Canada's tanks

[FJAG]

They had Corps artillery with something like five regiments of guns

Ah! ... Army Groups Royal Artillery ... sighs wistfully.

 

[Kirkhill]

I am sure that an AFV that was sighted in the open in WW2 could be destroyed quite quickly, but I am not sure how much operational research went into Whitaker's report of an eight-second life expectancy.

Regarding Jock Columns, I think some things need to be established without taking away from their applicability to the modern battlefield. The initial campaign in the Western Desert against the Italian in 1940 and early 1941 was not really ad-hoc, although of course adaptations were made by commanders based on the threat, demanding environment and extended lines of communications. The force that became 13 Corps under O'Connor had an Armoured Division and an Infantry Division (initially 4th Indian Division and then 6th Australian). They had Corps artillery with something like five regiments of guns plus the artillery regiments in the divisions. They also had, of particular note, 7th Royal Tank Regiment (7 RTR) with Matilda tanks.

The initial Italian invasion force was unmotorized, and after seizing an area of Egypt they settled down in to a series of strongpoints along the coastal road that lacked mutual support. The numerous Italian formations were poorly equipped with armour and lacked mobility. So they were isolated. Jock Columns from 7th Armd were indeed used as O'Connor assembled his forces and made his plan to keep the Italians blind, and they were subsequently used as guard forces. But much of the real work of destroying the strongpoints and setting the Italian army on the retreat was done by tank and infantry attacks supported by Corps and Divisional artillery.

O'Connor carefully planned the offensive after a deliberate estimate of the enemy's capabilities, the difficulties of supply and the nature of his own forces. He knew that the Italians didn't really have answer to the Matilda, so the destruction of Italian strongpoints would be done by Matildas breaking into these positions following Corps artillery preparation and accompanied by infantry. His tactical modification was leading with the Matildas instead of the infantry, but it would all look quite like a Battle Group or brigade attack today. Because the British were able to attack the Italian strongpoints sequentially, the full weight of Corps artillery was available for each attack. Each attack was followed by deliberate sustainment operations for the Matildas to ensure that they were able to get to the next fight. So not very ad-hoc.

The assault on Bardia was preceded by three days of naval gunfire (by three battleships) with over 160 guns from Corps Artillery firing together in support of the break-in. Methodical, meticulous warfare. There was certainly adaptation and improvisation on the ground to account for friction, but this was a deliberate Corps operation.

There were some more ad-hoc groupings for the forces that established the blocking positions to trap the retreating Italians at the conclusion of Operation Compass. "Jock Columns" were used by 7th Armd to guard and demonstrate in support of 4th Indian Divisions assaults on the initial strongpoints and for the subsequent assaults on Bardia and Tobruk. So they were useful, but the real success story was deliberate combined arms with tanks that the Italians had no answer to as the special sauce. Add to that facing a foe in the desert that had no real mobility. None of this takes away from the creativity of O'Connor in his plan, nor from his boldness throughout the campaign. He was willing to take chances in pursuit and this paid-off at the end of Compass. Later 8th Army commanders were not quite as willing to pursue with as much vigour.

The British would be on the receiving end of a similar calculus over much of the same ground when they faced an opponent with a ready answer to Matildas that could execute combined arms at an even higher level.

Back to Canada and the modern day, there is value in having forces that can conduct security operations. A screen provides warning, a guard provides time but operates under the support of the guarded force while a cover protects the covered formation independently. Guards and Covers will almost always have combined arms, with a Cover likely having its own artillery. In a Brigade context, though, you will see Screens and Guards. A CMBG could be a Cover for a higher formation. I think Cavalry is an unfortunate term to use because it unpacks differently for different people.

UAS have absolutely made an impact in security operations and information gathering. Any reconnaissance organization should have some UAS. I think we need to be careful, though, looking at the use of UAS in fairly static battles and making sweeping generalizations about all operations.

I think my larger point was the necessity for adaptation.

Ad Hoc. To This.

Adhocery doesn't preclude deliberation or planning. In my mind it simply implies taking what you have available and adjusting to suit.

 

[CBH99]

following along and then a quick look at Twiiter and saw this messed up Canadianization of procurement

https://twitter.com/x/status/1843311778630889693

To be fair, I don't think the German armed forces are an organization we should be looking to emulate anyway...

A good organization to study in the modern context, but NOT because they are a great example of maintaining a potent force on a shoestring budget

 

[KevinB]

To be fair, I don't think the German armed forces are an organization we should be looking to emulate anyway...

A good organization to study in the modern context, but NOT because they are a great example of maintaining a potent force on a shoestring budget

Fantastic case study though in how not to structure one’s budget, and how not to do maintenance…

 

[Kirkhill]

The unfortunate aspect is that so much of these questions will not get answered until the CA (and CAF, DND, GoC) decide what it wants to be when it grows up.

IMHO a MBT needs other tracked systems to be used to it's potential (IFV, RFV, AEV, ABV, AVLB, etc).
Canada acquired Leo 2's - but is missing nearly all the other enablers for an Armoured Bde/Div.

As much as there are a lot of Bradleys sitting at Sierra Army Depot - those are better sent to Ukraine.

The CV-90 is also a lot lower profile - which to me make a better RFV, and has the solid rubber track option (which is a lot quieter) - and the rear crew area can also hold some smaller models of UGV.

Adding the CV 90 to the Leo 2 would also open up the option of the CV90120 as a light tank.

 

[KevinB]

Adding the CV 90 to the Leo 2

I was fine to this point.

would also open up the option of the CV90120 as a light tank.

Please don't make me punch you in the face.

Light Tank doesn't really mean what it used to. Modern MBT's have the same mobility as lighter vehicles, unless you start looking at BV-206 type systems in certain conditions.

I would argue the role of the Light tank is absolutely obsolete - replaced by MBT and IFV/RFV formations.

Putting a 120mm cannon on an IFV/RFV really ensures that someone will plan on fighting it as a tank -- either someone doing budgets - or at the pointy end -- neither is good.

When one looks at a Combined Arms formation what does one need the CV90120 for?
MBT will have a 120mm gun
IFV will have a 25-50mm cannon and ATGM
Then you will have Artillery and Mortars as well as Combat Engineers.

If it isn't a Heavy formation - what are you trying to do with it that it needs a 120mm? This is where I see the fallacy of the "Shmedium" formations - they don't have the armor to fight as a heavy formation - and they have gotten too heavy to be an effective stand alone Medium Protected Mobility formation -- we have now put Stryker Brigades into Armor Divisions and Light Divisions as we have them, and can't really fathom the role for them.

Now the Stykers add more dismounts to Heavy formations - which can be very useful for complex terrain operations - or static defensive positions, and they can offer road mobility -- but they aren't a front line vehicle for a LSCO.

For Light formations - we have very specific roles for Light forces - and they don't involve frontal attacks versus a dug in enemy in open terrain.
There is where the whole M10 Booker theory fails on it's face - as it is being positioned for a role that we don't use Light forces for.
The Medium Force excels at Peace Support Operations that are not LSCOs - it offers protected mobility against limited attacks. But it is a primarily road limited force.

I see the CV90 120 simply as someone trying to cheap out on an actual MBT.

 

[Kirkhill]

I was fine to this point.

Please don't make me punch you in the face.

Light Tank doesn't really mean what it used to. Modern MBT's have the same mobility as lighter vehicles, unless you start looking at BV-206 type systems in certain conditions.

I would argue the role of the Light tank is absolutely obsolete - replaced by MBT and IFV/RFV formations.

Putting a 120mm cannon on an IFV/RFV really ensures that someone will plan on fighting it as a tank -- either someone doing budgets - or at the pointy end -- neither is good.

When one looks at a Combined Arms formation what does one need the CV90120 for?
MBT will have a 120mm gun
IFV will have a 25-50mm cannon and ATGM
Then you will have Artillery and Mortars as well as Combat Engineers.

If it isn't a Heavy formation - what are you trying to do with it that it needs a 120mm? This is where I see the fallacy of the "Shmedium" formations - they don't have the armor to fight as a heavy formation - and they have gotten too heavy to be an effective stand alone Medium Protected Mobility formation -- we have now put Stryker Brigades into Armor Divisions and Light Divisions as we have them, and can't really fathom the role for them.

Now the Stykers add more dismounts to Heavy formations - which can be very useful for complex terrain operations - or static defensive positions, and they can offer road mobility -- but they aren't a front line vehicle for a LSCO.

For Light formations - we have very specific roles for Light forces - and they don't involve frontal attacks versus a dug in enemy in open terrain.
There is where the whole M10 Booker theory fails on it's face - as it is being positioned for a role that we don't use Light forces for.
The Medium Force excels at Peace Support Operations that are not LSCOs - it offers protected mobility against limited attacks. But it is a primarily road limited force.

I see the CV90 120 simply as someone trying to cheap out on an actual MBT.

Fine - we will limit ourselves to the 90105 and call it a Booker.

 

[KevinB]

Fine - we will limit ourselves to the 90105 and call it a Booker.

Now you are just trolling.

All those requirements that are used to 'justify' that role are better filled by other systems, or heavier formations.

 

[MilEME09]

Now you are just trolling.

All those requirements that are used to 'justify' that role are better filled by other systems, or heavier formations.

but its the CAF way to not buy the better system, we by the good enough solution, that actually doesn't work because someone in Ottawa doesn't know what recce is, looking at you TAPV

 

[Kirkhill]

Why the 25 to 50 mm limitation on the IFV?

I was always taken by the possibilities of the IMI / OtoMelara 60mm HVMS.

Built off of the 6 pdr / 57 mm guns (WW2 Bn Anti-Tank gun and current Bofors Naval Gun)

Lots of stowed kills and a rapid fire autoloader.

60mm HVMS - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

M-60 Sherman (M-50 with 60mm HVMS Gun) - Tank Encyclopedia

The M-60 Sherman was a Chilean M4 equipped with a new 60 mm High Velocity gun by the Israelis. It was one of the last Sherman in service.

tanks-encyclopedia.com

...

Equivalent to the RO 105 as mounted in the 1980s

Lots of overmatch against the BMD and PT76 tin cans operated by Soviet Airborne forces as well as the BMPs and MTLBs. And given the success that has been had with 25mm against T72s and T80s it would still be a useful GP support gun.

In Development: BWP-2000

Learn more about the upcoming Tier 8 Polish Battle Path reward AFV

armoredwarfare.com

....

AAA C-UAS possibilities?

...

PS - It was prototyped on the Piranha 6x6.

 

[KevinB]

Why the 25 to 50 mm limitation on the IFV?

That's the US Army for you
Frankly I think the 40mm CTA is about optimal

Lots of overmatch against the BMD and PT76 tin cans operated by Soviet Airborne forces as well as the BMPs and MTLBs. And given the success that has been had with 25mm against T72s and T80s it would still be a useful GP support gun.

Keep in mind we gave the Ukrainians 25mm APFSDS-DU
The DU round is a massive penetrator, the standard APFSDS is no slough, but it isn't a solid choice to frontally engage a MBT.

....

AAA C-UAS possibilities?

The 30 and 35mm cannons do that well -- but the main issue is that IFV cannon aren't designed to take AD radar and other feeds to STC, so unless one is upgrading all the turret systems, it's better to get a purpose built turret to do that role.

 

[Kirkhill]

That's the US Army for you
Frankly I think the 40mm CTA is about optimal

Keep in mind we gave the Ukrainians 25mm APFSDS-DU
The DU round is a massive penetrator, the standard APFSDS is no slough, but it isn't a solid choice to frontally engage a MBT.


The 30 and 35mm cannons do that well -- but the main issue is that IFV cannon aren't designed to take AD radar and other feeds to STC, so unless one is upgrading all the turret systems, it's better to get a purpose built turret to do that role.

I reckon these days that turrets should be designed to handle aerial targets as the primary threats. Ground targets are easier to hit. Even AA guns can hit them.

 

[KevinB]

I reckon these days that turrets should be designed to handle aerial targets as the primary threats. Ground targets are easier to hit. Even AA guns can hit them.

I don't disagree -- but the cost implications of that are fairly extensive I am told.

 

[FJAG]

Fine - we will limit ourselves to the 90105 and call it a Booker.

I did a quick search. Does anyone actually use the CV90/105?

All I've seen are comments from Reddit re War Thunder gaming and the results aren't good.

The CV90105 is one of the most painful vehicles I’ve ever had the displeasure to play, in the whole of War Thunder. (so far)​

https://www.reddit.com/r/Warthunder/comments/1ccrv8q/the_cv90105_is_one_of_the_most_painful_vehicles

 

[quadrapiper]

If it isn't a Heavy formation - what are you trying to do with it that it needs a 120mm?

Poking holes in overly resilient buildings at less cost than a missile? Though there must be other options for that.

 

[PrairieFella]

Poking holes in overly resilient buildings at less cost than a missile? Though there must be other options for that.

Essentially a StuG then. There is something to be said about having that firepower with medium troops, especially if you consider the lessons learned from Afghanistan. The LAVs had a helluva time punching through the 2 ft mudwalls of grape huts (which were being used as ersatz bunkers) hence why the Leopards were rushed in to support the infantry. Tanks are the kings of DFS.

That said, maybe we should have followed through with the CV90s and sent our guys in true heavy formations, not medium LAV formations that required the rushing in of tanks.

 

[KevinB]

Poking holes in overly resilient buildings at less cost than a missile? Though there must be other options for that.

Engineers with a Demo gun - or rocket line setup.

Essentially a StuG then. There is something to be said about having that firepower with medium troops, especially if you consider the lessons learned from Afghanistan. The LAVs had a helluva time punching through the 2 ft mudwalls of grape huts (which were being used as ersatz bunkers) hence why the Leopards were rushed in to support the infantry. Tanks are the kings of DFS.

That said, maybe we should have followed through with the CV90s and sent our guys in true heavy formations, not medium LAV formations that required the rushing in of tanks.

Yeah I think the CV90 and Leo2 combination would have been better than LAV UP.

Retain some of the LAV III for actual Medium role work, and for PRes units that are in open areas that aren't collocated near Reg units.

 

[PrairieFella]

Engineers with a Demo gun - or rocket line setup.



Yeah I think the CV90 and Leo2 combination would have been better than LAV UP.

Retain some of the LAV III for actual Medium role work, and for PRes units that are in open areas that aren't collocated near Reg units.

Recently I've been thinking that the LAV would be perfect for the PRes and for a permanent UN peacekeeping 30/70 battalion in Canada. Most peacekeeping will never require anything larger than a 25mm and we can start making that soft power hay again in the UN. We don't really need medium conventional troops, we need heavy formations to fight Russkis in Latvia and we need light formations for potential Arctic and (albeit less importantly) Pacific shenanigans and as QRF if shit gets funky elsewhere. We don't need dedicated medium formations minus a token like I've suggested as none of our strategic focuses demand it.

 

[GK .Dundas]

Round about 1970, an issue of Armor had an article calling for what was basically a STuG .
It would have used the drive train and running gear of a then prototype of an MICV . And the main armament of the M 60 A2 a 152 mm gun.
Some where I suspect I still have a copy of that issue.
It may time to go looking for it .

 

[FJAG]

That said, maybe we should have followed through with the CV90s and sent our guys in true heavy formations, not medium LAV formations that required the rushing in of tanks.

When the CCV was initiated - 2006 - we were finding LAVs getting severely beaten up by IEDs (and RPGs) and were looking for something heavier. Note that the RFP did not require tracks and all but the CV90 were wheeled offerings. By the time the project came to fruition - December of 2013 - the following factors were at play:

a) Canada had been out of Afghanistan for several years;

b) the CDS had proudly proclaimed that with Afghanistan done, it was the navy and air force's turn for new gear and money;

c) the LAV UP program was also running and was going to deliver an upgraded LAV 6.0 which had solved most of the earlier problems with the LAV III;

d) due to the financial crisis the defence budget was dropping from a high of $21.4 billion in 2011 to $18.5 billion in 2013 and $17.9 for 2014 and 15; and

e) the semi-religious fervour behind the medium-weight, all-singing, all-dancing LAV army was still in vogue with many folks in the army's leadership. At this point, the CCV's champions - Andy Leslie and Dan Ross - were both gone. Those that remained saw little advantage that the CCV allegedly offered over the LAV 6.0. No one was really planning on what one could really call "heavy formations" - the aim had been better protection for the troops within a medium weight force (it's worth remembering that with 108 CCVs, there would have been roughly one company's worth per brigade for training purposes as well as an operational stock that could have been deployed for up to one battle-group. The army was never thinking of anything in the way of an armoured brigade here - the concept of a heavy 1 CMBG had been frittered away during Afghanistan)

The CV90 had not yet been announced but was considered the likely winner. Regardless $2 billion for 108 CCVs was considered an unaffordable luxury and so was cut. On a cheery note, the TAPV went ahead.