"Harper speaking to Canada's dark side?"

[vonGarvin]

Come on Rambler no one said you had to study philosophy at uni. You could have hung out with the cool guys, drinking beer and chasin' women ... oh, I forgot, that's what the philosophers did, along with a little grass. The only difference was they were usually too pissed or stoned to actually catch the women. 

Given that I was subject to the code of service discipline at the time, I refrained from the grass  :stars:

 

[George Wallace]

....... Trudeau went from absolutely wanting out of NATO, to viewing NATO as a necessary evil in order for him to acheive other political aims.  Though he did do his absolute best to destroy what was once widely viewed as the best NATO force in Europe prior to 1969.  Sadly he succeeded.

Actually, it was Mulroney who accomplished that feat.

 

[Kirkhill]

It is impossible for a utilitarian to be a socialist because

So, what then are we to make of this creature:  The Fabian Benthamite referenced in the accompanying article from 2006 (somewhat prescient given the current situation)

Or is that merely a label of convenience....like progressive conservative or national socialist or christian democrat?

At the time of writing, the most likely trigger for a
dollar collapse would be a collapse—or perhaps just stagnation—
of the U.S. housing market. This would hit the
dollar in several different ways. Much of the inflow of
short-term and central banking funds to the United States
is predicated on the assumption that the United States will
continue to be a rapidly growing economy. Afew quarters
in which U.S. GDP grows slowly or even falls could easily
deter many fund holders who are incurable
short-term operators. There would be other
effects as well. A housing setback would be
likely to trigger a setback to U.S. consumer
spending. This would make the Fed pause or
even reverse its present policy of gradually inching
higher on short-term interest rates. Well
before he became Fed chairman, Professor Ben
Bernanke insisted that the Fed could stop a
deflationary spiral, but the means of doing so—
involving cheaper money and even helping to
fund the Federal Budget—would put further
downward pressure on the dollar.
So both the immediate economic prospects
and the behavior of international interest rate
differentials would be bearish for the dollar. And
even without the Fed and U.S. Treasury doing
anything very special, the bond market would
decline and both real and nominal long-term
interest rates rise, thus contributing further to the recessionary
impact. Nevertheless, the results for the U.S. economy
need not be entirely adverse. The whole scenario starts
with the weakening of the domestic economy. In these circumstances,
the depreciation of the dollar would provide an
offsetting external stimulus. But it does mean that the U.S.
economy could not continue growing each quarter at an
annualized 3 to 4 percent rate. A major shift of resources
from supplying domestic demand of consumers to supplying
external markets or providing import substitutes could
not take place without some dislocation and a domestic
slowdown.

If the Dollar Collapsed…
One result could be an offsetting boost
given to demand in the euro area and in
Asia. At the other extreme, the United
States would be accused of deliberately
weakening its own currency for domestic
political reasons; and politicians like
President Chirac of France—if still in
office—would be amenable to ideas for
retaliation, whether raising protectionist barriers,
attempts at competitive devaluation,
or ill-conceived taxes on international capital
movements.

If the world is experiencing excess
demand, as the pressure on oil and
commodity markets and the abundance
of credit suggest, a modest recessionary
movement in the United States might be
just what the doctor ordered.

How severe that would be would depend partly on
developments in the rest of the world. According to the
Fabian Benthamite view of government, in which so many
international economists still believe, instead of retaliation,
an offsetting boost would be given to demand in the euro
area and in Asia. At the other extreme the United States
would be accused of deliberately weakening its own currency
for domestic political reasons; and politicians like
President Chirac of France—if still in office—would be
amenable to ideas for retaliation, whether raising protectionist
barriers, attempts at competitive devaluation, or illconceived
taxes on international capital movements.

More likely than either of these extremes is that dollar
depreciation might come at a time when the rest of the
world is still enjoying an economic upsurge along the lines
predicted by the International Monetary Fund, the OECD,
and similar organizations. In that case it would not be such
a tragedy if Europe or Asia failed to take offsetting demand
boosting measures. Indeed, if the world is experiencing
excess demand, as the pressure on oil and commodity markets
and the abundance of credit suggest, a modest recessionary
movement in the United States might be just what
the doctor ordered.

 

[Old Sweat]

Okay, I get it know.

It's okay for the likes of Kaplan and Kennedy (I'm resisting the impuse to add another well know Liberal commentator with a name beginning with K to the list so I could call them KKK) to produce such spittle-splattered balderdash disguised as opinion. However if anyone right of Lloyd Axworthy makes a comment even mildy critical of the left, it's interpreted as a mean-spirited, knuckle dragging assault on the very foundations of Western Civilization. 

 

[vonGarvin]

Actually, it was Mulroney who accomplished that feat.

Partially correct.  It was under Mulroney that our forces overseas were manned to 100% strength, going from 3 in place companies per battalion, plus one flyover, to four in place.  Same with the tanks, arty, etc.  Anyway, of course, after the "fall of the wall", it was under Mulroney that we faced the first of the slashings.  Naturally, Mr Chretien et al carried that on, until things started coming around under Mr. Martin, and followed up (in spades) by Mr. Harper.

Anyway, back on target. 

Leftists are hypocrites.

>

 

[Edward Campbell]

Actually, it was Mulroney who accomplished that feat.

No, Mulroney just put the poor, tired, crippled old beast out of its misery.

The damage, all the damage, was done in the 1970 White Paper - perhaps the greatest act of policy vandalism in our history.

 

[Kirkhill]

Re Caplan:

Replace Obama with Bush and Left with Right and I am sure that I have heard that diatribe before.  Gawd help us all.

 

[ltmaverick25]

Actually, it was Mulroney who accomplished that feat.

Mulroney brought the troops home, but he did not destroy their fighting capacity, that had already been done by Trudeau.  Prior to Trudeau our forces stationed in Germany numbered close to 20,000 at one point, and as I said, were generally regarded as the best formation on the front.  Even when cutbacks would occur back home, every effort was made to ensure that the troops in NATO had the best (that Canada could offer anyway) and their manning was always maintained.

In fact, Trudeau even went so far as to remove our Tank force completely, and give the troops a non front line role.  This was reversed later in the 70s when Canada purchased Tanks from Germany, but this was around the same time Trudeau realized he needed to maintain some sort of token presence and membership in NATO to achieve other political goals.

Perhaps the only correct thing he did do was to remove the nuclear weapons from Troops in Germany, as that total concept was flawed from the very beginning.

Mulroney on the other hand had originally come out with the 1987 defence white paper that would have dramatically increased the size and scope of the CF.  Even going so far as to acquire nuclear submarines.  However, by implementation time in the 90s, the deficit and the economy were in the crappers and the cold war had just come to an end.  It was no longer possible for any politician to maintain the original intent.

 

[Edward Campbell]

...
In fact, Trudeau even went so far as to remove our Tank force completely, and give the troops a non front line role.  This was reversed later in the 70s when Canada purchased Tanks from Germany, but this was around the same time Trudeau realized he needed to maintain some sort of token presence and membership in NATO to achieve other political goals.
...

Not quite. The role was changed from "front line" as a formation within 1 BR Corps to that of a CENTAG reserve formation. In the highly unlikely event that the Warsaw Pact leaders lost what minds they had and decided to attack the hills and valleys of South Germany (to go where? Trier?) then the Canadians would have been, very much in the front lines. And the Canadian Army formation (4CMBG) took its old but servicable Centurian tanks to Lahr - they were, eventually replaced by Leopard 1 tanks.

...
Perhaps the only correct thing he did do was to remove the nuclear weapons from Troops in Germany, as that total concept was flawed from the very beginning.
...

How so? How, other than by using tactical nucs (lots of 'em), would you have beaten the Warsaw Pact? We, whoever showed up to fight on the North German Plain, were going to be badly outnumbered and outgunned. I am happy to stipulate that the Russian Army consisted, largely, of huge masses of unhappy, ill trained, vodka soaked conscripts but, while we won the quality vs quantity contest, Sen Sam Nunn used to say something like, "When talking about the Russians quantity has a quality all its own." Nucs worked.

...
Mulroney on the other hand had originally come out with the 1987 defence white paper that would have dramatically increased the size and scope of the CF.  Even going so far as to acquire nuclear submarines.  However, by implementation time in the 90s, the deficit and the economy were in the crappers and the cold war had just come to an end.  It was no longer possible for any politician to maintain the original intent.

The Mulroney White Paper, the one with the nuclear submarines, was ill conceived, unnecessary, financially unsound rubbish. It was written by a team of Tory party hacks in the RCMI in Toronto and tossed towards NDHQ where it was laughed out of the building. Totally amateur hour stuff.

 

[Old Sweat]

I cannot speak about the Air Division which at one time in the 1950s provided the bulk of NATO's fighter force in central Europe. However I can speak with some accuracy about 4 CIBG, later 4 CMBG, in the mid to late sixties. It was a large formation with a strength of 6087, not counting the several hundred Brits attached for operations. In ability and effectiveness it ranked with the CEF in 1918 in relation to our British Allies.

And we had nukes and would have used them, if the proper releases came down the system. I know a bit about how the release worked but shall not discuss it here or by PM. Suffice to say, the employment of tactical nuclear weapons was the basis of our tactics, and of NATO's concept of operations for quite a long while.

 

[ltmaverick25]

The problem with the nuclear weapons strategy was that it was meant more to be a deterrence then anything else.  As you state, we were badly outnumbered and the role of the nukes was to break up massive Soviet armoured formations.  But, the chief principle of this policy was that a nuclear engagement in Europe could be limited to Europe.  Meaning, that both sides would restrict themselves to tactical nukes, and not use the strategic missiles.  I believe that strategy was ludicrous.  Any use of nuclear weapons by either side would have easily escalated.

That is why, I say that the policy was ill conceived.

As for the white paper being garbage.  Thats possible.  But it is evidence that suggests that the Mulroney government was, for a time, interested in increasing our military capabilities.  That stands in stark contrast to Trudeau's mentality.

 

[ltmaverick25]

Suffice to say, the employment of tactical nuclear weapons was the basis of our tactics, and of NATO's concept of operations for quite a long while.

Agreed, my point was, this concept of operations was flawed.  This is perhaps, the only item of defence policy from the Trudeau era that I support.  The rest, not so much.

 

[George Wallace]

No, Mulroney just put the poor, tired, crippled old beast out of its misery.

The damage, all the damage, was done in the 1970 White Paper - perhaps the greatest act of policy vandalism in our history.

Although the 1970 White Paper was out, there was minor increases in 4 CMBG throughout the 1980's; new equipment, new infrastructure, increased troop commitment.  Mulroney cut all that after great expense was put into the forces there.  Brand new equipment was sold off at fire sale prices.  Brand new hospital was "donated" to the city.  Brand new Air Defence facilities were sold off. 

No.  I strongly disagree that it was solely the result of the 1970 White Paper.  Don't forget there was several kicks at the cat after 1970. 

I do agree that Trudeau was next to the anti-Christ when it came to the CF and DND, but Mulroney wasn't too far off as well.  Chretien was just a bumbling fool who thought that if he took no action, the problems would disappear on their own.

 

[Edward Campbell]

I don’t think there is much of anything beyond fond memories to support your analysis, George. Of course there were upgrades to CFE (Lahr and Baden infrastructure and new equipment for the units therein). The decisions, there were several – related to finance, foreign policy and so on - that led to the close out were made in, relatively, rapid succession. Until they were taken some attention was paid to CFE and some money was spent, albeit reluctantly - because money was scarce all over the DND/CF.

The only kicks at the can that would have mattered, even a wee tiny bit, in foreign policy terms, would have involved quantitive improvements in CFE – more soldiers with more guns and/or more aircraft. That was the only real “message” for which the rest of NATO was waiting. It never came, not under Trudeau and not under Mulroney.

I hold no brief for Mulroney on military/defence policy, except that he appeared to understand that defence policy can be an effective tool in the larger national policy arena. Chrétien was more than just a bumbling fool. He played the buffoon – very well – but he had a defence policy which was summed up in the infamous “boy scouts” quip. While Mulroney understood using defence policy to advance other policy issues, Chrétien saw it as a way to advance his partisan domestic agenda: by cutting the defence budget.

Nothing, beyond killing the tired old cripple, in CFE mattered a damn from 1970 onwards. Nothing wrong with the people; they were doing the job given – just as they are doing it now all around the world. The “wrong” was rooted in a single act of policy vandalism – essentially an act of childish pique. All that came after was inertia.

 

[Old Sweat]

Part of the "master plan" in the 1970 White Paper never came to fruition. Originally 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group was re-titled 4 Canadian Mechanized Battle Group. The reduction in size and move of the brigade group was touted as the first step in a planned and phased reduction. I suspect the real plan was to close out our force in Europe by the mid-seventies.

The CDS of the time, General JV Allard, went on record that 4 CMBG was going to be converted into an airmobile force and he went so far as to claim that it would be the best-equipped heliborne force in the world. (I don't recall any serious projects to procure a family of helicopters in a scale that would lift even a battalion at the time.) We came close to replacing our Centurions with Scorpion armoured reconnaissance vehicles. The project was cancelled when the British would not licence the production of 76mm ammunition in Canada. Our M109s were also put up for sale, but this was blocked by the gunners holding out for a confirmed purchase of its replacement.

The conversion/reduction of 1 Air Division into 1 Canadian Air Group was at least as great a travesty. Our three wings with a real operational role became three squadrons neither equipped nor trained for its new ground attack role.

And since I am getting worked up about this pile of crap disguised as Defence Policy, let me close with a few words on the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable Combat Group. This was designed to compensate for our abandonment of the Central Front. It saw a brigade to be sent to North Norway in the event of war. The troops saw it for what it was very quickly. After a visit to Petawawa my boss asked me what the word on the street was about this new and exciting commitment. When I told him they called it Hong Kong Mark II, I thought he was going to cry.

 

[Edward Campbell]

I think you are correct, Old Sweat – in your last few posts - on what Trudeau wanted to do.

He was fairly new to power in 1969 and I suspect that he was having some trouble adjusting to the realities of cabinet government. His “base” in the Liberal Party was, essentially, built on his own personal charisma and his undoubted ability to win votes based on that charisma. But he did not have a loyal political base – that belonged to people like Turner and Paul Martin Sr.

We can be about 99.99% certain that he faced far more opposition than he ever expected from his cabinet – a few members of which went back to St Laurent’s time – and from the bureaucracy.

My impression is that his “management” was a bit rocky until 1975. I think Roberston fought him, hard on some (many?) issues, including NATO (Roberston, p. 266).

The biggest problem, for me, with the 1968/70 foreign and defence policy reviews and White Papers, was the totally inadequate scope. I stick with my description of them is being written in a fit of childish pique. Trudeau and Head were both sophomoric anti-Americans. They shared a distaste for nationalism and they saw post war American nationalism in roughly the same light as pre war German nationalism – a very, very strange view that just goes to prove that a first rate education (Harvard, Ecole des sciences politiques and the London School of Economics) cannot make one smart. The foreign policy White Paper (released in six colourful little booklets) totally ignored the USA and our relations with it and was, therefore, absolutely, completely worthless. It was, at best, intellectual masturbation by a couple of juvenile delinquents.

There was an argument for reconsidering our defence policy. But, according to my recollections, there was nothing in the review that could have led one to conclude that withdrawing, even partially, for our commitments to NATO should be one of the outcomes. Some civil servants and military officers did make a coherent case for leaving the central front (AFCENT)and providing a large, combat ready, force to, indeed IN, Northern European Command (AFNOR) but the increased costs – all those additional aircraft (fixed and rotary wing) – didn’t seem, as I understand what I recall several decades after reading the bumph, to be justified by any significant increase in our international profile.

I don’t think Trudeau was a communist, not even a communist sympathizer. I do think he was an idealistic internationalist who saw, almost eye-to-eye with Castro, Nasser, Nehru and so on. He felt like a oppressed colonial and so he felt most comfortable amongst those with some reasonable claim to that status. His “friends” took anti-Americanism to new heights/depths (take your pick) and he followed, almost joyfully.

One final factor: money. In the ‘60s there was a huge escalation in the costs of military hardware – based, largely, on technological advances made in the ‘40s and ‘50s. Look at the “cost” of a circa 1965 mechanized infantry battalion or SP artillery regiment vs. their 1945, 50 and 55 counterparts. The day-by-day running/maintenance cost of a Centurion was far higher than had been the case for a Korea era Sherman and a CF-101 Voddoo and CF-104 Starfighter was going to cost more to buy and fly than the existing fleets of Canuck or Sabre aircraft. Too few admirals and generals and almost no bureaucrats were ready and able to deal with the rapid inflation of military costs – that was, in fact, the primary “driver” behind Mr. Hellyer’s experiments in the ‘60s. 

 

[ltmaverick25]

Again, there need not be any suspicion about what Trudeau's original objectives were with reference to NATO.  He wanted to pull ALL of the troops out of Europe, however, it was decided not to pursue with that course of action "at this time" 1969 that is, due to other political considerations.

This is all well documented in the Cabinet Conclusions.  For those that dint know, Cabinet Conclusions are a secretary's notes of all cabinet meetings.  Recently they became available online through the national archives website.  All conclusions all the way up to 1976 are available, so its extremely easy to see exactly what the liberals wanted to do, how they came to certain decisions, and the factors they considered.

When I get more time I will post some links to this material so those of you who may be interested can peruse them.

 

[MarkOttawa]

A Postdate to the start of this thread:

Who's fighting terrorists? Or, delusional punditry, Part II
http://dustmybroom.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12364:whos-fighting-terrorists-or-delusional-punditry-part-ii&catid=49:terrorism

Mark
Ottawa

 

[ltmaverick25]

I wonder if his "war on terror" comment was intended, or if it was a slip up.  I think the reality for us right now is that its both.  There is still a war on terror going on, simultaneous to COIN ops.  The COIN ups being the facilitator to the ultimate end game; winning the war on terror.

 

[Long Sword]

Janice Kennedy connecting American politics (from the 60s) to Stephen Harper highlights the craziest habit of Canada's left: they are the quickest to denounce any American influence in the country yet are the quickest to be influenced by America.