Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[KevinB]

I agree.

As an institution we have to embrace that the institution is bigger and more important than any individual and their personal ambition and put the effectiveness of the institution first, above all else.

We're gonna have to break some eggs to make this omelet.

Honestly the only solution is going to need to be implemented from the outside.
Either a combination of a CDS who doesn’t give a shit about feelings, who has support from the CCA, and the potential successors to both, or an MND who is mission focused to reform the CAF as a great capable force.

I'll go out on a limb here and suggest that, based on my observations over the years, Reservist attendance is not determined, over the long term, by 'fair weather' as much as it is by 'good leadership'.

No surprise, more often than not, great leadership builds great units and where that is compromised for one reason or another, attendance plummets, sometimes overnight, because as my old man observed about his experience in the 3rd Div in WW2, "No one wants to be part of a shit show."

In a microcosm yes, but as an overview it doesn’t fully apply.

In the 7 years I was in 30 RCA:
1987 -1989 we could deploy 6 guns and 2 CP’s, 2 OP’s a BC’s Party, and 2 Recce Dets.
During the fall.
Come summer concentration that dropped to about 1/2 (and that was with the influx of new gunners)
1990-1991 the 10/90 experience, increased summer numbers solely due to the Reg Force #’s other than at times 2RCHA contributed troops as well to bolster the summer numbers.
*I was gone a lot of the summer of 92 for RV then 1993 Snowgoose 59 with 2 RCHA, and 1994 until I went PPCLI, I was teaching at the RCR BSL.

Based on what I have seen since, numbers have been dwindling since Afghanistan shut down, as most join to actually do the job.

 

[Kirkhill]

CADTC absolutely has responsibilities for the Reserves, and I am struggling to figure out what would make you point out that CADTC has obligations to the Reserves. What makes you think that they don't? You suggested reallocating people from CADTC to Reserve units - I am pointing out that you don't really understand the situation.

You are absolutely correct. I don't understand the situation. I am trying to understand the situation. The situation does seem to leave some room for improvement.

I am struggling to understand who is responsible for ensuring that the Army Reserve is at authorized strength and for keeping track of who has what qualifications and who is available on what terms to augment the Regular Force and who that person reports to.

What makes you think that Lessons Learned is only for the Regular Force? What are you basing all of your questions/comments on?

I am asking - and speculating - in the hopes of understanding.

When was your last time in uniform in an Armoury?

A long, long time ago.

CADTC tackles both Reg and Res training issues for both Individual and Collective Training. Delivery of that training varies between CADTC-controlled schools and those controlled the Divs. This is true for both Reg and Res. I had a position there where I was responsible for Collective Training, which meant both Reg and Res. I had a ARes advisor as well.

Thanks for the info.

It is worth pointing out that each Division has variations in their local situation, so a one-size-fits-all approach does not always work. The Divs have a lot of control, which makes sense.

I guess this is where my confusion arises.

Is there a clear, public domain, statement of what the Regular Army expects of the Reserve Army and an equally clear path to that endstate?

I have to say that this Sept 2022 CGAI article by C.P. Champion resonates strongly with me.

Rebuilding the Reserve Force - Canadian Global Affairs Institute

 

[daftandbarmy]

Honestly the only solution is going to need to be implemented from the outside.
Either a combination of a CDS who doesn’t give a shit about feelings, who has support from the CCA, and the potential successors to both, or an MND who is mission focused to reform the CAF as a great capable force.



In a microcosm yes, but as an overview it doesn’t fully apply.

In the 7 years I was in 30 RCA:
1987 -1989 we could deploy 6 guns and 2 CP’s, 2 OP’s a BC’s Party, and 2 Recce Dets.
During the fall.
Come summer concentration that dropped to about 1/2 (and that was with the influx of new gunners)
1990-1991 the 10/90 experience, increased summer numbers solely due to the Reg Force #’s other than at times 2RCHA contributed troops as well to bolster the summer numbers.
*I was gone a lot of the summer of 92 for RV then 1993 Snowgoose 59 with 2 RCHA, and 1994 until I went PPCLI, I was teaching at the RCR BSL.

Based on what I have seen since, numbers have been dwindling since Afghanistan shut down, as most join to actually do the job.

Well, there's this too, borrowed from one of @Kirkhill 's posts:

"If it looks as if the activity is going to be poorly planned, repetitive or standing by to stand by, the individual chooses to stay away."

Rebuilding the Reserve Force - Canadian Global Affairs Institute (cgai.ca)

 

[KevinB]

Well, there's this too, borrowed from one of @Kirkhill 's posts:

"If it looks as if the activity is going to be poorly planned, repetitive or standing by to stand by, the individual chooses to stay away."

Rebuilding the Reserve Force - Canadian Global Affairs Institute (cgai.ca)

Actually, the biggest issue was always summer concentration.
Basically because outside the students and .gov personnel, few could take 3 weeks vacation to do it.
Ironically in Ottawa a lot of Class B and C personnel at NDHQ had issues getting time to do a MilCon. Which speaks volumes about the entire process.

 

[McG]

I am struggling to understand who is responsible for ensuring that the Army Reserve is at authorized strength and for keeping track of who has what qualifications and who is available on what terms to augment the Regular Force and who that person reports to.

The “who” is the four regional divisions that own the reserve brigades.

 

[KevinB]

The “who” is the four regional divisions that own the reserve brigades.

I think you meant “divisions”

 

[Kirkhill]

Actually, the biggest issue was always summer concentration.
Basically because outside the students and .gov personnel, few could take 3 weeks vacation to do it.
Ironically in Ottawa a lot of Class B and C personnel at NDHQ had issues getting time to do a MilCon. Which speaks volumes about the entire process.

So why persist with the impossible? Why keep beating forehead against brick?

Something else needs to be done and perhaps some of that needs to be an adjustment of expectations?

Conversely, in this more disjointed working world we now inhabit are the assumptions of 1982 valid? How many people are engaged by employers on the same terms, and on the same contractual basis, they were in 1982? Many positions demand Continuous Learning, Continuing Career Progression which necessitates time off from the day to day. The portion of the population engaged on those terms is considerably larger than it was in the factory oriented 1980s.

Good or bad, more of the population is engaged in contract work, part time work and self-employment. To my mind that represents a larger pool of potential trainees. And it doesn't take into account that in 1982 there were 25 million Canadians. Now there are 40 million Canadians.

How about on-line education as a pre-requisite for entry? When you report to the recruiting centre for your medicals and CFATs and security clearances you already have to be able to pass an exam on military equipment and structures and history, law and hygiene, sensitivity, diversity.... The type of stuff that eats up training time while sitting in hot classrooms.

 

[McG]

If we expose people to DND Learn before they join, then we will never get anyone in the door.

 

[FJAG]

So, to distill this down to simple weatherman terms... You have a set of rules that have never been used, but have existed for decades, and you imagine that it's lack of fortitude from the CAF that is why the rules haven't been used... I genuinely respect your position, and have enjoyed speaking with you in online, but I think you're completely out to lunch on this.

I might be but I guess we'll never know because

If the CAF started forcing reservists to parade for training, we'd have 90% of reservists hand in their kit. It's not that they aren't dedicated, and loyal, it's more that you're asking more than the government can give.

I'll debate the numbers but we're both just guessing. Will some folks quit? Absolutely. Will new folks coming in quit knowing full well what the "rules" are. I think not. Some maybe but nowhere near the numbers you cite.

Take a look at the RMC system. People come in knowing full well that they'll have a period of obligatory service and still join. What makes you think reservists are any different. Properly incentivize recruiting and follow it up with decent training and periods of obligatory training that are not too onerous and the folks you have will be more committed to the job than the "fair weather" ones we all complain about.

Our reservists are "fair weather" because it makes sense for them.

It makes sense to some of them. And IMHO they're the ones who are the least committed. In my days most of the complaints about the ones who didn't show up came from the soldiers who did.

I've said this before in other threads. The problem right now with ordering someone to parade is not so much lack of intestinal fortitude on the part of the leadership (albeit that's part of it). The problem is s 294 of the NDA which makes failure to attend drill and training an offence triable before a civilian court rather than a military tribunal under the CSD.

• 294 (1) Every officer or non-commissioned member of the reserve force who without lawful excuse neglects or refuses to attend any parade or training at the place and hour appointed therefor is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction for each offence, if an officer, to a fine not exceeding fifty dollars and, if a non-commissioned member, to a fine not exceeding twenty-five dollars.
• Each absence an offence
  (2) Absence from any parade or training referred to in subsection (1) is, in respect of each day on which the absence occurs, a separate offence.

This makes it "inconvenient."

If I had a nickel for every time I met with a reserve CO who complained about the lack of attendance and when given the solution then chose to do nothing... Don't get me started on this or I'll get into kit recovery and we'll be here all night.

Personally, I'd prefer a prefer a reserve force of 10,000 trained and committed reservists than what we have now. But on the other hand, if it was done right, with all the pieces in place, I think you wouldn't have a problem recruiting and maintaining a force of 20,000. But just let me be absolutely clear. Obligatory training by itself, is not the answer. It needs to be part of a comprehensive package. I'll go one step further, whatever other reforms you might put in place will have little value without an obligatory training system.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I might be but I guess we'll never know because

I'll debate the numbers but we're both just guessing. Will some folks quit? Absolutely. Will new folks coming in quit knowing full well what the "rules" are. I think not. Some maybe but nowhere near the numbers you cite.
If I had a nickel for every time I met with a reserve CO who complained about the lack of attendance and when given the solution then chose to do nothing... Don't get me started on this or I'll get into kit recovery and we'll be here all night.

If those COs were fired, and better ones replaced them, the problem would be solved pretty quick

But that would never happen because: lack of accountability at the highest levels.

 

[KevinB]

. But just let me be absolutely clear. Obligatory training by itself, is not the answer. It needs to be part of a comprehensive package. I'll go one step further, whatever other reforms you might put in place will have little value without an obligatory training system.

Bingo.

Frankly I personally think Canada should be able to field a CA of about 60k, with 40k of those being PRes.
But that is all predicated on the PRes being an effective structure.
Failing that, shut the PRes down, but then one would need to grow the Regular Army, which really isn’t an efficient force in terms of PY unless it’s deployed or 110% ready to deploy, all of which takes a lot more $$$.

 

[KevinB]

So why persist with the impossible? Why keep beating forehead against brick?

Something else needs to be done and perhaps some of that needs to be an adjustment of expectations?

Conversely, in this more disjointed working world we now inhabit are the assumptions of 1982 valid? How many people are engaged by employers on the same terms, and on the same contractual basis, they were in 1982? Many positions demand Continuous Learning, Continuing Career Progression which necessitates time off from the day to day. The portion of the population engaged on those terms is considerably larger than it was in the factory oriented 1980s.

Good or bad, more of the population is engaged in contract work, part time work and self-employment. To my mind that represents a larger pool of potential trainees. And it doesn't take into account that in 1982 there were 25 million Canadians. Now there are 40 million Canadians.

How about on-line education as a pre-requisite for entry? When you report to the recruiting centre for your medicals and CFATs and security clearances you already have to be able to pass an exam on military equipment and structures and history, law and hygiene, sensitivity, diversity.... The type of stuff that eats up training time while sitting in hot classrooms.

People generally don’t learn in a vacuum. Theory is great, but it’s doesn’t mean it applies to practical implementation in the field.

1) Training Facilities, the idea of the summer Tent or H Hut facilities is ridiculous. There should be a large investment in training infrastructure.
Classrooms, real ones that have AC, bathrooms etc.
Barracks that are an actual hard fixed facility that is not a modular tent.

Integration of Technology into training - eg the Microsoft HoloLens type that can show how things are done correctly on a digital overview while a student does it physically they can learn and see right being done while doing it.

Fused training structures that allow Reg and Res personnel (if they are available) that take courses together.

Proper standards for training. I don’t know if it’s changed, but often when teaching reservists in the summer, some instructors didn’t have a clue of the subject matter or know how to teach, and lessons that would have failed off any competently run Leadership Course where accepted due to a shortage of instructors.
When you need to go back and reteach lessons repeatedly in the evening due to totally FUBAR instructor - it really eats into both the candidates and other instructors time. But the Sgt teaching is given a pass from the Standards WO due to just coming from a compassionate ERE position…
(That was a PPCLI issue, the RCR issues were different).

 

[Kirkhill]

Apparently we dont have an Army Reserve. We have four Brigadier Generals each with their own packet of exploitable civilians to recruit, train and organize as they see fit.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Apparently we dont have an Army Reserve. We have four Brigadier Generals each with their own packet of exploitable civilians to recruit, train and organize as they see fit.

You seem to be under the mistaken assumption that they really care that much about the ARes, which is cute TBH

 

[Kirkhill]

You seem to be under the mistaken assumption that they really care that much about the ARes, which is cute TBH

Well here's a thought. If they don't care maybe they could let those that do give it a shot.

cf the C.P. Champion article et al.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Well here's a thought. If they don't care maybe they could let those that do give it a shot.

cf the C.P. Champion article et al.

Way back when they created the 'Mini-Me' Militia GOFO positions I incorrectly assumed that's what would happen but, of course, they're just a neutered version of the real thing to give misguided Class A careerists something to aspire to: even greater irrelevance

 

[Kirkhill]

Way back when they created the 'Mini-Me' Militia GOFO positions I incorrectly assumed that's what would happen but, of course, they're just a neutered version of the real thing to give misguided Class A careerists something to aspire to: even greater irrelevance

My problem was that they put misguided Class A careerists into those roles when, in my opinion, the job needed to go to a regular on a mission.

 

[McG]

Apparently we dont have an Army Reserve. We have four Brigadier Generals each with their own packet of exploitable civilians to recruit, train and organize as they see fit.

What?

 

[FJAG]

Well here's a thought. If they don't care maybe they could let those that do give it a shot.

cf the C.P. Champion article et al.

I like Champion. His book was well researched and well presented. If there is one weakness its that he carries the Reserves 2000 message on the expansion of the reserves. He puts out the number 60 - 100,000. I can't find that number on Reserves 2000 web page now but numbers close to that have been put forward before. It's basically created by taking the existing reserve units (roughly 150 and filling them to fuller establishments of 500-600 each) That's coupled with a separate but equal partner structure with the RegF

I see two large problems with that.

First the numbers. 60-100,000 is the equivalent of roughly 4 to 7 divisions (at 15,000 per division average) or 20 to 35 brigades at 3-5,000 each. Canada struggles to equip and train 4 RegF brigades. The ten current ResF brigades are unequipped and poorly trained. Are we merely recruiting people and giving them rifle drill and parades? Do we even have a need for 4 to 7 divisions?

In Post WW2 the Militia was authorized at 180,000 in 6 divisions and four independent armoured brigades equipped with much war surplus equipment. By 1954 the Militia had dwindled to 46,506 all ranks. Yes, it was a smaller population then, but still we'd be challenged to keep even 60,000 reservists. And we certainly can't (or won't) equip them.

Secondly is the question of the complexity of leadership. The skill levels needed to lead, both at the officer and Snr NCM level is no longer learnable on weekends and two week summer courses. Cementing that book learning with practical training is even more difficult. The reserves would essentially have to send large numbers of people on senior leadership training at exactly the point in their civilian careers where senior leaders have little time to devote. Alternatively there would need to be full-time leadership and instructors either from the RegF or created "in-house."

I'm entirely with Champion on all the problems he describes. I just can't buy the solution. In the numerous napkin force I've floated here there is one underlying constant. We have to start with the force we have, the number of RegF, the number of ResF, and the equipment we have and which is in the pipeline. We build a better force with that and once its established and working we determine if and how it can be expanded. Unfortunately this means amalgamation and an overall reduction in reserve units which Reserves 2000 fights hard against. Partially with reason. Previous amalgamations have not been rousing successes for a host of reasons. the challenge is to avoid those reasons the next time.

Frankly I personally think Canada should be able to field a CA of about 60k, with 40k of those being PRes.

I agree. Given time and the requisite support.

But that is all predicated on the PRes being an effective structure.
Failing that, shut the PRes down, but then one would need to grow the Regular Army, which really isn’t an efficient force in terms of PY unless it’s deployed or 110% ready to deploy, all of which takes a lot more $$$.

Based on a 6 to 1 ratio on Class A to PY ratio, that should gain the RegF 4,000 folks tops. That's barely enough to replace all the Class Bs littering cubicles in Ottawa. I jest in part. Let @dapaterson give us the real figures but I'm pretty sure the field force wouldn't grow. Of course they might get enough $ selling all that prime downtown real estate that the armouries are on to build that Star Top replacement headquarters in Ottawa.

 

[Kirkhill]

60 to 100,000 may be a number of divisions but your never going to be able to parade that 60 to 100,000. The way I see that is that you have an attested pool of 60 to 100,000 from which you can draw.

Depending on circumstances you might be able to draw 600 or maybe even 6000. Or perhaps, in a local emergency you might even be able to draw on 10,000.

Frankly, for a volunteer force, I think there is a solid case for recruiting at those kinds of numbers. You are not going to create divisions and corps. Volunteers don't work that way.

Facts about the Danish Home Guard​

• The Home Guard is a volunteer military organization.
• The Home Guard had 43,374 members as of August 2022.
• The active force had 13,485 volunteer soldiers as of August 2022. The remaining volunteers belong to the Home Guard Reserve.
• Approximately 15 percent of all volunteer soldiers are women.
• The task of the Home Guard is to support the Armed Forces – nationally as well as internationally. In addition, the Home Guard supports the police, the emergency services and other authorities in carrying out their duties.
• 1,572 people applied for enrollment in the Home Guard, and 1,028 volunteers signed a contract in 2021.
• 66 percent of the new volunteers were aged 18-32.
• The appropriation allocated to the Home Guard in the Finance Bill amounted to DKK 526.2 m in 2021.

https://www.hjv.dk/sider/english.aspx

Population of Denmark - 5.8 million
Population of Canada - 40 million
Ratio = 7:1

7x 43,374 = 299,131 members
7x 13,485 = 93,000 active members
7x 1,572 = 11,000 applicants annually
7x 1028 = 7,200 contracted volunteers annually

526.2 mDKK = 104 mCAD
7x 104 mCAD = 728 mCAD

To supply a pool of volunteers - unpaid and willing - from which you can draw contracted personnel for longer contracts for specific tasks.

Open the gates to 60 to 100,000 and then sort through those to find the willing numbers to fill your brigades or take on more rigorous contracts with harder obligations.

In 2020, the Home Guard's soldiers provided a total of 1,732,219 hours for deployments, training and exercise activities and for deployment. Also read the article about the Home Guard's overall efforts in 2020:

Opgaver

www.hjv.dk

Hjemmeværnet har igen bevist sin enorme værdi for det samlede beredskab

www.hjv.dk

7x 1,732,219 = 12,125,533 hours or roughly 6000 PYs

And a major player in managing Covid 19 leaving the regs to get on with their jobs.

Edit-the Danish articles are available in English.