Constructing the CCG Hero class [Merged]

[Navy_Pete]

Got to work with the USNS on the tow home for the Protecteur (from HI to BC); their approach is quite different for what you would do for a standard tug around the harbour or a short distance, and it was a great learning experience to see professionals at work. After seeing the USNS Salvor though, can't really imagine anything not designed primarily for open ocean towing being able to do the job.

The wikipedia page is here; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USNS_Salvor

These guys are really impressive to see in action, and that winch is a big piece of kit. They are geared up for salvage/rescue, so also do diving and some other similar tasks, but would not want to do any kind of planned open ocean towing of a big ship without something of similar size and power.

I could see something like that being outfitted to be able to do some offshore work (environmental response? Basic SAR?) but tugs are built for bollard pull, not speed, so compromises to do other tasks can kill your primary role.

Given the desired uptick in vessel traffic they want to have with the pipeline port, would seem to be a reasonable precaution for those low likelihood/extreme impact risk scenarios with things running aground etc.

 

[chrisf]

I could see something like that being outfitted to be able to do some offshore work (environmental response? Basic SAR?) but tugs are built for bollard pull, not speed, so compromises to do other tasks can kill your primary role.

Most of the Canadian Coast Guard vessels max out at 15-17kts, any off the shelf anchor handler design should be able to do the same.

With the exception of a lack of helicopter facilities (which really get less use than you might think), there's a lot of off-the-shelf OSV designs that are pretty well suited to most coast guard tasks.

Bollard pull aside, one of the big features an anchor handler (or off shore tug) has in terms of towing is constant tension winch.

You set the tension on the winch, and the drum will automatically pay-out/take up to maintain the constant tension.

Plus shark jaws and tow pins, a hydraulic system on deck for holding whatever you're towing while you're making or breaking connections on deck.

Oil recovery systems, fire fighting, and SAR are all usually part of any off the shelf design as well.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

For handling the bigger buoys you need a 10/5 ton crane with 2 hooks and a decent reach and swing area. Buoys are 9 tons and rocks are 3 tons.

here is my old ship hard at work, the chain drum is a east coast addition. The nice thing about this design is you have a good size hold to hold buoys, chains and anchors, along with other stuff.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gIgjcbOkoag

 

[Navy_Pete]

Most of the Canadian Coast Guard vessels max out at 15-17kts, any off the shelf anchor handler design should be able to do the same.

With the exception of a lack of helicopter facilities (which really get less use than you might think), there's a lot of off-the-shelf OSV designs that are pretty well suited to most coast guard tasks.

Bollard pull aside, one of the big features an anchor handler (or off shore tug) has in terms of towing is constant tension winch.

You set the tension on the winch, and the drum will automatically pay-out/take up to maintain the constant tension.

Plus shark jaws and tow pins, a hydraulic system on deck for holding whatever you're towing while you're making or breaking connections on deck.

Oil recovery systems, fire fighting, and SAR are all usually part of any off the shelf design as well.

Thanks for the info; pretty interesting to hear what the CCG does.  Hadn't previously looked up the ETVs; bigger than what I thought they were.  Remember seeing those ships around St. John's but didn't realize they had been repurposed for this contract in BC.

 

[chrisf]

Thanks for the info; pretty interesting to hear what the CCG does.  Hadn't previously looked up the ETVs; bigger than what I thought they were.  Remember seeing those ships around St. John's but didn't realize they had been repurposed for this contract in BC.

They're well suited for what they've been contracted to do, at least as an interim solution.

They'll be a bit heavy on fuel consumption though. If they were to buy or build something in the future, they'd be well suited to go with a diesel-electric or hybrid option.

It's part of the reason they were available on the market, oil companies are paying more attention to fuel bills.

Coincidentally, Maersk Cutter is one of the more fuel efficient vessels that replaced them...

http://tugfaxblogspotcom.blogspot.com/2016/01/maersk-cutter-finds-work.html?m=1

Maersk had also bid the Cutter for the ETV contract.

 

[Uzlu]

Is the Canadian Coast Guard Underfunded?

“When there is more ice, you need more icebreakers. When there is less ice, you need more icebreakers.” At first, I was puzzled by this statement from a Canadian Coast Guard officer. The first part is obvious enough, the second part was less so. The reason for the second part is that when the ice starts to disappear, as is the case right now, the remaining ice starts moving unpredictably around by currents, tides and wind. Moving ice can prevent or delay the resupply of a community if there is not an available icebreaker to support the approach to that community.

Moving ice is what happened this past summer with expensive consequences. A significant amount of multi-year ice formed a plug in the Amundsen Gulf. Multi-year ice can be very thick and prevent even heavy icebreakers from getting through. That situation was a major factor in the failure to resupply a number of Arctic communities by barges. Some of the resupply had to be shipped by air at a cost of millions of dollars. Most of the heavy or bulky items such as vehicles and construction material will only be moved by the next shipping season causing delays to projects and logistical nightmares.

Unfortunately, the disappearing ice invites growing maritime traffic in the Arctic, including adventurers who may not be prepared for one of the most challenging environments on Earth. When the chief of defence staff states that when the Canadian Forces deployments to the Arctic are a form of expeditionary deployments people should pay attention. Too many come to the Arctic unprepared.

I was on board of the Canadian Coast Guard icebreaker Louis St-Laurent in 2013 when the ship received a distress signal from a group of adventurers who thought that it would be cool to sea-doo across the Northwest Passage. They became ice-bound by moving ice and their camp was attacked by polar bears. This past summer, a sailboat sank in the Arctic near the Bellot Strait. Fortunately, the crew members managed to transfer to a large ice floe and were later rescued.

One of the problems adventurers create when they come unprepared is that they may trigger a distress signal which will divert a Canadian Coast Guard icebreaker from their other duties. Apart from the significant cost to the Canadian taxpayers to rescue a party that is there for pleasure, it may very well delay the annual resupply of an Arctic community putting it at risk and/ or add significant cost to the companies like the Nunavut Eastern Arctic Shipping Inc. providing the resupply. Suzanne Paquin, president and chief executive officer, stated: “A community resupply delay because an icebreaker has been diverted to a distress call could cost our company as much as tens of thousands of dollars a day.”

Several maritime companies have criticized the availability of icebreaker support this past shipping season which experienced unusual difficult ice conditions. In 2018, the cruise ship Akademik Ioffe, operated by One Ocean Expeditions (OOE), grounded in the western gulf of Boothia on August 24. A Canadian Coast Guard icebreaker was dispatched to the scene as a precaution and remained onsite for three days. The cost to the taxpayers was more than $240,000 to support a tourist vessel which had sailed in uncharted waters.

This was the third cruise ship to run aground in the Arctic after the Hanseatic in 1997 and the Clipper Adventurer in 2010. Fortunately, there was no loss of life and only minor environmental impacts. With increasing activity in poorly-charted areas, our luck may soon run out.

Given the challenging conditions of the Arctic and the tremendous cost of search and rescue operations, it might be time to consider the requirement for those who wish to enter the Arctic to post bonds which would be forfeited should they trigger a search and rescue operation. The main reasons would be to force them to be better prepared given the inherent risks of the environment, discourage the less professional adventurers altogether and recover a portion of the cost incurred by the Canadian taxpayers when a rescue is triggered.

At the very least, Canada should consider a similar policy as in the case of the Nahanni National Park where “individuals who, through court proceedings, are found to be negligent, may be held responsible for the full cost of search and rescue.”

To make matters worse, the Canadian Coast Guard icebreaker fleet vessels are past their design life and require extensive refits and increased maintenance time, all of which reduces their availability. To the Canadian government’s credit the recent acquisition of three surplus icebreakers from Shell has improved the availability of icebreakers not only for Arctic operations but also for ice-breaking duties to maintain the Saint-Lawrence Seaway open during the winter season.

On December 14, 2018, it took delivery of CCGS Captain Molly Kool, the first of three newly-refitted medium icebreakers from Chantier Davie Canada Inc. Apart from the CCG Diefenbaker, which service date is slipping to the right, there is not a public plan to replace the aging fleet which averages 35 years of age. It could be that the Canadian Coast Guard is not funded properly to provide it with the resources necessary to perform their essential functions in the Arctic.

It has also been suggested that it may be better to move it to Transport Canada. Another option would be to move it back to the Department of National Defence where it used to be. That addition would improve the percentage of resources allocated to the defence of Canada and move us closer to the two percent of GDP pledge with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The U.S. Coast Guard is part of their armed forces. Regardless of which department it should be with, there is an urgent need to fund the Canadian Coast Guard adequately so that it has the necessary resources to provide essential services in the Canadian Arctic at a time when the maritime activity is on the increase.

In an exciting development for the people of the Canadian Arctic, the Canadian Coast Guard has recently created a new regional office called CCG Arctic Region. Its headquarters is in Yellowknife, N.W.T. It is refreshing that now “Coast Guard arctic operational decisions will be made in the Arctic.”

The Department of National Defence is about to deploy a new family of Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships that will have a limited capability to operate in ice of up to one meter. The development will certainly add to the federal government assets in the Arctic but those ships are not designed to break ice in support of maritime activity. That function has to be done by a properly designed icebreaker.

https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/is-the-canadian-coast-guard-underfunded

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Coast Guard was never part of the Armed Forces, SAR was and still is a responsibility of the CF. CG was formed by amalgamating the Department of Transport and the RCAF Crashboats stations into the Coast Guard around 1962-64.

Problem for a lot of people outside looking at the CG i they forget the other tasks such as Navaids, as you can suspect buoy tending is not high on the CF or Homeland Security priority list.

 

[MarkOttawa]

Latest on problems:

How some coast guard ships stayed tied up when they could have been at work
Social Sharing
Vessels tied up for 151 days when weather was 'within operational parameters,' document says

There is more evidence suggesting Canadian coast guard mid-shore patrol vessels are a fair-weather fleet.

Documents obtained by CBC News show that during a one-year period, two mid-shore patrol vessels based in Nova Scotia were tied up for 151 days in weather conditions when they were supposed to be operable.

Last month, CBC revealed the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) is looking at installing stabilizers — blades that counteract the motion of waves — on its nine coast guard mid-shore vessels. This followed widespread complaints from crew about excessive rolling at sea.

Michael Grace, DFO's offshore surveillance supervisor, looked at sea conditions during the 165 days when two mid-shore vessels based in Nova Scotia were in port or anchored — from April 1, 2017, to March 31, 2018.

His briefing table on the "probabilities the vessels were being anchored based on wind speeds and sea conditions" was released to CBC under the Access to Information Act.

"The vessels frequently did not operate in winds in excess of 20 knots, sea states under 2 metres," the table compiled by Grace states.

In March 2018, the Dartmouth-based supervisor delivered the presentation at a joint management meeting of officials with the Canadian Coast Guard and DFO in Vancouver.

DFO official studies wind speed, sea state

The vessels, which are 42 metres long and seven metres wide, are known as the Hero class since each is named after an exemplary military, RCMP, coast guard or DFO officer.

The mid-shore patrol vessels are based on both the east and west coasts of Canada.

According to minutes of the meeting, Grace looked at wind speeds and sea conditions when the CCGS G Peddle and CCGS Corporal McLaren were ashore.

"The reported weather and sea state condition outlined in the table indicates that up to 91.5% of the in port/anchored time occurred within the stated operating parameters of the MSVP."

For primary missions in the Atlantic, like fishery patrols, the vessel is expected to sail in what is known as Sea State 5, which is three-metre seas and winds averaging 24 knots.

According to the table, "28.6% of the port/anchored time took place in weather conditions with winds of less than 20 knots and a sea state of 0.5 to 2.0 metres."

Coast guard: no response

The Canadian Coast Guard did not comment on Grace's report when contacted by CBC News...

https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/canada-s-coast-guard-mid-shore-vessels-fair-weather-fleet-1.5061767

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Colin Parkinson]

This is a Malaysian Coast Guard ship that my Uncle inlaw was Chief Officer on, note the A frame on the bacf, another was of buoy tending.
https://perkapalanmalaysia.com/2018/07/30/kapal-untuk-dijual-buoy-tender-vessel/

 

[Kirkhill]

This is a Malaysian Coast Guard ship that my Uncle inlaw was Chief Officer on, note the A frame on the bacf, another was of buoy tending.
https://perkapalanmalaysia.com/2018/07/30/kapal-untuk-dijual-buoy-tender-vessel/

Question to you Colin.  What would happen to the stability issues if those Coast Guard Yellow structures were removed - to wit: the deck crane and the mast extension?

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Likely help a lot, but you lose the ability to launch a boat and lose Radar horizon, and create interference with the electronics. Better off to do Bilge keels, stabilizers and perhaps redeploy them elsewhere. 

 

[Kirkhill]

Radars are only a quarter of the way up the mast as it is so your radar horizon wouldn't improve much.  And as to launching boats - stern ramp.

https://products.damen.com/en/ranges/stan-patrol/stan-patrol-4207
https://www.youtube.com/embed/njhxLcauNZ4?rel=0?autoplay=1


Or perhaps something like this

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Same problem, a smaller vessel designed to go fast is going to suffer in the North Atlantic in winter time. there is no free lunch in ship design. 

 

[Kirkhill]

Point taken - but the vessel purchased as the Hero was the Damen Stan 4209 - which is the boat shown in the you tube video launching and recovering a RIB over the stern.

In addition, the official designation of the vessel is a Mid-Shore Patrol Vessel.  That neither suggests rolling around in deep water nor tending buoys.  Rather it suggests operations in sight of land in aid of the the police, fisheries and the environment.

 

[STONEY]

The Damen Stan 4209 is a perfectly good design used by several country's around the world including the US Coast Guard but when we bought the design and Canadianized it is when it was turned into a disaster. This is nothing new for CG HQ in Ottawa and continues today with problems in constructing new ships. You have to realize that most people in Ottawa don't know what a ship looks like let alone make decisions on design.
Cheers.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

That would not surprise me sadly. Here is a video of the 4209. I notice no pictures or video in heavy sea state



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u8XZI4wCdjw

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Just a few points.

First, the US Coast Guard does not operate Damen 4209 boats, they operate Damen 4708 boats. Much bigger and fully equipped with stabilizers.

And that's my second point: Stabilizers. They're removed in the Canadian mods. A completely stupid and irrational idea. Small patrol vessels need them if they are to survive heavy seas. The mast (which is the standard one) and the boat boom make little difference. Removing the stabilizers was the biggie here.

Finally, There are no parts of the Canadian East Coast that do not involve going to sea in the North Atlantic's worse weather. I've said it before, but  I'll say it again: On the East Coast, there is no such thing as "coastal" or "inshore" or "mid-shore". You get out of harbour and you are in mid-atlantic conditions whether you want it or not - even when in sight of land. That is just the nature of our oceanic border there, and it is NOT the experience of other nations using the Stan designs near European land masse, or in the Mediterranean sea, or in the Caribbean's.

We should have been looking for a better ocean going design, had it been selected by someone who knows anything about the Atlantic border of Canada.

 

 

[chrisf]

Question to you Colin.  What would happen to the stability issues if those Coast Guard Yellow structures were removed - to wit: the deck crane and the mast extension?

Both the mast and the crane serve important functions on the vessel, taking them off isn't an option.

Most of the equipment on a mast either needs height be effective (most of it antennas are either limited to line of sight, there's also several satellite antenna mounted that need a clear line of sight to the sky), and some need physical separation vertically from other equipment to work (particularly the radar)

If you could, it would lower the center of gravity of the vessel, which could help with stability, but it's not a stability issue so much as speed it rolls at.

Practically speaking, the weight of the mast and the crane isn't greatly significant compared to the rest of the vessel.

Bare in mind you've got a whole lot of things in the hull at and below the waterline you can't see in the picture....such as the engine, various machinery, and various tanks full of water and fuel.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Useful video


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5eepu_owFHI

 

[Uzlu]

God Herself could come down from the heavens and demand lots of new ships immediately, and the government of Canada will claim that the Canadian Coast Guard is in great shape.

Coast guard struggling to help with rescues, Arctic resupply due to old fleet

OTTAWA — Reduced search-and-rescue coverage, ferry-service disruptions, cancelled resupply runs to Arctic and coastal communities and nearly $2 million in lost navigational buoys.

Those are among the real safety, social and commercial impacts that communities across the country are starting to feel as the Canadian Coast Guard's fleet gets older, according to new documents obtained by The Canadian Press.

And the problems are expected to get worse: the documents warn that more than a third of the coast guard's 26 large vessels have exceeded their expected lifespans and many won't survive until replacements arrive.

"Vessels are at increasing risk of unrecoverable failure," reads one PowerPoint presentation prepared by coast guard officials last summer and marked "secret." "Many ships will not remain operational until their replacements arrive."

Obtained through the access-to-information law, the documents underline the stakes facing the federal government and various communities if Canada does not have a capable coast-guard fleet.

They come amid questions about how and when the government will replace the coast guard's existing vessels. Only five new coast-guard ships are currently included in the government's multibillion-dollar national shipbuilding plan.

The PowerPoint presentation is particularly frank in its assessment of what it describes as the "early impacts of an older fleet coupled with increasing demand" that are already visible.

"Over the past four years, lengthening repair periods and unplanned outages have temporarily reduced coverage in all four offshore search-and-rescue areas in Atlantic Canada," reads one section.

The coast guard has also lost nearly $2 million in navigational buoys in recent years "because they could not be removed due to ship availability and ice conditions," the presentation adds.

Ferry services have been interrupted, specifically Marine Atlantic's operations serving Newfoundland and commercial ships have been left waiting for days for icebreakers "at significant costs to industry."

Canada has also failed to meet its obligations under the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization in recent years for fisheries conservation and protection "due to repair and maintenance issues," the presentation says.

And the resupply of Arctic and coast communities have been delayed or cancelled — a problem that continued even after the presentation was prepared, as residents of three communities in the Northwest Territories can attest from last fall.

"I don't know why they couldn't have arranged an icebreaker," John Holland, senior administrative officer for the hamlet of Paulatuk, told The Canadian Press in October after one scheduled sea lift was cancelled.

The coast guard has a long history of being overlooked and ignored in political Ottawa, which is one of the key factors in the age of the agency's fleet, said Rob Huebert, an expert on the Arctic at the University of Calgary.

The presentation underscores the impact of such neglect, he said, namely real safety concerns, in the case of search-and-rescue services and lost navigational buoys, and northern communities cut off from supplies.

"We have talked in the past about an older coast-guard fleet and that there are problems (but) we can't get into details because the details are never presented," Huebert said. "This is the actual reality. This is what is happening."

Asked about the documents this week, Fisheries Minister Jonathan Wilkinson insisted in a statement the fleet "remains reliable" and the federal government "takes the renewal of the coast-guard fleet seriously."

Ottawa recently bought three second-hand icebreakers to pick up some of the slack, he noted, while the multibillion-dollar national shipbuilding plan includes money for one icebreaker and four science ships for the coast guard.

"We will continue to look at solutions so that Canadians can continue to receive the services they need," Wilkinson added.

Yet exactly when Seaspan Shipyards in Vancouver will deliver the five ships included in the national shipbuilding plan remains uncertain, let alone when the government will decide how and when to replace the rest of the fleet.

Seaspan was supposed to deliver the first of three fisheries-science vessels in early 2017 before problems were found with the ship's welding. It then crashed into a breakwater last month while returning from its first test run at sea.

Government officials say they still anticipate receiving that science ship this summer and that the other two will follow over the next year or so. Even if that happens, there is no firm schedule for the new heavy icebreaker and other science vessel to arrive.

Seaspan has also been tapped to build two new supply ships for the navy, the first of which won't be delivered until at least 2023.

Meanwhile, Seaspan and its Quebec-based rival Davie have been engaged in a fierce behind-the-scenes battle over the contracts for 10 other coast-guard ships that were promised to the Vancouver yard in 2013.

Seaspan has all but warned that its survival is contingent on building those ships, which were initially estimated to cost $3.3 billion.

Davie, however, has pointed out that Seaspan won't be able to start work on the ships for years and wants the government to shift the business to Davie.

https://www.lillooetnews.net/coast-guard-struggling-to-help-with-rescues-arctic-resupply-due-to-old-fleet-1.23783814