Chinese Military,Political and Social Superthread
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Perhaps the leadership is somewhat alarmed by Putin's aggressiveness and taking this step is putting Putin on notice to back off a bit. Every former republic is fair game for Russian intervention including two the Chinese have a financial stake in.
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E.R. Campbell said:
Many of the pro-Russian officials in the CCP like Luo Gan and ex-Premier Li Peng (who studied in Russia when it was still the USSR, IIRC) don't have that much influence anymore- Li Peng is retired, IIRC. His protege Luo Gan (who studied in East Germany) is no longer part of the Politburo.
Perhaps it is no coincidence that China chose to condemn Russia after the Beijing Olympics to demonstrate to its people that the projection of power and modernity that the world saw during the games was not merely a projection. A China supporting Russia's invasion of Georgia- simply because Russia and China were old allies- would go against the tenet of respecting a nation's sovereignty, which China has repeatedly emphasized on many occasions ad nauseam, and would make the CCP appear weak before their people and seem nothing more than "foreign running dogs" or "lao wai de zuo gou"/老外的走狗 to quote a Cultural Revolution phrase, IIRC.
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E.R. Campbell said:
I can think of several reasons:
1. First and foremost, to assert their power. This is a message not only for Russia, but for the EU and the United States as well, saying that the affairs of Asia are of Chinese concern, and it is the Middle Kingdom that should rightfully adjudicate regional disputes.
2. To cement their position that territories may not be dismembered. Remember China wants to "reunite" Taiwan and takes issue with the idea that Tibet is an independent nation they are occupying. Russia dismembering Georgia without challenge is a big threat to that legal position.
3. To offer assurances to their clients in the 'Stans that the Middle Kingdom will look out for their best interests against Russia (as opposed to the feckless westerners who are all talk but not so much on action). This is very important as America is also courting the 'Stans in the long game of "building relationships, not bases" (Robert Kaplan; Imperial Grunts)
4. To position themselves for the demographic crash. Russia will see its ethnic Russian population decline in the 2030's, and China is also facing demographic difficulties in the 2020's due to the "one child" policy (Mark Steyn's hilarious take on this is "China will be the first gay superpower since Sparta"). In the mean time, "the East is Green" as Islamic populations grow in the 'Stans and Xinjiang province. Establishing their power in the here and now means the next generation or two of leaders will look to China for military, economic and political leadership. A stable and pro Chinese central Asia will allow the leadership to deal with whatever turmoil results from the unbalanced demographics at home.
Of course there might be other reasons that I haven't thought of, but I think this is a good place to start.
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Thucydides said:
So like Kirkhill, you do not place much stock in the SCO/Shanghai Six alliance and are thus not surprised as Mr. Campbell that China would not show even a little shred of support for Russia in this case, despite the fact that both are members of this same entity and Putin was expecting even some form of support?
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I would say that China is playing its hand much better than both Vladimir and the EU just now.
China has the advantage of a much more truncated decision making process than the shambles at the EU. But what is Vlad's excuse?
He seems to be demonstrating a real talent for screwing up a deal.
If he wanted to make money he would build pipelines east and west, become a reliable supplier and invest his funds in other pipelines (as he was given the opportunity in Turkey and the Caucasus) so that he would gain additional income.
But, he seems more intent in being the Macho Strongman (always a problem for wee fellas, pace the German Corporal and the Corsican). It is more important for him to be seen to have power and to exercise it. Consequently he plays his hand early and over plays it.
His latest gambit, sees him cutting himself off from Europe, his best and most lucrative market, and offering his resources to China. This all or nothing strategy results in the loss of influence in Europe, and the world at large, and the loss of revenue from both Europe and China. (With China as his Monopoly Customer China gets to set the price to its advantage).
Net effect: Russia gets weaker; China gets fuel; China gets to take over Russian built pipelines in something like twenty years......
Historical Analogies? Darius and Cyrus built roads to connect and control an Empire - Alexander the Great ran along them and toppled the Empire (which he couldn't hold)
The Romans spent 400 years expanding Darius's network up to the North Sea. Those roads were subsequently used by Goths and Huns and Franks to reduce Rome to a destitute squabble of families.
Reprinted under the Fair Dealings provision of the Copyright Act.
From The Telegraph.
China has the advantage of a much more truncated decision making process than the shambles at the EU. But what is Vlad's excuse?
He seems to be demonstrating a real talent for screwing up a deal.
If he wanted to make money he would build pipelines east and west, become a reliable supplier and invest his funds in other pipelines (as he was given the opportunity in Turkey and the Caucasus) so that he would gain additional income.
But, he seems more intent in being the Macho Strongman (always a problem for wee fellas, pace the German Corporal and the Corsican). It is more important for him to be seen to have power and to exercise it. Consequently he plays his hand early and over plays it.
His latest gambit, sees him cutting himself off from Europe, his best and most lucrative market, and offering his resources to China. This all or nothing strategy results in the loss of influence in Europe, and the world at large, and the loss of revenue from both Europe and China. (With China as his Monopoly Customer China gets to set the price to its advantage).
Net effect: Russia gets weaker; China gets fuel; China gets to take over Russian built pipelines in something like twenty years......
Historical Analogies? Darius and Cyrus built roads to connect and control an Empire - Alexander the Great ran along them and toppled the Empire (which he couldn't hold)
The Romans spent 400 years expanding Darius's network up to the North Sea. Those roads were subsequently used by Goths and Huns and Franks to reduce Rome to a destitute squabble of families.
Reprinted under the Fair Dealings provision of the Copyright Act.
From The Telegraph.
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From today's Telegraph
This follows from the statement in my previously posted article
And it also links to http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,572686,00.htmlthis:
I would note that Schroeder is on the Board of Gazprom
that the German Foreign Minister is of the same party as Schroeder (Socialists in a coalition government with Merkel) and is counselling the same course as Schroeder
I would further note that Vladimir's previous predicament in the KGB was in Germany where as
This follows from the statement in my previously posted article
And it also links to http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,572686,00.htmlthis:
I would note that Schroeder is on the Board of Gazprom
that the German Foreign Minister is of the same party as Schroeder (Socialists in a coalition government with Merkel) and is counselling the same course as Schroeder
I would further note that Vladimir's previous predicament in the KGB was in Germany where as
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And then there is this:
A Strike against Iran would be a slap to Russia. It would also rip the guts out of the EU and NATO and prompt the formation of a new alliance. The only question remaining for me is: would France/Germany/Belgium/Luxembourg follow the route of Switzerland, Finland, Sweden and Austria in the Cold War, or would they actively take sides? My sense is they would opt for neutrality and become thorns in the side of the New West Alliance.
Spain and Italy? Weather Gages.
China - Smiling
Russia and the US fighting equals a weaker and Russia and a weaker US.
A Strike against Iran would be a slap to Russia. It would also rip the guts out of the EU and NATO and prompt the formation of a new alliance. The only question remaining for me is: would France/Germany/Belgium/Luxembourg follow the route of Switzerland, Finland, Sweden and Austria in the Cold War, or would they actively take sides? My sense is they would opt for neutrality and become thorns in the side of the New West Alliance.
Spain and Italy? Weather Gages.
China - Smiling
Russia and the US fighting equals a weaker and Russia and a weaker US.
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I don’t think the Chinese decision making process is quite as neat and tidy as Kirkhill suggests. See, e.g. http://english.gov.cn/ and http://www1.china.org.cn/english/27743.htm - and there are many others.
The ‘system’ is convoluted and designed, I believe to force a consensus. Power is, contradictorily, concentrated and diffused: concentrated when consensus is achieved – as now, I’m guessing, and diffused while consensus is being built – as during the period just after Mao Zedong and, again, after Deng Xiaoping. The military manages to retain its own power base by ‘convincing’ the National People’s Congress to make the most senior official (President, Chairman, Party Secretary – whoever) the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, too.
Amongst the important factions that compete in the formal government organs are:
• The provinces- which have most of the competing factions listed below;
• The military;
• Industrial/commercial magnates – the very nouveau very, very riche;
• Universities and intellectuals – who have a ‘power base’ (based on status) of their own;
• The big cities – some of which have provincial status while others compete with their provincial governments for status;
• The Party – which has all the competing factions listed above.
The Party is having problems. Its influence is diminishing. I know, personally, a lady who, just recently, turned down a party membership she had chased for decades. Her primary reason was that she no longer needs the influence Party membership confers, she also doubts that the influence (for her grandchildren, upon whom she dotes, now) is as powerful or as important as it used to be. As an example: Party members are unable – almost universally unable – to overturn the annual university entrance exams – not even to get a student from a good to a very good university much less, as was possible just 10 to 20 years ago, from failure to a top ranked university. Getting a couple of granddaughters into better faculties in better universities will be facilitated by a son who is a university professor and two daughters who are successful (that really means rich, by Chinese standards) overseas Chinese. Status and money are more valuable than a Party membership. This same lady participated, a few years ago, in a major protest in Beijing when the entrance fees for parks were raised. Despite Party warnings to cease and desist, tens of thousands of pensioners (pensions start at age 50 for some workers) marched in Beijing to protest the park fees (the public parks are the major source of ‘recreation’ for most Beijingers). They won! Pensioners can now buy a very cheap annual pass for all of Beijing’s parks and historic sites.* The Party lost and it lost ‘face,’ too, which is much more serious. In the local (municipal) elections the Party candidates are, routinely, I am told, being defeated by popular non-Party and even anti-Party candidates.
The military has been stripped of much of its previously overwhelming commercial power and there might be some new kinds of university/commercial and military/industrial alliances being built.
The overseas Chinese, especially those in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore who invest billions each year, year after year in China, do not like or trust he PLA. They don’t mind the Party, which they regard as providing stability for China, but they are dismayed by the corruption problem – which is exacerbated by the Party. The overseas Chinese and the nouveau riche inside China want a government of laws and equality at law because, when all is said and done,** that’s what protects their investments, their property rights. Money talks in China and the leadership – national and Party – is listening, I think.
While I do not disagree with anything Thucydides and Kirkhill have said, I remain convinced that one of the ‘principles’ of Chinese policy is surprise.† I’m waiting for the next shoe to drop and I’m still convinced that we haven’t seen it (foreseen it) yet.
China cannot afford an economic slowdown. Progress, while great by any historic standard, is totally insufficient. Most Chinese, in most of the country are still in the second and third worlds by almost every measure except healthcare and education. If the economy and economic progress falters then stability will falter, too, and the regime will fail. Oil is the fuel of progress, progress is required for stability and stability is the key to power.
--------------------
* Restricting access to China’s historic sites and monuments and public parks is vital. A billion people, most of whom feel compelled to climb the sacred mountains, do a lot of damage. The stone steps in many historic sites and temples are, quite literally, being worn away in years, not centuries.
(By the way, I climbed Tianmenshan, it is 999 steps to the top - after the cable car ride – about the equivalent of walking up the stairs in a 40+ story building!)
** And please don’t forget the old adage that, in politics “when all is said and done” more is said than done.
† Old joke: In the staff college candidates are required to memorize, analyze and explain the principles of almost anything. There are Principles of War and Principles of Leadership, Principles of the Attack, Principles of the Defence and so on, nearly ad infinitum. One (too early) morning (just after a dinner night) the directing staff (LCol) decided to quiz the students in his syndicate on the Principles of Administration. He jabbed a finger at candidate after candidate: “Planning!” said the first, “Foresight,” said another. “Cooperation,” a third offered. The finger finally pointed towards our hero who couldn’t remember any principles of anything. He looked stricken as he blurted out: “Surprise!”
Edit: typo
The ‘system’ is convoluted and designed, I believe to force a consensus. Power is, contradictorily, concentrated and diffused: concentrated when consensus is achieved – as now, I’m guessing, and diffused while consensus is being built – as during the period just after Mao Zedong and, again, after Deng Xiaoping. The military manages to retain its own power base by ‘convincing’ the National People’s Congress to make the most senior official (President, Chairman, Party Secretary – whoever) the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, too.
Amongst the important factions that compete in the formal government organs are:
• The provinces- which have most of the competing factions listed below;
• The military;
• Industrial/commercial magnates – the very nouveau very, very riche;
• Universities and intellectuals – who have a ‘power base’ (based on status) of their own;
• The big cities – some of which have provincial status while others compete with their provincial governments for status;
• The Party – which has all the competing factions listed above.
The Party is having problems. Its influence is diminishing. I know, personally, a lady who, just recently, turned down a party membership she had chased for decades. Her primary reason was that she no longer needs the influence Party membership confers, she also doubts that the influence (for her grandchildren, upon whom she dotes, now) is as powerful or as important as it used to be. As an example: Party members are unable – almost universally unable – to overturn the annual university entrance exams – not even to get a student from a good to a very good university much less, as was possible just 10 to 20 years ago, from failure to a top ranked university. Getting a couple of granddaughters into better faculties in better universities will be facilitated by a son who is a university professor and two daughters who are successful (that really means rich, by Chinese standards) overseas Chinese. Status and money are more valuable than a Party membership. This same lady participated, a few years ago, in a major protest in Beijing when the entrance fees for parks were raised. Despite Party warnings to cease and desist, tens of thousands of pensioners (pensions start at age 50 for some workers) marched in Beijing to protest the park fees (the public parks are the major source of ‘recreation’ for most Beijingers). They won! Pensioners can now buy a very cheap annual pass for all of Beijing’s parks and historic sites.* The Party lost and it lost ‘face,’ too, which is much more serious. In the local (municipal) elections the Party candidates are, routinely, I am told, being defeated by popular non-Party and even anti-Party candidates.
The military has been stripped of much of its previously overwhelming commercial power and there might be some new kinds of university/commercial and military/industrial alliances being built.
The overseas Chinese, especially those in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore who invest billions each year, year after year in China, do not like or trust he PLA. They don’t mind the Party, which they regard as providing stability for China, but they are dismayed by the corruption problem – which is exacerbated by the Party. The overseas Chinese and the nouveau riche inside China want a government of laws and equality at law because, when all is said and done,** that’s what protects their investments, their property rights. Money talks in China and the leadership – national and Party – is listening, I think.
While I do not disagree with anything Thucydides and Kirkhill have said, I remain convinced that one of the ‘principles’ of Chinese policy is surprise.† I’m waiting for the next shoe to drop and I’m still convinced that we haven’t seen it (foreseen it) yet.
China cannot afford an economic slowdown. Progress, while great by any historic standard, is totally insufficient. Most Chinese, in most of the country are still in the second and third worlds by almost every measure except healthcare and education. If the economy and economic progress falters then stability will falter, too, and the regime will fail. Oil is the fuel of progress, progress is required for stability and stability is the key to power.
--------------------
* Restricting access to China’s historic sites and monuments and public parks is vital. A billion people, most of whom feel compelled to climb the sacred mountains, do a lot of damage. The stone steps in many historic sites and temples are, quite literally, being worn away in years, not centuries.
(By the way, I climbed Tianmenshan, it is 999 steps to the top - after the cable car ride – about the equivalent of walking up the stairs in a 40+ story building!)
** And please don’t forget the old adage that, in politics “when all is said and done” more is said than done.
† Old joke: In the staff college candidates are required to memorize, analyze and explain the principles of almost anything. There are Principles of War and Principles of Leadership, Principles of the Attack, Principles of the Defence and so on, nearly ad infinitum. One (too early) morning (just after a dinner night) the directing staff (LCol) decided to quiz the students in his syndicate on the Principles of Administration. He jabbed a finger at candidate after candidate: “Planning!” said the first, “Foresight,” said another. “Cooperation,” a third offered. The finger finally pointed towards our hero who couldn’t remember any principles of anything. He looked stricken as he blurted out: “Surprise!”
Edit: typo
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Edward - "Nobody Expects the Spanish Inquisition!!!" ;D
I take your point about factions and power in China, and yes I do believe they are playing an economic game rather than a military game. Just as Russia is trying to play the economic game as well. (But I don't sense that Vlad has the patience or the cultural understanding to play that game successfully and so he resorts to what he knows - Tanks in the Street).
But I would still contend that China's ability to react to Geopolitical Changes is significantly greater than the EU which not only has to contend with factions, as the Chinese do, but also with a disparate group of sovereign governments, each with their own interests at stake and a right to act independently.
Lets just say that no matter how fractious China's politics might be their OODA is faster than that of the EU. Likewise Vlad has, potentially, the fastest OODA of them all. (On that basis Vlad's errors are his and his alone..... a lonely place if a strongman becomes weak).
I take your point about factions and power in China, and yes I do believe they are playing an economic game rather than a military game. Just as Russia is trying to play the economic game as well. (But I don't sense that Vlad has the patience or the cultural understanding to play that game successfully and so he resorts to what he knows - Tanks in the Street).
But I would still contend that China's ability to react to Geopolitical Changes is significantly greater than the EU which not only has to contend with factions, as the Chinese do, but also with a disparate group of sovereign governments, each with their own interests at stake and a right to act independently.
Lets just say that no matter how fractious China's politics might be their OODA is faster than that of the EU. Likewise Vlad has, potentially, the fastest OODA of them all. (On that basis Vlad's errors are his and his alone..... a lonely place if a strongman becomes weak).
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CougarDaddy said:
The SCO is more of a propaganda exercise than a functional alliance at this point in time, and I suspect the Chinese will not shed any tears if the SCO folds. If it serves their purposes, the SCO can also be turned into a real alliance (or a tributary system like the ancient Delian League).
I suspect Edward is right, there is some sort of surprise still waiting in the wings, but I have no idea what it could be. Russia's threat to send its energy exports to China is a convenience for China, since they already have access to oil from the middle east and Africa. From their point of view, it means the USN cannot potentially cut the energy artery, providing a greater degree of flexibility. In an ironic twist, China now can play off the US and Russia, like the US used to play China and the USSR against each other in the 1970's and 80's.
I suspect the stress of the "restart of history" will undo much of the EU project. My own take is the UK will drift back into the American orbit (and take its place in the Anglosphere), the EU will retrench in "Old Europe" and "New Europe" will pull together to resist the threat of Russia, while linking to the Anglosphere West for military, political and economic support. (Then again, people who know me think I am a hopeless romantic).
We live in interesting times
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CougarDaddy's post is interesting to me because it seems to fit into a hypothesis about how societies change and revolutions happen (propounded best by Georges Lefebvre in his book The Coming of the French Revolution and Victor Davis Hanson in The Other Greeks)
The basic argument is that true revolutions (or revolutionary changes, since armed revolution may not always be required) are based on the growth of a large and viable middle class. The middle class of merchants, businesspeople, artisans and others have an interest in preserving and expanding their property rights, as well as the social, political and economic muscle to support asserting their rights. Hanson takes us right back to Classical Greece, where the primary economic activity was agriculture, but practiced by family farmers who owned the land they worked (hence they had the same social and economic concerns of middle classed French Revolutionaries 2000 years later).
The poor (peasants, serfs, enslaved etc.) have risen in armed revolts throughout history, but lack the sort of vision and organizational skills to make a true revolution; the best they can hope for is to kill a bad set of overlords and get a different set in exchange. The Rich are very conservative, and work hard to preserve the existing order as it is the source of their advantage and privilege (which is the reason for the "Limousine Liberals" and "Champaign Socialists" that infest modern western societies).
If the Chinese middle class is organizing and demanding to take more control over their environment, then the interesting question is how the Party and Central government will respond. If they resist, then they risk creating a social pressure cooker as the middle class build up demands and resentment, but (especially as the Chinese favor stability above all else) allowing increasing freedom might be too much risk for them to take. The "best" result might be a series of stepwise changes, mirroring the evolution of British democracy from the late Middle Ages as Parliament became the vehicle of the growing middle classes to extract power and responsibility from the Crown.
A very interesting post indeed.
(edit for spelling)
The basic argument is that true revolutions (or revolutionary changes, since armed revolution may not always be required) are based on the growth of a large and viable middle class. The middle class of merchants, businesspeople, artisans and others have an interest in preserving and expanding their property rights, as well as the social, political and economic muscle to support asserting their rights. Hanson takes us right back to Classical Greece, where the primary economic activity was agriculture, but practiced by family farmers who owned the land they worked (hence they had the same social and economic concerns of middle classed French Revolutionaries 2000 years later).
The poor (peasants, serfs, enslaved etc.) have risen in armed revolts throughout history, but lack the sort of vision and organizational skills to make a true revolution; the best they can hope for is to kill a bad set of overlords and get a different set in exchange. The Rich are very conservative, and work hard to preserve the existing order as it is the source of their advantage and privilege (which is the reason for the "Limousine Liberals" and "Champaign Socialists" that infest modern western societies).
If the Chinese middle class is organizing and demanding to take more control over their environment, then the interesting question is how the Party and Central government will respond. If they resist, then they risk creating a social pressure cooker as the middle class build up demands and resentment, but (especially as the Chinese favor stability above all else) allowing increasing freedom might be too much risk for them to take. The "best" result might be a series of stepwise changes, mirroring the evolution of British democracy from the late Middle Ages as Parliament became the vehicle of the growing middle classes to extract power and responsibility from the Crown.
A very interesting post indeed.
(edit for spelling)
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But there are three Chinas and only one – the rich one on the Eastern seaboard – has a middle class.
There is a second world China, in e.g. Henan, Hubei and Hunan provinces where a middle class is now emerging (by the way Hebei and Henan and Hubei and Hunan mean North and South of the river and lake, respectively – the Chinese are a practical people).
There is also a third world China where a vigorous, ambitious middle class is a generation away.
As I mentioned middle class ‘revolts’ are becoming more common and the local authorities – even the authorities in big, powerful and autonomous local governments like Beijing - are, I think afraid to (or at least nervous about) offending the middle class. I doubt that provincial or national authorities are quite as ‘sensitive’ to the issues.
But, I think, the new and emerging middle classes are most concerned about pocketbook issues and corruption is near the top of their list – they understand that corruption and bureaucratic ineptitude threaten their newfound wealth and their property. Imagine that: property rights being the ‘issue du jour’ in Red China!
There is a second world China, in e.g. Henan, Hubei and Hunan provinces where a middle class is now emerging (by the way Hebei and Henan and Hubei and Hunan mean North and South of the river and lake, respectively – the Chinese are a practical people).
There is also a third world China where a vigorous, ambitious middle class is a generation away.
As I mentioned middle class ‘revolts’ are becoming more common and the local authorities – even the authorities in big, powerful and autonomous local governments like Beijing - are, I think afraid to (or at least nervous about) offending the middle class. I doubt that provincial or national authorities are quite as ‘sensitive’ to the issues.
But, I think, the new and emerging middle classes are most concerned about pocketbook issues and corruption is near the top of their list – they understand that corruption and bureaucratic ineptitude threaten their newfound wealth and their property. Imagine that: property rights being the ‘issue du jour’ in Red China!
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