Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ

[AlexanderM]

It is my understanding that The Joint Strike Missile is being developed for use with the F-35, so if we purchase the aircraft and the missile proves to be a good system then at some point we may have to choose between the JSM and the Harpoon, which have very similar numbers in terms of range. If we did choose the JSM they would fire out of the vls cells and we wouldn't need the launchers on the decks, so would provide more options for the deck space.

http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/focus-analysis/naval-technology/2328-exclusive-new-details-on-the-kongsberg-vertical-launch-joint-strike-missile-vl-jsm.html

 

[Cdn Blackshirt]

Does the RFQ specify a number of "Strike Length" cells in the Mk.41 VLS?   

 

[MarkOttawa]

Fincantieri is offering their FREMM for CSC:

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/italian-shipbuilders-pledge-to-use-allaustralian-labour-on-frigates/news-story/d0a6af4e61bad8a36ec984dc73a01db7

Meanwhile they're building a sort of super-OPV for Italian Navy:

Fincantieri Building Second Italian Navy Patrol Ship
https://www.marinelink.com/news/fincantieri-building429945#.WdPY9o9OHs4.twitter

From 2015:

Italian Navy’s Offshore Patrol Vessel Plans (RCN?), Part 2

https://cgai3ds.wordpress.com/2015/05/08/mark-collins-italian-navys-offshore-patrol-vessel-plans-rcn-part-2/

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Underway]

Looking at the "Canadian" version of the type 26 again, I can't say I am excited by the way they set up the Harpoon missiles launchers.

I mean why have them facing the way they do instead of 180 degrees from it (so that the port launcher shoots to starboard and the starboard launcher shoots to port, as usual and as on the HALs)? As set up right now, you will be flooding your deck with heat and toxic exhaust fumes every time you fire. By putting them back in the usual  configuration (port shoots to starboard and vice versa) you would have the heat and most of the fumes dissipated over the water instead of on the ship.

Agreed, I saw that as well.  Seems like a simple enough EC.

And, KD, I suspect the sea ceptors have been removed because as a usual loading, eight of the 32 Mk41 cells will be filed with quad ESSMs for that same purpose.

That would make the normal missile load as follows: 32 ESSM, 24 combination of Standards (SM-2ER, SM-3 or SM-6), 8 Harpoons (or the nextgen surface strike missile), and 22 SeaRAM rolling airframe missiles. Remember this is likely the GP version we are seeing here.

The AAD version could have two supplementary eight cells Mk41 launchers. One back of the smokestack, which would likely require sacrificing the flex deck below, for 32 self-defence ESSM, and a total of 40 cells forward instead of 32 for the various Standard missiles, and possibly land attack missiles.

From what I have been able to gather is that 48 cells is more than the requirement (recent article about De Zeven Provincien having more VLS capability at 40VLS than the requirement in CDR magazine).  I believe (with no direct evidence) that the requirement is for 32 cells similar to what the 280's had with the AAD version being exclusively kitted out with SM family missiles and the GP version being kitted out with mainly ESSM, though a mix makes sense.  Only issue with that would be the radar system for the AAD is going to be more powerful and more optimized for longer SM engagement ranges. 

[quote author=Canadian Blackshirt]
Does the RFQ specify a number of "Strike Length" cells in the Mk.41 VLS?
[/quote]
The funny thing is no one who actually knows the specific requirements is talking about it due to a publication ban or security clearance.  So the best we can do is infer and discuss based upon images like the one posted and the odd company statement or town hall bit of info.

The VLS canisters are supposed to be large enough for the SM family of missiles and it was stated in a recent town hall that "significant land attack capability" is a requirement.  I would interpret that this means strike length VLS to accommodate land attack missiles whatever they may be, as the strike length VLS can be shortened with inserts should you need AFAIK.

It would also be a bit future proof for the VLS to be strike length as the in-development Long Range Anti Ship Missile is well underway. 

Added thought/edit: We are assuming that the radar is an APAR type, which means the missile family would be a semi-active group.  It could be something like the Sea Fire 500.  This radar works with active homing missiles like the Aster family.  So the loadout would be more like 32 Aster 15's for a GP frigate and 32 Aster 30's for an AAD frigate.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Question: Does it save space to have individual missile cells or to have less cells that be fed from under deck by a magazine?

 

[AlexanderM]

Question: Does it save space to have individual missile cells or to have less cells that be fed from under deck by a magazine?

Pretty sure it's better to have the cells, they really don't take up that much deck space and the big plus is rate of fire, as all missiles are available to fire at any time, no need to reload.

 

[Kirkhill]

On the other hand:

Having the missiles in single-shot cells means that the vessel needs to return to port to rearm.

With a reloadable launcher then replenishing the magazine below decks might be something that could be accomplished at sea.

 

[MilEME09]

On the other hand:

Having the missiles in single-shot cells means that the vessel needs to return to port to rearm.

With a reloadable launcher then replenishing the magazine below decks might be something that could be accomplished at sea.

I think right there is a peacetime vs war time mind set. If you have the luxury of returning to port why plan to not be able to?

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Hmm or a combo of the two types. The big issue I guess is ensuring no gases or flames get out of the launcher into the magazine space and also ensuring the magazine space is protected in case of fire or penetration damage. I wonder from a damage control perceptive if the individual cells are safer than a magazine style system?

 

[AlexanderM]

I think right there is a peacetime vs war time mind set. If you have the luxury of returning to port why plan to not be able to?

That's why the Burke's have 90 to 96 cells each, so they can load up with missiles in case they get in a fight and can't reload for a while. It would take quite an effort to run them out of missiles. They could potentially carry up to 360 ESSM's. It's our mindset that is the problem with our 32 cells, thinking we're just there to have a presence and if anyone starts shooting call the Americans. If you look at the Spanish frigates they have 48 cells, that's 32 SM-2's plus 64 ESSM's, for a total of 96 missiles, to me that's the minimum. You don't need to worry about reloading in port if you've got 96 missiles ready to say hello.

 

[Cdn Blackshirt]

Even if it starts as "fitted for but not with", limiting the design to 32 cells certainly appears to limit the design going into an unknown future. 

 

[Kirkhill]

http://www.seaforces.org/wpnsys/SURFACE/Mk-26-missile-launcher.htm

Here's the launcher that preceded the Mk 41 VLS - the Mk 26.

I am going to guess that one of the major advantages of the vertical launch system was simplicity.  Fewer moving parts to fail.

Loading and Firing sequence video.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uuRvHV6_1eQ

 

[Underway]

See Falklands war where one of these jammed at the exact wrong time.  There is also the limitation that you can't fire all your missiles in quick succession as overwhelming the ships defences is an important tactic.  Those would be overwhelmed relatively quickly.

 

[NavyShooter]

Look at the moving bits in this video.

That's a LOT of stuff to keep working in order to launch missiles.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sTz5kL6gzSI

VLS please!

 

[MarkOttawa]

Relevant to possible missile defence role for CSCs:

Could SM-3 Interceptor Take On Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles?
As Pentagon adds dollars for missile defense, Raytheon pitches SM-3s as ICBM killers
http://aviationweek.com/defense/could-sm-3-interceptor-take-intercontinental-ballistic-missiles

Mark
Ottawa

 

[AlexanderM]

Relevant to possible missile defence role for CSCs:

Mark
Ottawa

I thought the SM-3 was specifically designed to take out ICBM's and that was pretty much its only function, so why would they have to pitch it?

I guess long range verses short to medium range is the answer.

 

[Underway]

I think there might be other missiles available for this sort of thing from a ground launch perspective (Patriot variants??).

Edit:  Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system and missile which is currently deployed to South Korea....

 

[MarkOttawa]

How many ships will RCN get, at what cost, built by Irving?

An Interview with Rod Story from the PBO on Costing for CSC

As part of its National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS), the Government of Canada has outlined a long-term project to renew Canada’s federal fleet of combat and non-combat vessels. One group of ships within this strategy is the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC). This program consists of building up to 15 ships to replace Canada’s 12 Halifax-class frigates and three Iroquois-class destroyers.

The original budget to build these 15 ships was set in 2008 at a total of $26.2 billion. Given the factors of inflation, rising cost of material, labour and other expenses, the original budget is not enough to construct the planned number of ships by the anticipated start year of 2020.

With a mandate of providing independent analysis to Parliament on the state of the nation’s finances and to estimate the financial cost of any proposal for matters over which Parliament has jurisdiction, the Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) prepared a report: The Cost of Canada’s Surface Combatants. This report which was released on June 1, 2017, was spearheaded by Rod Story, Financial Advisor – Analyst on the Expenditure and Revenue Analysis team at PBO.

Marcello Sukhdeo, editor of Vanguard spoke with Rod Story recently about this report and the methodologies used in arriving at an estimated cost for CSC../.

Q: The PBO report states that Canada would save 25 per cent, or $10.22 billion, if the ships are built at a foreign shipyard using an original ship design rather than in Canada. Can you elaborate further on that?

Just to be clear, the numbers we spoke about before are as-spent or nominal value. This one is based on 2017 dollars. If you spent all the money exactly today, the total budget for CSC would be $39.94 billion, not $61.82 billion. So, this $10.22 billion is in real numbers, or you can say 2017 dollars.

So two things are driving that cost difference. One, it’s built in a foreign shipyard that has already built at least nine of the ships. So they are no longer needing to go through a learning curve. In addition to that, the assumption is that there are no design changes; that is, we take the ship as it’s already scoped and designed and in operation. So, Canada is not going to go in and do a large number of changes. Basically, they’ve built nine ships, and we’re taking the 10th through the 24th ship.

You have two things driving the cost saving: one is the learning curve. When Irving starts to build in the Halifax shipyard, clearly they’re going to go on a learning curve. And they have two things affecting that learning curve. One is, any time any shipyard builds a new design, there’s a lot of churn in the first eight to nine ships. During that time, they learn how to build most efficiently.

The other aspect that’s driving this is: Irving has not built a surface combatant. Surface combatants are vastly different than what they’re building now in the case of the Arctic Offshore Patrol ships. They’re much denser, much more complicated, and again that also affects the learning curve. So, your first eight ships will be that much more expensive purely because you’ll have that much more to learn.

Q: So, it takes about nine ships to really get it right?

Well, to reach your maximum efficiency. Basically, theoretical analysis has shown that by the ninth ship, you’ve now reached that point. This is analysis done in the original 2006 RAND report. So yes, it takes nine ships before you get to that maximum efficiency...

Basically, learning curve is the primary challenge. We have not built surface combatants since the finishing of the Halifax frigates in 1996. All that knowledge has been lost; it has to be relearned.

The other challenge is the amount of changes that DND will want to make on the design. If they are to take a design from another country, how much are they going to change that design? It’s not like you change 5 per cent and expect the cost to increase by the same percentage. In fact, it multiplies. Once you’ve changed about 20 or 30 per cent, you may as well have redone the design from scratch. It’s one of those things – it’s very multiplicative. These ships are so dense in the sense of so many things are packed in so tightly and so dependent on each other. You make one change, it ends up propagating throughout the whole ship quite often. They have to be extremely careful. Managing those changes will be quite a challenge...
https://vanguardcanada.com/2017/10/16/an-interview-with-rod-story-from-the-pbo-on-costing-for-csc/

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

Good flipping intellectual property grief!

Sturgeon and Cairns: Warship procurement needs a course correction

Canada’s plan to replace its fleet of destroyers and patrol frigates with new vessels under the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) project is the largest and most costly single procurement our country has launched since the Second World War. Unless the federal government makes significant changes to the process, however, it will become a textbook case of how not to conduct a competition that’s fair, open and transparent and that ensures the best value for Canadian taxpayers and the growth of Canadian jobs.

This shouldn’t be happening for a project the recent Defence Policy Review said would require a total of 15 ships and which the federal government acknowledges is likely to cost $60 billion – a figure supported by the Parliamentary Budget Office – and up considerably from the original budget of $26.2 billion.

When then-minister of Public Services and Procurement Judy Foote announced in June 2016 that the government wanted a “Military Off the Shelf” (MOTS) solution for the new ships, she said it would save taxpayer dollars and help reduce the production gap between CSC and the Arctic Patrol Ships  to be built by Irving Shipyard of Halifax. Since then, however, there have been a series of incremental changes to the competition that have made the current Request for Proposals (RFP) inconsistent with the original MOTS criteria and which now appear to accommodate solutions that are not yet operational.

In addition, serious concerns have arisen about intellectual property (IP), data transfer to third parties and foreign state-owned classified data.

The government is in effect asking the key bidders – all of whom are paying their own very substantial costs of submitting proposals – to prepare exhaustingly complex bids and provide all of their IP data for only a three-ship contract, without any guarantee of follow-on work for the other 12 ships [emphasis added]. “Step in” provisions also create the possibility that Irving Shipyard would have the option of undertaking the winning bidder’s proposed work directly with the bidder’s subcontractors for the production phase.

Potential bidders are rightly concerned that, once IP data rights are provided, any additional surface combatants could be built without them. This would mean the successful bidder will have taken all of the risk in building the original three ships and exposed its IP to firms under contract to Canada (through Irving Shipbuilding) that would normally be seen as global competitors. This is a very difficult risk/reward scenario for many bidders to accept. (By contrast, a new plan by the U.S. Navy to acquire 20 small combat frigates offers much better risk/reward for potential bidders – including the same firms involved in Canada’s CSC requirement – who will not have to share their IP with their competitors.)

Additionally, some foreign governments aligned with key international bidders for the CSC project are concerned that Canada has entangled state-owned classified data within this procurement, despite the general protocol of western nations and the NATO Standard that any requests for this sensitive data, and the handling of it, must be on a government-to-government basis [emphasis added].

It is time to get the CSC procurement back on track...

Raymond Sturgeon is a former Senior Assistant Deputy Minister of Defence for Matériel; Vice-Admiral (Ret’d) Peter Cairns is a former Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy.
http://ottawacitizen.com/opinion/columnists/sturgeon-and-cairns-warship-procurement-needs-a-course-correction

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Cdn Blackshirt]

So key question:. Has anyone been fired yet?

Not re-assigned.

Not transferred.

Fired

If no one has, there is no real accountability and nothing will ever change.