Some good background on the 60mm is available on the web. The US are looking at ways to improve its effectiveness based on previous successes in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. The Israeli's mount them on the tanks as a result of lessons learned in the 1973 War.
TTPs for the 60mm mortar section
In the first week of April 2003, Task Force Red Devil, comprised of the 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry (Airborne) and Delta Battery, 3rd Battalion, 319th Field Artillery, conducted two artillery/mortar raids outside of the northern Iraqi city of Irbil. These missions were against an Iraqi Republican Guard Battalion supported by armor and artillery.
The mission was to destroy forward Iraqi observation posts, dug-in Iraqi positions, and to neutralize Iraqi armor and artillery pieces. The 60mm mortar primary targets were personnel and light-skinned vehicles near the observation posts. The battalion 120mm mortar section and two 105mm howitzers were tasked to neutralize the enemy armor and artillery. The mounted rifle companies were tasked to provide route security, security of the firing elements at the firing points, quick reaction force (QRF) duties, and to emplace accurate fires onto the enemy using their vehicle-mounted 50-caliber machine guns and Mk-19 grenade launchers.
The 60mm mortars from Alpha Company, 1-508th Infantry, were tasked to provide immediate indirect fire support onto known and suspected targets. Upon reaching their planned mortar firing point, the section immediately dismounted their HMMWV (high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle) and conducted an emergency occupation. The section immediately received a call for fire from their forward observers. Within 60 seconds of occupation, the section was placing accurate high explosive (HE) and white phosphorus (WP) rounds onto and in the vicinity of the Iraqi observations
posts.http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IAV/is_3_93/ai_n6366546
Mortars in Afghanistan
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WAzioXfgVhY
81mm and 60mm Mortars in OIF
http://209.85.173.104/search?q=cache:hp83XNf3ES8J
roceedings.ndia.org/C347/Clayton.pdf+60mm%2Bmortar%2Beffective&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=20&gl=ca
Indirect fire the close fight: the 60mm mortar
Army-wide, light infantry platoons are reluctant to incorporate indirect fires, specifically from the 60mm mortar, when the enemy establishes contact in the close fight. Some platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, squad leaders, team leaders, and also forward observers (FOs) are reluctant to use the mortars in the close fight because they are not familiar with the weapon system, nor do they trust it. This situation should cause great concern. The mortars exist to support infantry platoons, enabling them to conserve their combat power during chance contact and to maximize it during the decisive fight. The 60mm mortar can be a valuable asset to a light infantry platoon by providing highly responsive and short minimum range indirect fires that either kill the enemy or suppress his fire, thus enabling the assaulting rifleman to close with and kill him. We cannot blame the platoon leadership for being wary of using mortars. I wouldn't use a weapon system that I wasn't familiar with or did not trust. It is vital that we develop a solution that will help platoon and company leaders establish trust in a weapon system that is a "critical and irreplaceable element of a rifle company's maneuver"
After action reviews from the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) from the 4th Quarter, Fiscal Year 94 to the 1st Quarter, FY 00, have shown that there is a recurring trend in infantry battalions--team leaders, squad leaders, and platoon leaders are not aware of or just not comfortable with calling for fire. The result is that units have failed to integrate indirect fires into chance contacts with the enemy, thus allowing the enemy to break contact on their own terms. A former senior brigade fire support observer/ controller at JRTC stated that the failure to adjust indirect fires onto a fast-moving enemy when contact is made contributes to the 7:1 loss ratio between the blue force (BLUFOR) and the opposing force (OPFOR) at JRTC. The 60mm mortar is the only indirect weapon system organic to the light infantry company. Regardless of the conditions or constraints applied by higher levels, the 60mm mortar is all-weather, always present, and approved at company level. The situation in Afghanistan reinforces the need for infantry platoons to incorporate mortars into the close fight and fix the problem. Because of conditions such as extreme altitude and inclement weather, coupled with mission specific constraints, there were times when the 60mm mortar was the only indirect fire asset available to companies conducting dismounted patrols during combat operations. The fact is that without the employment of mortars during the close fight, platoons can neither conserve nor maximize their combat power.
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IAV/is_1_93/ai_n6123808
Defense Update
The 60 mm mortars are becoming a popular weapon of choice among peacekeeping forces, engaged in war against terror in Afghanistan and Iraq, where they are rapidly fielded as low-cost, highly effective defensive or offensive weapon to improve the integral fire support of small contingent forces fielded by contributing NATO members. Old generation tubes, including 60mm and 51mm tubes were quite popular in the past, but in recent years were practically shelved due ammunition obsolescence. The British Army already decided to phase out its 51 mm tubes in favor of 60 mm mortars, while the US Army is currently considering a similar move. The Israeli army fields 60 mm tubes with all tanks and heavy APCs as a lesson from the 1973 Yom Kippur war.
http://www.defense-update.com/events/2007/summary/ausa07fires.htm
Small Arms - The 60mm Mortar
For mobile platoon and company level action, an easily portable weapon for use between the effective ranges of hand grenades and the 81mm mortar was needed. Hence, the 60mm M2. The bipod was often left attached to the tube for speed in bringing the mortar into action, and the combination was readily carried by two men, with ammunition in complete rounds being carried by supporting troops.
In the Marine Corps, our 60mm guns were usually in three gun-squads in a 20-man mortar section commanded by a lieutenant, reinforcing each Rifle Company. Each gun-squad consisted of a squad leader, gunner, assistant gunner and 3 ammo bearers. In deployment for action, the ammo carriers humped 6 loads, in addition to their weapons and equipment. On the move, the gunner carried the complete mortar w/o sight, and all other men carried ammo bags or packboards strapping 12 loads. In addition all men carried their equipment and a carbine, and the squad leader carried the M4 sight. These guns were invaluable in close support. Sometimes in battery, but usually assigned one gun per platoon, they moved fluidly close behind our assault troops, and registered on assault lanes in front of the platoons before night, so as to be ready to quickly provide murderous close support.
They often had to.
Infantry mortars are normally employed in defiladed positions, such as the reverse slope of a hill or ridge, so as not to be vulnerable to enemy direct fire positions. Hence direction and altitude settings are normally controlled indirectly by a forward observer, or an aiming stake about 10-25 yards forward of the gunner, and the rounds are normally dropped down the barrel. The 60mm M19 could be used as a direct fire weapon by attaching the small M1 base plate to the barrel. This reduced the mortar weight substantially, and greatly lowered the weapon profile in the open during fluid engagements where targets were close and in direct view.In such situations, however, the recoilless rifle or bazooka were usually more effective.
Comparing weight of material to destruction delivered at the target, mortars are very efficient. "The infantry's artillery", they provide small infantry units artillery-like fire support when artillery either was not available, or could not be moved forward fast enough. The initial Chinese Communist assaults of November and December 1950, did not bring artillery, but they did bring mortars, and used them with great effectiveness.
Typical CCF assault tactics were to drift strong infantry units near our lines at night, and use small probing attacks to locate our automatic weapons and machine guns and, if possible, junctions between our platoons or other weak points. Then, they would attack in strength with platoons armed only with grenades, followed by submachine gun platoons. Their light mortar units would follow quickly, and place their fire on our strong points from fairly close distances, enabling them to fire with reasonable accuracy even though at night and without prior registration.
http://www.rt66.com/~korteng/SmallArms/60mm.htm
