• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

Infantry of Tomorrow

The Israeli Army is experimenting with a portable system which allows soldiers on teh ground to view real time data from UAVs etc., without going through the "filter" or waiting for the CP to process things:


New Portable Surveillance Receivers 'Arm' Israeli Troops
Karen Epper Hoffman March 15, 2005

A new communications technology that delivers video to a receiver one-fifth the size of normal is allowing Israeli troops to see what enemies may be lurking just over the next hill or around the next corner.

The V-Rambo system, which was formally unveiled last Wednesday at a conference in Tel Aviv, is a three-inch, wristwatch-sized LCD screen that enables ground troops and pilots to view real-time video images taken by unmanned planes.

Itzhak Beni, CEO of the Israeli company Elisra Group that makes the product, says V-Rambo gives soldiers an aerial view of combat areas, which is particularly important in a dense urban landscape where military forces may not have a clear line of sight in combat zones.
The Israelis, like military forces from other countries, have been collecting video from unmanned vehicles for two decades -- but typically that information was sent to one central location where it was displayed on larger receivers before it could be disseminated to ground troops or pilots who could then use that data.

The concern with this "hub and spoke system" is the lag time in relaying information from central command to the troops, says Jason D. Rabbino, vice president of global consultancy and business development for Jane's Strategic Services Group, which advises corporate clients and military organizations on defense issues.

Until recently, it was not feasible to send information direct to the individual soldiers or units because the technology needed wasn't rugged enough for military use, and was too costly.  Also, there was a risk that by sending disparate feeds collected by different reconnaissance vehicles directly to the troops, soldiers in harm's way would be saddled with information overload

Now the technology is hardened and cheap enough -- on the order of $50,000 or less for a full system that would include a receiver, transmitter, battery -- and advances in technology have led to the increased use of unmanned aerial vehicles that are designated for specific fighting groups, which cuts down on the chance of such overload while giving units a better view of their theater, Rabbino says.
Being able to marry aerial surveillance to technology which can convey pictures and global positioning location to the front lines directly -- which has only recently become feasible -- significantly improves an army's chances for success, says Dr. Roger McCarthy, chairman of Exponent Inc., a Menlo Park, Calif.-based consulting firm that often works on military projects.
"It's the worst of all possible worlds for the opposition," McCarthy says. "In a digital battlefield, once your position is known with accuracy, you're dead."

With the V-Rambo, information goes directly to the men and women in the field, reducing reaction time in some cases from 10 minutes to a few seconds, according to Beni.
"Instead of coordinating by voice with a central command, soldiers can see behind the hill and around the corner," says Beni.

Reducing the size of the receiver -- and ultimately the transmitter -- down to the size of a wristwatch was the major challenge in developing the technology, says Beni.
Now, the receiver, rechargeable battery and flexible antenna that actually receive the images over digital radio bands weighs two pounds and can be carried in a jacket pouch or vest pocket -- an important component for soldiers toting heavy weapons. 

Beni says the company hopes to reduce the combined weight to about 1.5 pounds in the near future, making them even easier for troops to handle.

Although they have kept their use of this portable communications system under wraps, the video receivers have been used by Israeli attack helicopter pilots for nearly a year and ground troops on foot and in tanks started using them more recently.

While he believes conveying surveillance data directly to the front line soldiers is important, McCarthy is leery about whether the three-inch screens can relay pictures that will be clear enough for soldiers to make out. 

The surveillance video is often being shot from 1,000 feet in the air and, McCarthy believes, may come out looking "pixilated" on such a small screen. And, he adds, using zoom optics from an unmanned plane to get a closer look might come out "jerky".

McCarthy's company also makes a portable video receiver, which has a six-inch screen.  The receivers, battery and antenna together weigh about 2.8 lbs.  The units are part of the Exponent's own surveillance and communication system, about a dozen of which are being used by U.S. troops in Iraq, according to McCarthy.

No matter the technological limitations that still linger with both video systems, troops in Iraq and Afghanistan are just beginning to use these technologies in combat situations, even though Rabbino says these systems are still largely in the prototype stage.

"Every military of size is experimenting with this kind of thing," says Rabbino.
Military users, says Beni, are interested in his V-Rambo system, but he declined to say whether the United States was one of those countries. The U.S. Marine Corps had no official comment on whether it has a similar technology already in use, or in the works. 

Other branches of the U.S. Armed Forces are already customers of the company's military search and rescue technologies. The U.S. Navy has already purchased the company's emergency location transmitters, which offers transmit the global position of lost soldiers to aid in their recovery, which the U.S. Air Force is also considering, according to a recent company release.
McCarthy says technologies such as these video systems will eventually be deployed throughout the military world. But, they won't be the magic bullet for combat. Such direct communication systems can have their downsides.

Military forces will need to be careful about managing their bandwidth as more of communications devices are being used in the field. And, more importantly, the use of short-range surveillance craft to relay reconnaissance can sometimes be spotted by enemy troops, letting them know that "they're being watched by someone fairly close," says McCarthy,

However, moving the information from a centralized location out to the edges, where action is occurring means that the military will increasingly been in the hands of the men and women in the field.
"That means your front-line troops are infinitely better informed than your generals," says McCarthy.

 
Just looking at that soldier reminds me of an article on a USMC high-technology exercise in an Urban environment - the article was titled "They died looking at their monitors".  Apparently, there was a high amount of soldiers being picked off while they were dicking around with whatever input device they had.

Perhaps the "filter" is there for a reason - to save the guy on the sharp end from an overload of information when he should be paying attention to the common-dog tricks.  ???

That's what the Luddite in me is saying, anyways.... ;)
 
I think we had this conversation in the past Inf. where I stated I don't like it as it may cause info over load and cause casualties while taking in the info.
Our brain only work's so fast and that depends on the Operater. ;)
 
In one of the discussions on updating the Stryker's capabilities I mentioned the use a system developed for the CC.  It involved a projector mounted on the CC's helmet that projected an image right into the CC's eye.  Just like the Head's Up Display for pilots, helmet mounted HUDs and the Monocle based system for the Apache drivers.  See the info and the world around you.  It just requires a change in mental focus,  no hands, no heads up heads down.

The soldier in the picture could be moving down the street, head up, eyes open, both hands on his weapon and still getting the view from the UAV.
 
One fear that I have, is not new technology, but the possibility of troops becoming ineffective due to "Information overload".  In your example of the CC driving down the street and also maintaining contact with a UAV, there is the possibilities of his being distracted from one or another of the tasks he is performing.  Gunnery, Comms, Navigation, Crew Supervision and now monitoring video from a UAV may be TOO much information simultaneously.
 
I suspect the current use of the system is for the section commander to look in on his monitor prior to crossing a piece of dangerous ground, rather than staying plugged into the system all the time. On a convoy, there might be a designated observer watching the monitor, in addition to the troops covering their arcs. Really, this is giving the section access to a mechanical scout to look one bound ahead.
 
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/Commentary/com-3_19_05_MK.html

This one is must reading

March 19, 2005
Army, Marines Need Priority in Rumsfeld's New Defense Review
By Mort Kondracke

Which is why, in Scales' view, Rumsfeld should upgrade America's tactical capabilities, with more combat troops and equipment such as new combat vehicles, aircraft to carry them and unmanned drone planes to provide pictures of the combat environment, even in cities.

Combat troops also need better communications and body armor, a new infantry weapon and munitions that will detonate above hidden enemy fighters and knock down the walls they hide behind.

But just as important, Scales says, soldiers need better training, both military and cultural. As demonstrated by the recent mistaken shooting of an Italian journalist at a Baghdad checkpoint, he said, "tactical decisions made by sergeants and lieutenants can have as much strategic importance as those made by generals and admirals.

"Every American soldier should receive cultural and language instruction," he said. "Not to make him a linguist, but to make him a diplomat in uniform" who can deal with civilians and gather intelligence.

Robert Scales admits he's biased. He's a ground soldier. He won a Silver Star as a 24-year-old artillery captain at "Hamburger Hill" in Vietnam. He commanded ground troops, and the Army War College, before retiring as a major general.

He's a ground-combat theoretician with a Ph.D. in history and five books to his credit, including a well-reviewed new one, "The Iraq War: A Military History." He wrote his doctoral dissertation on the 19th century British Army because he believed, in 1976, that America's future wars would be close-combat encounters like Vietnam, not all-forces strategic conflicts like World War II or a World War III with the Soviet Union or China.


 
He wrote his doctoral dissertation on the 19th century British Army because he believed, in 1976, that America's future wars would be close-combat encounters like Vietnam, not all-forces strategic conflicts like World War II or a World War III with the Soviet Union or China.

Interesting. In Robert Kaplan's book "An Empire Wilderness", he claims the US Army's institutional view of itself is founded on the experience of the "Indian Wars" of the 1870s to 1890s (Chapter one: Fort Levensworth, pg 12). There are a lot of similarities between these experiences, but probably a lot of very signifigent differences as well.
 
pbi said:
Let's not get carried away here. As far as I can tell, these guys are approximately equivalent to a Canadian Inf Bn Recce pl. I wonder how their sniper course (4 wks) stacks up against ours, and what are the comparative skill and experience levels of the soldiers being put into LRSD vice Recce? I don't see anything at all in this article that a Cdn recce pl isn't either already doing or could easily do.

Cheers.

My brother-in-law is one of the NCOs in the 173rd and I happened upon this thread while "googling" his unit for news.  I am a civilian and I don't know anything about your Recce group, but I can tell you a little bit about him and his group.  The younger guys in his unit admittedly probably do not have a great deal of experience (at least prior to going over), but the NCOs are all highly experienced.  For example, my brother-in-law is a former army sniper who saw action in the first gulf war and Somolia.  He is ranger certified and a jump master as I believe are his fellow NCOs.  Long story short, the younger guys in the unit are just that, which is probably true for any army unit other than maybe special ops, but the NCOs, which I would think is where the real difference-maker in terms of effectiveness is going to lie, are all highly-experienced, highly-trained professionals. 
 
I am curious about any thoughts concerning the dissolution (formally at least) of the company level within battalions in favour of flexible taskings of platoon groups, the individual platoons of which might have varying levels of training and equipment optimized for different functions.  As the proliferation of networking capabilities take hold, either by design or through the influence of non-military developments, there is at least a theoretical advantage to be gained by flattening the levels in the command structure, allowing them to be more responsive to a potentially broader range of types of OPFOR as well as to a greater tendency to military actions in complex and diverse terrain environments.  What types of equipment?  What types of specialized training?  What are properly platoon functions, what mix of platoons are needed, and what ones are purely battalion functions?  What problems would be posed by ad hoc groupings of platoons?

Much of this thread has focussed on section/squad/platoon, I am curious about any thoughts concerning the company level (please excuse if some comments relate to it but I have not read them, there is a fair amount of material here).
 
The company seems to be the "basic" size of a unit since at least Roman times (a "Century" was recorded to have between 60-80 men, and was probably a 100 man unit to begin with). Mercenary "companies" in the Middle ages were also similar in size to what we think of as a company.

The addition of specialized weapons and training at the platoon and section level is what gives the modern Infantry company its flexibility, often the company commander will group platoon mortars, GPMGs or anti-tank weapons to support a particular plan. Platoon commanders can do the same with the C-9s and M-203s if they so desire (a fighting patrol, for example).

Although I don't think anyone has worked this out in great detail, I believe that changes at the section level (which is what has been mostly discussed here) will have a ripple effect upwards to the platoon and company levels as well.

Battalions might actually be the "units" getting the chop in the modular plug and play environment we are getting into, since we no longer have the organic support of the Combat Support Company, but have to get attachments from the Engineers, Artillery and Armour to do what an Infantry Battalion used to be able to do on its own.
 
I don't believe that companies will be 'dissolved' as an organizational group.  The coy level is the lowest where an actual tactical HQ can exist without being immed involved in a fire fight, for example.  The Pl comd is almost 'in the soup' right from the start and probably doesn't have more than 45 sec to come up with some plan.  The span of control is just right in an organizational sense as well. 

Logistically the company has the min no of pers for short term sustainability, as well as medical and mechs as detached.  In the legal sense, OCs handle the piddly cases the CO needn't be concerned about. 

Although we can bandy about the exact size and equipment, the company is a natural organization.  If it didn't exist it would be invented.
 
I am not disagreeing with the natural tendency for a company sized grouping as a tactical formation, but more the company becoming a task oriented structure rather than as one with a fixed structure of manpower, vehicles, equipment, and role.  To varying extent, this already is done by temporary assignments of detached platoons and support units within the battalion for a particular operation.

Historically, the greatest variation amongst infantry battalions of different armies in different eras has been in their support or specialist unit structure, suggesting the need for flexible company sized detachments on a task oriented basis.  (By extension, battalions would become task biased formations ranging from light infantry through to heavier formations with significant direct/indirect fire support, as opposed to mixing capabilities from separate regiments).  Would constant mixing and matching of platoons with different competencies and different tactical leaders and command sections present a problem?  Would their be an advantage to an infantry battalion which might have two 'companies' for one operation, and seven for the next?  Do modern communications really render distance inconsequential, but terrain and a much wider variation in OPFOR's making task orientation essential?

Primarily, what I am looking for here are some insights and tendencies here that may never had occurred to me, and not necessarily actual validity or practicality.
 
T.S. Rea - good question, and one that the US has identified.  In their light divisions (7th if it still exists) there were 7 bns (plus div sp) which in our concept would make it 2 bns short.  Conceptially it was criticized in SOF as "too light to fight".  In practice one Bn was airmobile and one motorized at a time, almost like the WW 2 US concept of 'selective motorization'.

In a high intensity environment this would be suicide.  In hindsight, the planners had built a great deal of flexibility and even redundancy to the unit.  Would 8 or 9 Bns be any more effecitve?  Or 4 or 5.

I believe the 25th Div (Platoon) was also organized uniquely - one Bde Armd, one Mech, one airmobile.  Must've been an interesting unit.
 
What I   think I found in Afghanistan was that while the company is still a needed level of command and control (not least because of the tactical and leadership experience its key members represent), we need to do more work on the tactical autonomy of platoons and even sections. I believe the Americans are now ahead of us here, if what the Army/ARNG/USMC Inf ldrs I spoke with are correct. They were regularly employing squads and platoons, including with extensive tactical groupings of other elements under the Pl or Sqd ldr's command, in a very autonomous manner. We still have the ability to do this, but we are IMHO running on fumes. We need to train Inf ldrs (NCOs as well as Offrs) to be strong, independent and decisive leaders with confidence in command. We need to teach junior soldiers to be alert, to be able to act and think on their own, and to be ready to take command in an emergency. We still have these traits to some degree but IMHO we need to do all we can to develop and strengthen them.

Another issue that arises if you start breaking up companies is that of cohesion: the coy is the last level of command at which there can be really close, almost face to face, cohesion and knowledge of others. A battalion, even the shrivelled ones we have now, is really almost too big unless you spend years together in the same battalion. I am not sure to what extent this is still happening in our Reg Inf bns.

Cheers.
 
http://www.defence.gov.au/army/lwsc/Publications/WP%20124.pdf

Interesting article that discusses the past, present and future of the Infantry Battalion in the Australian context.  The author concludes that the Infantry of the Future will have to assume many of the tasks traditionally in the SOC realm; coordinating combined arms fire in close contact with the enemy.
 
Thinking about the future; perhaps the biggest change of all would be right at the individual rifleman level. Combinations of new drugs and common sense techniques are being developed to boost the power of the human brain, soldiers may have the potential to out think potential opponents before commiting a boot to the ground. http://www.newscientist.com/channel/being-human/mg18625011.900

Physical training can be seriously enhanced as well by examining the techniques of Olympic athletes, particularly the use of performance enhancing techniques like "blood doping" (recycling blood you donated earlier to increase the volume of red blood cells) and the use of human growth hormones to promote muscle growth and promote healing, among other things. I'm sure the troops won't mind daily training regimes similar to modern pentathalon to develop strength and agility either as opposed to the "Fall in in three ranks, left turn, begin jogging".

Since we are in an environment where we have more tasks yet fewer people, finding ways to make big jumps in human potential should be on our shopping list along with the Gucci electronic kit and section/platoon/company level reorganization.
 
^Well, you're stepping into potential ethical issue here. How far would you go to develop a 'super soldier'? Genetic manipulation?

As well, you can do your best to make a super soldier, but in the end, you still end up with ONE soldier who can do only ONE task at a time.
 
RoyalHighlandFusilier said:
^Well, you're stepping into potential ethical issue here. How far would you go to develop a 'super soldier'? Genetic manipulation?

As well, you can do your best to make a super soldier, but in the end, you still end up with ONE soldier who can do only ONE task at a time.

Indeed, but the soldier who can keep doing things for 40 hr at a time without mental fogging will be able to carry out a lot more tasks than the Mk 1 Jihadi who needs to knock off for some rack every 24 hr. This entire issue needs to be thought through very carefully, but if our present society is any indicator, "doping" for enhanced performance is already an accepted practice in both sports and in the academic/business world (Ritalin abuse to enhance mental focus is thought to be growing in leaps and bounds in public and post secondary education). In one sense, performance enhancing techniques for soldiers should be a no brainer, troops on the firing line are in a life or death situation, so any advantage must be carefully considered. On the other hand, should these techniques have long term adverse effects similar to steroid abuse, then they should be given a pass.

My own opinion is that some existing techniques like blood doping that have minimal adverse effects and should be introduced for specific purposes (i.e. operational deployments) where they give our soldiers a measurable advantage over potential opponents. Other techniques to enhance mental performance should also be given careful consideration; the ability to remember 600 names is a big deal in PSOs and "three block wars" where pattern association could be the key to unravelling networks like Al Queda and its successors. The ability to deal with large volumes of data is also a burning issue, so any way to help the soldier there should also be encouraged.

Another source to look at: Radical Evolution : The Promise and Peril of Enhancing Our Minds, Our Bodies -- and What It Means to Be Human
by JOEL GARREAU. The author interviews both pro and anti sides of the coin, and comes up with 4 scenarios ranging from Heven, Muddling through (1&2) to the Island of Dr Moreau
 
a_majoor said:
My own opinion is that some existing techniques like blood doping that have minimal adverse effects and should be introduced for specific purposes (i.e. operational deployments) where they give our soldiers a measurable advantage over potential opponents. Other techniques to enhance mental performance should also be given careful consideration; the ability to remember 600 names is a big deal in PSOs and "three block wars" where pattern association could be the key to unravelling networks like Al Queda and its successors. The ability to deal with large volumes of data is also a burning issue, so any way to help the soldier there should also be encouraged.

I disagree that blood doping and drugs are a path we should go down.  Enhancing mental performance can be accomplished by education.  Pattern recognition can be taught and practiced in many ways.  Problem solving, war gaming, CMX, or even chess will do more than ritalin.  I would argue in Canada that we are well ahead of the pack.  It is pretty common for soldiers to have at least some post secondary education.  That would probably be rare even in most NATO countries let alone our likely enemies.  If we need a pte/cpl to unravel an Al Queda network in his head, we are in big trouble.  Computers are employed to handle large volumes of data, and it won't be long before every commander could access that information from their vehicle.

I would be very leery of the risks of performance enhancing drugs over any benefits.  Unnaturally increased blood volume (doping) combined with increased heart rate (combat) seems to be playing with fire and heart attacks.  Maybe there is an MO in the forum who can answer that.

40 hours without sleep is no big thing as anyone who has done a combat arms leadership course can tell you.

Train harder and fight smarter.


 
Back
Top