F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)

[CougarKing]

Don't we still have some CF-5 FreedomFighters still in long term storage? Or did we manage to pawn them off to a third world nation?

Botswana.

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[Rifleman62]

What are the credentials of the authors, Yan Cimon & Simon Vérronneau in that they would have the experience/knowledge base to write an article on defence matters?

 

[Transporter]

What are the credentials of the authors, Yan Cimon & Simon Vérronneau in that they would have the experience/knowledge base to write an article on defence matters?

They have a computer with internet connection.

 

[dapaterson]

Years ago I casually knew Yan, when he was a young signals officer.

 

[larry Strong]

Wasn't there a ban on exporting the F-22?


Larry

 

[jonsey]

Wasn't there a ban on exporting the F-22?


Larry

Yep
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_Martin_F-22_Raptor#Ban_on_exports

 

[eliminator]

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/f22-raptors-to-japan-01909/

 

[Rifleman62]

From the G & M 11 Aug 14

Why Canada needs a competitive process to choose a fighter jet

C.S. Sullivan

Contributed to The Globe and Mail

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/why-canada-needs-a-competitive-process-to-choose-a-fighter-jet/article19985970/

C.S. Sullivan is a former general officer and fighter pilot, has served in senior command and leadership positions in the Canadian Forces, NATO and NORAD, and commanded international combat operations in Afghanistan.


In late 2008, the Royal Canadian Air Force briefed me on its efforts to identify a replacement for Canada’s aging CF-18 fleet. As the former director-general of Capability Development at DND and defence advisor to the Prime Minister’s Privy Council Office, I was surprised to learn that the Air Force was recommending the sole source acquisition of the F-35.

Most alarming was that this internal Air Force decision had been taken without a “Statement of Requirement”, without a competitive process, and, as I was to learn later, with no clear understanding of program costs or the aircraft’s final operational capability. Although concerned, I departed for Afghanistan for duty as NATO’s Air Component Commander, comforted in knowing that the Government would not approve the largest military procurement program in Canadian history without an open and thorough competitive process.

As we have learned, the exact opposite occurred. The Air Force’s internal decision to sole-source the F-35 was embraced by the minister of defence and endorsed by the government, knowing that there had been no competitive process. To the relief of many, the Auditor-General created the opportunity for the Government to reconsider its F-35 decision.

Canada’s strategic military planners use a capability-based methodology, not the U.S.-styled threat-based approach, to identify future military capabilities and equipment. Recognizing that Canada’s military “can’t do everything”, a capability-based approach allows planners to focus on defence and security scenarios that are most relevant and most likely for Canadian foreign and defence policy goals and objectives. The U.S. threat-based approach focuses on worst-case scenarios and threats that, no matter how unlikely such scenarios might be, are unavoidable for the world’s preeminent global superpower. Countries that have purchased the F-35 have non-discretionary defence missions far different than Canada.

For this reason, Lockheed-Martin designed the F-35 to be a stealthy strike fighter with the ability to carrying out pre-emptive and retaliatory strikes against China and Russia. Although assessed as highly unlikely that Canada would participate in these types of “discretionary” combat missions, it was this type of threat-based scenario that Canada’s Air Force surprisingly used to justify its selection of the F-35.

To identify the most suitable fighter aircraft requires an open and transparent competitive process. Only a competition can rigorously measure the capabilities of each competing aircraft against Canada’s non-discretionary defence mission requirements. Non-discretionary missions are those related to domestic security operations, air sovereignty missions across Canada’s high Arctic, homeland defence operations, and continental defence and security. Non-discretionary missions define the mandatory requirements that need to guide the selection of Canada’s next fighter aircraft.

Three of the four contenders – Boeing’s Super Hornet, Dassault’s Rafale, and Eurofighter’s Typhoon – meet and, in many cases, exceed the mandatory requirements of Canada’s non-discretionary missions. Surprisingly, Lockheed Martin’s F-35 would not fare as well given its most notable deficiencies: air refueling capability incompatible with Canada’s tanker fleet; no tail-hook for landings on icy runways and in the high Arctic; and a single-engine aircraft with limited range and payload. Losing an engine on a twin-engine fighter is a non-event. An engine failure on a single-engine fighter is catastrophic.

As F-35 users in the U.S., Australia and the U.K. have confessed – but seemingly not to Canada – the narrowly-focused strike capability of the F-35 will require close integration with other air superiority and multi-role fighters for decades to come. A mixed fleet approach is required to address the narrowly-focused capabilities of the F-35, which are capabilities that are not a good fit for Canada’s non-discretionary missions.

If the government of Canada is interested in selecting the most appropriate fighter aircraft to meet Canada’s defence needs, then the rigour of a competitive process seems to be the only way forward.

 

[MarkOttawa]

Aviation Week and Space Technology:

Editorial: JSF Program Has Some Explaining To Do [engine]
http://aviationweek.com/defense/editorial-jsf-program-has-some-explaining-do

Defense News:

Further Restrictions Lifted for F-35 Test Fleet; Army Awarded Contract
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140813/DEFREG02/308130024

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Transporter]

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/careers/career-advice/life-at-work/i-want-to-be-a-fighter-jet-test-pilot-what-will-my-salary-be/article20010818/

Billie Flynn, current F35 test pilot, former CF18 Sqn CO, and an old boss of mine. Best quote "I have the coolest job on the face of the planet”. The "on the face of the planet" bit is significant... his wife is astronaut Julie Payette... they do ok.

 

[Loachman]

From the G & M 11 Aug 14

Why Canada needs a competitive process to choose a fighter jet

C.S. Sullivan

Contributed to The Globe and Mail

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/why-canada-needs-a-competitive-process-to-choose-a-fighter-jet/article19985970/

C.S. Sullivan is a former general officer and fighter pilot, has served in senior command and leadership positions in the Canadian Forces, NATO and NORAD, and commanded international combat operations in Afghanistan.

"Duff" Sullivan was one of my instructors in Moose Jaw. He was flying CF18s in Baden while I was stationed in Lahr from 1986 to 1989. I last saw him - a very pleasant surprise - in KAF on my first tour there. I have considerable respect for him.

I have also been aware of his objections to F35 for quite a while, and do not understand what is driving them.

I can accept that some will lack faith in a single engine, regardless of statistical indications that there is no increased risk, but I am also aware of engine failures on twin-engine fighters that resulted in loss of the aircraft, including a CF18 at an airshow a few years ago. Again, I do not see a lot of US Navy or Marine Pilots lining up in the press to slag the much-hyped "lack" of a second engine, or complaining about lack of range. I've also not seen any indication of any significant problems with F16 due to its single-engineness.

I also cannot understand the media obsession, now raised here by an experienced and high-ranking fighter Pilot, with holding a "competition". Nobody has ever defined what such a "competition" would be, despite the fact that so many are calling for one. Enough information can be gathered from enough sources to reasonably rate an aircraft's suitability. What more do these people want? Do any of them know, or event have a hint of an inkling of a clue? What would this mythical "competition" prove that any other thorough assessment would not - and how much would it cost?

Constantly complaining about "sole-source" deals is another red herring. One picks the machine that one judges to be most suitable for the anticipated tasks (while trying to anticipate events over the next forty years), and one buys it from its manufacturer. There is no other option. Do these people think that we could pick Typhoon and buy it from Boeing if Boeing claims that they can build Typhoon for less? If one decides that one wants a Ford, for example, one cannot buy it from General Motors. Whatever aircraft is chosen will come from a "sole-source".

 

[Colin Parkinson]

A good report from government outlining what they were looking for and pro's and con's of the various aircraft would be useful. Of course the companies would scream if their aircraft got a poor score in a certain area even if justified.

Just once I want them to include a Russian/Chinese aircraft/helicopter in mix to send a message to industry that they are replaceable.

 

[Loachman]

I do not think that that would worry them too terribly much.

 

[YZT580]

Perhaps Loachman he thinks we aren't getting enough airplanes to make it worthwhile.  65 aircraft isn't much of an air force, I don't care how fancy the electronics may be.  And we are definitely not going to get even that few without doubling the amount of cash per aircraft. 

 

[SupersonicMax]

We are not getting more than 65 regardless of which on we get.  Oh, and the JSF is the cheaper option.

 

[GR66]

We are not getting more than 65 regardless of which on we get.  Oh, and the JSF is the cheaper option.

I think what the General might be suggesting is that if the primary focus for our extremely limited military procurement budget is defence of NA airspace even at the expense of expeditionary capabilities then the argument may no longer be which 5th Gen/4th Gen multirole fighter we purchase.  A real threat analysis might determine that we can best defend against the most LIKELY threats with a very different mix of assets (patrol aircraft, UAVs, AWACS, ground-based facilities, picket ships, Lighter than Air ships, satellites, maybe even 3rd Gen or lead-in fighters, etc.). 

Short of both a Foreign policy and a Defence White Paper to clearly define our policies and the required capabilities though, of course the CF leadership will by default look for the platforms that will give them the most flexibility in reacting to whatever situation the political leadership might put them into.  That would be an advanced multirole fighter aircraft. 

 

[cupper]

How the Canadian debate is being reported in the US.

Canada’s second thoughts on F-35 Lightning show concerns about plane’s high cost

http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/canadas-second-thoughts-on-f-35-lightning-show-concerns-about-planes-high-cost/2014/08/18/3349a1ba-1e37-11e4-ab7b-696c295ddfd1_story.html?hpid=z1

O, Canada, land of “peace, order and good government.” Land of compromise and polite politics. Land of turmoil over whether to buy the F-35.

As in the United States, the fighter plane has become a rancorous political issue. What once looked like a sure buy of 65 planes has been bogged down by infighting and un-Canadian vitriol, and the purchase is on hold while Canadian officials consider whether to buy another plane.

The F-35 Lightning II is a U.S. plane, made by a U.S. company for the U.S. military. But if the cost for U.S. taxpayers is going to come down to levels that make the plane affordable in the long term, the Pentagon is depending on foreign governments to buy the F-35 as well.

From the beginning of the program, Defense Department officials signed up eight international partners, including Canada. Since then, they’ve crossed the globe looking for additional foreign government customers with some success. Japan and Israel have agreed to buy some of the planes, while South Korea appears likely to make the F-35 its next fighter jet as well.

But as Canada shows, not everyone is sold on what has become the most expensive weapons system in U.S. history. In addition to being a symbol of power, might and mind-bending technology, the next-generation Joint Strike Fighter has, to some, come to represent waste and unwieldiness — in the United States and abroad.

Many thought that by now Canada would have decided whether to buy the planes — a move that would help drive down costs in the nearly $400 billion program — or instead force the plane’s manufacturer, Lockheed Martin, to compete for its business. But it’s now unclear when that will happen.

Some fear that if nations such as Canada balk, there could be questions about the long-term affordability of the program. Meanwhile, Boeing, one of Lockheed Martin’s fiercest competitors, has pounced on what it sees as an opportunity in Canada and other countries to tout its F/A-18 Super Hornet as a proven, affordable alternative.

Facing budget constraints, Italy and the Netherlands have already curtailed the number of F-35s they said they plan to buy. Denmark is holding a competition that would pit the F-35 against other fighters. Meanwhile, the production line at Lockheed Martin’s Fort Worth plant has been limited to a little over 30 the past two years, as tightened U.S. budgets and technical problems have forced the Pentagon to significantly slow its procurement as well.

“The program is stuck in low production rates and high costs,” said Richard Aboulafia, an aerospace industry for the Teal Group. “The production rates are low because costs are high and costs are high because production is low.”

Currently, the plane’s so-called “flyaway cost,” which doesn’t include research and development, among other things, is approximately $110 million apiece for the Air Force’s model, the company says. But Lockheed and Pentagon officials say it could be lowered to less than $80 million by the end of the decade. Lockheed and some of its subcontractors are investing $170 million to reduce the price.

Still, the Government Accountability Office recently said that affordability “remains a significant concern” and that “the program is likely to be challenged” to meet cost reduction goals.

While ramping up production would bring the per-plane cost down, it would be unwise to build too many too soon because not all of the necessary testing has been done on the aircraft, said Todd Harrison, director of defense budget studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

Additional testing will inevitably reveal problems that need to be fixed, which then cost money to repair, he said. For years, critics of the program, including Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), have said that the United States should never have committed to buying the plane while it was still being developed, saying it violated one of the basic rules of airplane acquisition: “fly before you buy.”

“It gets to the fundamental tension within the JSF — you want to buy more of them because the quicker we buy them, the cost will come down,” Harrison said. “But the faster we buy them, that just increases the concurrency in the program. We’re buying planes that haven’t completed testing and are going to require modifications.”

The slowed production rate could have another consequence he said.

“One of the concerns has been as we’ve reduced the production rate, people have floated the idea of cutting back on the number of planes the U.S. is going to buy. Then you spook the allies.”

But with the relatively large numbers of aircraft the United States plans to buy, he said, “the fate of the program is up to us, not them.” Though the Pentagon initially planned to buy 2,852 planes, it has for years remained consistent with its commitment to buy 2,443. Britain, which plans to buy 138 planes, the most of any other nation, also said its confidence in the program remains strong even though the F-35 was grounded after a recent engine fire and missed its international debut at a pair of air shows in England last month.

And at a recent “rollout” event in Fort Worth, Australian and U.S. officials celebrated the anticipated delivery of its first two planes. During the ceremony, Air Marshal Geoff Brown, chief of the Royal Australian Air Force, called the F-35 a “revolution” and said it will cause a “step change in the way we prepare for and conduct operations into the future.”

Lockheed Martin officials are confident that more countries will sign on in the years to come as the need to replace their fighter fleets becomes more urgent. The F-35 is designed to supplant several different legacy aircraft, from the F-16 to the F/A 18 and the A-10.

“This is the airplane that’s going to replace all those airplanes and create a capability for the next 50-plus years,” said Steve O’Bryan, Lockheed Martin’s vice president of international strategy and business development.

Replacement of the F-16 alone creates a huge market for the F-35, he said. More than 4,500 F-16s have been built, and nearly 30 countries use the aircraft.

And while not all of those F-16s will be replaced, “the potential is significant,” he said.

Potential customers are one thing. Signed contracts are another.

It initially appeared as if Canada was definitely going to buy. Defense officials praised the F-35’s speed and stealth. At a news conference announcing the purchase to buy 65 F-35s in 2010, then-Defense Minister Peter MacKay called it “the best that we can provide our men and women in uniform.”

But two years later, the government put the acquisition on hold after an auditor general’s report suggested the government misled Parliament, saying that key costs over the course of the fleet’s life were much higher than previously stated.

Liberals attacked the conservative government. John McKay, a member of Parliament, called it “deceit and incompetence at the highest levels.” Another member, Ralph Goodale, wrote that the “F-35 fiasco exposes dishonesty and incompetence.”

As a result, the Harper administration, while denying it misled Parliament, put the purchase on hold and appointed a National Fighter Procurement Secretariat to ensure the Canadian military acquires the right plane.

But Goodale thinks that the government will put off any decision until after the upcoming elections. “This is a hot potato for them,” he said. “Their process up to now has been terribly flawed, and they have very little public support for how they’ve gone about this.”

The cost has been a big issue, and there was also “concern here in some circles that the F-35 was the anointed choice without having gone through the formality of a competitive process,” said Martin Shadwick, a Canadian defense analyst and a professor at York University.

Still, he said, “My personal anticipation is that we’ll still buy.”

But Boeing is doing everything it can to change minds.

“We certainly believe the Super Hornet is very well-suited for the unique environment and geographical challenges faced by the Royal Canadian Air Force,” said Howard Berry, Boeing’s F/A-18 international business development team leader. “We continue our battle rhythm. We continue to engage our political colleagues on both sides of the aisle.”

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I do not think that that would worry them too terribly much.

Maybe the fighter industry might feel immune, but Russian helicopters offer some interesting capabilities and are already flying here commercially. There bggest issue has been customer support, but that seems not to be just a Russian thing anymore.

Frankly I am finding the aviation companies are to prima donna's, always threatening this or that. The current attitudes and processes are poisonous to the industry and the military. 

 

[YZT580]

At the moment, I think it would be a very hard sell to get the CDN govt to look into buying a Russian Helicopter.  Maybe next year when PET junior makes his run for the money. :

 

[PuckChaser]

At the moment, I think it would be a very hard sell to get the CDN govt to look into buying a Russian Helicopter.  Maybe next year when PET junior makes his run for the money. :

Good luck getting military procurement dollars out of him, Russian or not.