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Ex Vigilant Guardian

Worn Out Grunt said:
Obviously my knowledge of the 510 set is of little use here......

It was a good radio and (IMO) a heck of a lot more robust  (and serviceable) that the TCCCS stuff we routinely get back from ARC.

a_majoor said:
For point four I will put on my official G6 hat:

Make sure it's on good and tight, Arthur, for here it comes:

a_majoor said:
The number of frequencies allocated to Petawawa are limited, and this EX sucked up the vast majority of those available.

Ask IC for more freqs to be used specifically on this ex on a strict NIB.  Or,"borrow" unused freqs from2 CMBG units.

a_majoor said:
Using FRS or GMRS radios is FORBIDDEN, and there is an LFCAD on that subject. .....
Motorolla CT-250s are expedient solutions to the TCCCS shortage problems. ....PRR would be nice, but this is part of the same problem with TCCCS: not enough exist. What we really need are more RAD A and RAD B analogues, since the 521 RAD D sucks for range.

So, source more radios!  SQFT didn't do a VG style ex this year so why not borrow theirs?  What of the radios in TF3-06 units?  They didn't take them overseas.  Source those.

a_majoor said:
For people who thought there were problems with the comms plan, we worked with the available resources. Now if we could only get people to execute the plan as written...... :rage:

Your rage is misplaced.  Look inwards as well as outwards.  "Train as you Fight" is not just a catchphrase thrown about to encourage us to deal with adversity.  Properly training soldiers for battle in the COE is like building a car from scratch.  The performance you get out of it is depandant on the parts you put into it.  You can't build a Cadillac using Skoda parts.
 
silentone said:
The helicopter is always a twinkle in any soldiers eye on ex.

Thank-you. This is my motivation. I started out as a rifleman in 4 RCR in 1973 and that was the best thing about that year's concentration - and most other ones as well. I appreciate not only the training value but the excitement and retention value as well. I hate seeing empty seats in the back.

i even heard they were giving fun rides to those non-infantry types to give them the experience. If that is true, That's great. :warstory: I think everyone should enjoy a ride or two.

True. We were able to squeeze in a couple of famil flights primarily for GDs and Sigs Guys etcetera (the people who do all of the work) at 3 MNB HQ and a couple of the TFs despite a huge reduction in capacity this year. Unfortunately, a few got turned away at the Sqn loc on one occasion because more showed up than expected and we just couldn't take them without jeopardizing ex missions. I really regret that though, so if any of them are on this site: sorry.

The pilots I think also knew that a number of people hadn't ridden on them before, so the rides were always exciting. :)

We are well aware of that, hence the stress on load/unload drills prior - but even those who've done it before need the refresher. I always include (with few exceptions) a circuit in the tasking, so that once the dry drills are done, everybody gets to do it once with the noise, wind, and blowing dust/twigs/small rodents etcetera as a disposal-of-virginity thing for the new guys. I've found that, for them, the fear/thrill of the first flight combined with the rush of going into a tactical situation is often overwhelming, and that's when they forget the drills, especially when offloading. It's not always possible to do this, though, due to weather, time, or other problems. As for the ride, we all like the tactical flying, whether we're in the front seat or back. My custom, when the situation allows, is, if I hear any shrieks or screams from the back (whether from fright or delight), to repeat that manoeuvre until the shrieking or screaming stops.

Of course everyone owuld like to say they'd want them to be longer

We'd agree, but there are time, fuel, and airspace restrictions that, together or separately, prevent that. It takes too much time and fuel to move a company decently in three or four lifts of four hels especially if a fifteen- to thirty-minute refuel is required, and when one's area is bounded by live ranges and arty gun positions...

Also, all will agree when I say miles gear and simunition would be a great training aid and more enjoyable and people will be more prone to properly handle their their gear and selves.!!

Definitely, but the MILES gear has to be rented and it costs a fortune to do so, which is why it was cut last year. I think that the cost would have been over $1M back then.
 
Don't get me started on comms...

Ah, what the hell - we need to get this info out to the people who make the descisions and control the purse strings.

After having witnessed the Chinese fire drill that was the comms situation at Stalwart Guardian last year, and having fallen victim to various comms problems throughout the training year, comms was first and foremost on my mind for VG.

All our 522 manpacks were tasked out to ARC, and I was told we'd get them back for VG. Having no control over that, I chose to be optimistic and believe it.

We also have 2 X Iltis equipped with 522 "A Set" installations. One is complete, the other was missing a power cable. I arranged it so that both vehicles would be sent to VG on the flatbed, and I arranged for the 2 X 522 that we have that don't have manpack adaptors to come up with us on the road move, along with all the vehicle installation EIS.

The intent was to have 2 X "A Sets" in the troop. That would require knitting a power cable, but I have faith in the scrounging abilities of our guys.

Well, the vehicle with the missing power cable broke down while being loaded on the flatbed, so what I had on the ground Day 1 of VG was 1 X "A Set" complete, plus a spare 522 (less battery plate), plus a hockey sock of 521s.

Of our 522 manpacks, 3 made it back from ARC - so now I had an A set in my callsign, a 522 in each patrol commander's car, and 521s in all the junior cars. Plus, as backup comms, I have a bunch of privately-purchased FRS radios.

At this point, my intent is to use the TCCCS net and only use the FRS if TCCCS goes down.

As it happens, by the halfway point of the ex, we've determined that most of the 521s are useless, and that there are problems with a lot of the TCCCS handsets/headsets. For the first convoy escort task, we are working half TCCCS, half FRS. This means I'm running two parallel troop nets, where no one net can reach the whole troop, and I wind up a very busy beaver when I finally wrap my head around that I have to relay net traffic from one net to the other.

That night, the word comes down that the Jimmies are upset about all the FRS traffic (not just us by a long shot) that there are big fines involved, ELINT operators in the area triangulating signals, blah blah blah. My OC gives me a direct order to stand down all FRS traffic... and there's *no* wiggle room in that order, so I have to comply. When I point out that there is a safety issue here, I'm told that that they will stand down training for callsigns that cannot maintain effective comms during tasks.

Jimmies, think about that for a second - **we lose comms, we stop training**.

Now as it happens, the Tp WO and I had forseen that "no FRS" order, and we had not let up on our attempts to scrounge additional radios. We got two more back from ARC that day, and it turned out that one of the 1H radios installed in the CP had started life as a manpack, so we were able to draw the spare battery plate and affix it to the battery-plateless 522 we had brought up for our other vehicle installation. This brought us to 1 X A set, 6 X 522 manpacks, and 1 X 521 for all 8 vehicles (and in actuality, the 521 in T42G could hear everybody else, but only talk to one other 521 - and those were our best 521s! - so my callsign would up carrying the 521 that Golf could talk to)

We also had time (while I was doing battle procedure for a combined arms task with the Infantry) to sort through the EIS and come up with working handsets/headsets for everybody.

From that point on, comms were awesome. I, having the A set, could talk to the world, and part of my combat appreciation was placing myself in optimum positions for comms purposes - I wound up relaying most of the radio traffic from the India platoons to their CP and to each other. Not all of my callsigns could talk to each other or the CP (although most could) and I could relay the rest.

But everything, and I do mean *EVERYTHING*, hinged on that one A set installation. That's what made this work. Had we lost that, we would have been eukered. As it happened, the jeep that that installation lives in was crankier than hell, and the only reason it kept running all week was because of some good support from our FOB-mate maintainers, and because there was an ex-maintainer in the crew.

The one dark cloud in this sunny picture happened during the second convoy escort. It appears that our frequency - and we only got the one! - was also issued to another Task Force, and for a good chunk of our trace we were overlapping each other. That, in of itself, wasn't bad (at least we had different callsigns for all else save the CPs) but the mystery callsigns's scenario had OPFOR compromise the frequency and start jamming (although I'm not sure if this was OPFOR or an overenthusiastic Observer/Controller) Our scenario had us notionally on encrypted comms and so we were free to say what we needed to (a way around the fact that we had no alternate frequency) but the mystery OPFOR and O/C kept trying to chase us off the frequency. I wound up in a bunfight with the O/C over the use of the frequency, which was really only solved when we finally moved out of range.

So then, here are my VG comms AAR points:

1) Each arm in each task force needs its own frequency, pointe finale. When we get close enough together to start stepping on each other, confusion reigns and training realism goes out the window. This is DOUBLY true when there are no alternate frequencies issued. If it takes a year to reserve/assign that much of the spectrum, then start the paperwork now.

2) Of all the arms likely to step on each other, Armoured Recce is the most probable, because we cover the most ground and we (should) have the highest power transmitters. I saw every corner of the AOR we were alloted. If there is a shortage of frequencies such that task forces *must* overlap, at the very least, reserve three frequencies for the exclusive use of the Armour (one per TF)

3) The vehicle mounted "A Set" radio is the centerpiece of Recce comms. All our brand spanking new GWagons have the wiring and mount points in place to accept vehicle installations - these MUST MUST MUST be installed into the GWagons as fast as possible - maybe it could be arranged that Rad Techs visit units to install them? The minimum number is two installations per troop (the Tp Leader and a backup) so if they are in short supply, you're looking at 4-6 installations per Armoured Recce unit (depending on unit size)

4) There needs to be some sort of process between the turn-in of radios tasked to ARC and the reissue of radios coming back from ARC. We wasted a lot of time tracking down radios, determining which handsets/headsets were actually functional, etc etc. Either we need more time at the start of the ex before jumping into the tactical scenarios so we can sort this stuff out, or there needs to be rad techs involved with radio turn-in after ARC so N/S EIS can be weeded out before the units get on the ground.

5) As far as FRS goes... while I agree that FRS should be a backup at best (if I have working TCCCS comms I don't need FRS) I personally see stepping on the FRS spectrum as no different than using a farmer's field in Germany as a manouevre area. We try to avoid stepping on private property whenever possible, but the demands of the mission take priority. I would LOVE to see the court case when somebody tries to fine a soldier for using FRS during training because the Army couldn't/wouldn't issue him a radio that could do the job. Do any of us want to see THAT on CBC news or on the front page of the Globe and Mail?

If comms aren't fixed, that WILL happen - its only a matter of time.

DG
 
RecceDG said:
Don't get me started on comms...

...

So then, here are my VG comms AAR points:

1) Each arm in each task force needs its own frequency, pointe finale. When we get close enough together to start stepping on each other, confusion reigns and training realism goes out the window. This is DOUBLY true when there are no alternate frequencies issued. If it takes a year to reserve/assign that much of the spectrum, then start the paperwork now.

2) Of all the arms likely to step on each other, Armoured Recce is the most probable, because we cover the most ground and we (should) have the highest power transmitters. I saw every corner of the AOR we were alloted. If there is a shortage of frequencies such that task forces *must* overlap, at the very least, reserve three frequencies for the exclusive use of the Armour (one per TF)

3) The vehicle mounted "A Set" radio is the centerpiece of Recce comms. All our brand spanking new GWagons have the wiring and mount points in place to accept vehicle installations - these MUST MUST MUST be installed into the GWagons as fast as possible - maybe it could be arranged that Rad Techs visit units to install them? The minimum number is two installations per troop (the Tp Leader and a backup) so if they are in short supply, you're looking at 4-6 installations per Armoured Recce unit (depending on unit size)

4) There needs to be some sort of process between the turn-in of radios tasked to ARC and the reissue of radios coming back from ARC. We wasted a lot of time tracking down radios, determining which handsets/headsets were actually functional, etc etc. Either we need more time at the start of the ex before jumping into the tactical scenarios so we can sort this stuff out, or there needs to be rad techs involved with radio turn-in after ARC so N/S EIS can be weeded out before the units get on the ground.

5) As far as FRS goes... while I agree that FRS should be a backup at best (if I have working TCCCS comms I don't need FRS) I personally see stepping on the FRS spectrum as no different than using a farmer's field in Germany as a manouevre area. We try to avoid stepping on private property whenever possible, but the demands of the mission take priority. I would LOVE to see the court case when somebody tries to fine a soldier for using FRS during training because the Army couldn't/wouldn't issue him a radio that could do the job. Do any of us want to see THAT on CBC news or on the front page of the Globe and Mail?

If comms aren't fixed, that WILL happen - its only a matter of time.

DG

I want to reemphasize a point a_majoor made: there aren’t that many frequencies.  The radio frequency spectrum is a finite natural resource which all, civil and military, friend and foe alike must share and it is being used, shared, reused, subdivided and otherwise chewed up at an astonishing rate.  It can be made more efficient if one throws more and more money at the problem.  25 kHz channels could be 10 kHz channels – and could still be secure - IF we are willing to spend billions and billions more on radios – rather than, say, new weapons, vehicles, aircraft or ships.  To make matters ‘worse’ you (the military) are seeking more and more RF dependent systems – including e.g. devices to jam IEDs and incoming PRGs; those that do not use active RF transmitters for the job still use radio for system command and control. 

Power and frequency usage are intimately connected – the more power A uses then less frequencies are available for B, C, D … Z because A uses that frequency and he ties up the adjacent channels and harmonic channels (66.5 MHz is the harmonic of 33.25 MHz) and so on.

Radio spectrum assignment, for the army, was one of the 'top 10' problems debriefed in the Pentagon after Desert Storm.  Nothing, to the best of my knowledge, has changed all that much since what I said just above was said to the US Army and Marine commanders in 1991.

As an aside: FRS spectrum is not private.  If you bought the radio you bought the ‘right’ to use the channel – on a no-protection basis.  You might interfere with others and they might interfere with you.  No problems.  You may not use any radio, including your TCCCS radios, to interfere with licensed frequencies and your TCCCS radios overlap several [exclusivecivilian frequency bands.
 
Allright, that's it! For VG07 it's going to be smoke signals and carrier pigeon.  ;D

At least you won't have obnoxious Zero on your back, correcting every single little mistake.
 
career_radio-checker said:
Allright, that's it! For VG07 it's going to be smoke signals and carrier pigeon.  ;D

At least you won't have obnoxious Zero on your back, correcting every single little mistake.

I hate to indicate how old I really am, but: about 40 years ago, when Canadian infantry battalions in 1st (BR) Corps were just short of 1,000 men in strength, had 100+ APCs , 75+ wheeled vehicle, 150+ radios,* etc, etc, etc … we simply got used to sharing spectrum and we made it work, day-in and day-out.  1 (BR) Corps was a largeish formation (3+ divisions) which might have deployed in a fairly tight area (if our allies showed up for Day 1 of the war, a prospect which was viewed, by the corps commander and staff as being highly unlikely).  There was less spectrum available (smaller tuning ranges for many of the radios)  and use was more complex (higher power, wider (50 kHz channels), poor ‘adjacent-channel’ and ‘co-channel’ characteristics, etc).

We trained for the war we planned to fight and we planned to share most of the VHF spectrum amongst ourselves – with way, way too many nets for the available channels, and with the red hordes and with EW jammers on both sides and with flanking formations – if they appeared.  That means we trained, routinely, with company nets shared two, three, even four times over.  We learned to use good excellent procedures to remain fighting effective despite the characteristics and limitations of the signalling systems.

We made the best use we could manage of our radios – and land line, which we laid prodigiously, even though we were highly mobile.  We all learned a lot about radio – not because of mistrust of Pronto and his people but because he/they were concentrated in one spot (Bn HQ) and everyone else had to understand how to get the most out of our radios wherever they were.

It is not the radio’s fault.  It is not the system’s fault.  They may not be the best but I am 99.99% sure they are better, much better, than what they replaced.  If you cannot make them work, despite their limitations then I suggest the fault is with your skills and knowledge and, therefore, with the individual and unit training programmes.

</rant> - nothing personal, but it (blaming the hardware/system) is one of pet peeves
----------

* I used to know this stuff in detail: for a while I was keeper of the battalion's weapons, radios, vehicles, etc - what we used to call 'G controlled' (G meaning general (ops) staff, as opposed to Q (log) staff) stores.  I think I can still draw the 'grouping' diagrams in my sleep.


 
I hate to indicate how old I really am, but: about 40 years ago, when Canadian infantry battalions in 1st (BR) Corps were just short of 1,000 men in strength, had 100+ APCs , 75+ wheeled vehicle, 150+ radios,* etc, etc, etc … we simply got used to sharing spectrum and we made it work, day-in and day-out.

You're not the only old fart on here Mr. Cambell. :)

The practice when I did my Phase 4 so many moons ago was 2 radios in the Tp Ldr's car - one for the Tp net, one for the Sqn net. (and I guess they still teach it that way) Not once have I *ever* seen that outside of the course environment.

Standard practice (in my experience) has been forever 1 frequency for all armour, and I've been in situations where we had one frequency for two squadrons of Sabre and three troops of Recce, and yes, we made it all work through impeccable voice procedure and extensive use of other-means comms (particularly hand signals).

But we don't live in that world anymore.

1) The overall status of voice procedure in the Corps is *terrible*; just horrid. I blame this on two factors:

    a) Equipment availablity: Once upon a time, every single callsign had a 524 set mounted in the vehicle and a 77 set strapped to the trunk monkey. Nowadays, if you have 1 X 522 manpack for every patrol, you're doing well, and on VG I was beside myself with joy to have a single A set in my callsign, plus 522 manpacks in 6 of the remaining 7 callisgns.

    b) The lack of speakers. When we all had 524 sets, which have built-in speakers, everybody in the crew was constantly exposed to the radio chatter. Voice procedure has a rythym and flow to it, and with the speaker on, everybody got to hear it even if they weren't actively using the radio themselves. It made it so one learned by osmosis. Nowadays, the radio is limited to the phones on the crew commander's head, so the driver and observer just don't get the exposure any more, and VP quality is suffering accordingly.

Not only is this bad for voice procedure, it's bad for SA as well.

Yes, there exist speaker boxes for TCCCS. See point 1a.

2) The size of the Primary Training Audience has shrunk. Once of a time, the summer concentrations would exercise Regiments, with the Regimental CO (or the Combat Team CO) getting orders, doing battle procedure, issuing orders to Squadron Commanders, and down through the chain to Tp Leaders and Patrol Commanders. Everybody on that shared frequency was on the same mission at the same time, working towards the same end state.

This year, the size of the PTA was the Troop/Platoon (although it is my observation that the Infantry fudged that somewhat and they were operating more at the Company level) At any given point in time, you had three Infantry companies and two Recce Tps, operating out of the same task force and same FOB, working on 5 completely separate and independant tasks - and here's the important part - under separate umpire/Observer/Comtroller control.

When we did the Regimental sized tasks, any enemy seen by one was enemy seen by all. But when we are doing the smaller-scale stuff, it was entirely possible (and in fact commonplace) that enemy activity that was part of a given unit's training scenario "wasn't actually happening" for another unit's scenario.

And for small unit training, that's entirely appropriate. Each subunit is trying to learn a set of skills appropriate for that subunit, and you don't want training for other, unrelated subunits bleeding over and contaminating the training for each other. When we run an Armoured Phase 4 and an Infantry PLQ in the same training area, we don't want the PLQ suddenly executing section attacks on contacts called in by the Phase 4. The courses effectively inhabit separate realities.

Now multiply that by three task forces....

That's what happened to us on VG. The "reality" of a pair of unrelated units carrying out unrelated missions under separate Observer/Controller control bled into each other, and the result was lost training value for both sides.

We *probably* could have worked it out on the fly, except that the other unit's "reality" included the frequency being compromised, and as a direct result, their Observer/Controller tried to kick us off our own means - which resulted in even MORE lost training value as we tried to sort THAT out.

OK, so a reasonable approach is to treat their "reality" as if it was "real" for us too - play it like OPFOR had compromised OUR means too and act accordingly. Well that's fine and dandy, but we weren't issued an alternate frequency, and my only alternate means (the Tp FRS radios) had been banned - meaning we were stuck.

The point I'm making here is that if the next few iterations of the XX Guardian exercises are going to continue to be Tp/Platoon level focussed, then we need separate frequencies exclusive to each subunit to ensure maximum training value.

I know that I've identified crappy voice procedure as a major problem, and I intend to adjust unit training accordingly in order to rectify it.

Incidently, the comms situation wasn't all bad. We did two combined arms tasks with two separate Infantry companies, using their company frequency, and that I think added a lot of training value. It got us used to working as subordinate callsigns on someone else's net (so Tango 42 instead of 42, etc) it taught me a lot about liasing Command and Sigs with another arm (making sure my report lines make it onto their trace) and it provided an opportunity for Armour to add value to Infantry training when we wound up acting as their radio relays. But note that this is a step towards the "Regimental" exercise level, away from the "Troop/Platoon" exercise level.

And man, as bad as Tango voice procedure is, the India callsigns are WAY worse....

I also had no problems dealing with Zero - in fact, I don't think Zero ever wanted to talk to me. Three Niner, however, had issues with Zero harassing him about his H-Hour being pushed back while he was chest-deep in a swamp.... :D

And finally, I have no issues with TCCCS as a technology. I think there are flaws in implementation, especially with the user interface, but that's not a killer tomatoe by ANY means - when we have it, it works. My problem with TCCCS is that we DON'T HAVE ENOUGH OF THEM. I was short 7 X A sets and 2 X 522 manpacks, and I'm beside myself with joy that I had the stuff that I DID have - I was quite possibly the best-equipped Recce Tp on the whole exercise with my 1 X A set and 6 X 522.

DG
 
Haggis said:
Make sure it's on good and tight, Arthur, for here it comes:

Good thing the G6 hat comes with a Kevlar backing

Ask IC for more freqs to be used specifically on this ex on a strict NIB.  Or,"borrow" unused freqs from2 CMBG units.

The Forman of Signals was scrambling for this area wide, but frequencies aren't available in ailse 36 of Canadian Tire. The frequencies we got ARE the unused ones, but other groups like CSOR, the "Ski Team", various base functions you don't want to shut down, Range control etc. are present and also need frequency allocations. See also what Edward Campbell has to say on this subject.

So, source more radios!  SQFT didn't do a VG style ex this year so why not borrow theirs?  What of the radios in TF3-06 units?  They didn't take them overseas.  Source those.

The flat, bloody spot on our foreheads is due to our attempts to do this. A lot of stuff is going downrange on the G4 net in relation to the ARC situation, consider that retroactive satisfaction for the problems encountered.

Your rage is misplaced.  Look inwards as well as outwards.  "Train as you Fight" is not just a catchphrase thrown about to encourage us to deal with adversity.  Properly training soldiers for battle in the COE is like building a car from scratch.  The performance you get out of it is depandant on the parts you put into it.   You can't build a Cadillac using Skoda parts.

Since we were hand forging the Skoda parts you did see, expectations may be running too high. Shoot for a Yugo sports model, maybe but if you don't follow the blueprint, there will be difficulty making the parts work together. Edward Campbell has outlined a lot of good historical experience on large radio nets in prior posts, and we should start adjusting the training to reflect those realities as Recce DG points out. Even in "resource rich" environments you would be surprised at some of the lash ups which have to happen, and you will understand if I don't get into more details.
 
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