C3 Howitzer Replacement

[Kirkhill]

I wonder what an "M113 155mm Armored Personnel Carrier" is? I think we have a reporter mixing apples and oranges.


Not to be pedantic but I think you would be much better served by asymmetric regiments consisting of:

• a 70/30 close support regiment with three 6-gun batteries, a small STA battery and a tactical battery providing enough FSCCs and FOOs and JTACs for at least one brigade. You bolster that with one 30/70 close support regiments for each formed RegF or ResF brigade (and I do not mean those ten things we call CBGs right now). (As between the CS regiments you create a mix of M777s and SPGs depending on defence missions and the CA structure)
• a 70/30 AD regiment bolstered by a 30/70 ResF AD regiment; and
• a 30/70 general support regiment with three HIMARS batteries, a loitering munition battery and an STA battery.

The key issue here is command and control both in training and for scalable operational deployments. Hybrid regiments with small numbers of varying capabilities are difficult to operate and develop a viable doctrine for.

Troop and battery organizations are built around several factors: footprint of fire on the ground, local defence of the position, fire direction capabilities and logistics.

• The ability to have howitzers that can self locate mitigates on the footprint of fire on the ground factor as guns shooting form many different locations can now concentrate their fire much better than in the past.
• Similarly computer systems make fire direction much simpler (as long as you have a permissive EW environment) so that one command post can control a varying number of scattered elements.
• Local defence is probably a bigger issue now than in WW2 and Cold War days. Afghanistan made it clear that there would be no security detachments to attach to scattered gun positions and the troops had to look after themselves. A 30-man, two-gun troop is about the smallest that can take care of itself.
• Logistics become much more complicated the more scattered your gun batteries are.

We are currently running two-gun troops in four-gun batteries. Conventional wisdom in the Cold War days with dumb ammunition was that you needed a three-gun 155mm fire unit to be effective at the target end which is why we had four-gun troops so that one gun could always be out of action for rest and maintenance. I'm not sure to what extent the old lore has been reviewed and revised. Our current structure is more based on equipment and PY numbers than anything else. I think its high time for a structure review and simply leave it at the fact that the US continues to run six-gun batteries divided into two firing platoons.

We have ten provincial capitals and Ottawa which would indicate we need 44 saluting guns. For those guns, if used purely for saluting, barrel wear, sighting systems and recoil systems are essentially irrelevant. Wear and tear on wheel assemblies and trails and carriages becomes minimal. It should not be hard to winnow the fleet down to 44 saluting guns and spares.

The problem comes in only if we also need to use those same guns for training including live fire as we do now. They are long in the tooth and becoming harder and harder to keep functioning for live fire.

It's long past time where we should rearm the ResF (and the RegF) with enough of the right type of operational systems that the CA needs ... if the CA can ever figure out what it needs.

Suppose we were to look at static, or defensive forces, vs manoeuverist, or offensive forces?

While accepting that offensive action in the defence is necessary, and that every good defence, even a static one, needs a manoeuverist element, is it reasonable to suggest that an artillery unit that is tied to a particular location (a city that cannot be moved for example) may have a different structure than a unit that is designed to operate on the move?

For instance, if the guns can't be moved because of their tasking, then do they need GPS locating gear? Or are they better with engineers supplying overhead protection? What impact is there on the logistics if they can work from a deep magazine rather than a conveyor of trucks?
Do they need as many FDCs as unit on the move?

If the guns are not operating as constantly moving ones and twos can they survive being organized into large, emplaced, troops?

In other words, I guess, re-establishing a distinction amongst garrison, field and horse artillery with different kit and organizations particular to role?

 

[FJAG]

Suppose we were to look at static, or defensive forces, vs manoeuverist, or offensive forces?

While accepting that offensive action in the defence is necessary, and that every good defence, even a static one, needs a manoeuverist element, is it reasonable to suggest that an artillery unit that is tied to a particular location (a city that cannot be moved for example) may have a different structure than a unit that is designed to operate on the move?

For instance, if the guns can't be moved because of their tasking, then do they need GPS locating gear? Or are they better with engineers supplying overhead protection? What impact is there on the logistics if they can work from a deep magazine rather than a conveyor of trucks?
Do they need as many FDCs as unit on the move?

If the guns are not operating as constantly moving ones and twos can they survive being organized into large, emplaced, troops?

In other words, I guess, re-establishing a distinction amongst garrison, field and horse artillery with different kit and organizations particular to role?

Are you planning on building a new Maginot Line somewhere? Or an Atlantic Wall?

Those didn't work out too well. Maybe we could repurpose Fort Henry and Fort George.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Are you planning on building a new Maginot Line somewhere? Or an Atlantic Wall?

Those didn't work out too well. Maybe we could repurpose Fort Henry and Fort George.

Both served a purpose, it made the Germans alter their plans. The Maginot line held,despite being denuded of guns and personal. It was fully the failure of the "mobile" French Army and High Command to lay the blame on.

The Atlantic Wall denied us the use of the ports for invasion and even delayed their use post invasion. It forced the allies to expend a huge amount of resources to overcome the fairly light defences at Normandy.

 

[FJAG]

Both served a purpose, it made the Germans alter their plans. The Maginot line held,despite being denuded of guns and personal. It was fully the failure of the "mobile" French Army and High Command to lay the blame on.

The Atlantic Wall denied us the use of the ports for invasion and even delayed their use post invasion. It forced the allies to expend a huge amount of resources to overcome the fairly light defences at Normandy.

I can easily see anti-ship missiles and anti-missile systems deployed on the coasts but would think they should be on mobile launchers so as not to be predesignated strike targets. Static defences, not so much.

 

[GR66]

Both served a purpose, it made the Germans alter their plans. The Maginot line held,despite being denuded of guns and personal. It was fully the failure of the "mobile" French Army and High Command to lay the blame on.

The Atlantic Wall denied us the use of the ports for invasion and even delayed their use post invasion. It forced the allies to expend a huge amount of resources to overcome the fairly light defences at Normandy.

Those were in the days before PGMs. Static defences are much more vulnerable now.

Arguably both the Maginot Line and the Atlantic Wall forced the French/Germans to disperse their forces along the full length of their defensive lines where they could be attacked by locally superior forces rather than being held in reserve where they could then concentrate against the point of the invasion.

Frederick the Great is quoted as saying "He who defends everything, defends nothing."

I agree with @FJAG . The cost of mobility is worth it.

 

[Kirkhill]

Are you planning on building a new Maginot Line somewhere? Or an Atlantic Wall?

Those didn't work out too well. Maybe we could repurpose Fort Henry and Fort George.

The people of Kyiv stayed and demanded their city be defended. Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Mariupol, Melitopol, Kherson, Mykolaiv and even Odesa. All stayed. All were forced to fight in place with what ever weapons they were offered or could scrounge. There may have been armoured brigades in the offing but they certainly didn't dominate the defence. Most of them seem to have been held back in their home districts in case the Russians achieved a breakthrough.

Not everybody gets to run out of the way of the guns. Some folks just have to stand and take it. At that point 700 NLAWs on the barricades at 20,000 a piece may be more welcome than a single 14,000,000 Paladin
poncing around the vicinity. Or 20 HIMARS at 3.5 Million instead of a single 70 Million F35.

War is NOT about armies. War is about kids in subways.

 

[FormerHorseGuard]

I am not a Gunner nor am I am expert. But I have been doing some light reading on a war over seas. They are using L118 a 105mm towed gun, donated from the UK and maybe Australia. They are suppose to be getting more M101 ( very close to the C3 after modifications, being donated by another country. So if the 105mm can be used on a battle field and with success in what ever role they are using it, why not just get an updated 105mm, they are being made.

 

[McG]

I am not a Gunner nor am I am expert. But I have been doing some light reading on a war over seas. They are using L118 a 105mm towed gun, donated from the UK and maybe Australia. They are suppose to be getting more M101 ( very close to the C3 after modifications, being donated by another country. So if the 105mm can be used on a battle field and with success in what ever role they are using it, why not just get an updated 105mm, they are being made.

Are 105 mm being used because they are the right tool, or because they are the available tool? Are they being used on a main effort, or do they displace more capable guns from tertiary efforts (like guarding the Transnistria & Belarusian boarders)?

 

[FJAG]

I am not a Gunner nor am I am expert. But I have been doing some light reading on a war over seas. They are using L118 a 105mm towed gun, donated from the UK and maybe Australia. They are suppose to be getting more M101 ( very close to the C3 after modifications, being donated by another country. So if the 105mm can be used on a battle field and with success in what ever role they are using it, why not just get an updated 105mm, they are being made.

It's not that the 105 mm calibre doesn't still have its uses, but it has several limitations. The two major ones are range and terminal effects.

In general, 105mm rounds, even rocket assisted ones, have a range around the 17km point (like the LG1). The current L39 version of the 155mm can put rounds out to 30 to 40 kms depending on ammunition type. The L52 version, such as on Caesar 42 kms. The L58 version currently contemplated for the M1299 has test fired out to roughly 60 kms. These changes in range are both a function of newer, longer and stronger barrels as well as changes in the ammunition which improves their flight characteristics.

Longer range gives you significantly more tactical benefits such as being able to position your guns outside the range of the enemies while still being able to pound them and in striking deeper command and logistics nodes of the enemy.

The terminal effect of the round is based on its size. The standard dumb 105mm has a diameter of 4 inches and weighs 33 lbs while the 155mm is roughly six inches and weighs around 95 lbs. The greater diameter leads to a bigger projectile which can carry more materiel, whether steel or composite B explosive or electronics or steering fins or a rocket or a ramjet engine etc etc. Bottom line is the 155 gives you a significantly bigger bang at the target than the 105mm.

Better terminal effects are useful against dug in or protected defensive positions and provides better effects against troops in the open and armoured vehicles through a bigger blast and splinter radius.

The vast majority of projectile research at this point in time is in the 155 mm calibre as the round provides more space for the newer features required to make long range precision rounds. Comparatively little is being done for the 105 mm even though there are still armies that have a large number of legacy 105 systems in service (S Korea for one). For most of these countries, like Canada, the 105 mm is a training gun or a reserve force gun expected to be rarely used in combat.

The advent of the M777 as an air transportable system (by Chinook) is also replacing the 105mm in its major legacy role, airmobile operations albeit in modern armies, the M119 and the L118 are still holding on although I think the M119's time is limited what with a replacement being sought for the SBCT's M777s which will flow down to the IBCTs which currently run a battery with M777s and two with M119s.

There are still advantages in the 105mm calibre such as an easier logistics burden, but in time the standardization into one 155mm calibre within NATO seems inevitable. We're pretty much there already and the introduction of guided loitering munitions and armed UAVs which can deliver terminal effects similar to a 105mm but with much higher precision will probably do that calibre in.

 

[FormerHorseGuard]

Are 105 mm being used because they are the right tool, or because they are the available tool? Are they being used on a main effort, or do they displace more capable guns from tertiary efforts (like guarding the Transnistria & Belarusian boarders)?

My thought I guess I should of made it more clear, 105mm used by Canadians is more of a training aid then something we will use on the battle field. So if it is a training aid, why not just get an update training aid. How easy would it be to transfer skills to a new gun platform. We did with machine guns, skills were transferred to a new platform.

 

[daftandbarmy]

It's not that the 105 mm calibre doesn't still have its uses, but it has several limitations. The two major ones are range and terminal effects.

In general, 105mm rounds, even rocket assisted ones, have a range around the 17km point (like the LG1). The current L39 version of the 155mm can put rounds out to 30 to 40 kms depending on ammunition type. The L52 version, such as on Caesar 42 kms. The L58 version currently contemplated for the M1299 has test fired out to roughly 60 kms. These changes in range are both a function of newer, longer and stronger barrels as well as changes in the ammunition which improves their flight characteristics.

These guys are going into the assault with, apparently, no indirect fire support.

105mm has a higher rate of fire, and Infantry can get closer to the objective before dismounting, than with 155mm. 105mm could do a wonderful job supporting quick attacks like these against dug in enemy positions where even mortars might have limited effect.

105mm would make an excellent 'close support' gun, which is how the British have deployed them, I believe.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1567913477070802946

 

[McG]

Maybe the reason these guys did not have fire support is because they were being supported by 105 mm howitzers and had out run the range of their support? There is a really big danger to using a video that doesn't show the whole context of an encounter and suggesting it as support for a type of weapon that would not have been visible if it had or had not been assigned to that fight.

 

[FJAG]

These guys are going into the assault with, apparently, no indirect fire support.

105mm has a higher rate of fire, and Infantry can get closer to the objective before dismounting, than with 155mm. 105mm could do a wonderful job supporting quick attacks like these against dug in enemy positions where even mortars might have limited effect.

105mm would make an excellent 'close support' gun, which is how the British have deployed them, I believe.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1567913477070802946

The Ukrainians have both 105mm and 122mm in service to the tune of several hundred. They have some 300 2S1 122mm SPs in service (not to mention around 300 152mm 2S3s and 2S19s). I would think (especially if they still have some reliance on Soviet TTPs) 2S1 would be perfect for accompanying any mech attacking forces to provide close-in fire support.

Not to sound to flippant but there are supported arms commanders who opt for a quick "hey diddle diddle, straight up the middle" before getting all of their fire support in place. That little farmstead in the video was the perfect target for an area neutralization with HE while the assault elements manoeuvred into position.

So it's not for the lack of the right weapon systems for that attack. Its the lack of it in place at the time or the lack of it being used.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I can guarantee that if we replace the 70 or so remaining 105's with 155's it will be 1 gun for two and your yearly ammo allotment will be cut in half, why? Because Canada.....

 

[Kirkhill]

The Ukrainians apparently have advanced 50 to 80 km in 3 days since they broke through at Balaklaia.

Balaklaia to Kupyansk is 50 km. Balaklaia to Senkove on the Oskil is 80 km by way of the Kupyansk road.

The L118 has a maximum range of 17 km. That means 3 to 5 firing point moves in 48 to 72 hours. Meanwhile, judging from those videos the enemy is dispersed and doesn't appear to be particularly effective. The Ukrainians are conducting pursuits along roads at 80 km per hour and conducting hasty attacks across open fields.

I think we are all forgetting the scale of the battlefield here. As Infanteer reminds us the Front is 1600 km long. After 6 months of grind the Russians don't have a lot of their Feb 24th people or gear left to hold that line. They have to concentrate to defend two or three places. That leaves a lot of lightly defended line that the Ukrainians can exploit with minimal concentration.

The Russians apparently consider a Tank Company assault (Combat Team to Battle Group) an armoured fist of note.

At the beginning of this war, base on Cold War views, neither side would have considered a Company Assault as a viable independent action nor as an effective, operational event.

Now it is being treated by the Russians as noteworthy as an Army.

The key element, in my opinion, is that the Ukrainians are using 105s and 122s and 152s and 155s and 203s and any missiles they can get their hands on. They use everything available to its best advantage - and they choose where, when and how best to employ what they have. Regardless.

 

[Kirkhill]

These guys are going into the assault with, apparently, no indirect fire support.

105mm has a higher rate of fire, and Infantry can get closer to the objective before dismounting, than with 155mm. 105mm could do a wonderful job supporting quick attacks like these against dug in enemy positions where even mortars might have limited effect.

105mm would make an excellent 'close support' gun, which is how the British have deployed them, I believe.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1567913477070802946

I'm willing to be that that platoon of HMMWVs would have been quite happy to have one of these travelling with them. The 81mm mortar variant occasionally known as the Wolf.



Or, for that matter, been happy to swap their HMMWVs for Bisons. They would have been just as useful, and rapid, in the pursuit.

 

[KevinB]

I'm willing to be that that platoon of HMMWVs would have been quite happy to have one of these travelling with them. The 81mm mortar variant occasionally known as the Wolf.

View attachment 73441

Or, for that matter, been happy to swap their HMMWVs for Bisons. They would have been just as useful, and rapid, in the pursuit.

I’d argue the Bison would have been a lot better:
1) better off road stability and mobility than the Hummer.
2) more spots for gunners to shoot from (or so more people can yell for ammo )

I’ve done raids from a Hummer variant, it works but isn’t ideal, in that territory the LAV 3 or 6.0 would be a fantastic tool - the stabilized gun with useful FCS would have removed a lot of Russians faster.

 

[Kirkhill]

The only reason I keep mugging up the Bison over the LAV3/6 is the transportability of it. The fact that it actually could be transported in a C130 without preparation.

The counter argument I keep hearing is that it was too light, too poorly armoured for a peer war.

And yet, here, in a war, against the peer we were preparing to fight, armed with the weapons that concerned us, we have an army taking on that enemy with vehicles that are more lightly armed and armoured, with poorer mobility, than the vehicles we were concerned were too light. Vehicles that we up armoured to the point where we reduced their ability to deploy easily and accompany our troops into the field.

Go back to the Light vs Mech argument.

What happens to a Light Battalion if it has a platoon of Bisons (14 or 15 with Drivers and Gunners) that can be delivered rapidly by Herc? Vice LAVs that have to be delivered by C17 at a slower pace?

 

[Kirkhill]

Some comparisons

Which would you rather have? A lot of Grizzlies or Bisons or a few LAV 6s?

	Weight	Length	Width	Height
	tonnes	meters	meters	meters
Grizzly	<10	6	2.5	2.5
CH-147	10	NA	NA	NA
Bison	11.1	6.5	2.5	2.2
Stryker	16.5	7	2.7	2.6
CC-130J-30	19	16.8	3	2.74
LAV 3	17	7	2.7	2.8
LAV 6	25	7.6	2.8	3.2
ACSV	25	7.6	2.8	>3
CC-177	77.5	27	5.5	3.8
Chinook slings 1 Grizzly
Herc carries 2 Grizzly
CC-177 carries 8 Grizzly
Herc Carries 1 Bison
CC-177 Carries 6 Bison
Herc Carries 1 LAV 3 (with height reduction)
CC-177 Carries 3 LAV 3
CC-177 Carries 3 LAV 6

 

[FJAG]

Vehicles that we up armoured to the point where we reduced their ability to deploy easily and accompany our troops into the field.

Don't confuse air portability with "reduced their ability to deploy easily and accompany our troops".

Not everything, in fact very little, is a rapid air deployment operation. A LAV 6.0 does a road move and has a cross country mobility every bit as well as a LAVIII or Bison or Stryker.

In my years when we had Grizzly's I never saw a Chinook sling load one. Not saying someone didn't play around with the idea but it just wasn't what we did then.

Every armoured vehicle is a trade off. Personnel protection that you need all the time is well worth trading off for air transportability that you hardly ever use.