip on his shoulder, due to the fact that the US Government threw him under the bus, he does make some valid points. 

Here is an opinion piece he published on his new companies blog, my key takeaways highlighted:

Courtesy of Frontier Security Group
http://www.fsgroup.com/chairmans-column-isis/

fsgteam | October 6, 2014

Chairman’s Column – Thoughts on Countering ISIS

Chairman's Column

As someone who spent many years operating in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other underdeveloped countries facing existential security threats, I was recently asked about my reaction to President Obama’s plan for fighting ISIS.

My immediate response is that the President’s current plan seems half-hearted at best. American air power has significant reach and accuracy, but ultimately will be unable to finish the job of digging ISIS out of any urban centers where they may seek shelter amongst the populace. Clearing operations ultimately fall to the foot soldier. The Iraqi army is demonstrably inept after billions spent on training and equipping them. Providing them more gear is a high risk endeavor. When ISIS first attacked, the Iraqi army folded, quickly providing ISIS with five heavy divisions of US weaponry (tanks, howitzers, armored vehicles and even helicopters) and three logistic support units’ worth of equipment and munitions.  The Kurds, once a lean and strong fighting force that routinely rebuffed Saddam’s forces, now find themselves outgunned, under-equipped, and overwhelmed. But they do fight, and they fight bravely. The Kurds’ biggest problem is the US State Department blocking them from selling their oil and from buying serious weaponry to protect their stronghold and act as a stabilizing force in the region.

Unfortunately, the DOD has mastered the most expensive ways to wage war, adding only very expensive options to the president’s quiver. Flying off of an aircraft carrier in the north end of the Persian Gulf may be a great demonstration of carrier air power suitable for a high tempo war, but the costs will quickly become staggering, far higher than they need be for what will quickly become a counter-insurgency effort.
As I explain in my book, “Civilian Warriors: The Inside Story of Blackwater and the Unsung Heroes of the War on Terror,” the private sector has long provided nations around the world with innovative solutions to national defense problems in a variety of ways, from the kinetic to the background logistical support necessary to keep militaries humming. If the old Blackwater team were still together, I have high confidence that a multi-brigade-size unit of veteran American contractors or a multi-national force could be rapidly assembled and deployed to be that necessary ground combat team. The professionals would be hired for their combat skills in armor, artillery, small unit tactics, special operations, logistics, and whatever else may be needed. A competent professional force of volunteers would serve as the pointy end of the spear and would serve to strengthen friendly but skittish indigenous forces.

The American people are clearly war-fatigued. Defeat was already snatched from the jaws of victory by the rapid pullout of US forces in 2009. Afghanistan will likely go the same way after never truly defeating the Taliban. Now the danger of a half-baked solution in Iraq is that if ISIS isn’t rightly annihilated, they will portray their survival as a victory over the forces of civilization; thus, there is no room for half-measures. [color=yellowThe longer ISIS festers, the more chances it has for recruitment and the danger of the eventual return of radical jihadists to their western homelands. If the Administration cannot rally the political nerve or funding to send adequate active duty ground forces to answer the call, let the private sector finish the job.
[/quote]

My key takeaways:

1.  Hinging our success on indigenous forces, whom after years of training and billions of dollars spent, still managed to fall apart almost immediately is beyond stupid. 

2.  We are incapable of thinking outside of the box.  Prince is spot on when he says the DOD has mastered the most expensive ways to win war and it makes little economic sense to continue to do so.

3.  We don't have the nerve for the fight at hand and we are going to get burned with half measures.


Prince is no friend of the Americans or the West though, he was burned by the US Government and he is out for blood.  As a result he has thrown in his lot with the Chinese who have welcomed him with open arms.  Here is an article that was published this past January in Forbes.

Courtesy of Forbes
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamespoulos/2014/01/25/ex-blackwater-ceo-erik-prince-africa-neocolonial-with-china/

Washington1/25/2014 @ 3:32PM27,064 views

We Created A Monster: Ex-Blackwater CEO Erik Prince Is Going Neocolonial With China

What happens when America outsources its craziest security assignments to a private contractor, then throws him under the bus?

Answer: an object lesson in the craziness that awaits when he makes his next big move.

The Wall Street Journal sat down — in Hong Kong — with Erik Prince, former CEO of the notorious Blackwater firm. Guess what he’s doing there?

“
Now, sitting in a boardroom above Hong Kong’s Victoria Harbour, he explains his newest title, acquired this month: chairman of Frontier Services Group, an Africa-focused security and logistics company with intimate ties to China’s largest state-owned conglomerate, Citic Group. Beijing has titanic ambitions to tap Africa’s resources—including $1 trillion in planned spending on roads, railways and airports by 2025—and Mr. Prince wants in.

Once, policymakers traded blame for “losing China.” Will anyone ask who lost Erik Prince?

Prince himself is clear about what sent him packing. Though the ordeal of falling out with the federal government was intense — Prince claims he was the top target of IRS auditors — that’s all in the past. It’s America’s future that has Prince turning to China. “”I would rather deal with the vagaries of investing in Africa,” he told the Journal, “than in figuring out what the hell else Washington is going to do to the entrepreneur next.” While America has lost its stomach for massive adventures, China “has the appetite to take frontier risk, that expeditionary risk of going to those less-certain, less-normal markets and figuring out how to make it happen.”

Some might see in Prince’s lament a particularly hard-nosed case for more “national greatness” programs favored by the dominant policy minds who came of political age in the 1990s. But if neoconservatives and neoliberals can ruefully pat themselves on the back for using Prince’s semi-defection as proof of the wisdom of enterprise zones, global interventionism, and rivalry with China, paleoconservatives, libertarians, and old-school leftists can see in the private-security kingpin a confirmation of their own biases too. A big-government military-industrial complex, too clumsy and fearful to take on its own toughest security challenges, can’t take the heat when the guy it hires to do so makes a mess — so it proceeds to clumsily and fearfully flog him out of Washington. What happens? Blowback, that favorite word of American foreign-policy critics.

But this isn’t just a foreign policy story. Whatever your politics, this is a story about the kinds of perils you can best grasp when you set aside a partisan policy lens and pick up the analytical frameworks offered by systems theory. Consider how the contours of our concern about Prince shift when we think of big government as a systems problem instead of an ideological one. It’s a truism that the bigger a system, the harder it falls. But we don’t focus enough on the how of it. The lesson is the same whether you’re looking at the pattern of global order in the post-Cold War world — where only a few outliers of major political risk (“the Axis of Evil”) persisted at the margins of the international political economy… or the pattern of international finance that produced the economic crisis of 2008… or the pattern of data collection and control that culminated in the “catastrophic” leaks released by Julian Assange and Edward Snowden. When a system gets so large that its catastrophic threats become as marginal as possible, the nature of those threats becomes difficult to see, understand, and address. In theoretical parlance, rather than trying to predict unpredictable “black swans,” we should focus on whether we’ve created structural environments that amount to “black lakes” (or might we say… black water?).

The systems-theory approach to catastrophic risk is not, of course, free from strong criticism. One of the biggest names in systems theory, Nassim Taleb, has been drawn into the political controversy surrounding the potential systemic risk created by US monetary and fiscal policy. For some, there’s a lot at stake politically in theories potentially predicting that very loose money will provoke a collapse of America’s financial system (and the world’s) — or, at least, a lot of inflation. Rather than becoming ensnared in those debates, however, we’re best off approaching systems theory from the kind of standpoint that Erik Prince’s turn to China affords us. Rather than using systems theory as a tool for predicting painful events, we should use it as a heuristic for living what Taleb calls an “antifragile” life. Unlikely as it may at first seem, there’s a real connection between the shocking events that shake a system and our personal exercise of anti-fragile habits.

I could lay out an argument trying to persuade you of this, but I think it’s ultimately more powerful to just point back to Prince. After all, his explicit rationale for his new venture is that the US, as a system, has ceased to be anti-fragile, in both political and cultural terms. I’d suggest that the harder a system pushes against antifragility, the more dangerous the antifragile become to the system. Intentionally or not, that’s how you “create monsters.” It’s hard to guess just how dismaying an impact on Africa China will have with Erik Prince at its side. But it’s hard to see how any American can be happy with these latest fruits of our Blackwater experience. And though our pattern is to commence with the finger-pointing and the assignation of personal blame, it’s time to consider what it means for us to hold culpable our whole social and political system of bureaucratic bigness.

This article highlights quite clearly why I believe that if Canadian's aren't willing to pay for an Armed Forces they would be better off disbanding it and figuring out another way to exert influence.  We have developed a system of government that is so focused on "political correctness" and "risk-aversion" that we stifle creativity and entrepreneurship. 

Prince States:

I would rather deal with the vagaries of investing in Africa,” he told the Journal, “than in figuring out what the hell else Washington is going to do to the entrepreneur next.” While America has lost its stomach for massive adventures, China “has the appetite to take frontier risk, that expeditionary risk of going to those less-certain, less-normal markets and figuring out how to make it happen.”

These comments struck a cord with me, if we are unwilling to use our Armed Forces, than why keep them around?  Why not use the money to pay someone else to do the heavy-lifting for us?  It would certainly provide the government with less political problems in the short term?  particularly since every little-action we do is now placed under the intense microscope of public opinion, so much so that we have become incapable of doing our jobs correctly.

The danger of doing something like this is clear, a guy like Prince will work for us but he can also be bought by the other team for a price.  However, if we can't commit to anything else perhaps this is our only solution?

 

[ModlrMike]

Would they really be "American" boots on Canadian soil?  or would the US military simply subsume the CAF much as the OPP or RCMP subsumes small municipal police services when it assumes responsibility for community policing?  If not, what would happen to those 120,000 full and part time CAF members and the tens of thousands of federal public servants in DND?  Lay them off?

I may be wrong, but I can't think of anywhere the US extends its sovereignty without simultaneously having a physical presence.

 

[The Bread Guy]

Would they really be "American" boots on Canadian soil?  or would the US military simply subsume the CAF much as the OPP or RCMP subsumes small municipal police services when it assumes responsibility for community policing? 

In the policing examples, it's still police whose ultimate bosses are still in Canada doing the policing.  My guess:  Canadians would perceive even Canadian troops working under American management as troops controlled by Washington, not Ottawa.

what would happen to those 120,000 full and part time CAF members and the tens of thousands of federal public servants in DND?  Lay them off?

As per the bit in yellow, I've seen municipalities lay off folks from the former local force because they weren't needed anymore now that "Big Blue" or "Big Red" is policing, so at least some would go.  Maybe THAT'S a way to cut our HQ's!  >

 

[Kirkhill]

How many of us live in communities that have hired private watchmen?

What equipment do you want to give them beyond a bicycle, a flashlight and a radio?

Car?
Bulletproof Vest?
NightVision?

Handcuffs?
Batons?
Tasers?

CO2 Guns?
Pistols?
Shotguns?
Rifles?
SMGs?
40mm grenade launchers?

I doubt many would suggest Carl Gustav's and higher for the local community ..... unless the local community has a dispute with the neighbouring community over the height of the dividing hedge and the amount of noise.  In which case it is my nightwatchmen against your nightwatchmen.

 

[cupper]

How many of us live in communities that have hired private watchmen?

What equipment do you want to give them beyond a bicycle, a flashlight and a radio?

Car?
Bulletproof Vest?
NightVision?

Handcuffs?
Batons?
Tasers?

CO2 Guns?
Pistols?
Shotguns?
Rifles?
SMGs?
40mm grenade launchers?

I doubt many would suggest Carl Gustav's and higher for the local community ..... unless the local community has a dispute with the neighbouring community over the height of the dividing hedge and the amount of noise.  In which case it is my nightwatchmen against your nightwatchmen.

Betcha no one would think twice about stoopin' and scoopin' the poopin'. >

 

[a_majoor]

Drifting even further  ff topic:  ...

I have a couple of concerns right now, things about which I am, possibly, rethinking my established positions:

    First: the very nature of the nation state, itself. OGBD talks about the "sanctity of borders," a concept that, in the West, dates, really, from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, and it is a concept that
    is, indeed, enshrined in the UN Charter. I'm not so sure that the "sanctity" of borders is something that we must or even can defend. Look, just for example, at what Russia did to Ukraine. What
    would have happened to the borders of the UK is Scotland had voted 'Yes,' or to Canada's in QC voted 'Oui,' for that matter? What is happening to the borders of Iraq and Syria right now?

    Second: the nature of war. We have, again since the 17th century, come to perceive 'war' as being symmetrical: one 'side' against another; friend and foe; we and they and so on. It now
    appears to me that war is between several 'sides' and allies might be both very, very temporary and ever changing, as might enemies. We do not, it seems to me, always know
    which side we are on.

    Third: the 'language' of war. It also seems to me that we, and China, for example, speak two different languages of war: ours comes to us from Clausewitz and was, perhaps, best spoken by Roosevelt
    and George C Marshall. In our language 'war' is, eventually, a clash of forces and one side always wins. China does not appear to have believed Clausewitz and they still think Sun Tzu was right:
    'war' might involve fighting and destruction but one's war aims can be achieved without fighting. I believe that China thinks that it is fighting World War IV right now. China doesn't want, ever,
    to engage the US in physical battles but it is happy to 'engage' in every other sphere. My guess is that China is 'happy' with the way the war is going; it hasn't won all the battles but it thinks
    that it is winning enough of the important battles to, eventually, win the war. I am also guessing that IS** war aims are less that Clausewitzian.

So, I wonder: what should Canada be doing? We have, I believe, vital interests beyond our borders and we need the capacity promote and protect those interests, independent of the interests and views of others. My own, traditional response to my own concern is to demand that we have bigger, better armed forces. But, is that, really, the best use of our resources?

Various military thinkers have been exploring these concepts for quite a while, but the bureaucratic and political machines which actually operate and use Western militaries have not really moved with the times, mostly because institutional incentives to do so are lacking (think about it: did anyone get fired or demoted for debacles like "Cloth the Soldier", failing to purchase new logistics vehicles or any of the other nightmarish purchasing and acquisition horror stories we have been subjected to for a decade or more? Either inside the military or the civil service?). I suspect that it will take something really drastic like an aircraft carrier being sunk or a major defeat of a field force by an asymmetric enemy to really make things change.

Yet Robert Kaplan's "The Coming Anarchy" was published in 1994.
Martin van Creveld published The Transformation of War in 1991
Colonel Thomas X. Hammes' book The Sling and the Stone was published in 2006

And these are only the most prominent ones. There are literally scores of articles, books, websites etc. devoted to the topic of the evolution and changes in warfare and the military environment.

This kind of goes to the Fire Department analogy. A Fire Department should be aware of the changes in the community they serve. If there are no high rise buildings they would be silly to spend money on a ladder truck. Our military establishments seem a bit like fire departments using equipment and footprints that were relevant in the past, but do not reflect the changed cityscape they now operate in. Despite the gradual increase in high rises, urban sprawl, hazardous materials in industrial facilities etc., the Fire Chief insists all he needs are some new pumpers and more dispatchers to enable the firemen. So long as there are few fires, the politicians at city hall and the voters don't think about it too much (besides the occasional uproar over sole source purchases of new fire engines every few decades).

As Kirkhill alluded to upthread, there are greater forces at work here. Cultural, economic, technological and demographics have changed pretty drastically and our institutions (of all kinds) really don't reflect these changes anymore. What sort of force will be needed to protect citizens, their rights and properties will be difficult to define. I suspect many overlapping "forces" will be needed; from the neighbourhood watch to whoever mans the Anti Ballistic Missile Shield. Threats as varied as diseases, drugs, market manipulation and computer virii all pose huge threats to people and property. Maybe instead of an overarching "Homeland Security" type bureaucracy we really need a "bridge" organization that can contract and rapidly deploy resources wherever needed to match whatever the threat is (and "sovereignty" as we understand it now only extends as far as the "bridge" can reach).

Lots to think about, but the real question is who will act on this?

 

[Eye In The Sky]

While the Saint-Jean incident is pretty f**king bad, let's also be cautious about developing a military (or any capability) based on only one problem.

Fully agree.  But, I think we need to be honest with ourselves; not only is 'the enemy at the gate', in some cases he is thru the gate, across the yard, into the house and sitting comfortably on the couch.  Watching us in our own backyards.

 

[The Bread Guy]

Fully agree.  But, I think we need to be honest with ourselves; not only is 'the enemy at the gate', in some cases he is thru the gate, across the yard, into the house and sitting comfortably on the couch.  Watching us in our own backyards.

Even if this didn't happen, very good point to keep in mind.