Canada's tanks

[Kirkhill]

There is a big difference in a FOO (and JTAC) and an MFC or other arms observer.

Calling for fire can be done by any idiot with access to a radio.

But they are not running Fire Plans for Deliberate Attacks, or setting up Defensive Fire Plans either.

During GWOT a lot of folks got given ‘god guns’ to try to call air strikes, and coordinate which A/C was hitting what — it was messy and dangerous— you want a JTAC to do that.

You can only get so many FOO’s and JTAC’s as their is only so many assets to go around to run courses and keep current.

Not everyone needs a FOO or JTAC. All Arms Calls for Fire and learning adjustment aren’t hard (I mean I was a FOO Tech back in my Arty days, it can’t be that hard ), but when your dealing with coordinating of fires or dealing with multiple air assets, it isn’t for the layman.

Each Coy should have a FOO party able to be assigned to it - as well as there should be MFC’s available at the Platoon level that can help.

Most SOF teams will have a JTAC attached, and the OPS Sgt is generally a qualified MFC or equivalent.

I appreciate that asking isn't getting.

I appreciate that there is a difference between designating targets and co-ordinating responses.

But

Just like you can't have too much data you can't have too many targets. The key in both cases is being able to sort and manage and decide, while keeping people informed.

As you said, MFCs and FOOs are different than those manning the FSCCs.

And I am still convinced that there will be a wider distribution of God Guns as software permits and dispersion demands.

 

[KevinB]

I appreciate that asking isn't getting.

I appreciate that there is a difference between designating targets and co-ordinating responses.

But

Just like you can't have too much data you can't have too many targets. The key in both cases is being able to sort and manage and decide, while keeping people informed.

Depends on the level. A Bn will generally have a Bty for CS - plus the Bn’s mortars.
Depending on the situation, some missions won’t be serviced due to lack of guns and higher priorities.

As you said, MFCs and FOOs are different than those manning the FSCCs.

Your mistaking roles as MFC’s are less useful than FOO Tech’s when it comes to planning, and significantly less trained than FOO’s. The FSCC’s aren’t the only ones running planning, it doesn’t take a BC, BC’s Tech etc to run a fire plan - any FOO Party can do it - the FSCC is most likely wedded to 0 or 0A and/or 9’er. The FOO with the OC so depending on scale of the operation the FOO party might be alone in the Fireplanning.

The MFC’s will be running targets of opportunity Fire Missions with the BN mortars - but generally not part of the Fire planning, other than sometimes helping registration of targets (these days it’s generally not needed due to GPS and Lasers, and a FooTech and signaller can do it while helping the FOO on the plan.

And I am still convinced that there will be a wider distribution of God Guns as software permits and dispersion demands.

Doubt. The availability of aircraft on call vastly outpaced the amount of JTAC’s etc in GWOT. The Air Forces where not dealing with enemy aircraft or SEAD or deep strike missions etc. So there were persistently a number of aircraft and other assets available for support. The same won’t be occurring in a larger fight against an enemy that has an air force and depth.




The big take aways for me, aren’t the need for more FOO’s and JTAC’s, it’s the need for more tubes, actual acquisition of Rocket/Missile systems, and armed UAS capabilities.


Oh and more tanks, since this is what the thread was about.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

The big take aways for me, aren’t the need for more FOO’s and JTAC’s, it’s the need for more tubes, actual acquisition of Rocket/Missile systems, and armed UAS capabilities.


Oh and more tanks, since this is what the thread was about.

There you go again! Dragging the thread off track with hypotheticals, fairy dust and unicorns.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Sorry for quoting myself but...

I am thinking that some folks are rethinking the vulnerability of the tank and rather than seeing the tank as an invulnerable monster dominating the battlefield and busting through berms and over ditches it is being seen as a less vulnerable form of recce vehicle.

Tanks are being killed. They have always been killed, This is not news. But the American way of war has permitted the tank to dominate the battlefield after the US Air Force had cleared the way and suppressed the opposition. The opposition also didn't have the same quality of anti-tank weapons currently on display in Ukraine.

Canada has a small number of tanks. They are a valuable resource. Small numbers and high value makes them precious and something to be hoarded and used with care. That suggests to me that it is unlikely that Canada will be launching 40 tanks in a single roll of the dice assault against a fixed enemy position.

On the other hand they can add to an aggressive reconnaissance effort. pushing forwards further than troops in lighter vehicles, and giving overwatch support from longer stand off distances.

How long before our tanks add "cope cages"? (Have we stopped laughing at that term yet?)

You have it backwards. This Armoured Cavalry initiative expressed in the Doctrine Note is not focused on the vulnerability of tanks and that we would therefore use them for reconnaissance. There are number of factors driving this shift, but one of them is a sense that traditional "sneak and peek" ground manouevre reconnaissance by light AFVs has significant challenges. It is a recognition that we cannot simply rely on stealth.

Another factor driving the doctrine note is the small size of the RCAC and the breadth of tasks. Having crews/officers "streamed" into classic reconnaissance and tanks means that it is difficult to train and force generate. Having a common set of tasks for all armour units should allow for greater flexibility generating and employing armour units.

 

[FJAG]

Short walk down memory lane. There are two concepts to forward observing. The Brit/Cdn one where FOO/FACs are captains who have done tours on the gunline (which used to be run by lieutenants under the casual supervision of the Battery Captain) and have had extensive training as both FOOs and FAC/now JTAC. We basically had two of them in every close support battery to support a battalion (plus a battery commander - a major - who joined up with the mortar platoon commander at the battalion TAC HQ to form the FSCC. Two FOOs were ample when battalions had small frontages and you generally ran two companies up and one in reserve. In short the gunner experience is up forward.

The American/German system puts a major as the S3 of the battalion's fire direction centre and the battery commanders (who are captains in the US) at the gun line. The Battalion fire support officer (ie the head fire support coordinator) is a captain. The Fire support team for a company is run by a lieutenant who has three assistants and three fire observer teams of two NCMs each. The FO teams are deployed with the platoons and do both mortar and guns by way of requests for fire rather than fire orders. In short in an American artillery battalion the experience is at the gun lines. The Lt has his own vehicle but the three NCM teams hitch rides with the platoons

Afghanistan changed things for the artillery. Since everybody becomes a captain now as soon as they can chew gum and because troops are dispersed, each gun troop is usually run by a junior captain assisted by a lieutenant and several solid senior NCMs. FOOs are still senior captains with specialized training.

In 2005 the artillery upped its FSCC and FOO/FAC teams dramatically to compensate for the disappearance of the mortar platoons. There is still an arty major at the battalion but since he usually roams with the battalion commander there is now a senior gunner captain and WO welded into the FSCC. FOO/FAC teams have been increased to three per battery on the scale of one per rifle coy. The LAV OPVs come heavily equipped with sensors and a few extra people. We also started training NCMs as FACs so that a FOO party had both a FOO who could FAC, a sergeant who could FOO and another sergeant who could FAC plus a few radops etc - all squeezed into one LAV OPV. Eventually FACs turned into JTACs and, after many, many recommendations from the field, some of the JTACs became non gunners and were taken out of the LAV OPV and given slightly more freedom to roam. The increase in FSCC and FOO teams and personnel came as a direct expense to the gun line because the transformation was one of the army's famous zero PY change transformations. At the same time they created a surveillance and target acquisition battery in each regiment. Even though there are only two gun batteries (four guns each), there are now enough FSCCs (3) and FOOs (9) to man every infantry battalion and rifle company in a brigade (sorry tankers - you still get bubkus.)

If push comes to shove, a FOO party can split up for short durations to do satellite OPs but 24/7 operations make this a short time affair. In our manner of working, because FOOs are senior captains, they are pretty much left to their own devices by the company commanders. FOOs roam around throughout the company's formation to always find the best place to be effective - comms with the coy comd are usually by radio throughout an operation with frequent personal contacts throughout the day. A single FOO party with a JTAC can usually handle all the simultaneous targets that need engaging by the company. In my own FOO party, when life was simpler, not only my tech but my driver/sigs could all engage targets. People have gotten only better since then.

I earlier mentioned specialized equipment - FOOs have specialized LAV OPVs which have laser designators and range finders, slaved to GPS systems, as well as small radars - stuff your average platoon can't drag around with them. (Although back in the day I would have given my right nut for some Vectors) Much more important than that is that we're a bit in the stone age when it comes to digital fire control linkages. Pretty much everyone else worth his salt has an OPV where you sight and laze a target and the target data is transmitted digitally to a battalion fire direction centre that assigns a weapon(s) to engage. Once those come on line all arms call for fires will still need to go through a FOO filter to get to the guns.

I'll add one final point. The consequence of error has gone up dramatically. We teach fire support on ranges where the fall of shot is so far away that it would require a major disaster for anyone to be injured. In Afghanistan the "danger close" mission was the norm. Rounds were routinely called in to within 200 metres of friendlies who were generally only protected by ditches or clay walls. Anecdotally missions were frequently brought in to within eighty metres of friendlies. That takes not only skill and the right tools but an excellent command of situational awareness as to where all the friendly moving parts are. It's one thing to pick a target grid, its quite another to know what the line gun target is and how many probable errors in range that particular round will have coming in or how its splinter pattern will disperse in the area. At eighty metres a gun can fire a round accurately but the round could still wander in the friendlies' danger area simple by a random PEr event.

I like our FOO system more than the Americans. Putting experience up front is what the supported arms deserve. The down side is that there is only so much experience by way of trained FOO parties and JTACs to go around. I think we're at a reasonable mix right now for the way our companies and battalions operate. As we assimilate more modern weapon systems we may need to compensate. I don't see that yet based on the weapon systems Canada has or has access to.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

At the risk of hijacking this thread to talk about tanks and armour, I will give a little more context on my last post (I lost half of the post).

The doctrine note identifies tactical tasks that all armoured units will execute within the categories of Offence, Defence, Stability and Enabling (RAPZ /screen/guard etc). While all armoured cavalry squadrons/regiments would be able to execute all those tasks, this would be moderated by the threat and their equipment. So a light armoured squadron with LAVs might conduct the entire spectrum on a stability operation, but in a high-intensity operation against a peer threat it would not likely conduct the whole mission set.

In any case, the leadership would be trained in all tasks regardless of their platform.

Upon reflection, I don't think that TAPVs as currently armed would really meet the definition of Light AFV since they would have difficulties destroying a similarly Light AFV. A LAV, though, would certainly meet the definition. We have a Heavy AFV. Nuff said about that.

The DN and associated work that will follow may lay the underpinnings for a new capability (Medium AFV) that would provide a platform that could execute a wider breadth of tasks against a wider threat level. I don't know if an M10 Booker or a Centauro would meet the definition due to protection levels, but those could be examples of what a Medium AFV might be.

Medium can be a tough space to be in that you can end up with the disadvantages of light and heavy without accruing enough advantages. Still, something to explore.

 

[Brad Sallows]

I see armoured recce basically being FOO parties, the armour is there for protection and not actually going across frontlines.

Asking one person to be highly recce-competent and highly fire-planning-competent might be a stretch.

 

[dapaterson]

Asking one person to be highly recce-competent and highly fire-planning-competent might be a stretch.

Where does gravy competence enter the equation?

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Asking one person to be highly recce-competent and highly fire-planning-competent might be a stretch.

As Kevin mentioned the role of recce is changing from our days. I see them more as UAS operators in a light small AFV.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

Where does gravy competence enter the equation?

With the Gravy Drinkers (Strathconas)

 

[childs56]

Anyone remember the Call for Fire simulator in Wainwright for the Armored and Infantry. My understanding was any Section Commander, Platoon Commander, Troop, Sqn Commander etc could request a call for fire.
They would Request the fire, the FOO would approve/deny and if approved co-ordinate if the guns were available, ammo available and if they were not in a position to directly observe the fire. They would hand the adjustment and FFE to the Person requesting fire plus recommend info.
Also delegation could be passed onto the Section Commander, Recce Commander for dedicated guns if so required with still being co-ordinated through the FOO But having access directly. Mainly used for priority targets and special tasks where the FOO could not not be with them.

It is funny how the size of FOO/FAC parties can be so large, sophisticated and intricate but one person on the ground can control it all.

 

[markppcli]

Anyone remember the Call for Fire simulator in Wainwright for the Armored and Infantry. My understanding was any Section Commander, Platoon Commander, Troop, Sqn Commander etc could request a call for fire.
They would Request the fire, the FOO would approve/deny and if approved co-ordinate if the guns were available, ammo available and if they were not in a position to directly observe the fire. They would hand the adjustment and FFE to the Person requesting fire plus recommend info.
Also delegation could be passed onto the Section Commander, Recce Commander for dedicated guns if so required with still being co-ordinated through the FOO But having access directly. Mainly used for priority targets and special tasks where the FOO could not not be with them.

It is funny how the size of FOO/FAC parties can be so large, sophisticated and intricate but one person on the ground can control it all.

Having been that section commander, and now having worked in an Artillery Regiment, I can say that in An All Arms Call for fire isn’t controlling anything. The FOO is just delegating some control, and it will be the simplest type of fire mission possible. FOO parties are 5 ish people at present, FOO OPDC Tech and two driver / signallers. One guy makes the plan, one guy observes and corrects, one guy makes sure everyone is doing their job correctly, and two do what ever they’re told told. The intricacy is in the planning of multiple missions to synchronize effect with maneuver.

@Fishbone Jones and @ueo are also just describing the All Arms Call for Fire. And yes it’s useful, but the actual calculations of amounts of round, the way they’re going to hit, ect ect is being done by a supporting foo or the FSCC.

Is there a simple solution to be found in simply training more Fire Controllers, Forward Observation Officers, JFACs etc and just assigning them downwards as the USMC seems to be doing with their Asst Squad Leaders / Systems Operators?

We seem to be stumbling over the need for concentration and the dispersed battlefield.

I am seeing a lot of evidence that suggests concentration is becoming harder and distribution is becoming more necessary.

If that is so then delivery of effects from stand off positions is going to become more prevalent. That suggests one of two things to me: the section/squad requires longer ranged munitions which will necessarily be larger and more complex or they require the means to accurately designate fires from third parties.

Some years back a young infanteer on this site argued that in the future he could envisage the section as an escort for the sensor operators and that the sensor operator, not the machine gun, would become the central organizing principle.

I think that day has come.

I’m very curious to know how the USMC JFO experiment has gone. JFO is a MOA with international partners and lays out fairly strict currency requirements. I can’t imagine a lot of Bn COs are terribly please that all of their NCOs need to be tracking 6 month currency updates for their side gig. If they don’t pass JFO courses what happens? Etc etc. while the idea of making a JTAC in every section is probably appealing 1. We’ll never get that much air, 2. The sky isn’t big enough over a company for 3 JTACs egos I mean air space let alone 9, and 3. Were sitting at a 60% pace rate on that course and roughly 1 million per candidate. Not well suited for mass training.

 

[ueo]

The all-arms call for fire is still a useful thing.

Fire support has gotten more complex. Almost all the precision weapon systems these days need specialist tools and training to use - expensive training. In my day we all had the same tools--a map, a set of binos, a compass, a grease pencil and a radio. The gear that FOOs and JTACs have these days are not widely distributed. I think its going to become even more complex once we introduce drones and loitering munitions on the scale that they should be.

I'm not saying that recce can't be taught this and equipped for it - in fact I'm very much of the view that they should be. From what I see from the outside looking in its that recce should be moving from just ISTAR to being an organization that adds a heavy attritional fight to its ISTAR functions through a variety of stand-off precision weapons tied in to a variety of sensors. IMHO - in the recce (or cavalry role) the FOO will more than likely become a fire support coordinator across a wide front rather than the guy that actually engages targets. It's the recce dets that will be doing the actual engagements.

I think the Brits have the concept right with "deep strike" but right now they are doing it with the tools at hand while they are working out more efficient ways of doing business. Coupling recce in its various forms with long range fires is the answer. Solutions to problems that dictated how we fought in the past are popping up all over the place. Its time to develop the doctrine and TTPs to make it work and acquire the right tool sets to give it effect.

Not sure about tech overcoming Mk 1 eye ball, sure over the horizon msns tech rules but within vis distance I would argue that all that is required is a fairly accurate loc/description of the tgt being handed off to an FCC like entity with direct obsn and correction to fall of shot as reqd.

 

[KevinB]

Not sure about tech overcoming Mk 1 eye ball, sure over the horizon msns tech rules but within vis distance I would argue that all that is required is a fairly accurate loc/description of the tgt being handed off to an FCC like entity with direct obsn and correction to fall of shot as reqd.

If one has a tool to passively get a 16 fig grid ref for a target and relay it directly, that’s significantly better than a guy with a Vector23 LRF linked to gps sending direction and distance, which is vastly better than someone trying to distill a 6figure grid and then spending time and ammo adjusting.

 

[IKnowNothing]

At the risk of hijacking this thread to talk about tanks and armour, I will give a little more context on my last post (I lost half of the post).

The DN and associated work that will follow may lay the underpinnings for a new capability (Medium AFV) that would provide a platform that could execute a wider breadth of tasks against a wider threat level. I don't know if an M10 Booker or a Centauro would meet the definition due to protection levels, but those could be examples of what a Medium AFV might be.

Medium can be a tough space to be in that you can end up with the disadvantages of light and heavy without accruing enough advantages. Still, something to explore.

Sorry - missed this.

Light, medium, and heavy AFVs are defined. Tanks are heavy (tracks, turret cannon, able to destroy similar threats while also protected against similar threats). Medium armour is a bit of a question mark.

Is a LAV Recce a light or medium AFV? I tend to think its a light AFV using the doctrine note's definitions. A TAPV is certainly light. So is a LUVW. Super-light. Ultra-light. I think in practice the distinction between Medium and Light will be rather moot for the time being, but perhaps there will be some capability development. Medium works great for Goldilocks' choice of porridge temperature, but it can be an awkward place in terms of battlefield capabilities.

This does enable one stream of tactics courses for leadership. Without minimizing the challenges, converting between platforms should be less difficult. I've converted a recce sqn to a tank sqn and it was certainly a process.

To what extent will commonality/ease of conversion play a role in shaping that "Medium capability/?" The thing that come to mind for me is the weapons system and it's relationship with crew complement / overall manning. How much additional training is there to convert from say an autocannon and ATGM set up to a traditional large bore gun, and how important will it be to maintain the 4 man crew? Would it be viable for the reserve augmentee system to provide the 19 loaders to a squadron converting for a tank deployment?

Also, while certainly no ringing endorsement these posts seem to be more open to the concept of an M10 type "light tank" in the medium slot relative to our conversation earlier in the year. Can I ask what's prompting that change? From your and McG's comments in August I was working on the assumption that an AFV in the weight band between LAV 6 and MBT was somewhat of a non-starter.

 

[MilEME09]

There you go again! Dragging the thread off track with hypotheticals, fairy dust and unicorns.

I mean there is what we want, vs what will happen. We want to upgrade to 1 common leopard model, but I also want a dragon. Guess I'm getting a dragon first, it's more realistic

 

[markppcli]

Not sure about tech overcoming Mk 1 eye ball, sure over the horizon msns tech rules but within vis distance I would argue that all that is required is a fairly accurate loc/description of the tgt being handed off to an FCC like entity with direct obsn and correction to fall of shot as reqd.

TLE on the “mark one eyeball” and a map is around 300 meteres with a GPS deriving your own location. Using a vector 21 and sterna is low single digits. Which would you want to call fire / report with.

 

[KevinB]

TLE on the “mark one eyeball” and a map is around 300 meteres with a GPS deriving your own location. Using a vector 21 and sterna is low single digits. Which would you want to call fire / report with.

Something better

That I can use day or night without an active laser, so no intercept/detection possibility, and plugs directly into my comms.

But you probably won’t like the cost.

 

[GR66]

Something better

That I can use day or night without an active laser, so no intercept/detection possibility, and plugs directly into my comms.

But you probably won’t like the cost.

Well we really only need to buy one due to the amount of artillery we have to deploy...

 

[KevinB]

I believe it also reads AC codes, and can designate if needed but I’ve not seen it used for that.

I think OOB lasers are non exportable outside of 5E SMU’s but I have not paid any detailed attention to VAS CDD stuff in a while.