How Low Can The Stock Markets Go?
Nouriel Roubini, 03.12.09, 12:00 AM EDT
The answer: Lower ... much lower.
For the last six months, I have been arguing that, in spite of the sharp fall in U.S. and global equities, there were significant downside risks to stock markets. Thus, repeated bear market rallies would fizzle out under the onslaught of worse than expected macro news, earnings news and financial markets/firms shocks.
Put simply: If you take a macro approach, earnings per share of S&P 500 firms will be--quite realistically in 2009--in the $50 to $60 range. (Some may even argue that in a severe recession they could fall to $40). Then, the question is what the multiple, i.e., the price-to-earnings ratio, will be on such earnings. It is realistic to expect that the multiple may fall in the 10 to 12 range in a U-shaped recession.
Then, even in the best scenario (earnings at $60 and P/E at 12), the S&P index would be at 720. If either earnings are closer to $50 or the P/E ratio is lower, at 10, then the S&P could fall to 600 (12 times 50 or 10 times 60) or even to 500 (10 times 50). Equivalently, the Dow Jones industrial average (DJIA) would be at least as low as 7,000 and possibly as low as 6,000 or 5,000. And using a similar logic, I have argued that global equities--following the U.S.-- had another 20%-plus downside risk.
These predictions were made when the S&P 500 was close to 900 and the DIJA at 9,000. This basic macro approach was the reason why I've argued that the latest bear market sucker's rally--the one going from late November 2008 to early January 2009--would fizzle out, and new lows would be reached. Indeed, like previous bear market rallies of the last year, this one went bust--falling over 20%--and the DJIA and the S&P fell below the 7,000 and 700 upper limit of our range for U.S. equities. With the DJIA and the S&P now well below the "7" range, the next test for the markets may well be 6,000 and 600 for the two indexes.
I have also argued that another bear market rally may occur some time in the second or third quarter of this year and may end up like the previous six. Indeed in the last 12 to 18 months, every time something dramatic happens (that leads to a lower stock market low) and the government reacts to it with a more aggressive policy action, optimists come out and say that this is the dramatic and cathartic event that suggests a bottom has been reached.
They said that after Bear Stearns, after the collapse and rescue of Fannie Mae (nyse: FNM - news - people ) and Freddie Mac (nyse: FRE - news - people ), after Lehman Brothers , after AIG (nyse: AIG - news - people ), after the TARP was announced, after the G-7 communiqué and after the $800 billion fiscal stimulus package was announced last November (the onset of the latest sucker's rally).
And after a while, markets are again "shocked, shocked" to discover that the macro news is much worse than expected in the U.S. and abroad; that earnings news is much worse than expected, not just for financials, realtors, home builders and consumer discretionary firms but also for most other non-financial firms; and that financial markets/firms shocks are worse than expected.
This is what I see and argue: More financial institutions are effectively insolvent and will have to be taken over by the government; highly leveraged institutions--such as hedge funds--will be forced to de-leverage further and thus sell illiquid assets into illiquid markets; even non-levered investors (retail, mutual funds, etc.) that lost 50% plus into equities are burned out and want to reduce their exposure to equities; and a number of emerging-market economies are on the verge of a contagious financial crisis.
Why do even small, open economies such as emerging-market ones matter for global risk asset prices? Take the case of Iceland, a small island of 300,000 souls in the middle of the Atlantic: The local banks borrowed abroad 12 times the gross domestic product (GDP) of the country and invested it in toxic assets. Now the banks are bust, and the Icelandic government is bust as the banks are too big to be saved. Thus, local banks now selling distressed and illiquid assets into illiquid global markets are having ripple effects on those global markets.
So if tiny Iceland can have contagious effects, how much greater would the contagion be if a larger and more important emerging market were to enter a fully fledged financial crisis (Latvia or Hungary or Ukraine or Pakistan or Venezuela)? Even a mere rating downgrade of Ukraine a few days ago had a shocking effect on financial markets in Emerging Europe--and even in the E.U.
What are the downside, and upside, risks to the bearish predictions for U.S. and global equities? On the downside, I have argued here that there is at least a probability of an L-shaped global near-depression rather than the mere current severe U-shaped recession. If a near-depression were to take hold globally, a 40% to 50% further fall from current levels in U.S. and global equities could not be ruled out. But in this L-shaped near-depression, the last thing one would have to worry about would be stock markets, as more severe issues would have to be addressed, such as unemployment rates in the mid-double digits--15% or above--and multi-year stagnation and deflation.
On the upside, one could argue that the aggressive policy stimulus in the U.S. and other countries will lead to a faster sustained economic and financial markets recovery than expected here. We have discussed why this "sustained" as opposed to "temporary in second- to third-quarter" recovery is highly unlikely to take place. But the bullish argument for a non-bear market and early persistent recovery of global equities is based on a better than expected recovery of the U.S. and global economy.
Earlier this year--at the peak of the latest bear market rally--I met Abby Cohen--the ever-bullish equity markets expert at Goldman Sachs (nyse: GS - news - people ) who predicted a 25% equity rally for 2008 and is making again a similarly bullish call for 2009. I asked her if we disagreed on earnings or on the multiple (P/E). It turns out that our forecasts for earning per share for S&P 500 firms are similar: in the 50 to 60 range for me and the 55 to 60 range for her. But she argued that a P/E in the 1,012 range was too low, as investors would ignore the bad earnings numbers for 2009. If a rapid recovery of earnings was to occur in 2010 and beyond, investors would discount the 2009 bad number and assign to them a much higher multiple of 17, or even more.
The trouble with that argument is that, with the U.S. and global economy in a massive slump, and with deflationary forces at work, it is hard to believe that a massive economic recovery will occur in 2010, thus lifting earnings sharply. Even in a U-shaped scenario, U.S. growth in 2010 would be 1% or lower, and Eurozone and Japanese growth would be close to 0%. With weak growth, deflationary pressure would still be lingering, putting pressure on profits, the pricing power of firms and, thus, profit margins. So even in a U-shaped scenario, a rapid rally of equities is highly unlikely.
It is true that equity prices are forward-looking; they usually tend to bottom out six to nine months before the end of a recession, as they see--ahead of the curve--the light at the end of the tunnel. So the optimists seeing a recovery of growth in the second half of 2009 argue that equities should start to rally on a sustained basis now. But this severe U-shaped recession in the U.S. may not be over at the 24th month date (December 2009). Most likely, the unemployment rate will rise throughout 2010 well above 10%, and the growth rate will be so weak (1% or closer to 0%) that we will remain in a technical recession for most of 2010 (36 months if the recession is over only in December 2010). Thus, the bottom of the stock market may occur in late 2009, at the earliest, or possibly some time in 2010.
Also the "six to nine months ahead forward-looking stock market view" is not always borne out in the data. During the last recession, the economy bottomed out in November 2001 and GDP growth was robust in 2002 but the U.S. stock markets kept on falling all the way through the first quarter of 2003. So not only were the stock markets not "forward looking," they actually lagged the economic recovery by 18 months--rather than lead it by six to nine months.
A similar scenario could occur this time around. The real economy sort of exits the recession some time in 2010, but deflationary forces keep a lid on the pricing power of corporations and their profit margins, and growth is so weak and anemic, that U.S. equities may--as in 2002--move sideways for most of 2010. A number of false bull starts would occur as economic recovery signals remain mixed.
Thus, most likely, we can brace ourselves for new lows on U.S. and global equities in the next 12 to 18 months. Eventually, a more sustained recovery will occur once we are closer to clear signals that this ugly global U-shaped recession is not turning into an L-shaped near-depression, and that the global economic recovery is clear and sustained. Until then, expect very volatile and choppy U.S. and global equity markets--with new lows reached in the next months and the year ahead.
Nouriel Roubini, a professor at the Stern Business School at New York University and chairman of Roubini Global Economics, is a weekly columnist for Forbes.com.