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Inf Cbt Sp - Which Capability is MOST needed again (split from CASW)

Jim Seggie said:
Back a number of years ago, PRes regiments were tasked with Cbt Sp roles...The Royal Regina Regiment (The Johns) were the 81 mm Mortar dudes who, in event of war, would man some tubes for Reg Force bns (In theory anyways) I believe the Royal Winnipeg Rifles were anti-tank dudes.
Thoughts?

Yup, when I joined up in the 1970's Seaforths were Mortars, Westies had the 106mm etc. Later on  saw Recce in RNLDR, 81mm in the PLF in the 1980's and then again in the 1990's 81's the 48th in Toronto etc etc. 3 RCR Mortar Platoon on Reforger in 1980 had 7 trained militia augmentees in it. It wasn't broke and didn't need fixing.
 
Jim Seggie said:
Back a number of years ago, PRes regiments were tasked with Cbt Sp roles...The Royal Regina Regiment (The Johns) were the 81 mm Mortar dudes who, in event of war, would man some tubes for Reg Force bns (In theory anyways) I believe the Royal Winnipeg Rifles were anti-tank dudes.
Thoughts?
My old regiment, Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment (out of Ontario) had a "mortar platoon".  Other units had other tasks, such as The Toronto Scottish had Anti Tank, I believe.  (I recall seeing them with their 106 recoilless rifles on jeeps, and I immediately wanted to take my 18 year old self and rebadge to their "desert rats"  ;D )

As a concept for force employment and force generation, I would see things thus:
Each Reg Force Inf Bn would have a fully manned BHQ, 3 x Rifle Coys, a partially manned Cbt Sp Coy and a partially manned Cbt Svc Sp Coy.  We can do this if we had only six battalions.

For force employment on overseas operations, each Bn would field four companies.  Reserve areas affiliated with each CMBG would be tasked to force generate that fourth company, as well as to top up the combat support and combat service support companies.  How exactly that relationship would work would need to be worked out, of course, but the main political fight would be to reduce the battalions in number from 9 to 6.
 
GhostofJacK said:
He also noted the importance of the .50Cal HMG. The TB would not think much of 5.56mm fire. When the C6/7.62mm MG came out, they would concentrate on the gunner's location. When the .50 came out, they would bug off. Evidentally, I am told that they really do not like the .50 IRT its range, stopping power, and sound.
Is this a call for more wide-spread use of the .50 cal?
 
MCG said:
Is this a call for more wide-spread use of the .50 cal?

There in lies the role for PRes Infantry - HMG gunners.

Have we reinvented yet another wheel - the resurrection of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps?

Whose idea was it to divest ourselves of that awesome weapon?
 
Jim Seggie said:
There in lies the role for PRes Infantry - HMG gunners.

Have we reinvented yet another wheel - the resurrection of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps?

Whose idea was it to divest ourselves of that awesome weapon?

HMG/GMG Gunners in the PRes?  With a really low-tech weapons carrier for domestic usage?
 
Kirkhill said:
HMG/GMG Gunners in the PRes?  With a really low-tech weapons carrier for domestic usage?

I think we had one once 8)

1245801711_fuRD7-L.jpg
 
Where the weapon (HMG) is mounted really depends on the battle you're in - is it defensive? Offensive?

I've fired them from the tripod, the M113 and the AA mount. A properly headspaced and timed .50 is a sweet thing to listen to....if you are on the giving end.

Just one case of where it is better to give than receive. ;)

 
Jim I agree  and while I was joking with the jeep picture or the tracked varient here
carrier21.jpg
I wa only partually so. Any small utility vehicle could be used to tranport the weapon, crew and ammo around, in a domsetic or othe rlow intensity situation same as the old 1 tons were used to carry the mortar in non mech units.

Techno, when I took over as A Coy CSM in the Torscots the Coy rooms in Fort York still had the "tie down" bolts for the 106mm in the floor. After tripping over them enough times I found a working party with sledges to get rid of them as I knew the 106's were never coming back. I tried to get as many troops on either the MG course or Inf Recce in those days for their mandatory TQ2/QL4 despite the bean counters up at Dennison suggesting that Driver Wheeled and Comms were sufficient and easier to run. Of course that served the unofficial idea pre end of the Cold War that the "molitia augmentees" should be drivers and joe job types that unfortunatley existed in some mindsets,  both Regular and Reservists.

A Cbt support company of reservists paired to a regular Bn could be doable but I still think each having their own would be better. Besides I get a nice lucrative civvy consultant contract coming back to teach 81mm and .50 cal at the school right?  8)
 
Danjanou said:
Besides I get a nice lucrative civvy consultant contract coming back to teach 81mm and .50 cal at the school right?  8)

Ummm make that TWO civvy consultants. :nod: :camo: :camo: ;)
 
Danjanou said:
I think we had one once 8)

1245801711_fuRD7-L.jpg

Exactly what I had in mind Danjanou.....but equally the old Bren Carrier or any other "Technical".  The primary function of the vehicle is to get the gun, 2 men and a useable amount of ammo to a site where it can be dug in.

The pintle mount is strictly an expedient device to assist in convoy defence while the vehicle is on the move.  It is not anticipated that any but the "bravest of the brave" will be joining Troy leaping sand dunes with the Rat Patrol.  ;D
 
GhostofJacK said:
He concluded by showing me that in each section, there should be a designated marksman that is capable of touching out to 800m. These gentlemen would be a good shot but not have to worry about the stalking, hiding, or recce aspects of being a sniper. Evidentally the Americans are going back to using the M14 in this role (and developing upgrades to it too). The British are doing the same. The problem with our C7 rifle is that it's effective range is only 300m. Throw in a C9 and you got 600m. The Dragunov is engaging us at 800m with the PKM at similar ranges. They would engage us, take us to ground, and we could not do anything effective until the Pl C6 came in. At least with a designated marksman, we could have one guy putting rounds down the range in an effort to push the enemy back or hunker them down until heavier fire came in.

I think that the Infantry Corps has embraced this concept. Although I have not heard any solid doctrine hammered out I do know that the the procurement machine is looking to replace the AR-10T and procure 272 semi-automatic sniper system (SAWS) rifles (7.62 mm) by competitive procurement and LFTEU testing no later than 2013.  It is my impression that these are to be used in the designated marksman role at least in the interim.

I also saw a footnote in the Small Arms Modernization (SAM) project that a sharp shooter capability is being addressed  This is one of the eleven capabilities being addressed by this project which is supposed to be completed by 2019.  I am not sure if the SAWS procurement above is in support of this project (or if the eight lines in the Sniper System project is a separate deal altogether), but if it is... it looks like the SAWS was at the front end of the eleven items in this project. 

MC

 
Since we're going back to the "old" way of doing things....how about we get some tripods for those GAU 21s, a C2 Sight Unit, some aiming stakes and make it a super C6 (SF) gun.
One characteristic of MG fire:

Sited in defilade to provide enfilade fire. I can imagine what one of those would do to a section of advancing infantry......
 
MCG said:
Is this a call for more wide-spread use of the .50 cal?

Maybe it is or maybe...it is! (plus mortars wouldn't hurt but that's my opinion since I am too young to have ever been in the Mortars Pl, but I full-heartedly agree with their concept of ops)
 
GhostofJacK said:
Maybe it is or maybe...it is! (plus mortars wouldn't hurt but that's my opinion since I am too young to have ever been in the Mortars Pl, but I full-heartedly agree with their concept of ops)

Lets hope so. It was the biggest mistake ever (close second is the sale of the Chinooks to the Dutch) to lose Mortars to the arty world.

Lets NOT reinvent the wheel. The orbat is there:

Coy HQ -
Mortars
Sigs
Recce
Pioneers (blowing stuff up is fun and occassionally required)
AAP - that is if The Army is willing to give the Bns an integral heavy Anti Armour capability.

This is NOT hard.

As for the HMG, those should be integral to the Rifle Platoons/Coys. We need something to bridge the gap between the C6 (SF) - which might not have enough punch at times - and the 25 mm - which might have too much.

Thoughts? Do the ANA have .50s?
 
Thucydides said:
Moving back a bit on topic, I am wondering which model is favoured:

80's style mech battalion, with a separate combat support company housing the mortars, AAP and Pioneers, or

USMC LAV/SBCT model with assets integrated at the company level.

I am a bit on the fence, since I understand the arguments for keeping assets centralized, but am also thinking of the Distributed Operations model where companies and even platoons are working far beyond the effective range of most battalion/battlegroup assets (obvious exceptions being M777 batteries or air support assets), so having assets directly integrated in the company provides immediate support.

I also realize that if we accept the DO model, there is one asset which has not been mentioned; an integral logistical support element analogous to the "admin troop" in an armoured squadron.
Jim Seggie said:
You have brought up a very good question.  I lean towards the conventional model - where the support platoons are administered by a Cbt Sp HQ - which only adminsters the platoons and does not "command" them.
Niner has the ability - through groupings and taskings - to attach elements of Cbt Sp Pls to Rifle Coys, if that is what the task calls for.

Recognizing that “military administration” is properly defined to include logistics but colloquially is often used to describe purely clerical undertakings, could somebody clarify if the presence or lack of a Cbt Sp Coy has any bearing in the logistical support of Cbt Sp Pls?  Are the platoons fed from the company which is fed from C/S 8, or do the platoons maintain some element of echelon themselves and then feed directly from C/S 8?

… in either case, there is another potential force model to consider.  The Engr have used a model that places a functionally pure Sp Tp (Hy Eqpt Tp, Engr Ress Tp, Const Tp, Armd Tp) in every Fd Sqn for force generation, but this is converted to a multi-role Sp Tp in every Fd Sqn for force employment.  Conceivably, the infantry could adopt a model of a functionally pure Cbt Sp Pl (Mortar, Hy Missile DFS, Recce) in each Rifle Coy for force generation.  For domestic & humanitarian ops, this would add a fourth Pl to each company as opposed to a fourth company in each Bn.  On operations, the Cbt Sp Pls could remain functionally pure commanded by 9er, supported by 8 and clerically administered by the “home” rifle company – or – if the estimate so concluded, they could be converted to non-homogenous Cbt Sp Pls (mixed capabilities) for DOs.

Jim Seggie said:
As for the HMG, those should be integral to the Rifle Platoons/Coys. We need something to bridge the gap between the C6 (SF) - which might not have enough punch at times - and the 25 mm - which might have too much.
Is the HMG a feasable Rifle Pl weapon?
 
Is the HMG a feasible rifle pl weapon?

Short answer - it depends. For the most part, I think it is feasible.
In a heavy mech platoon - yes, for dismtd def ops. In the "olden days" the Grizz mtd a .50 and a GPMG and the .50 was often dismtd from the turret for a def op.

Not an ideal situation - but we did it anyways.

In a light infantry context - again, that depends on the structure of the Light Infantry Bn - does it employ a Direct Fire Support Pl - ie a bunch of wheeled vehicles mounting HMGs?

As for "administration" each Cbt Sp Pl (in my day) had their own Pl WO who was in essence the CQ and he was the one, in conjunction with his storemen ensured his C/S were kept supplied with bullets, beans, fuel and water.

CQ Cbt Sp was only concerned with resup for BHQ.

3VP attempted to place Cbt Sp types in all Rifle coys in Croatia, and would gather them periodically for training. Not ideal, in fact IMO it could have been disasterous. When 2VP took over, 1 VP sent its AAP and Mor Pl over, as we had none...we were told they weren't needed.

We all know what happened in Sep 93.....right?
 
Is it just me but doesn't anyone else find it odd that we are the only army in NATO without a heavy anti tank capability? Remember Anti Armour Platoone was like the warning on cigarette packages "IDLE BUT DEADLY"!!!
 
You realize you can still edit your post, yeah? No need to get Godwin on us, thanks.

Scott
Staff
 
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