Infantry Vehicles

[markppcli]

That answers the question then. We only have enough tanks to support the single deployed Squadron(-) we have in Latvia, which combined with the LAV Company(+) and either another allied Infantry Company within eFP Latvia (or a 2nd LAV Company deployed from Canada...which is not something that is envisioned under our current policies) gives us a single deployable and sustainable Combat Team per our doctrine (with the Polish Tank Company and the other two allied Infantry Companies within eFP Latvia presumably forming a 2nd Combat Team).

The Spanish and Italians have their own tanks, the Poles will be free to be a tank squadron doing tank squadron things.

That's basically the limit of what our doctrine would indicate that our current force structure says we are capable of deploying. Six LAV Battalions and three Armoured Regiments force generating a single doctrinal Combat Team (with allied contributions to round it out).

For six month rotations, yes. Bearing in mind we also contribute the Bn HQ and a significant combat support element.

Which brings me back to my original question. Assuming that we are not going to see a new tracked IFV to replace the LAVs or any significant increase in the size of our tank numbers then how do we envision the role and employment of tanks within what is essentially a SBCT structure for our Medium LAV forces (with the US SBCT's not having any tanks organic to their BCT)? Or do we accept the fact that the limit of our LSCO deployment capabilities per our current doctrine for a total of 6 x Infantry Battalions and 3 x Armoured Regiments is a single doctrinal Combat Team?

I think looking at what we can rotationally sustain vs what we could deploy for a conventional war are two different questions entirely. Could we deploy an Bn from an Bde? Absolutely, infact we do it for JPMRC and our LIV commitments. Now could we do it every 6 months, probably not but that’s man power more than equipment. So I don’t see why you’re relating it to needing a tracked IFV. Again the how we use LAVs and tanks is an established part of our doctrine. We have functionally moved to an asymmetrical structure at this point we just haven’t codified it. No one suggests our total output would be a single combat team.

 

[IKnowNothing]

Uh no? A doctrinal squadron is 19 tanks. Agree we don’t have enough but I think that’s hyperbole.

20x A4MC2 + 20x 2A6MC2 = 40

Less one of each to tech reference
Less one of each to Borden
Less 3 of each to gagetown for the armour school
Less 4 of each to Alberta for LdSH for predeployment work up


20 -9 = 11, *2 = 22
19 with few spares

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

That answers the question then. We only have enough tanks to support the single deployed Squadron(-) we have in Latvia, which combined with the LAV Company(+) and either another allied Infantry Company within eFP Latvia (or a 2nd LAV Company deployed from Canada...which is not something that is envisioned under our current policies) gives us a single deployable and sustainable Combat Team per our doctrine (with the Polish Tank Company and the other two allied Infantry Companies within eFP Latvia presumably forming a 2nd Combat Team).

That's basically the limit of what our doctrine would indicate that our current force structure says we are capable of deploying. Six LAV Battalions and three Armoured Regiments force generating a single doctrinal Combat Team (with allied contributions to round it out).

Which brings me back to my original question. Assuming that we are not going to see a new tracked IFV to replace the LAVs or any significant increase in the size of our tank numbers then how do we envision the role and employment of tanks within what is essentially a SBCT structure for our Medium LAV forces (with the US SBCT's not having any tanks organic to their BCT)? Or do we accept the fact that the limit of our LSCO deployment capabilities per our current doctrine for a total of 6 x Infantry Battalions and 3 x Armoured Regiments is a single doctrinal Combat Team?

A Square Combat Team is a rather unlikely operational construct. It became out institutional bolt-hole during the 90s as we struggled with the post-cold war drawdown. Its really a training construct.

A more usual combined-arms grouping is the Battle Group. A Battle Group led by an infantry battalion could have the battalion HQ, two or three infantry companies, a tank squadron and a engineer squadron. The BG CO can then form combat teams as his estimate of the situation indicates. Those combat teams would likely be much smaller than a square combat team.

We do not have SBCTs. We have CMBGs that generate Battle Groups. Our LAV 6 and Leopard 2 team is well-established. Our combined arms doctrine and TTPs are sound. Would I like tracked IFVs? Sure. Having said that, the LAV 6 is a good combat vehicle. The 25mm is absolutely useful to deal with enemy light AFVs and suppress trenches etc. Its also made in Canada. If I was suddenly given a bunch of public funds to spend I would likely just buy 100 more LAV 6 and place a BG worth at JMRC Hohenfels for Level 5/6 training and as a surge BG.

 

[markppcli]

20x A4MC2 + 20x 2A6MC2 = 40

Less one of each to tech reference
Less one of each to Borden
Less 3 of each to gagetown for the armour school
Less 4 of each to Alberta for LdSH for predeployment work up


20 -9 = 11, *2 = 22
19 with few spares

We have 54 2A4s, 42 of which are retained for training.

 

[Kirkhill]

1 regiment is too few I agree, however our intent isn’t to piecemeal them across the army. I think anyways.

I think the introduction of the Booker to the US Army's Light Divisions may increase the pressure to penny-packet the tanks. Their doctrinal solutions seem to find a way to be incorporated in Canadian doctrine even when we don't have the full slate of capabilities that they have available to support and justify their doctrine.

We have had a history, in my opinion, of citing their doctrine much the way that many folks cite the bible: to justify a preferred course of action.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I think the introduction of the Booker to the US Army's Light Divisions may increase the pressure to penny-packet the tanks. Their doctrinal solutions seem to find a way to be incorporated in Canadian doctrine even when we don't have the full slate of capabilities that they have available to support and justify their doctrine.

We have had a history, in my opinion, of citing their doctrine much the way that many folks cite the bible: to justify a preferred course of action.

At CMBG and below our doctrine is more or less British at its core with fifty or so years of Canadian development. A lot of our supporting arms doctrine (which is often above CMBG) is absolutely American. That is not because its the bible, its because we would be integrating into their systems or relying on their systems. Having said that, there is daylight between NATO and US doctrine in some areas. All that to say, we need to be flexible - which we are.

The M10 Booker is currently for the US "light" divisions. Some folks north of the border are looking at it for a different role than an IBCT bunker-buster. But that is covered in another thread.

 

[IKnowNothing]

We have 54 2A4s, 42 of which are retained for training.

The 34 obsolescent A4's don't change the math on the 40 combat grade tanks. 40 less the domestic needs leaves 1 squadron+ deployable.

 

[markppcli]

The 34 obsolescent A4's don't change the math on the 40 combat grade tanks. 40 less the domestic needs leaves 1 squadron+ deployable.

The A4s are for training, frees up the 40 for deployment

 

[KevinB]

I think the introduction of the Booker to the US Army's Light Divisions may increase the pressure to penny-packet the tanks. Their doctrinal solutions seem to find a way to be incorporated in Canadian doctrine even when we don't have the full slate of capabilities that they have available to support and justify their doctrine.

The Booker has no doctrinal support down here. It was more a ‘leads change’ item and some believe a way to get GDLS a leg up on XM-30 OMFV.

We have had a history, in my opinion, of citing their doctrine much the way that many folks cite the bible: to justify a preferred course of action.

The problem with doctrine is that it needs to be grounded in reality. The M-10 Booker realistically could have been a JLTV/Hummer or GMV 2.0 with a Modern Version of a 106mm RR and one would have been better off. Our Light doctrine literally says don’t do shit that you may need a tank for, as well as the entire goal of being platform agnostic. You for sure aren’t fitting a M-10 into a Blackhawk or Chinook, nor are you jumping them out of a Herc, and it can’t climb mountains…

It however has somewhat forced the Armor establishment down here to realize that the M1A3 Abrams will be lighter then the A2 and not be the 80t behemoth that some had been envisioning.

 

[GR66]

A Square Combat Team is a rather unlikely operational construct. It became out institutional bolt-hole during the 90s as we struggled with the post-cold war drawdown. Its really a training construct.

A more usual combined-arms grouping is the Battle Group. A Battle Group led by an infantry battalion could have the battalion HQ, two or three infantry companies, a tank squadron and a engineer squadron. The BG CO can then form combat teams as his estimate of the situation indicates. Those combat teams would likely be much smaller than a square combat team.

We do not have SBCTs. We have CMBGs that generate Battle Groups. Our LAV 6 and Leopard 2 team is well-established. Our combined arms doctrine and TTPs are sound. Would I like tracked IFVs? Sure. Having said that, the LAV 6 is a good combat vehicle. The 25mm is absolutely useful to deal with enemy light AFVs and suppress trenches etc. Its also made in Canada. If I was suddenly given a bunch of public funds to spend I would likely just buy 100 more LAV 6 and place a BG worth at JMRC Hohenfels for Level 5/6 training and as a surge BG.

This is my point. We only have enough tanks to deploy and sustain a single Tank Squadron for a combat deployment (the 15 x 2A4M's already in Latvia plus an additional 20 x 2A6M's in Canada). That squadron is already tasked to eFP Latvia with our LAV Company(+) and our Allied units.

That means that there are a grand total of ZERO additional Tank Squadrons available to deploy to support a further Canadian Mechanized Battle Group deployment unless you want to scrape together a single Squadron of 2A4 training tanks for a one-shot, non-sustainable squadron.

Nothing I have read indicates there is any intention to increase the number of tanks that Canada has. The new Cavalry doctrine for the RCAC is specifically talking about Heavy, Medium and Light Cavalry Regiments with only the single Heavy Cavalry Regiment having tanks so in addition to supporting the infantry by generating Tank Squadrons for Battle Groups they are also envisioning them doing "Cavalry" things on their own. Where they envision getting enough tanks to do the eFP Latvia Squadron, an additional Squadron for a Battle Group and another for "Cavalry" stuff is beyond me.

I only see a couple of options based on the number of tanks we have available.

1) We accept that the current eFP Latvia force is the only Mechanized combined-arms deployment we will be doctrinally capable of supporting in an extended combat situation with the number of tanks we have available. This brings into question the need for a total of 6 x LAV Battalions to support a Company(+) deployment.
2) We accept the risk of deploying an additional combined arms Battle Group using our 34 x 2A4 training tanks that have no sustainment depth.
3) We assume that the required tank support for an additional LAV Battle Group or Battalion-sized deployment will come from Allied nations (in which case we should be setting up that relationship in advance)
4) We accept that we don't have enough tanks to match our Mechanized deployment capacity per our existing doctrine so we need to adjust our doctrine to account for the fact that tanks will not be available to us.

This isn't a criticism of our existing doctrine. It's simply a simple mathematical calculation that points out that we don't have enough tanks to support our LAV forces under that doctrine, which begs the question...do you limit the size of your deployable force to match the availability of the tanks in order to stick to your doctrine, do you increase the number of tanks we have to enable larger doctrinal deployed forces, or do you adjust your doctrine to account for the fact that the tanks simply aren't available?

 

[Kirkhill]

The Booker has no doctrinal support down here. It was more a ‘leads change’ item and some believe a way to get GDLS a leg up on XM-30 OMFV.

The problem with doctrine is that it needs to be grounded in reality. The M-10 Booker realistically could have been a JLTV/Hummer or GMV 2.0 with a Modern Version of a 106mm RR and one would have been better off. Our Light doctrine literally says don’t do shit that you may need a tank for, as well as the entire goal of being platform agnostic. You for sure aren’t fitting a M-10 into a Blackhawk or Chinook, nor are you jumping them out of a Herc, and it can’t climb mountains…

It however has somewhat forced the Armor establishment down here to realize that the M1A3 Abrams will be lighter then the A2 and not be the 80t behemoth that some had been envisioning.

Kevin, you were probably hanging around the same armoury floors as I was in the 80s. I have vivid recollections of infantrymen arguing strongly for the Marder. The rationale was that we needed to keep up with the tanks. The discussion wasn't based on the needs of the battlefield. It was based on the needs of the Infantry Corps. Without the Marder then we would be irrelevant on the battlefield and the tankers would own 4CMBG and all the promotions.

Fast forward 20 years and relocate south of the border - after a couple of spectaculars (Kuwait and Iraq) - the American shoe was on the other foot. The requirement was for lots of pointy sticks. MPs, AA gunners, gunners at large ... and tankers were all reverted to infantry and issued HMMWVs and MRAPs. Tanks were surplus to the needs of the day.

IMHO the Booker has been created as a means of ensuring that some Blackhats will be found on all missions. The Booker appears to be, essentially, an Abrams M1 turret on a lighter hull. The infantry wanted DFS - that was the intent of the Stryker MGS and Stryker TOW. The infantry has always argued, begged and pleaded for their own armour. They wanted something that would be on immediate call to the Company Commanders in a support role. They wanted, essentially, penny packets of large calibre weapons. My guess is that the Booker Battalion COs will be clamouring to retain their "non-tanks" as an armoured fist.

IMHO, again, the difference between an infantry CO and an armoured CO is the knowledge that his troops don't have the advantage of a foot of steel. The infantry commander has to be more cautious than the armoured commander. That caution translates to the employment of thin skinned vehicles, like the MGS, as well.

....

Waltzing Matilda - The Infantry Tank

 

[suffolkowner]

20x A4MC2 + 20x 2A6MC2 = 40

Less one of each to tech reference
Less one of each to Borden
Less 3 of each to gagetown for the armour school
Less 4 of each to Alberta for LdSH for predeployment work up


20 -9 = 11, *2 = 22
19 with few spares

We have 54 2A4s, 42 of which are retained for training.

The A4s are for training, frees up the 40 for deployment

so the tanks in IKN post are coming out of the 2A4's not the 2A4MC2 and 2A6MC2?

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

This is my point. We only have enough tanks to deploy and sustain a single Tank Squadron for a combat deployment (the 15 x 2A4M's already in Latvia plus an additional 20 x 2A6M's in Canada). That squadron is already tasked to eFP Latvia with our LAV Company(+) and our Allied units.

That means that there are a grand total of ZERO additional Tank Squadrons available to deploy to support a further Canadian Mechanized Battle Group deployment unless you want to scrape together a single Squadron of 2A4 training tanks for a one-shot, non-sustainable squadron.

Nothing I have read indicates there is any intention to increase the number of tanks that Canada has. The new Cavalry doctrine for the RCAC is specifically talking about Heavy, Medium and Light Cavalry Regiments with only the single Heavy Cavalry Regiment having tanks so in addition to supporting the infantry by generating Tank Squadrons for Battle Groups they are also envisioning them doing "Cavalry" things on their own. Where they envision getting enough tanks to do the eFP Latvia Squadron, an additional Squadron for a Battle Group and another for "Cavalry" stuff is beyond me.

I only see a couple of options based on the number of tanks we have available.

1) We accept that the current eFP Latvia force is the only Mechanized combined-arms deployment we will be doctrinally capable of supporting in an extended combat situation with the number of tanks we have available. This brings into question the need for a total of 6 x LAV Battalions to support a Company(+) deployment.
2) We accept the risk of deploying an additional combined arms Battle Group using our 34 x 2A4 training tanks that have no sustainment depth.
3) We assume that the required tank support for an additional LAV Battle Group or Battalion-sized deployment will come from Allied nations (in which case we should be setting up that relationship in advance)
4) We accept that we don't have enough tanks to match our Mechanized deployment capacity per our existing doctrine so we need to adjust our doctrine to account for the fact that tanks will not be available to us.

This isn't a criticism of our existing doctrine. It's simply a simple mathematical calculation that points out that we don't have enough tanks to support our LAV forces under that doctrine, which begs the question...do you limit the size of your deployable force to match the availability of the tanks in order to stick to your doctrine, do you increase the number of tanks we have to enable larger doctrinal deployed forces, or do you adjust your doctrine to account for the fact that the tanks simply aren't available?

I guess I am trying to see the "so what?" Doctrine is an agreed-upon set of fundamental principles on how we will fight. Our BG-level doctrine is sound, and we can execute it. Our CMBG-level doctrine is also sound, and it applies in what we are leading overseas (with variations, of course, for the local situation).

I do not see a need to adjust doctrine based on numbers of tanks? Why do you see that? If we had no tanks at all and no scope for allied tanks then we'd need to look at out combat team and battle group doctrine.

We have six LAV battalions that will be cycling through Latvia. This means that each Battalion will deploy once every three years. This includes the Battalion HQ. combat support company and the combat support company. If we surged another LAV Company Canada could field a rather doctrinal Mech Battle Group on its own.