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Chinese Military,Political and Social Superthread

The earlier posts about China and Russia nearly coming to war during the 1960s and 70s aren't really that surprising, since a sort of schism between Moscow and Beijing had developed during the Cold War from the 50s onwards, which partially had to do with who led the Communist world; this explains why Chinese and Soviet forces actually came to a number of border clashes in the late 1960s. If you go to the Chinese People's Military Museum (Jun Shi Bo Wu Guan/军事博物馆) in Beijing, you will see a captured Soviet T-55 tank from one of those skirmishes. 

At times, Beijing and Moscow used proxies to fight each other, such as when Vietnam (which was pro-Moscow at the time) occupied Cambodia in 1978 and forced the pro-China, Khmer Rouge government away from power; this provoked the ire of China, driving them to invade Vietnam in the costly 1979 invasion which saw China withdraw. And didn't the Vietnamese also allow the Soviets to base some of their ships at Cam Ranh Bay for a while in the late 70s and 80s? One can infer that the Soviet naval presence was another signal to China to back off. Thus it is probably not surprising that Beijing and Moscow nearly came to nuclear blows during this point of the Cold War.

Perhaps one can infer that the Chinese historians intended to portray the then USSR as another foreign power trying to victimize China to add to the theme of a "China being victimized" which seems to be recurring all throughout their recent history since the Qing Dynasty.

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Also, from last week:

(Contrast this to another earlier article which stated that the PLAAF was reluctant to accept "made-in-China fighters" like the J-11B/indigenously-produced Su27)

Reuters link

26 minutes ago

By Jim Wolf

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - China is building an advanced combat jet that may rival within eight years Lockheed Martin Corp's F-22 Raptor, the premier U.S. fighter, a U.S. intelligence official said.


The date cited for the expected deployment is years ahead of previous Pentagon public forecasts and may be a sign that China's rapid military buildup is topping many experts' expectations.


"We're anticipating China to have a fifth-generation fighter ... operational right around 2018," Wayne Ulman of the National Air and Space Intelligence Center testified on Thursday to a congressionally mandated group that studies national security implications of U.S.-China economic ties.


"Fifth-generation" fighters feature cutting-edge capabilities, including shapes, materials and propulsion systems designed to make them look as small as a swallow on enemy radar screens.


Defense Secretary Robert Gates had said last year that China "is projected to have no fifth-generation aircraft by 2020" and only a "handful" by 2025.


He made the comments on July 16 to the Economic Club of Chicago while pushing Congress to cap F-22 production at 187 planes in an effort to save billions of dollars in the next decade.


Ulman is China "issues manager" at the center that is the U.S. military's prime intelligence producer on foreign air and space forces, weapons and systems. He said China's military was eyeing options for possible use of force against Taiwan, which Beijing deems a rogue province.


The People's Liberation Army, as part of its Taiwan planning, also is preparing to counter "expected U.S. intervention in support of Taiwan," he told the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.


He said the PLA's strategy included weakening U.S. air power by striking air bases, aircraft carrier strike groups and support elements if the U.S. stepped in.


Attacks against U.S. "basing infrastructure" in the western Pacific would be carried out by China's air force along with an artillery corps' conventional cruise missile and ballistic missile forces, he said outlining what he described as a likely scenario.


He described China as a "hard target" for intelligence-gathering and said there were a lot of unknowns about its next fighter, a follow-on to nearly 500 4th generation fighters "that can be considered at a technical parity" with older U.S. fighters.


"It's yet to be seen exactly how (the next generation) will compare one on one with say an F-22," Ulman told the commission. "But it'll certainly be in that ballpark."



Lockheed Martin, the Pentagon's No. 1 supplier by sales, is in the early stages of producing another fifth-generation fighter, the F-35. Developed with eight partner countries in three models with an eye to achieving economies of scale and export sales, it will not fly as fast nor as high as the F-22.


Gates has argued that the United States enjoys a lopsided advantage in fighters, warships and other big-ticket military hardware. Some U.S. congressional decisions on arms programs amount to overkill, out of touch with "real-world" threats and today's economic strains, he said in two speeches on the issue this month.


"For example, should we really be up in arms over a temporary projected shortfall of about 100 Navy and Marine strike fighters relative to the number of carrier wings, when America's military possesses more than 3,200 tactical combat aircraft of all kinds?" Gates said on May 8.


"Is it a dire threat that by 2020 the United States will have only 20 times more advanced stealth fighters than China?" he added at the Eisenhower presidential library in Abilene, Kansas.


Geoff Morrell, the Pentagon press secretary, discounted the gap between the timelines cited by Gates and Ulman. He declined to comment on whether China had made enough progress since last July to change intelligence on the next fighter's debut.

Richard Fisher, an expert on the Chinese military at the private International Assessment and Strategy Center, said Gates' decision to end F-22 production is proving to be "potentially very wrong."

"We will need more F-22s if we are going to adequately defend our interests," he said in an interview on Thursday at the hearing.

Bruce Lemkin, a U.S. Air Force deputy undersecretary for ties to foreign air forces, told the commission he had visited Taiwan twice in his official capacity and that the capabilities of Taiwan's aging F-16s, also built by Lockheed, were not "keeping up."

Whether to meet Taiwan's request for advanced F-16 fighters or upgrade the old ones was still under review by the Obama administration, he said before Ulman spoke.
 
A short not from FT, which hints at a potentially huge problem lurking below the radar. China's government will take steps to intervene in the market, producing many unintended consequences (Community Reinvestment Act; Freddie Mac and Fannie May anyone?) and probably end up with a far more serious problem on their hands as multiple crisis link up into a cascade failure. Even China is not immune from the Local Knowledge Problem.

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/d6b8f8d8-6ce2-11df-91c8-00144feab49a,Authorised=false.html?_i_location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F0%2Fd6b8f8d8-6ce2-11df-91c8-00144feab49a.html&_i_referer=http%3A%2F%2Fpajamasmedia.com%2Finstapundit%2F

China property risk is worse than in US
By Geoff Dyer in Beijing

Published: May 31 2010 20:08 | Last updated: May 31 2010 20:08

The problems in China’s housing market are more severe than those in the US before the financial crisis because they combine a potential bubble with the risk of social discontent, according to an adviser to the Chinese central bank.

Li Daokui, a professor at Tsinghua University and a member of the Chinese central bank’s monetary policy committee, said recent government measures to cool the property market needed to be part of a long-term push to bring high housing prices under control.
 
China boasts world's second-fastest supercomputer
Agence France-Presse
First Posted 23:07:00 06/01/2010

BEIJING – China's ambitions to become a major global power in the world of supercomputing were given a boost when one of its machines was ranked second-fastest in a survey.

The Nebulae machine at the National Supercomputing Center in the southern city of Shenzhen can perform at 1.271 petaflops per second, according to the Top 500 survey (http://www.top500.org), which ranks supercomputers.

A petaflop is equivalent to 1,000 trillion calculations.

The United States still dominates the list, holding top spot with its Jaguar supercomputer at a government facility in Tennessee, and more than half of the systems on the list, released at a supercomputing conference in Germany.


But China has a total of 24 systems on the list, and two in the top ten, with the Tianhe-1 supercomputer in Tianjin ranking number seven.

And the Nebulae, built by Dawning Information Industry Co. Ltd., has a theoretical speed of 2.98 petaflops per second, which would make it the fastest in the world.

The machine's uses include scientific computing and gene sequencing, according to Chinese state media.

Calls to the company for further comment went unanswered.

The supercomputers on the Top 500 list are rated based on speed of performance in a benchmark test. Submissions are voluntary, so it does not include all machines.

The survey is produced twice-yearly.
 
Predictably, Xinhua and CCTV didn't report this:  ::)

NY Times link

The strike that has crippled production at Honda Motor’s factories in China has come as a wake-up call to Japan’s flagship exporters as they seek to remain competitive and push into China’s burgeoning market with the help of low-wage workers.

The strike by Chinese workers to protest pay and working conditions has cost Honda, Japan’s second-largest carmaker after Toyota, thousands of units in lost production in the world’s biggest auto market. The walkout began on May 17 at a Honda transmission factory in Foshan, in the southeast, and has shut down all four of Honda’s factories on the mainland.


“Honda takes the situation very seriously,” said Yasuko Matsuura, a spokeswoman for Honda in Tokyo. The company “is working toward reaching a resolution as soon as possible.” On Tuesday, there were conflicting accounts by the company and Chinese employees about how soon workers might return to their jobs.

In Tokyo, the strike has driven home a salient point: as Chinese incomes and expectations rise in line with the country’s rapid growth, while Japan’s own economy falters, the two countries face a realignment that could permanently alter the way their economies interact.

To complicate the picture, Japanese companies see the Chinese as crucial consumers of their goods to make up for a shrinking and aging market at home. Some of the most profitable Japanese companies, like Fast Retailing, which runs the budget clothing line Uniqlo, have relied on production in China since the 1990s to keep prices low.

“Japan is starting to realize that the age of cheap wages in China is coming to an end, and companies that looked to China only for lower costs need to change course,
” said Tomoo Marukawa, a specialist on the Chinese economy at Tokyo University.

Despite the consequences for production costs, a rise in wages and standards of living in China would be welcomed by many Japanese exporters. The same companies that produce in China have also moved to sell their wares there, moving factories to the mainland to reduce costs further and meet the needs of local customers.

In Uniqlo’s case, as incomes in China rose, it followed up with local stores in 2002; the company has opened 64 outlets in China and aims to open 1,000 stores there in the next decade.

And yet, for Honda, prices of its cars in China may have to drop considerably before the company can truly tap into the market.

(...)
 
Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from the Globe and Mail, is more about the continuously and, I think, accelerating socio-economic reformation of China:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/change-finally-afoot-for-chinas-workers/article1590744/
Change finally afoot for China’s workers
The years of an endless supply of cheap labour are coming to an end

David Pilling

London — FT.com
Published on Thursday, Jun. 03, 2010

Listen to the following statements about the strike at Honda’s transmission plant in Guangdong province, one that has brought the Japanese company’s car production throughout China  to a juddering halt. The first goes like this: “The strike reflects the low wages the bosses are paying the workers. The system does not provide a legal base for collective bargaining.” The second, like this: “In the three decades of opening-up, ordinary workers are among those who have received the smallest share of economic prosperity. The temporary stoppage of production lines in the four Honda factories highlights the necessity of organised labour protection in Chinese factories.”

The first speaker is Han Dongfang, a former railway electrician who, in 1989, tried to unite workers and students during the Tiananmen Square protests. He was jailed for his troubles, contracted tuberculosis in prison and had a lung surgically removed. Now living in exile in Hong Kong , he works as a trade union activist, monitoring workers’ rights in mainland China.
So why are a leading dissident from Tiananmen Square and a newspaper with close ties to the Communist party speaking with one voice on such a delicate issue?

First, government authorities, through the media, are simply acknowledging reality. The years of an endless supply of cheap labour, on which the first three decades of China’s economic lift-off was built, are coming to an end. That is partly demographic. Because of China’s one-child policy, the supply of workers under 40 has dwindled by as much as a fifth. Fewer workers mean more bargaining power. Honda staff are demanding no less than a 50 per cent rise. Foxconn, a China-based Taiwanese contract manufacturer plagued by a recent spate of worker suicides, has just granted a 30 per cent wage increase.

Unlike the first wave of migrants who came to the cities in the 1980s and 1990s, the current batch has more options and higher aspirations. Many are not content to save money for a few years before returning home. They want to settle in the booming cities. That means they need higher wages. If they can’t get them, there are opportunities at home. Under cost pressure, some factories have shifted inland, away from the factory towns on the east coast and the Pearl River Delta, and closer to the provinces from which most migrants come.

The second reason for the cautious sanction of industrial action is that the Communist party has a stake in better working conditions. Providing cheap Chinese labour to multinationals from Japan, the US and Europe was a means, not an end. Deng Xiaoping said it was glorious to get rich, not to make foreign-invested capital rich. As elsewhere, the share of labour in corporate profits has been falling. That runs contrary to the emphasis placed by China’s leadership on a “harmonious society”. Chinese media coverage of the Honda strike, as well as of the Foxconn suicides, has been heavy with analysis of the widening income gap.

There are other signs that the scales may be tipping labour’s way. In 2008, Beijing enacted the labour contract law, stipulating that workers be given written contracts. Coupled with growing wage pressure, this changed atmosphere has obvious implications for foreign investors grown accustomed to a low-wage, strike-free, hire-and-fire environment.

Yet few are likely to pull out. That is because China has ceased to be merely a low-cost production centre. For many companies, it is also becoming an important market and an integral part of their global supply chain. Walmart sources $30bn worth of goods from China each year. Japanese car manufacturers, such as Honda, have brought with them a network of components makers, and built ties with Chinese parts suppliers. What goes for cars goes for iPads, mobile phones, digital cameras and colour photocopiers. Such a clustering effect makes it almost impossible for manufacturers to pick up sticks and start afresh elsewhere.

For all these reasons, Beijing may continue to offer cautious support to an emboldened workforce, though it will keep a watchful eye on wage inflation. But on no account will it tolerate any hint of organised labour evolving into a political force. Even Mr Han, whose political activities in 1989 landed him in jail and exile, has reached the pragmatic conclusion that labour rights and political rights must be separate. “I’m trying my best to depoliticise the labour movement in China,” he says. When a Chinese labour activist wants to take the politics out of collective bargaining and official China is cheering on strikers, change is clearly afoot.


There are, at least, three “Chinas:” the newly prosperous East coast, the middle provinces which are just starting to reap some of the benefits of modernization and industrialization and the poor, agrarian far Western provinces. This story, like much of what we hear about China, is a bout the sophisticated, relatively rich, “modern,” indeed almost Western East coast. It takes a long time for change to happen in all of China, especially in the poor West.
 
Moscow News link

Russian military: China's J-15 fighter jets not up to par
Source Alyona Topolyanskaya at 07/06/2010

China's J-15 carrier-based fighter will not be able to compete with Russia's SU- 33 fighter on global markets because it is inferior to the Russian aircraft, said  Russian military analyst .

China since 2001 has been developing the J-15 naval fighter, which is believed to be a clone of Russia's Su-33 Falcon-D. China bought an SU-33 prototype earlier from Ukraine, and used it to develop its new aircraft.

"The Chinese J-15 clone is unlikely to achieve the same performance characteristics of the Russian SU-33 carrier-based fighter, and I won’t rule out the possibility that China could return to negotiations with Russia on the purchase of a substantial batch of SU-33s," said Col. Igor Korotchenko, a member of the Defense Ministry's Public Council.

The J-15 is expected to be stationed initially onboard the Chinese Varyag aircraft carrier, which is currently being fitted in the port of Dalian. China purchased  the unfinished Admiral Kuznetsov class aircraft carrier from Ukraine back in 1998.

The SU-33 is a carrier-based multi-role fighter, which can perform a variety of air tasks such as fleet defense, air support and reconnaissance missions. The aircraft entered service with the Russian Navy in 1995 and are currently deployed on board the Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier.

Korotchenko said that China was unlikely to solve technical problems related to the design of the folding wings and to develop a reliable engine for the aircraft, although the first J-15 prototype reportedly made its maiden flight on August 31, 2009, powered by Chinese WS-10 turbofan engines.

J-15b.jpg

 
 
From Strategypage.

China Steals The Abandoned Su-33
June 7, 2010: For over five years, China has been developing a carrier version of the Russian Su-27, calling it the J-15. There is already a Russian version of this, called the Su-33. Russia refused to sell Su-33s to China, when it was noted that China was making illegal copies of the Su-27 (as the J-11), and did not want to place a big order for Su-33s, but only wanted two, for "evaluation." China eventually got a Su-33 from Ukraine, which inherited some when the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991. The first prototypes of the J-15 have been under construction for two years, and the aircraft is believed to have taken its first flight in the last few months. The Russians are not happy with this development. Russian aviation experts have openly derided the J-15, casting doubt on the ability of Chinese engineers to replicate key features of the Su-33. That remains to be seen, as the Chinese have screwed up copying Russian military tech in the past. But the Chinese have a lot of experience stealing foreign tech, so the J-15 may well turn out to be at least as good as the Su-33. Meanwhile. Russia itself has stopped using the Su-33.
Late last year, the Russian Navy ordered 24 MiG-29Ks (for about $42 million each) to replace the Su-33s currently operating from the aircraft carrier Kuznetsov. It was two years ago that the carrier version of the Russian MiG-29, the MiG-29K, made its first flight, about fifteen years later than originally planned. India is buying 30-40 of these for use on at least two aircraft carriers. The Indians are already receiving the first sixteen. The reason for dropping the Su-33 is the order from India. It's cheaper to build 64 (or more, for planned Russian carriers) MiG-29Ks, than just 16 more Su-33s to replace the ones already on the Kuznetsov (and wearing out). The MiG-29Ks are lighter and cheaper than the Su-33s.

In the early 1990s, work began on creating a variant of the MiG-29 for carrier use. These were to be used on the Kuznetsov class carriers, originally conceived of as 90,000 ton, nuclear powered ships, similar to American carriers (complete with steam catapults). Instead, because of the cost, and the complexity of modern (American style) carriers, the Russians were forced to scale back their goals, and ended up with the 65,000 ton (full load) ships that lacked steam catapults, and used a ski jump type flight deck instead. Nuclear power was dropped, but the Kuznetsov class was still a formidable design. The thousand foot (322 meter) long carrier ended up carryings a dozen Su-33s, 14 Ka-27PL anti-submarine helicopters, two electronic warfare helicopters and two search and rescue helicopters. The ship was designed to carry up to 36 Su-33s and sixteen helicopters.

The 33 ton Su-33 is larger than the 21 ton MiG-29K, and both types of aircraft were to operate from the three 65,000 ton Kuznetsovs. But when the Cold War ended, only the Kuznetsov was near completion. The second ship in the class, the Varyag, was sold to China. The smaller Gorshkov is being rebuilt and sold to India (who believed the smaller MiG-29K was more suitable for this carrier.).

The MiG-29K modifications included arrestor gear and stronger landing gear for carrier landings, folding wings and rust proofing to reduce corrosion from all that salt water. Anti-radar paint is also used, to reduce the radar signature. Fuel capacity was increased 50 percent and more modern electronics installed. A more powerful engine is used, which enabled the aircraft to carry over five tons of weapons (air-to-air and anti-ship missiles, smart bombs).
 
Keep U.S. Aircraft Carrier Out of Our Backyard, China Warns

A state-run Chinese newspaper on Tuesday criticized the South Korean government for allowing the 97,000-ton aircraft carrier George Washington of the U.S. Navy's Seventh Fleet to join South Korea-U.S. military training scheduled late this month.

In an editorial, Global News wrote the West Sea "is in proximity to China's political hub of Beijing and Tianjin. If a U.S. aircraft carrier comes into the West Sea, mainland China falls under the military strategic influence of U.S. military forces. The people of China will not accept South Korea having military demonstration involving a U.S. aircraft carrier."

It added U.S. forces appear to regard China "as their largest potential enemy, exposing a lack of strategic mutual trust between the U.S. and China. If South Korea wants to develop trust with China, it will have to consider the sentiments of the people of China."

The paper warned Seoul "will have difficulty taking any kind of step forward on issues concerning the whole Korean Peninsula without China's understanding and cooperation." What South Korea needs to do now is not to put pressure on China by frequently involving the U.S. and escalating tensions in Northeast Asia but seek ways to alleviate tensions in the peninsula, it added.

link
 
Taking a few moments out from "OP EPIC ****" (where generals decide which way rifles are to be slung while we scrounge for CLP and cleaning supplies...), I read this unsettling piece of news:

http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/china%e2%80%99s-military-threatens-america-we-will-hurt-you/?singlepage=true

China’s Military Threatens America: ‘We Will Hurt You’
The Pentagon finally takes the hint from China’s openly hostile flag officers.

June 14, 2010- by Gordon G. Chang

“Every nation has a right to defend itself and to spend as it sees fit for that purpose, but a gap as wide as what seems to be forming between China’s stated intent and its military programs leaves me more than curious about the end result,” said Admiral Mike Mullen this Wednesday. “Indeed, I have moved from being curious to being genuinely concerned.”

It’s about time the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in public, expressed disquiet about the Chinese military buildup. For decades, American flag officers, many of them from the Navy, have remained optimistic about America’s military relations with China. And after every Chinese hostile act — even those constituting direct attacks on the United States, such as the March 2009 attempt to interfere with the Impeccable in the South China Sea — American admirals have either remained silent or said they were “perplexed” or “befuddled” by Beijing’s intentions.

Why the befuddlement? The assumption in Washington has been that America was so powerful that we could integrate hardline Chinese leaders into a liberal international system they had no hand in creating. To this end, successive administrations sought, among other things, to foster ties between the American and Chinese militaries.

The Pentagon, therefore, pushed for port calls, reciprocal visits of officers, a hot line, and an incidents-at-sea agreement, with varying degrees of success. Admiral Timothy Keating even went so far as to offer to help China build aircraft carriers.

Keating’s offer, made in May 2007 when he was commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, may have been extended with the knowledge the Chinese would reject it, but the apparent generosity was nonetheless in keeping with the general approach of the Navy during the Bush administration, an approach that President Obama has also adopted. So if there is any significance to Mullen’s recent comment, it is that the American military, at the highest levels, is beginning to voice in open forums its doubts about Beijing’s ultimate intentions. At this point, however, the expressions of “genuine concern” remain muted.

Senior Chinese officers, on the other hand, have no trouble telling us how they really feel.

In February, Colonel Meng Xianging promised a “hand-to-hand fight with the U.S.” sometime within the next 10 years “when we’re strong enough.” “We must make them hurt,” said Major-General Yang Yi this year, referring to the United States.

And last month, at the Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Beijing, a Chinese flag officer launched a three-minute rant that stunned the 65 or so American officials in the audience. Everything that is right with U.S. relations with China is due to China, said Rear Admiral Guan Youfei. Everything that is wrong is Washington’s fault. According to Guan, the United States sees China as an enemy.

A senior American official traveling on Secretary of State Clinton’s plane back to the United States said the admiral’s comments were “out of step” with the views of China’s civilian leaders. U.S. officials at the time also predicted that Beijing would soon welcome Robert Gates on his long-planned trip to China.

They were wrong. On June 3 the Chinese foreign ministry announced that the Defense secretary was in fact not welcome. Gates, who also thought he would travel to Beijing this month, said the turndown was just the military’s fault. “Nearly all of the aspects of the relationship between the United States and China are moving forward in a positive direction, with the sole exception of the military-to-military relationship,” he said on his way to Singapore. “The PLA is significantly less interested in developing this relationship than the political leadership of the country.”

Is that true? “Admiral Guan was representing what all of us think about the United States in our hearts,” a senior Chinese official told the Washington Post. “It may not have been politically correct, but it wasn’t an accident.” Chinese flag officers do not launch into polemical speeches at tightly scripted events, such as the once-a-year Strategic and Economic Dialogue, and it was reckless for American officials to assume, despite everything, that Admiral Guan was speaking only for himself.

Gates perhaps knows better now. After having his visit rejected at the last moment, he had to endure a series of hostile comments from Chinese flag officers at a security conference in Singapore at the beginning of this month. And that is just more evidence our officials and diplomats, even after more than three decades of close relations with their counterparts in Beijing, still do not understand China.

That, of course, is another “genuine concern.” So what, exactly, is the consequence of our miscomprehending the Chinese, refusing to hear what they openly say? It’s worse than the rejection of official visits to Beijing by overly eager Defense secretaries. Listen to former State Department analyst Robert Sutter: “China is the only large power in the world preparing to shoot Americans.”

Gordon G. Chang is the author of Nuclear Showdown: North Korea Takes On the World and The Coming Collapse of China.



 
Associated Press link

China now pressuring Tibetans outside politics
1 hour, 29 minutes ago

By Cara Anna, The Associated Press


BEIJING, China - Karma Samdrup was always the kind of Tibetan the Chinese government liked.


The antiques dealer's cultural and environmental preservation efforts won national awards and praise, and he stayed out of the region's highly charged politics. But next week he'll stand trial on what rights groups say is a trumped-up charge of grave-robbing amid the largest crackdown on Tibetan intellectuals since the Cultural Revolution.


China's government has grown increasingly sensitive about Tibet in the two years since rioting in the regional capital of Lhasa left 22 people dead and led to the most sustained Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule in decades. Violent clashes and demonstrations swept Tibetan towns throughout western China, where occasional protests still continue, and security remains extremely tight.


Now, activist groups say a growing number of Tibetan intellectuals are coming under pressure from authorities determined to squelch all forms of dissent.



The government has always sought to silence critics of China's policies in Tibet, where a debate rages over how much autonomy, from religious freedom to outright independence, the Himalayan region deserves. But now officials appear to be expanding their reach and targeting even those previously considered allies or at least innocuous.


Karma Samdrup used to be in the latter group.
State-run China Central Television named the stocky 42-year-old the country's philanthropist of the year in 2006 for "creating harmony between men and nature" with his environmental efforts in Tibetan areas. The same year, China's most prominent weekly newspaper, Southern Weekend, hailed him as the "Tibetan bead king" for his large collection of amulet beads.


The trouble began last year.


Karma Samdrup's two brothers, fellow environmentalists, were detained in August after accusing local officials in eastern Tibet of poaching endangered animals. They were accused of running an illegal environmental group and stirring up local protests, and they have not been released. Human Rights Watch says one brother, Rinchen Samdrup, is serving a 21-month sentence of re-education through labour for "harming national security."


On January 3, plainclothes police detained Karma Samdrup as well. Officials later said he was being charged in the neighbouring region of Xinjiang with "excavating ancient cultural relics and tombs" — a complaint that dates to 1998, when he was accused of dealing in items allegedly looted from archaeological sites. At the time, he was released on bail and police never pursued the charge.


"There's something unusual and disturbing about this case," said Robbie Barnett, a Tibet scholar at Columbia University. "China has often been accused of using aggressive laws to silence critics, particularly in Tibet, but there's no record of this family of Tibetan environmentalists criticizing China's policies. In fact they've been widely written about in China as model citizens."


Barnett said the case could be a sign that the wide latitude public security officials in Tibet have been given to deal with suspected separatists is leading to abuses of power.



Karma Samdrup's supporters say the 1998 charge has been revived to punish him for trying to defend his two brothers.


"Absolutely fabricated," said a Chinese writer who closely follows Tibetan issues, Wang Lixiong.


But the case does have some worrying recent precedent.


Last month, the Washington-based International Campaign for Tibet published a report saying 31 Tibetans are now in prison "after reporting or expressing views, writing poetry or prose, or simply sharing information about Chinese government policies and their impact in Tibet today."


The report said it was the first time since the end of China's chaotic Cultural Revolution in 1976 that there has been such a targeted campaign against Tibetan singers, artists and writers who peacefully express their views.



In another recent case, a writer named Tagyal — who was seen by fellow Tibetans as an "official intellectual" for usually toeing the Communist Party's line — was detained in April after signing an open letter critical of the Chinese government's earthquake relief efforts in a Tibetan region of Qinghai province.

Karma Samdrup's trial begins Tuesday in the Yanqi county court in Xinjiang. Theft of cultural relics in China carries a maximum penalty of life in prison or death, but his lawyer Pu Zhiqiang said Friday he was not expecting such a harsh sentence.

Still, Pu is concerned. He said he's only been able to meet Karma Samdrup twice, most recently for about 40 minutes, while police watched and videotaped. The court would not let him photocopy the case file on Karma Samdrup.

"He was noticeably thinner — 20 to 30 kilograms (44 to 66 pounds) thinner," Pu said. "I could hardly recognize him. Before that, he looked like Genghis Khan. But he was in good spirits."

Karma Samdrup will plead not guilty, Pu said.

Calls to the court rang unanswered Friday.
 
And thousands of native Taiwanese/ben sheng ren protest the latest trade deal between Taiwan and China:

Reuters link

TAIPEI (Reuters) - Tens of thousands of Taiwanese decried a landmark trade deal with rival China in a protest on Saturday that will not stop their government from signing the agreement to boost around $100 million in annual two-way trade.


Braving thunderstorms and rain, the demonstrators lambasted Taiwan's pro-China President Ma Ying-jeou, whom they pledged to vote out of office if he sticks by the deal, set to be signed on Tuesday.


Presidential spokesman Lo Chih-chiang scoffed at the protest, saying the strongest tie-up ever between the political foes of 60 years did not mean Taiwan was selling out to China.


"They don't dare to oppose ECFA," Lo said, referring to the economic cooperation framework agreement with China. "Their opposition is to a one-China market... A one-China market would be like a European Union, but we don't have that with China."

The crowds that converged on Ma's office included opposition leaders raising their profile ahead of an expected parliamentary challenge next month to ECFA, which may delay the implementation of the deal.


The protest was organized by the anti-China opposition Democratic Progressive Party, whose leaders hope to position the ECFA as a key issue in November 27 local elections seen as a bellwether for the 2012 presidential race, analysts say.


"Ma Ying-jeou won't listen, but he'll lose in the elections," said demonstrator Chen Chih-wu, 48, a self-employed merchant, as air horns blasted through the packed streets. "I came out to remind him how arrogant he is."


The deal, full of sweeteners for Taiwan with less in return for China, has been described as Beijing's gambit to charm Taiwan as an economic benefactor, part of its long-term goal of reunifying with the island over which it claims sovereignty
.


Dilution of the trade pact, which includes import tariff cuts on about 800 items, would cool Taiwan's $390 billion export-led economy. The government is pushing the deal, fearing Taipei will lose out to rivals in the booming Chinese market.


But some protesters said the ECFA will hurt small businesses by letting in cheaper Chinese goods, and put Beijing a step closer to a reunifying politically with self-ruled Taiwan.


"Ma Ying-jeou is depending too much on mainland China for everything, but Taiwan is Taiwan and China is China," said protester and Taipei retiree Lu Chun-tsun, 78. "If this were Japan he would have stepped down by now."


The Democratic Progressive Party said 100,000 people took part in the protest, but the police said, at its peak, the protest included 32,000 people, with the numbers falling as thunderstorms crackled in the skies above Taipei.


The ECFA will be signed on June 29 in Chongqing, once briefly the capital of China under the rule of the Nationalists, who are now Taiwan's ruling party after losing the civil war to Mao Zedong's Communists in 1949 and retreating to the island
 
Kunlun-Shan.jpg


China’s PLA Navy Sends Largest Surface Combatant to Gulf of Aden


China is sending its largest surface combatant, the amphibious landing ship Kunlun Shan, to the Gulf of Aden to serve as a command ship for a PLA Navy anti-piracy task force, according to China Defense Blog. This marks the first deployment of the 071 LPD, launched in 2006, the largest naval ship of its own design China has built to date with an estimated displacement of around 20,000 tons.

China is scheduled to command the multinational task force operating off the coast of piracy haven Somalia. Accompanying the Kunlun Shan is the destroyer Lanzhou and the supply ship Weishanhu. Available specs on the Kunlun Shan say it has a lift capacity equivalent to the U.S. Navy Austin class LPD; it has a large helicopter flight deck and a floodable bay that could fit up to 4 air cushion landing crafts (LCAC).

There was a lot of discussion about the challenges China’s PLA Navy faces in operating at long distances at a National Defense University conference on Chinese naval modernization I attended earlier this month. These range from difficulties in maintaining and repairing ships to providing medical care and fresh produce to personnel.


A shortage of underway replenishment ships and the obvious lack of overseas bases places an upper limit on the number of ships China can deploy and how long they can remain on station in distant waters.

The PLA Navy has been increasing their “out of area” naval operations incrementally in recent years. They are very methodical about it, using a small number of their most modern ships. These deployments have a noticeable political “soft power” component to them. Expect more of that soft power naval diplomacy when China soon deploys its purpose built hospital ship.

Check out this really cool cutaway diagram of the Kunlun Shan provided by Hobby Shanghai.

– Greg Grant
 
The not so subtle way China deals with the military aspects of social networking and Web 2.0:



Loveless Chinese troops banned from online dating

By Associated Press

Wednesday, June 30, 2010

BEIJING (AP) -- What will the lonely hearts of the People's Liberation Army do now?

Rigid restrictions on Internet usage imposed this month on the 2.3 million-strong Chinese armed services are sure to cramp the already lackluster social lives of the predominantly young, male force. Online dating was given the boot, along with blogs, personal websites and visits to Internet cafes.

It may seem harsh and out of touch, particularly for troops posted in remote regions of China who have little contact with the civilian world. But military experts said restraints are necessary to avoid compromising security for a Chinese military that prizes secrecy.

"Some soldiers leaked military secrets when chatting online, for instance, giving away troop locations. Certainly a large amount of secrets were revealed this way and the regulation has just blocked the hole," said Ni Lexiong, a military expert at Shanghai University of Political Science and Law.

Plus, Ni said, "matchmaking for soldiers can be conducted in more serious ways, such as through introductions from families, friends, or their work units."

China is just the latest country to wrestle with the sticky issue of Internet freedoms for its military, trying to find a balance between the demands of Web-savvy troops, who as civilians were used to sharing personal details online, and the need to maintain security.

After years of back and forth, the U.S. Department of Defense now promotes use of social media by everyone from privates on the front line to generals at the Pentagon as a way of spreading its message. For example, Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, has 20,000 followers on Twitter.

Most other countries fall somewhere in between.

"Cyberspace has been a gray area. This is a tricky issue because it straddles both personal and professional space," said Ho Shu Huang, an associate research fellow at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies at Singapore's Nanyang Technological University.

"The military is a reflection of society and how it responds will be a result of that. So in more closed societies, it's easier for the military to say, 'Don't do anything. Don't talk online. That's that,'" he said.

Countries such as Britain and Israel allow troops to post personal information online, as long as it does not compromise military operations. The open approach has not always worked for Israel.

The Israeli military scrapped a raid on a West Bank village earlier this year after a soldier revealed the time and location of the operation on his Facebook page. In 2008, a soldier attached to an elite Israeli intelligence unit was sentenced to 19 days in jail after uploading a photograph taken on his base to Facebook.

The Chinese Internet prohibitions are a brief part of lengthy internal affairs regulations issued by the Communist Party's Central Military Affairs Commission.

"Seeking marriage partners, jobs or making friends through the public media is not permitted. Going online in local Internet cafes is not permitted," the regulation states. "Opening websites, home pages, blogs and message forums on the Internet is not permitted."

It was not clear if troops would be completely cut off from social networking sites. The regulations do not apply to civilians serving in military research and training academies.

It's also not known how authorities in China plan to enforce the restrictions. The regulations, posted on the Ministry of National Defense's website, did not say how troops would be punished for transgressions. Phones rang unanswered at the ministry's information office and questions submitted by fax were not answered.

Yet the prohibitions seem out of step in a wired society with 400 million overwhelmingly young Internet users in a country hurtling toward prosperity and global power.

"(The policy) is regressive in its understanding of technology, regressive in generational attitudes and regressive in transparency and attitudes we have of leading powers in the 21st century," said Peter Singer, director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative at the Brookings Institution.

Chinese social networking sites and instant messaging programs are wildly popular. Young Chinese office workers chat online with friends throughout the work day. Internet cafes in small towns are packed with youngsters playing games. Ni, the Chinese military affairs expert, said in the past soldiers had been allowed to visit Internet cafes in plainclothes and some had become addicted to the pastime.

The stipulation that troops cannot "make friends through the public media" is likely to be unpopular. In recent decades, rank-and-file soldiers often drawn from poorer rural families and until recent years paid miserably have found it hard to find spouses.

A blog apparently written by a paramilitary soldier which has not been updated since the new rules took effect on June 15 features a poem titled "We Are Still Single."

The Internet has been a boon, with a proliferation of unregulated online dating sites targeting military men.

The Chinese military now plans to attack that problem the way it did decades ago, when it arranged socials between military units and civilian work outfits with heavily female work forces such as textile factories. A report on a military news website said the Xigaze Military District in central Tibet is working with the local government and women's federation to help troops find partners.

Ho, the researcher in Singapore, said the restrictions are meant to prevent people from getting an inside look at the military. He said security lapses don't usually involve highly classified information, but rather small details that intelligence agents can use to piece together a larger picture about an operation or a unit.

"Most intelligence is based on really, really mundane stuff. History is replete with examples: the color of the sand, the types of uniforms they're wearing, the kinds of vehicles being deployed, the number of people and what they're wearing, whether they have facial hair, stuff like that," he said. "That's what militaries are concerned about, people piecing bits and pieces together."

___

Online:

Dating site for Chinese troops: http://8181.com.cn/

Paramilitary soldier's blog: http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/articlelist_1562068555(unde sco re)0(underscore)1.html

Text of regulation: http://www.mod.gov.cn/policy/2010-06/07/content_41629 1(u nderscore)5.htm

Adm. Mike Mullen on Twitter: http://twitter.com/THEJOINTSTAFF
 
Asia Times link

China focuses on 'far sea defense'

By Joseph Y Lin

Recent discourse concerning the Chinese People's Liberation Army's (PLA) modernization has principally focused on technological advances and less on the human dimension of PLA force transformation. In particular, a review of these discussions revealed the absence of a publicly available database of Chinese military leaders with the rank of full general (shangjiang).

Against the backdrop of the PLA's stated intention to reorient the armed forces as part of its modernization efforts, an analysis of promotion patterns of the 118 PLA generals (1981-2009) may yield important insights into the foci of PLA force transformation.

PLA to build up navy and air force
A string of recent statements by senior Chinese military officials alluding to the realignment of the PLA indicates that significant changes in the composition of the armed forces may be in the offing.

In April, the Chinese Defense Ministry's spokesperson Senior Colonel Huang Xueping stated during an interview, "It's quite natural that we want to build up a streamlined [emphasis added] military force which has more focus on technologies rather than man power." Huang's statement, taken in the context of increasing Chinese naval assertiveness in international waters near Japan and in the South China Sea in recent years, has raised questions over the PLA's intentions and capabilities.

To be sure, the Chinese military leadership seems to be signaling its intention to depart from its long-held emphasis on the army for the air force and navy. By enhancing the role of the navy and air force, the goal of its effort appears aimed at extending China's military power projection capability into the Pacific while reducing the size of its total military force.


(...)



'Far sea defense' strategy
The advent of the People's Liberation Army Navy's (PLAN's) "far sea defense" (yuanyang fangyu) strategy calling for the development of China's long-range naval capabilities, appears to be one of the major drivers behind the push to transform the composition of the Chinese armed forces.

Yin Zhuo, a retired PLAN rear admiral who is now a senior researcher at the navy's Equipment Research Center, stated in an interview with People's Daily Online that the PLAN is tasked with two primary missions: preservation of China's maritime security (including territorial integrity) and the protection of China's burgeoning and far-flung maritime economic interests.

And while the former is still the PLAN's chief concern, the PLAN is beginning to prioritize more attention to the latter. Rear-Admiral Zhang Huachen, deputy commander of the PLAN's East Sea Fleet argues, "With the expansion of the country's economic interests, the navy wants to protect the country's transportation routes and the safety of our major sea lanes." The rear-admirals' statements present a legitimate rationale behind the PLAN's new strategy.



The far sea defense strategy is significant for two reasons. First, it declares that China's naval ambitions extend beyond its traditional coastal area or "near sea" (jinyang). Secondly, it expands the PLAN's defense responsibilities to include the protection of China's maritime economic interests - which China's latest defense whitepaper did not explicitly address [2]
.

It stands to reason then that a possible key motivation behind the reorientation of China's armed forces stems from China's perceived need to project power beyond its coastal area to where the PLAN is required to carry out the newly expanded far sea defense duties.

CMC as China's highest military commanding body
As the highest military policy and commanding body in China, the CMC supervises and commands five service branches of China's armed forces: the PLA ground forces, PLAN, People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), Second Artillery Corps (SAC) and the People's Armed Police (PAP) (which falls under the joint leadership of the CMC and the State Council).

Since the restoration of military rank (junxian) in 1988, the CMC has promoted 118 military leaders to generals: 17 under Deng Xiaoping (1981-1989), 79 under Jiang Zemin (1989-2004) and 22 to date under Hu Jintao (2004-present)

The Chinese military has traditionally been influenced by its ground forces because of China's historical status as a land power. Additionally, the PLA ground forces can trace their roots to the 1920s, predating the founding of the People's Republic of China and all other service branches.

Therefore, ground forces generals not surprisingly represent a lion's share or 71% of the total.Yet, Hu has promoted substantially more "non-ground forces" (PLAN, PLAAF, SAC and PAP) generals than his predecessors. In percentage terms, 45% of Hu's generals are non-ground forces, compared to 25% and 24% for Jiang's and Deng's, respectively.


Strategic Second Artillery Corps

The CMC directly supervises and commands the SAC, which controls China's nuclear arsenal and conventional missiles. Its small manpower (estimated at 100,000 or 3% of Chinese military manpower) notwithstanding, the SAC has produced a disproportionately large number of generals.

Of the 118 military leaders promoted to generals, six (or 5% of the total) were SAC generals - which may be an indication of the SAC's special status in China's armed forces. Hu has promoted the most SAC generals in percentage terms (9%), compared to Deng (6%) and Jiang (4%). Hu's relative overweight in his SAC generals is a reflection of the strategic emphasis he places on the SAC.

Internally oriented People's Armed Police

While other service branches are externally oriented, the internally oriented PAP is charged with "the fundamental task of safeguarding national security, maintaining social stability and ensuring that the people live in peace and contentment" [3].

Jiang successfully incorporated the PAP into the CMC's command structure by promoting the first PAP general in 1998. Altogether, he promoted five PAP generals, representing 6% of his total. Continuing the emphasis on PAP generals, Hu has promoted two PAP generals, representing 9% of his total. Since domestic stability remains among Hu's and the CCP's highest governing priorities, one can expect Hu to continue promoting PAP generals.


Hu to promote more admirals

Excluding the strategic SAC and the internally oriented PAP to determine the relative proportions among the army, navy and air force generals, one finds that 33% of Hu's generals are non-ground forces (PLAN an PLAAF), compared to 17% and 19% for Jiang's and Deng's, respectively.

In other words, Hu's generals are 67% army, 11% navy and 22% air force. Jiang's generals were 83% army, 7% navy and 10% air force, whereas Deng's generals were 81% army, 13% navy and 6% air force.

Hu appears to have begun the process of reorienting his generals by emphasizing the promotions of military leaders in the navy and air force. Given China's naval ambitions and the relative under-representation of PLAN admirals (when benchmarked against Xu's stated target proportion at 25%), one can therefore expect Hu to emphasize the promotions of PLAN admirals.

As CMC chairman, Deng promoted 17 generals in a single "class" in 1988. Jiang on average promoted generals once every two years between 1989 and 2004, with the average "class size" at about 10 generals. Hu on average has promoted generals once every year between 2004 and 2009 with the average class size at four generals. Where Jiang appears to have institutionalized the promotion process, Hu appears to have regularized the promotion process.

Implications
If Hu continues to promote generals at roughly the same pace as he has in the past, he could reasonably promote another 10 generals by the end of his tenure as CMC chairman in 2012 (although he may hold on to CMC chairmanship beyond 2012 following Jiang's example). Given the reorientation of China's armed forces as a PLA priority, one should expect to see an overweighting in the promotions of non-ground forces generals in Hu's remaining tenure.

Of the additional 10 Hu generals, assuming one slot is set aside for each of the SAC and PAP, one may find it reasonably likely that the other eight could comprise three army, three navy and two air force generals.

This combination will result in a final relative weighting of 58% army, 19% navy and 23% air force for Hu's generals - a directionally consistent outcome when compared with Xu's stated goal of 50% army, 25% navy and 25% air force.

The number of PLA Navy admirals is not likely to leapfrog as Hu is expected to continue his gradualist and balanced approach in promoting his generals in the future, taking into consideration each service branch's interests and representation as in the past. This also reflects Hu's rather cautious approach to the military given his lack of a military background. Yet the goals are clear. This is only the beginning of a long-term trend.



Notes
1. Todd Harrison, Analysis of the 2010FY Defense Budget Request (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, August 12, 2009): 38. When the "defense-wide" item is excluded from the US military budget, the relative budgetary ratio among the army, navy (including the Marine Corps) and air force has been approximately 40:30:30 in recent years.
2. Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, "China's National Defense 2008", January 2009, Section V: 7.
3. Ibid, Section VIII: 10.

Joseph Y Lin currently studies at the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies of Tamkang University in Taipei, Taiwan. He has held executive positions in multinational corporations and investment companies in the US, China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Lin's most recent article "The Changing Face of Chinese Military Generals: Evolving Promotion Practices Between 1981 and 2009" was published in The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis in March 2010.
 
Two articles of interest:

From Reuters via thestar.com link

Democracy no cure for corruption, China paper says
BEIJING (Reuters) - Multi-party democracy is no panacea for overcoming graft, which is instead best tackled by getting ordinary people to report corrupt officials, the mouthpiece of China's ruling Communist Party said on Monday.

Beijing fears official malfeasance and graft is undermining its authority and sparking protests by disgruntled workers and farmers.

Despite public campaigns and high-profile crackdowns, corruption remains a serious problem. Critics say the graft fight is hampered by lack of an independent judicial system and officials not held accountable to an electorate.

Not so, said the official People's Daily, in a lengthy editorial about tackling corruption.

"Looking back on the political development of the West, corruption has gone hand-in-hand with the establishment of the multi-party system," the newspaper wrote.

"In the 1990s, the main governing parties of many Western countries had corruption scandals," it added, in a part of the editorial called "Answering a question from web users".

Italy and the United States had serious corruption scandals over that period, it said.

"Some developing nations, after promoting multi-party systems, found that not only was the problem of corruption not resolved, it actually got more serious in some cases," the newspaper added.


In a 2008 list of the world's 10 most corrupt countries, nine had multi-party systems, it said.

"The facts prove that the Western multi-party system ... cannot prevent or solve the issue of corruption, and is not a panacea."

The Communist Party allows carefully controlled ballots for some low-ranking posts in villages and local assemblies. But calls to expand popular votes made little headway, while leaders say they have expanded discussion and voting within the Party.

China does have other political parties, but they have no power and answer to the Communist Party.

In China, "the masses are the main force to rely on to fight corruption and promote good government", the editorial said.

More than 70 percent of graft investigations came from tip-offs from ordinary people over the past few years, it added.

More efforts should be made to encourage people to report graft via the Internet, the newspaper said.

Last year, the head of China's Communist Party-run parliament, Wu Bangguo, struck an uncompromising stance against political liberalisation, ruling out Western-style democratic reforms.

(Reporting by Ben Blanchard; Editing by Alex Richardson)

(For more news on Reuters India, click http://in.reuters.com)

Copyright © 2010 Reuters


And again on the naval front:

Defense Tech.org link

State Push or Commercial Pull Driving China’s Naval Modernization?

When analyzing China’s naval modernization one of the most difficult aspects to discern is: What’s behind it all? China is clearly intent on becoming a real maritime power; but is that a strategic choice made out of necessity or out of a desire to challenge other nations on the high seas.

Two China watchers, Gabriel Collins and Michael Grubb, in China Goes to Sea, argue that China is embarking on a different development path than other nations that sought to become maritime powers.

“The Soviet Union, Meiji Japan, and Wilhelmian Germany built their navies first and then promoted merchant marine development. Thus the relationship was based on a “push” from the state, rather than a “pull” in which commercial interests led the way and then the state stepped in to create the capacity to protect these new commercial maritime interests.

China is following a different path marked by an emphasis on commercial maritime development, with naval development trailing.

If China continues to expand its naval forces, the drivers will include a mix of a desire for status in the international community and a perceived need to defend economic interests, but the single most prominent element will be that Beijing’s policymakers are struggling to keep up with China’s dynamic commercial mariners.”

How strong is that “pull” from China’s dynamic commercial mariners? In 1980, China built 220,000 tons of commercial shipping; China is on pace to exceed 20 million tons in 2010.
As the authors point out, the push for that huge expansion in commercial shipbuilding came in the late 1970s with Deng Xiaoping’s reform and “opening up” to the world; which included a process of “defense conversion,” transforming inefficient defense industries into viable commercial enterprises.

The interesting thing to watch will be whether China moves to put in place some of the key missing elements – such as overseas bases and a large logistical support fleet – it needs if it intends to provide true global security coverage for its far reaching mariners.

– Greg Grant
 
In spite of warming relations between Taipei and Beijing in recent years since Pres. Ma Ying Jieou became Taiwan's leader, China has not reduced the amount of firepower pointed at the island:

Reuters link

China on track to aim 2,000 missiles at Taiwan: report
Mon Jul 19, 2010 9:39am EDT 
TAIPEI (Reuters) - China will have 2,000 missiles aimed at its rival Taiwan by the end of the year, several hundred more than the current number, despite fast-warming trade ties between the two sides, an island defense study said.
Beijing's preparations setting Taiwan further back in the military power balance against its political adversary could destroy 90 percent of the island's infrastructure, the report published in the defense ministry's naval studies periodical said.

The increase from today's estimate of 1,000 to 1,400 missiles could raise tensions after two years of upbeat dialogue between the rivals that has cleared the way for direct civilian flights and a free trade-style deal in June.


"Even though we've signed the trade deal, there won't be any progress on military issues," Hsu Yung-ming, political science professor at Soochow University.

China claims sovereignty over self-ruled Taiwan and has not renounced the use of force to bring the island into its fold.

A new threat to detente between tech-reliant Taiwan and economic powerhouse China, already the island's top export destination, would likely chill financial markets as investors hope to see relations gain momentum.

The 2,000 short-range and mid-range missiles aimed at the island just 160 km (99 miles) away at its nearest point would follow from Beijing's broader plans to modernize its military, said Taiwan Deputy Defence Minister Andrew Yang.

"In the process of improving air missile capabilities, that could be the number by the end of the year," Yang told Reuters. "We always show our concern, because we see China still has this intention. They are not reducing missiles."

Taiwan officials have said that China, though keen to unify peacefully with the island by offering economic incentives, must remove missiles aimed at the island before the two sides can discuss a peace accord after six decades of hostilities.

(Reporting by Ralph Jennings; Editing by Ken Wills)
 
The Chinese are not "threatening" Taiwan; as far as 99.99% of the Chinese leadership and 99% of the Chinese people are concerned, the issue is settled: Taiwan will rejoin China as a province, under some sort of "one country three systems" administration - China (1st "system") + Hong Kong (2nd "system") + Taiwan (3rd "system"). There is no room for debate, indeed there is no issue to be debated. No one in China gives a tinker's dam about opinions or 'strategies' in the USA or the UN or the entire world, less China. The opinions of all others are worthless and cannot, will not be considered.

Could that mean war with the USA? Yes, and most Chinese, while frightened of the prospect, are convinced that it would be a just war and that, eventually, after much suffering, China would emerge victorious. You may have a different opinion but I wouldn't bet the farm on it.

China's continuing military build up is part of a long term "grand strategy" to emerge (around 2050?) as a global superpower, at least as powerful - soft and hard power, globally, as the USA and Europe, combined. "The East is Red" is more than an old slogan; it is living, breathing Chinese policy: the East includes Japan and Vietnam, Cambodia, etc and even Malaysia; the East also includes the "Stans" in Central Asia and it may, implicitly, include Eastern Siberia. The East can, may well have to be shared with India but there is no room in the Chinese (or Indo-Chinese) East for the USA.

Spheres of influence, anyone? Welcome back to the 19th century; it was such fun and it ended (circa 1914) so well, didn't it?
 
E.R. Campbell said:
The Chinese are not "threatening" Taiwan; as far as 99.99% of the Chinese leadership and 99% of the Chinese people are concerned, the issue is settled: Taiwan will rejoin China as a province, under some sort of "one country three systems" administration - China (1st "system") + Hong Kong (2nd "system") + Taiwan (3rd "system"). There is no room for debate, indeed there is no issue to be debated. No one in China gives a tinker's dam about opinions or 'strategies' in the USA or the UN or the entire world, less China. The opinions of all others are worthless and cannot, will not be considered.

Could that mean war with the USA? Yes, and most Chinese, while frightened of the prospect, are convinced that it would be a just war and that, eventually, after much suffering, China would emerge victorious. You may have a different opinion but I wouldn't bet the farm on it.

China's continuing military build up is part of a long term "grand strategy" to emerge (around 2050?) as a global superpower, at least as powerful - soft and hard power, globally, as the USA and Europe, combined. "The East is Red" is more than an old slogan; it is living, breathing Chinese policy: the East includes Japan and Vietnam, Cambodia, etc and even Malaysia; the East also includes the "Stans" in Central Asia and it may, implicitly, include Eastern Siberia. The East can, may well have to be shared with India but there is no room in the Chinese (or Indo-Chinese) East for the USA.

Spheres of influence, anyone? Welcome back to the 19th century; it was such fun and it ended (circa 1914) so well, didn't it?

Just a couple of things. So you're just going to summarily dismiss the pro-Taiwan independence sentiment (with the latest instance cited at the top of this page as well as on previous pages of this thread) on the part of the island's mostly Ben Sheng Ren/Native Taiwanese population, as inconsequential?

Those who favour unification dismiss this sentiment as an exaggeration created by labor unions and opposition parties such as the Democratic Progressive Party/DPP which was recently voted out of office. These groups supposedly are the ones who make a big show through those anti-mainlander/da lu ren demonstrations.

I remember when I was still doing my undergrad studies in the US, and I had returned to Taipei in 2004 to visit my folks (we're not from there, but we had lived there as expatriates from another Southeast Asian country). This was before we had immigrated to Canada. My father was one of the foreign managers in the company; he had been tasked back then with closing a factory in Taichung since the company was moving its production to mainland China. When the announcement was made at the factory, many of the workers made such emotionally-charged protests and even wailed, that extra security had to be brought in since it threatend to turn violent. Who could blame them?  They were losing their jobs in spite of the fact they were being compensated handsomely; most of the workers were ben sheng ren rather than the wai sheng ren* who held many of the white collar jobs.

My point in relating this is that there is still some anti-mainland sentiment on the island, and it is driven partially by protectionist unions that resent having to see their workers lose employment just because mainland workers have lower wages.


From what I noticed in the past, in spite of the fact that ben sheng ren/native Taiwanese compose much of the island's population, most of them are pragmatic and the independence sentiment is losing its appeal. Chen Shui-Bian, the former DPP leader, and ex-Taiwan President who ran on a platform that favoured greater steps toward independence, was actually voted out due to a worsening economy and the corruption scandal that involved his wife and his brother-in-law, if I can recall correctly. Chen was also eventually imprisoned as well. His successor, Pres. Ma Ying Jieou of the conservative Guo Min dang party, as said before, actually oversaw the improvement of relations with the mainland and even further economic intergration, such as the opening of greater trade and air/transportation links between Taiwan and the mainland.


Secondly, as stated before, the Taiwanese are also Han Chinese (the Taiwanese dialect is just a derivative of Hokien or Fukiense, the dialect spoken on the adjacent mainland province of Fujian) although their rocky history on the island with their wai sheng ren* compatriots is not easily dismissed. Over 50 years of Japanese occupation from 1895-1945 insulated them from key events of Chinese history such as the 1911 revolution against Qing Dynasty, Chiang-Kai Shek's Northern Expedition, the on-again, off again Civil War betwen the Guo min dang/Nationalists and the Communists through the 1930s and 40s. Then you have the 2-28 massacre of 1947 when some Guo Min Dang troops massacred a number of local Taiwanese. And all those years of being treated like second-class citizens when Chiang Kai-Shek fortified his island against a mainland invasion during the height of the Cold War, when few, if any local Taiwanese, were allowed into Guomindang official posts.

Yes, it is true that many Taiwanese of the generations who were alive during the above events compose less and less of the voter base. But the history of such events is not censored in Taiwan schools and the memory is kept alive through the younger generations. However, the dominating culture is still Han Chinese, perpetuated by over 60 years with the
wai sheng ren
at the helm.

However, most younger Taiwanese/ben sheng ren will care more about the latest fads in Chinese pop culture, such as Mandopop singers like A-mei or Jolin Tsai and about how to earn a living (or about reaching their MBA if they're educated) and less and less about their Taiwan ancestors' history. It is to these younger Taiwanese that China is trying to present a sense of "a cosmopolitan, greater China" that they might want to be a part of.

My point is that while China seems to be gaining influence on the island, there is still some protectionist/pro-independence sentiment that China cannot completely ignore if they want a  peaceful unification and continued stability within a "greater China".
I agree that re-unification between Taiwan and China is probably inevitable in spite of what I stated above, but wouldn't it be more pragmatic for Taiwan to wait and see if China gradually became less politcally oppressive first before moving on toward unification? Observing how Hong Kong (and Macao) fares under mainland rule is a must for Taiwan.

As for the "2nd system" you pointed out with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region/SAR, isn't it a bit too early to judge it? If I can recall correctly, the "one-country two systems" arrangement made before the 1997 handover called for China to respect the democratic freedoms of Hong Kong residents until 2047, when Hong Kong ceases to be an SAR and is further integrated into China.

*wai sheng ren/外省人= Taiwanese of mainland Chinese descent who fled to the island after the Chinese Civil War which ended in 1949; many are also the descendants of Chinese Nationalists/Guo Min Dang supporters.

 
Also note another exercise that occurred last month:

China naval drill in South China Sea: state media

AFP

by Allison Jackson Allison Jackson – 7 mins ago

BEIJING (AFP) – China this week staged a large naval and air exercise on its southeast coast, as South Korea and the United States conducted their own naval drill opposed by Beijing, state media said Friday.

News of Monday's live-fire exercises in the South China Sea came as a defence ministry spokesman reiterated that China's territorial claims in the contentious waters were "indisputable" and should not be "internationalised"
.

Last week, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said the resolution of territorial disputes was "pivotal" for regional stability and that Washington had a "national interest" in seeing international law respected in the area.

During the South China Sea exercise, a large group of submarines and warships from the People's Liberation Army Navy fired guided missiles and tested anti-missile air defence systems, the official Xinhua news agency said.

Navy aircraft also conducted "air control operations", Xinhua said.

Artillery forces also staged an exercise on China's east coast this week
, earlier reports said.

It was not immediately clear if the two Chinese exercises were pre-planned or a response to the four-day joint naval and air drill by the United States and South Korea, which ended Wednesday.
The US-South Korean exercise was conducted as a warning to North Korea -- China's ally -- following the sinking of a South Korean warship blamed by Seoul and its allies on a North Korean submarine.

China is North Korea's closest ally and trade partner and has refused to join in international condemnation of Pyongyang for the incident.

Beijing had expressed concern about the July 25-28 drill, which was initially supposed to be held in the Yellow Sea separating China and the Korean peninsula but was later relocated to the Sea of Japan after Beijing's protests.

China has warned against further actions that it says could raise tensions in the region.

Last week, Clinton told an Asia-Pacific security forum in Vietnam thatthe United States had an interest in "freedom of navigation, open access to Asia's maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea".

"We oppose the use or threat of force by any claimant," she said.

AFP link
 
 
China conducts a major air defense exercise over two provinces:

Associated Press link

China military launches major air exercises
By CHRISTOPHER BODEEN (AP) – 15 hours ago

BEIJING — China's military launched major air defense exercises Tuesday, highlighting rising capabilities that are seen as tipping the balance of power in east Asia.

The drills involve more than 10,000 service members, including those from naval and army aviation units and land-based air defense forces, according to the official China News Service.

CNS said the war games would run for five days over parts of the provinces of Shandong and Henan south of the capital Beijing. They will include three simulated attacks and one live-firing exercise designed around the scenario of defending the capital from an air assault.

No rehearsals were held for the exercises, which will emphasize real-time responses to unplanned events and the integration of units under separate commands, CNS said. About 100 aircraft of seven different types will take part, along with air defense missiles and artillery units.

Amid a boom in defense spending, China has lavished funds on its air force, navy and missile forces in recent years as part of a gradual shift away from ground units. The widely respected Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates total expenditures on the 2.3 million-member People's Liberation Army, including funding for arms imports and defense research and development, reached nearly $100 billion last year.

New additions to its air forces include SU-27 fighter-bombers purchased from Russia and produced under license by China, along with the homebuilt latest-generation J-10 fighter that Beijing touts as a breakthrough for its sprawling defense industry.

Such hardware and China's adoption of more effective training and tactics is widely seen as strengthening China's ability to assert its territorial claims over Taiwan and the South China Sea. Military planners from New Delhi to Washington have taken note, fueling calls for more attention to Chinese developments and increased regional cooperation with the U.S. military.

While tensions with Taiwan have declined under the island's relatively pro-Beijing administration, China has grown increasingly vocal in protesting U.S. naval operations off its coast.

Beijing repeatedly criticized last month's joint U.S.-South Korean exercises in the Yellow Sea and recently elevated the South China Sea — over which it claims complete sovereignty — to its list of high priority territorial claims.

Such moves coincides with a willingness to send its navy further from shore, including the unprecedented dispatch of Chinese ships to join an anti-piracy flotilla off the coast of Somalia.

As troops readied for Tuesday's exercises, two of those ships, the destroyer Guangzhou and frigate Chaohu, docked in Italy as part of a three-nation goodwill cruise, the government's Xinhua News Agency reported.

Overseas visits and more realistic exercises are both aimed at boosting the PLA's ability to project power and improve cooperation between its different branches, said Russell Smith, an analyst with Jane's and former Australian defense attache in Beijing.

"These are opportunities to practice conducting joint operations. I think you're going to be more reorganizing and restructuring in the PLA to emphasize this," Smith said.
 
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