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Discussion on Israeli Strategy

The decision by Israel not to push to the Litani river is a strategic mistake. But it may be one brought on by the government's aversion to casuaties. The current plan to carve out a DMZ of sorts will not solve the Hizbollah rocket problem. If UNIFIL occupies the zone then Israel will be back to square one. If the Lebanese Army occupies the area Israel runs the risk of the Hizbollah militia donning Army uniforms and resumes its campaign against Israel. For the Lebanese PM the fear should be that the shadow government that is Hizbollah becomes the defacto government which will be a serious problem for the druze/chrisitan population. What we may be seeing in Lebanon is the formation of another terrorist state which should be a non starter for Israel and the US.
 
The Chief of Staff IDF has ordered a change in leadership for the Northern Command detailing his deputy MG Kaplinsky to take over the northern front.

http://haaretz.com/hasen/spages/747973.html

Stratfor article.

Special Report: A New Phase of the War

We have not written publicly available alerts on the Israel-Hezbollah conflict for several days, simply because there has been nothing to report. This is not to say that nothing was happening; brutal fighting was going on, rockets were being fired and airstrikes were being carried out. However, the basic pattern of the war appeared to be fixed, with Israeli troops fighting well-entrenched Hezbollah forces in southern Lebanon, and with the results of those battles uncertain. The diplomatic process was lurching along without any clear direction.

We are now beginning to detect some changes on the Israeli side. At its meeting Aug. 7, the Israeli Cabinet appeared to have given up on a diplomatic solution -- if it ever actually believed diplomacy would work -- and made it clear that Israeli forces were going to be given a much freer hand in Lebanon. Today, Israeli Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz announced that Deputy Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Moshe Kaplinsky was to become Halutz's representative at Northern Command -- which owns the Lebanese operation -- for the duration of the war.

There are political ramifications for this in Israel Defense Forces, but what is essentially being done is that Kaplinsky, an army officer who commanded the elite Golani Brigade, has been put in charge of the Lebanese operation. Halutz, an air force officer who had been criticized for waging an extended air campaign that did not shut down rocket attacks, is ceding authority over the war. Obviously, this is also a criticism of Northern Command's performance over the past weeks -- but the important message, following recent Israeli Cabinet decisions, is that the Israelis are going to unleash their ground forces.

What this means is unclear. It might mean that one or more additional divisions will be thrown into the southern Lebanese campaign, trying to force a decision. It might mean that the attack into the Bekaa Valley that we have discussed is in the works. It could also mean that Israel might move toward Beirut. What seems to be happening, however, is that the Israelis are moving beyond the current phase of the war.

As we have said, Hezbollah has relatively few options. In the south, the militants are committed to a static defense that they seem to be executing well. In the Bekaa Valley, they might opt to resist or to draw the Israelis in and then try to impose an insurgency on them. The same in the southern Beirut area. They might also decide to try and launch some of the longer-range rockets they claim to have, assuming the Israeli air force hasn't taken them out.

Much is unclear. However, this is intended to alert you that the Israelis are vigorously signaling a shift in their war fighting strategy. This may be intended to induce a new round of diplomacy, but we rather doubt it. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has run out of room on the strategy he was following. A new one is likely.
 
Doubtless, the fact that this regional conflict is important in the eyes of global players plays an effect on both Israel and Hezbollah/Hamas strategy in the region.  More from the Economist:



http://www.economist.com/world/na/displaystory.cfm?story_id=7255198

Middle East policy

To Israel with love
Aug 3rd 2006 | WASHINGTON, DC
From The Economist print edition

Why America gives Israel its unconditional support
AP
ANYBODY who doubts the size of the transatlantic divide over Israel should try discussing the Middle East conflagration in Britain and then doing the same in America. Everybody watches much the same grisly footage. But, by and large, people draw very different conclusions. The emphasis in Britain is overwhelmingly on the disproportionate scale of the response. Americans are much more inclined to give Israel the benefit of the doubt—and to blame Hizbullah. Some Jewish organisations are so confident of support for Israel that they even take out slots during news programmes, pleading for donations.

Opinion polls confirm that Americans are solidly on Israel's side. A USA Today/Gallup poll conducted on July 28th-30th showed that eight in ten Americans believed that Israel's action was justified—though a majority were worried about the scale of the action. A plurality (44%) thought that America was doing “about the right amount” to deal with the conflict. An earlier USA Today poll found that 53% put “a great deal” of the blame for the current crisis on Hizbullah, 39% put the blame on Iran and only 15% blamed Israel.

Similarly, Americans are far more likely than Europeans to side with Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A Pew Global Attitudes survey taken between March and May found that 48% of Americans said that their sympathies lay with the Israelis; only 13% were sympathetic towards the Palestinians. By contrast, in Spain for example, 9% sympathised with the Israelis and 32% with the Palestinians.

The political establishment is even more firmly behind Israel than the public is. Support for Israel stretches from San Francisco liberals like Nancy Pelosi to southern-fried conservatives like Bill Frist. The House and Senate have both passed bipartisan resolutions condemning Hizbullah and affirming Congress's support for Israel. The House version passed by 410 to 8 (of which three were from districts in Michigan with concentrations of Arab-Americans). The Senate resolution, sponsored by 62 senators—including the leaders of both parties—passed unopposed.

Indeed, the parties are engaged in a competition to see who can be the most pro-Israeli. Twenty or so Democrats, including Ms Pelosi, the House leader, and Harry Reid, the Senate leader, demanded that Iraq's prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, retract his criticisms of Israel or have his invitation to address Congress cancelled. (Mr Maliki, strongly backed by the administration, was eventually allowed to go ahead.) Several leading Democrats, including Hillary Clinton, have addressed pro-Israeli rallies. The contrast with the simmering rage within the Labour Party over Tony Blair's support for George Bush could hardly be more marked.

Pro-Israeli forces command the intellectual high ground as well as the corridors of power. Commentators such as Charles Krauthammer issue column after column ridiculing the notion of proportionality and stressing Hizbullah's responsibility for civilian casualties. Most middle-of-the-road commentators question the effectiveness, rather than the morality, of Israel's actions. Out-and-out critics of Israel are relegated to the sidelines.

Why is America so much more pro-Israeli than Europe? The most obvious answer lies in the power of two very visible political forces: the Israeli lobby (AIPAC) and the religious right. AIPAC, which has an annual budget of almost $50m, a staff of 200, 100,000 grassroots members and a decades-long history of wielding influence, is arguably the most powerful lobby in Washington, mightier even than the National Rifle Association.

“Thank God we have AIPAC, the greatest supporter and friend we have in the whole world,” says Ehud Olmert, Israel's prime minister. The lobby, which is the centrepiece of a co-ordinated body that includes pressure groups, think-tanks and fund-raising operations, produces voting statistics on congressmen that are carefully scrutinised by political donors. It also organises regular trips to Israel for congressmen and their staffs. (The Washington Post reports that Roy Blunt, the House majority whip, has been on four.)

The Christian right is also solidly behind Israel. White evangelicals are significantly more pro-Israeli than Americans in general; more than half of them say they strongly sympathise with Israel. (A third of the Americans who claim sympathy with Israel say that this stems from their religious beliefs.) Two in five Americans believe that Israel was given to the Jewish people by God, and one in three say that the creation of the state of Israel was a step towards the Second Coming.

Religious-right activists are trying to convert this latent sympathy into political support. John Hagee, a Texas televangelist who believes that supporting Israel is a “biblical imperative”, recently founded Christians United for Israel. Last month he brought 3,500 people from across the country to Washington to cheer Israel's war against Hizbullah. Mr Hagee's brigades held numerous meetings on Capitol Hill; both Mr Bush and Mr Olmert sent messages to his rally.

These pressure groups are clearly influential. Evangelical Christians make up about a quarter of the American electorate and are the bedrock of Mr Bush's support. Congressmen take on AIPAC at their peril. But they deal with well-heeled lobbies every day. And the power of the religious right can hardly explain why Democrats are so keen on Israel. Two other factors need to be considered: the war on Islamic radicalism, and deep cultural affinities between America and Israel.

Seeing themselves in Israel
Americans instinctively see events in the Middle East through the prism of September 11th 2001. They look at Hizbullah and Hamas with their Islamist slogans and masked faces and see the people who attacked America—and they look at Israeli citizens and see themselves. In America the “war on terror” is a fact of life, constantly reiterated. The sense that America is linked with Israel in a war against Islamist extremism is reinforced by Iranian statements about wiping Israel off the surface of the earth, and by the political advance of the Islamists of Hamas in Palestine.

But the biggest reason why Americans are so pro-Israel may be cultural. Americans see Israel as a plucky democracy in a sea of autocracies—a democracy that has every right to use force to defend itself. Europeans, on the other hand, see Israel as a reminder of the atavistic forces—from nationalism to militarism—that it has spent the post-war years trying to grow beyond.

Americans are staunch nationalists, much readier to contemplate the use of force than Europeans. A German Marshall Fund survey in 2005 found 42% of Americans strongly agreeing that “under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice” compared with just 11% of Europeans. A Pew survey found that the same proportion of Americans and Israelis believe in the use of pre-emptive force: 66%. Continental European figures were far lower.

Yet all this unquestioning support does not mean that America will give Israel absolute carte blanche to do whatever it wills. Condoleezza Rice, the secretary of state, was visibly shaken after the tragedy in Qana where at least 28 civilians, half of them children, were killed by Israeli bombs. There are growing worries both about Israel's conduct of the war and its wider impact on the Middle East. Many of these anxieties are expressed by the “realist faction”. Chuck Hagel, a Republican maverick, has given warning that America's relationship with Israel “cannot be at the expense of our Arab and Muslim relationships”. Richard Haass, a State Department official under George Bush senior who now heads the Council on Foreign Relations, has laughed publicly at the president's “birth of a new Middle East” optimism about the crisis. Some of the worries extend to conservatives. Tony Blankley, a former press secretary for Newt Gingrich and a fire-breathing columnist for the Washington Times, says that “We ignore world opinion at our peril.”

A few cracks are starting to appear. But they are still insignificant in the mighty edifice of support.

http://www.economist.com/world/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_SNGTJSJ

Iran

The regional manipulator
Aug 3rd 2006 | TEHRAN
From The Economist print edition

It is unclear on what terms Iran would press Hizbullah to cease its fire


WHAT odds on the foreign minister of a prickly Middle Eastern state sitting down to a cordial chat with his opposite number from a Western country that had, only a few hours before, sponsored a UN Security Council resolution threatening sanctions against his country? On July 31st, the day the council said it would take “appropriate measures” if Iran did not suspend its controversial uranium-enrichment plan, Manuchehr Mottaki, Iran's foreign minister, and Philippe Douste-Blazy, his French counterpart, spent two hours in Iran's embassy in Beirut, discussing ways to end the Israeli-Lebanese conflict. Iran has not hidden its satisfaction that France and others in the EU regard it as a potential agent for peace, and not solely, as Israel and the Americans see it, as an instigator of aggression.

The anti-Zionist presidentThe welcome Mr Mottaki received in Beirut from his Lebanese counterpart, and the contrast it presented with Lebanon's cancellation of a planned visit by Condoleezza Rice, the American secretary of state, boosted Iran's self-esteem. Since the conflict started, Iran has basked in the widespread—but only partially true—perception that the Islamic Republic, as a founder (with Syria) of Hizbullah in the 1980s, and latterly as its suspected main arms supplier, can orchestrate events in the eastern Mediterranean. Yet behind Iran's bravado there is worry at the way the war is going.

This week's intensification of Israel's assault on Hizbullah is raising fears in Tehran that Israel may eventually succeed in its stated aim of mauling Hizbullah militarily. That would be bad news for the Iranians, who, they have repeatedly made clear, see Hizbullah as a proxy agent of retaliation should Israel or America blast its nuclear installations.

Iran's hardline president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, reacted to the UN resolution by vowing that Iran would not give up enrichment, though the Iranians say they will reply, on August 22nd, to a package of incentives offered by the UN Security Council's five permanent members plus Germany. That response may include a proposal, short of full suspension, designed to appeal to veto-holding waverers such as Russia and China, who have long been loth to impose sanctions.

In Tehran, officials adhere to the government line that Iran provides only humanitarian and moral support to Hizbullah. A conservative newspaper reported that Hizbullah had politely turned down requests from “private” Iranians that they be allowed to join the fighting. There is no sign that Iran has helped send over the suicide battalions that were formed earlier this year.

All this is in character. Since the beginning of George Bush's war on terror, Iran has perfected the art of manipulating regional conflicts while remaining officially above the fray. Iran's new challenge is to maintain Hizbullah as a deterrent to military action against the Islamic Republic. The trouble is that any multinational force would be deployed to ensure that the militia cannot strike Israel. The biggest question, then, is whether Iran would accept such a condition. At present, it seems unlikely.
 
If there were a ceasefire today I would have to give Hizbollah the win as Israel has not yet acheived any of its operational objectives. Olmert and IDF Chief Halutz get low marks for pursuing a losing strategy. Fortunately as with any war plan, if it doesnt work you try something else. Initially the IDF thought they could acheive their aims with an air campaign only. Then it was air campaign and limited ground operation.
As the Stratfor article lays out the iDF may have to go all out and drive to the Litani river or beyond. Because what they are doing now doesnt seem to be achieving the Israeli objectives. The rockets keep falling. The IDF isnt even close to controling the limited zone they have carved out. The IDF needs to cut off southern Lebanon from the rest of the country if they have any hope of rooting out the Hizbollah fighters.
 
Today the Israeli government has decided to move its divisions up to the Litani river. This is expected to provide a workable defensive line against Hizbollah. This is expected to result in a decrease of rocket attacks
on Israel to maybe 30 a day, thats the hope anyway.

Hizbollah has used an array of ATW's against both Israeli tanks and infantry. The loss of infantrymen to ATW's is a tactic that the Israelis have now appeared to counter. The ATW team would target infantrymen searching houses or in the open. The Israeli response has been to make use of sniper teams covering the infantry from available high ground.
 
Not exactly a strategic discussion but the time has come for the  IDF's combat engineers to be recognized as the tip of the spear in this campaign as I have heard from several reliable sources and as exemplified in these 2 JP articles:

With the combat engineers in South Lebanon


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Anshel Pfeffer, THE JERUSALEM POST  Aug. 2, 2006

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As the Puma AFVs crossed the border fence at 1 a.m. and moved into Lebanon, the order was given for all the soldiers inside the vehicles to lower their heads and close the hatches. Only the commanders remained hunched outside with night-vision goggles, directing the drivers, deep within their armored compartments.

Inside, five soldiers from the Lahav Battalion of the Engineering Corps crouched with their personal weapons, LAW missiles and the various paraphernalia they would need for their three-day ambush on a ridge, a few kilometers north of the border, on what's termed "the contact line" with Hizbullah.

Squad commander Sgt. Daniel was anxiously checking his soldiers' equipment and insisting that he was not afraid. "We've been inside twice already," he said. "We were sent in to demolish the Hizbullah headquarters and fortifications in Maroun a-Ras."

Some of the others were more open about their feelings on spending 72 hours camouflaged on the cutting edge of the front. "I'm trusting God," said Doron, the medic. "He's the only who can help us."

One of his friends joshed him: "You've already begun to be frightened?"

The troops who would be manning the ambush came from the company's "young platoon," barely a year in the army, and this was the first time that they would be carrying out such an operation. Each of them had been given an "iron number," which would enable the officers to easily keep track of their location throughout the ambush.

They passed the half-hour it took to reach the jump-off point with jokes at the expense of one of the company's soldiers who had his picture in the papers on Sunday.

Capt. Ro'i, the company commander, was leading the convoy, and he slowly maneuvered each of the Pumas into a wooded south-facing valley, hopefully hidden from the Hizbullah teams still in the area. The platoon couldn't reach the point on foot, as most of the route goes through an old minefield through which the engineers had cleared only one path.

Ziggly, the driver, had trouble finding his way up the narrow ridge, and needed directions from St.-Sgt. Shalom, who was in command of the Puma. Ziggly could barely see anything through his night-scope and was essentially driving like a blind man taking directions from his passenger. Finally the Puma reached the narrow gully and the squad disembarked.

The deputy company commander, who would lead the ambush, was concerned mainly with making sure that no one was left behind in the dark and that the squads didn't get mixed up. From here, the platoon would have to climb the ridge in silence, and replace soldiers from Sword Battalion, a Druse unit, who were being relieved after their three long days and nights in ambush.

The Puma, an Israeli development based on the venerable British Centurion tank, is regarded as one of the heaviest armored fighting vehicles in the IDF, but Capt. Ro'i preferred the vehicles pull back, closer to the fence, while the soldiers were switching places.

While he was waiting for the order to go back in, Shalom reflected on the last few hectic weeks. "I haven't been on leave for 24 days," he said. "When all this broke out, we were on Mount Hermon and were ordered to fire into Lebanese territory to deter Hizbullah from moving in that area."

The last week was spent in Maroun a-Ras. "We blew up houses and the entrances to Hizbullah bunkers," he said. "We didn't see any of them, but a least some of them were still around. One of our officers was narrowly missed by an RPG."

"It's natural that they're afraid now when they're going in and have time to think," he said of the younger soldiers. "But the moment you're inside, you don't have time to be afraid."

The order is given to move into position. The Sword soldiers were waiting, but one of the Pumas had damaged its track and returned to the border. As a result, twice the usual number of soldiers piled into Shalom's Puma, and the smell of nine unwashed bodies was overpowering.

"It's wasn't easy staying alert up there," said Jamil. "We only managed to sleep two hours each night and two hours during the day."

They didn't see any Hizbullah fighters, but fired into areas of undergrowth where they detected movement.

Despite the fatigue, they were still capable of joking. Fadi was lugging an empty tank shell that he planned to convert into an ornamental ashtray. The first thing they did on reaching the border, even though it was 4 a.m., was to call up their families.

Capt. Ro'i was pleased that one of the first IDF missions on which journalists were allowed was his unit's. "The papers were full of photographs of my soldiers coming out of Maroun A-Ras this week, but the captions always said that they were Golani or Paratroopers," he said, and he was anxious to rectify that.

"People have difficulty defining us," he said. "We do so many things. We have infantry capabilities, and we undertake armored missions, demolition, mine-clearing and bridging. We've proven ourselves in all our roles over these weeks." •


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Elite Yael unit clears the way for IDF
By YAAKOV KATZ
[
Hizbullah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah promised hell for the IDF on the ground in southern Lebanon. He may not have heard of the Engineering Corps' elite Yael (Ibex) unit.

Members of the unit, one of the most classified in the IDF, were the first soldiers to enter southern Lebanon during Operation Change of Direction, days before troops from the Golani Brigade set foot on the other side of the fence.

Yael was responsible for clearing an access route for the infantrymen through the hundreds of explosive devices and mines planted there by Hizbullah. On Monday, the unit opened its doors to The Jerusalem Post.

Using advanced technological warfare and well-honed senses, the soldiers of Yael have participated in dozens of operations into Lebanon since the fighting with Hizbullah erupted on July 12 following the abduction of two soldiers and deaths of eight more in a cross-border attack.

Maj. Ido - the unit's commander - told the Post on Monday that Hizbullah had planted explosive devices along the border, made of high-quality explosives and put together with great expertise. "They build advanced and professional explosive devices," Ido said as his troops were preparing for the night's raid at a community along the northern border. "They are much more professional than the Palestinian bombs which we encounter in the Gaza Strip."

In contrast to the infantry brigades which have operated in Lebanese villages a mere few kilometers from Israel, Yael, one of the other officers revealed, was responsible for the demolition of bridges in an effort to impair Hizbullah's mobility. The unit was also responsible for the demolition of several buildings in southern Lebanon, most of them used by Hizbullah.

Why not just blow up the bridges and buildings by air? "Our demolitions are more precise and pinpoint and cause less collateral damage," Ido said, explaining that his unit inserted explosives into the buildings, bringing the structures down from inside.

Candidates undergo a one-and-a-half year course before they are accepted as members of Yael. In addition to learning how to dismantle mines and demolish buildings, members of the unit are also trained in how to covertly enter enemy territory. As the unit that entered Lebanon first, that skill is what keeps the soldiers, who carry equipment weighing sometimes 70 kilograms, alive.

"We know how to move quietly while carrying heavy equipment," Ido said. "Being quiet can sometimes save your life."
 
Hi all,

I have a question for those of you who are better informed on Israeli strategy than myself.

I heard on CBC this morning that Hezbollah claimed to have destroyed 13 armoured vehicles (CBC said tanks, but I find that reporters usually  include APC's in that category). I haven't been able to corroborate that from any news source, so take that claim for what its worth.

I then heard that the IDF was going to hold position (CBC) for a few days to give the diplomatic front a chance.

My question is this:

Is the IDF buying time to regroup, is this a serious offer or a combination of both?
 
I seldom believe anything CBC says on anything remotely military related. I never believe Hezbollah on, well, pretty much anything, really. Combine the two, and you have a gong show of epic proportions.

I'd suggest searching other sources, such as the Jerusalem Post, BBC, & Asia Times.

And, all anyone on this site could provide on Israeli strategic plans is speculation and guesstimation.
 
Re: Moving up to the Litani river.

That's really the only way. There's really no point in stepping foot on Lebanese soil at all if they don't intent to mitigate or eliminate the threat, and the only way to do that is by pushing those rockets outside of their max eff range from Israeli cities.

I'm interested to see if their strategy for achieving this will work however. They're not going to to advance northwards clearing their way up to the river, rather they're going to move straight up to the river bypassing the enemy and when they get there, they're going to go firm there, and then clear backwards towards Israel. While the benefit of this strategy is obviously that they get to cut off Hezbollah from supply and support, encirclement works best if the ground to your own rear is relatively secure. In this case, Israel is going to have their backs to the litani rive knowing full well that there's Hezbollah reinforcements and supplies piling up on the other side, wanting to pass. Israel should expect to have to fight that position in both directions - south against the Hezbollah forces who are the objective, and north against their friends who are going to be coming at them from the north.

And there's also the fact that by advancing North to south, they'll be conering their enemy where a south - north advance would allow them to flee. You don't want to fight a cornered enemy. They should be happy with allowing Hezbollah forces to flee north into Lebanon. If they're no longer able to fire rockets at Israeli cities then your objective is met.
 
Its nearly impossible to deliver a "knock out blow" to a guerrilla group when you yourself do not want to get bogged down in another lengthy occupation.   Nevertheless the consensus is that the last withdrawal from Lebanon just created a vacuum that Hez filled and consolidated.   Given these I suspect that Israel's strategy is to do such damage, including damage to client states, thats its obvious that you dont fool around with the IDF.   Call it  deterrence through demonstrated and raw destruction.


 
Was looking at pictures of the Litani river, basically a large creek for most of it from appearances.
 
Colin P said:
Was looking at pictures of the Litani river, basically a large creek for most of it from appearances.

Ah then, it is remarkedly similar to the River Jordan, into which we placed an inflatable raft with 4 people in it and as we "white-watered" it downstream...we rubbed the banks continuously. Check out the "Sea" of Gallilee. Very small lake by our standards. Very important strategicly by ME standards however.
 
The offensive is in high gear. Debka has a pretty good description of todays events. An Israeli chopper is down. Two soldiers were killed when a tank went into reverse. A number of Merkava's have been shot up by anti-tank weapons. Israel could have the area south of the Litani sealed off by monday morning.

http://www.debka.com/article.php?aid=1200

 
Perhaps but it is possible to cross check their stories for accuracy. This account of the offensive seems to be accurate.
 
tomahawk6 said:
Perhaps but it is possible to cross check their stories for accuracy. This account of the offensive seems to be accurate.
that would require effort, and you know very well that I'm a lazy, lazy man.
 
OK, so now there's a ceasefire.

This suggests the next questions: what constitutes a breach in the terms, and what happens when it breaks.

We know that even prior to the kidnappings, Hezbollah was lobbing rockets into N Israel.  Does a recommencement of this signify a breach?  What happens if Hezb tries to re-occupy battle positions?  What happens when they start delivering the next round of Katyushas?

Do the peacekeepers just take note and let it happen?  From what I can tell, their ROE are about as tight as is typical for the UN.  Effectively, Israel has just agreed to adding a Western barrier to their next response, while there's nothing that Hezb has to worry about returning to where they were before this all started.

So, back to the second question- what's the Israeli strat for the next time that missiles fly into Haifa?  With a French Div standing in between them and Hezb, they can't simply call game on and recommence where they left off.

My guess is that the only strategically sound means of responding would be (paradoxically enough) an airstrike against military and political installations in Syria.  The hope at that point is that with the Alawites decapitated, there will be civil war in Syria, and it will cease to be this decade's version of the Ho Chi Minh trail.

thoughts?
 
I don't think this ceasefire will last. If Hezbollah even twitches on a rocket attack against Israel, they'll be pounded yet again. I don't think Israel gave it enough punch, and I am sure they'll be back at it soon enough. Just watch Fox News for the 'football commentary'.

Hezbollah is still foaming at the mouth to get at Israel, and there is enough Iranian and Syrian money and motivation behind them for Rd 2.

Wait out on this one...

Wes
 
There will be no ceasation of hostilities until the UN is between the two forces at the very earliest.
 
Ya, we'll see just how much the Paper Tiger can accomplish. I do not have much confidence in today's UN. Over all 1/10.

My opinion anyways.

Wes
 
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