Michael Dorosh said:
I don't think employing an entire division really counts as being an "augmentee".
And I wonder if a Canadian Division serving in North Africa for a year would have suffered any worse than the 2nd Division did at Dieppe in nine hours?
I agree that a division wouldn't count in that defintion, but one must remember that between September 1st and 20th 1939 there were no guarantees that the division would even stay together or be under Canadian command.
" ..... The first sign of difficulties arose over his insistence that Canadian forces had to serve under Canadian command. Having watched Arthur Currie resist British attempts to feed the original Cdn. Corps into battle division by division, McNaughton never let his British counterparts forget that he was the commander of a national army, not a colonial force under their control.
Reviewing these political disputes with Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, it is difficult not to have considerable sympathy for the Canadian general. McNaughton had a constitutional duty and a personal commitment to the autonomy of the Canadian Army while Brooke wanted to control all Commonwealth forces as if they were British units. Australia, New Zealand and South Africa accepted British direction, why were the Canadians so difficult?
The problem was compounded by the British belief that they knew and understood modern war. Brooke believed Canadian formations ought to be commanded by British generals particularly if British units might serve with them. This was not an argument that held much appeal for Canadians, or for the Americans when their turn came. The British Army had after all failed at virtually every task it undertook from 1940 to the Battle of El Alamein and it was not obvious why anyone should believe that British generals held the key to success on the battlefield.'' McNaughton also insisted on expressing his own views about the best strategy for winning the war. He made no secret of his support for the direct approach to liberating Europe that was favored by generals George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower, but strongly opposed by the British military. When McNaughton agreed, at Churchill's invitation, to re-examine the Jupiter schemeâ “a projected invasion of Norway which the British generals had already rejectedâ “he created further resentment, even though his report concluded that the plan was too hazardous.
The Chief of the Imperial General Staff was not the only powerful individual to clash with McNaughton. He found himself at odds with Ralston, a distinguished WW I veteran who had commanded an infantry battalion at Vimy Ridge. From McNaughton's perspective, Ralston was prone to interfere in matters that ought to be left to the responsible officers. Ralston, McNaughton insisted, should stick to policy and leave the details to the professional head of Canada's overseas army. Again, it is hard to disagree with McNaughton. Ralston, a man of great ability, was respected for his commitment to the army but was notorious for his inability to delegate authority. Canadians concerned with the current debate over civilian versus military control of the Armed Forces would find much that is familiar in the Ralston/McNaughton conflict. .... "
http://www.legionmagazine.com/features/canadianmilitaryhistory/97-05.asp