Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ

[Colin Parkinson]

It's hard to not leave things parked when you only have crews for half the ships...and firing more people won't help.

To build warships is something that takes a nation's treasure.

To build effective crews is something that takes a nation's best that want to serve.

Right now, we live in a 'post nation state' and have been told that our national identity is unimportant. That's a tough hill to climb over when looking for patriotic youth that want to learn to serve.

Believe me, the same people who have defunded and demoralized you, will also expect you to pull large miracles out of your ass and will order you to go out, regardless.

 

[Navy_Pete]

Your response are logical and correct. However I don't share your belief that things will be parked come a major conflict. My guess they will fire anyone who says "Can't" till they find someone that will say "Yes sir".

We have to take parts from somewhere, and lots of them will become (more of) parts bins. If war breaks out the long lead time critical items probably will never get delivered, and there are a lot of them pending with a 1-2 year lead time.

Big difference between a 'can do' attitude and being an asskissing careerist that ignores reality. Personally think 4 properly crewed ships that have basic working parts provides mroe real effectiveness then trying to limp 12 ships around with resources for 3. I don't care how optimistic someone is a ship isn't going anywhere without cooling water pumps, control air, miles of missing piping, etc.

That would probably also tap most of our actual ammunition anyway, and it's a lot easier in the short term to keep a few ships in good state of repair and run them hard then resurrect HCMS Structural Paint with a $500M refit that we don't have parts or time for.

I'm not exaggerating when I say a lot of our ships wouldn't sail under commercial regulations; basic things like fitted systems not working, detection being spotty and core crew quals missing fairly normal. Ships aren't asking for things like waivers on insufficient number of liferafts (according to our own rules, not the more stringent SOLAS ones) because they are in great repair.

 

[GR66]

Could you possibly build a CSC engine room mock-up ashore to train Reservists on the systems? Partner with civilian Mar Tech schools to share the facility (ideally multiple facilities). Also obtain a handful of inshore patrol vessels for training basic seamanship. Reduce the training delta/learning curve for Reservists to deploy on RCN vessels.

 

[Navy_Pete]

Could you possibly build a CSC engine room mock-up ashore to train Reservists on the systems? Partner with civilian Mar Tech schools to share the facility (ideally multiple facilities). Also obtain a handful of inshore patrol vessels for training basic seamanship. Reduce the training delta/learning curve for Reservists to deploy on RCN vessels.

Sure, with funding, staffing to figure out the project and then extra instructors. We just don't have any of those 3 at the moment.

The MCDVs used to be completely crewed by reservists, and were partly taken over by reg force for some of the technician spaces due to some shortages, but training and sea days to build up the experience was kind of the point of those, not sending them to Africa because everything else was broken. Great little ships that have their own niche, but wasn't really intended to forward deploy on their own.

 

[GR66]

Sure, with funding, staffing to figure out the project and then extra instructors. We just don't have any of those 3 at the moment.

The MCDVs used to be completely crewed by reservists, and were partly taken over by reg force for some of the technician spaces due to some shortages, but training and sea days to build up the experience was kind of the point of those, not sending them to Africa because everything else was broken. Great little ships that have their own niche, but wasn't really intended to forward deploy on their own.

In theory the funding should be available if Canada were to meet its 2% GDP objective. For the other two at some point staffing and instructors will have to be found regardless if the RCN's personnel issues are going to be resolved.

That's why I suggested partnering with civilian schools that have Maritime Tech/Engineering programs. The facilities could initially be used with civilian instructors teaching some of the engineering basics and hopefully steering more of the students toward RCN careers (as well as loading Reservists on the courses). Over time you'd replenish the lower level positions in the RCN which would eventually (with career progression) lead to more availability of instructor-level staff which would allow for more RCN-specific training at the facilities.

The status-quo obviously isn't working for recruiting, training and retaining personnel in the RCN. The leadership knows there is a shortfall in personnel projected for the ships we are already planning so the long term steps need to be taken now to resolve the issue.

Like the housing issue this to me seems like a no brainer for the government. Increase Canada's school capacity for required skilled trades and count that 100% Canadian investment toward our 2% GDP Defence commitment.

Like new ships this wouldn't happen overnight. It would take several years to plan, build and implement facilities like this but there would be a long-term benefit to both Canada in general and the RCN. Heck, it could even enhance serviceability of the fleet since you'd have an extra supply of key parts you could draw upon in an emergency.

 

[KevinB]

Your response are logical and correct. However I don't share your belief that things will be parked come a major conflict. My guess they will fire anyone who says "Can't" till they find someone that will say "Yes sir".

I don’t think he’s suggesting that things will be parked in a major conflict. I also do not think you will have issues finding personnel should that occur.

I suspect things would sail with inexperienced crew that would ideally be reserved for lower threat operations until the crews had been better trained.

 

[Navy_Pete]

In theory the funding should be available if Canada were to meet its 2% GDP objective. For the other two at some point staffing and instructors will have to be found regardless if the RCN's personnel issues are going to be resolved.

In theory all kinds of things are possible.

In reality we are getting a giant kick in the bureaucratic sweets to cut $900M in in service funding, not a funding increase.

I guess I will just do my part and stop claiming expensive orange juice and avocado toast for breakfast.

 

[Halifax Tar]

I would think training our backlog of sailors that need to be trained some of which will be employed on other warfighting platforms would add value.

Thats the whole point of this:

But AOPs has almost no value in conflict. Its a constabulary vessel. What they are doing, when they actually work, is give our sailors sea days.

 

[Navy_Pete]

I don’t think he’s suggesting that things will be parked in a major conflict. I also do not think you will have issues finding personnel should that occur.

I suspect things would sail with inexperienced crew that would ideally be reserved for lower threat operations until the crews had been better trained.

I think the CSC platform is going to be great once built, I just don't see much RCN left by that point, and we may be down to only 2-3 combatants left sailing at that point.

I fully expect ships to get parked because they are broken AF and we can't afford to fix them, and also don't have people to sail them. Some of the DWPs are forecasted at $500,000,000 + now, with growth expected, and that's just to do basic structural and mechanical repairs, and is a 3 year plus down time.

That's insane, and would probably about the same to build a new hull, with new piping and wiring (if you ignore the costs to cannibalize the current ships for systems, plus all the engineering costs to redo the detailed design and production design to actually build things replacing all the obsolete widgets, which number in the 1000s).

For context the last 280 refit had a fraction of the total work hours, and didn't need to go 24/7 shifts, so even with the transit costs to/from port weller, hotel costs on site, and some repairs back in Halifax was under $40M total, with a shorter reactivation period compared to what the frigates do now. That was with a hull that was a bit older, but for various reasons in better shape at end of life compared to the CPFs now.

If there is a major conflict, I'm sure we could surge some people and do something within 3-6 months, but the platforms are pretty busted and would take a few years to duct tape them to life. If their only purpose is to be a sacrificial outer screen probably can do that more effectively by commandeering a new civvie ship and slapping drones on them then with sailing our busted fleet around. We'd probably have more of a real impact by supplying assets like Asterix for support, and trying to get one or two ships in really good shape to rotate crews off those than try an push out large numbers of ineffective assets.

 

[quadrapiper]

Realistically you can't, and just need to sail as is with a bunch of capability gaps. For missing maintainers (and already degraded equipment) makes it difficult to even get across the pond without losing more equipment from normal faults, let alone sustaining it.

We could probably do a few ships with trained crews and equipment shortfalls, but untrained crews and equipment shortfalls turns them into meat shields.

Maybe could do more with a few months, but most ships have years of backlog on big repairs, so cumulatively we'd struggle to get them up to commercial standards, which has huge survivability gaps compared to a combatant. Would be a waste of potentially useful assets for short term check in the box that may not be at all effective in real terms.

I am expecting half the fleet to get parked in the short term with the budget cuts and crew shortages, and we don't actually have crews for AOPs 5 &6 or the JSSs currently, so really makes the equipment bit fairly irrelevant.

You can mitigate equipment issues with people, you can mitigate personnel shortages with equipment automation, but you can't do much when you have issues with both concurrently other than be realistic about what you actually can do. I think the gap between the fleet on paper and the real capability we could do is pretty huge, due to big issues at the 10k foot level and also down in the weeds.

Would frontloading trade-specific material (NCIOP, say) and pushing the "sailor" content (and for that matter, some or all of Basic) to an intentional WUPS/OJT scheme be a suitable "break glass in case of war" efficiency?

 

[Navy_Pete]

Would frontloading trade-specific material (NCIOP, say) and pushing the "sailor" content (and for that matter, some or all of Basic) to an intentional WUPS/OJT scheme be a suitable "break glass in case of war" efficiency?

WUPs is built around having a basic level of individual and collective training done already, so you are just fine tuning it at a ship level and getting departments to work together, so they aren't set up to do that kind of at sea wargaming (and we don't have extra bunks for that many extra sea trainers).

OJT relies on having experienced people with time to teach it, so works well if you get dedicated cells that drive a whole class of trainees (basically the Orcas) and woudl be something you could do with the 20ish bunks for riders on AOPs, or even with a CPF parked alongside. There are also roaming squads of jr maintainers that go around in little maintenance squads to help the ships out lead by some MS and PO2s, which is great, but hard to do without the MS and PO2s.

All probably things we coudl do more of if we stopped trying to do everything at once and stretch things too thin. I honestly think parking a lot of ships and some boats is going to suck, but also probably the extreme lenght the navy needs to go to actually start to regenerate. Morale might even get a bit better if people get the time and resources to fix things, without the expectation to keep working miracles to keep things at sea.

 

[Baz]

I felt the same way towards the end with the Sea King. They were trying to make them all green, instead of making the amount needed and reasonable green. Result was a bunch of green aircraft at 8 am that were red at 9.

I commented that 12AMS mission of “maximizing aircraft availability “ was wrong. It should be “make aircraft available as required for operations.” You get what you measure.

Cyclone has more issues than that, looking in from the outside now.

My understanding was that Eisenhower’s HQ focus on 7 Jun was follow on forces, not the fight. We seem to have forgotten that.

All that to say that the RCN’s priority now should be generating forces, including planning ships at sea. Admirals need to stop measuring their success as how many deployments they oversaw, but how many qualified sailors they created.

The article Halifax Tar pointed out indicates we have been here before, in ‘64, with less than an optimal outcome.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

All that to say that the RCN’s priority now should be generating forces, including planning ships at sea. Admirals need to stop measuring their success as how many deployments they oversaw, but how many qualified sailors they created.

And there is a way to do that with the naval reserve so it truly becomes a "break glass in case of emergency" manning pool: Close all 24 N.R.U.'s.

The last thing we need is to maintain and use 24 buildings, with 24 CO's, XO's etc. etc. down the line and thus wasting half the Naval Reservist's careers doing administration.

Create five regional training centers : Atlantic (likely Halifax, but separate from the main base); Quebec (Quebec city - facility is already there), Ontario (current location of Star in Hamilton - and kick the Army out of there), Prairies (Winnipeg would be my choice) and, Pacific/Mountain (Vancouver).

These centers would be manned, operated and administered (including the reservists' administration and standards) by the Reg Force and have classrooms, shops, simulators and part task trainers for all trades and MOC.

A reservist's service cycle would entail recruiting and charge taking at any recruiting center, followed by GMT or BOTC at St-Jean (or any other facility specifically designated for such basic training - but please, not in tents or shacks in Valcartier -( we are trying to retain those sailors not discourage them with Army mentality). At this point, the reservists would be sufficiently indoctrinated and trained to follow orders and be trusted to show up wherever we tell them to go. They would be given a schedule of week-end training to attend at one of the regional centers and means to travel there and would be expected to attend six week ends before Christmas break and six more after, followed by summer courses of two weeks duration plus any OJT time in the summer they can handle. The coursing (24 week-end days + 10 days in the summer, totaling 34 days) gives a reasonable amount of time to progress through the various levels.

In my system, no reservist would have to do any administration. Regardless of rank and time in, they would spend all their available time either on course, in refresher training or at sea in OJT.

Even if the reserves were halved in number by this system, it would generate more personnel ready to go to sea if needed than the current system.

...

And I am willing to bet we would have greater retention after the first two to three years current average service before quitting.

 

[Kirkhill]

My understanding was that Eisenhower’s HQ focus on 7 Jun was follow on forces, not the fight. We seem to have forgotten that.

One more thing I did not know. Thanks for that.

Kind of makes sense though. He wouldn't have been able to manage the fight at the front edge. He couldn't stop mistakes from happening. What he could do is make sure there was always somebody else coming in to fill the gaps and exploit the opportunities.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

The Battle for Normandy was a logistics battle: The Allies could make up their losses every night, the Germans couldn't.

If the Napoleonic saying that "amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics" be true, Eisenhower was a true professional.

 

[KevinB]

The Battle for Normandy was a logistics battle: The Allies could make up their losses every night, the Germans couldn't.

If the Napoleonic saying that "amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics" be true, Eisenhower was a true professional.

And clueless amateurs invade Russia in the winter…

 

[dapaterson]

The RCN, having refused to learn the lessons of Protecteur a decade ago, may well be forced to learn harder lessons in blood.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Dapaterson, blood is the price of Admiralty.

 

[Furniture]

In my system, no reservist would have to do any administration. Regardless of rank and time in, they would spend all their available time either on course, in refresher training or at sea in OJT.

I think you overall idea has merit, but this part is a major sticking point unless all reserves are capped at S1... Which makes sense if the idea is to have surge capacity.

The actual job of MS and above is administration. A PO 2 that can turn wrenches like an S1 is less useful than an S1, as they cost more money, but add nothing more to the unit/department than an S1 does.

 

[Halifax Tar]

The Battle for Normandy was a logistics battle: The Allies could make up their losses every night, the Germans couldn't.

If the Napoleonic saying that "amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics" be true, Eisenhower was a true professional.

I hate to be that guy but every war or battle is a test of logistics. And the RCN is just a big Logistics FP organization.

Until we get leadership that isn't impressed by flashy lights and big sounds; and instead focuses on the creation and sustainment of power we wont get out of our current doldrums.

Fighting is boring, Logistics is where the real action is. Want to impress me ? Show me a CO who gives a shit about their HPR list and warehouse levels.