C3 Howitzer Replacement

[OldSolduer]

Our doctrine is to keep all 81mm mortars in the bn's mortar platoon. We gave up the 60mm years ago in favour of the C16 grenade launcher in our famous "you gotta give up something to get something" acquisition program.

I was somewhat amused that a relatively inexpensive man portable weapon was ditched in favor of a behemoth that from what I understand takes three men and a good sized boy to crew. Plus it needed targeting software to make it work. Not impressed.

 

[GK .Dundas]

Aside from the fact that it's an overpriced piece of junk and it can't actually do the job of the weapon it replaced.
What exactly do you have against the C 16 in all its death spewing awesomeness ? ( I always loved that phrase !)

 

[KevinB]

Honestly the HK GMG is a fantastic piece of kit, even without a good FCS. It just gets range (or effective engagement range) limited with a good FCS and LRF.

It isn’t a 60mm Mortar though (and I’m not the biggest fan of those personally).

The issue is that while it makes sense to replace gear with newer equipment, it doesn’t make any sense to replace something with a different system that doesn’t fill the role the other had. Common sense should dictate that a 40mm Automatic Grenade Launcher is primarily a direct fire weapon, with low trajectory indirect fire possible in some circumstances.

I mean this isn’t a novel new concept, AGL’s came to be in Vietnam, and no one ran out and dumped mortars for those.

The same stupidity saw the Mortar platoons cut from the Infantry and assigned to the Artillery without any PY increase.

I don’t think anyone is going to argue that a 81mm Mortar isn’t a 105mm or 155mm Howitzer. But that is exactly what the Army did with the Mortars, as if a gun Det has a gun and a mortar, they can’t use both…

 

[FJAG]

The issue is that while it makes sense to replace gear with newer equipment, it doesn’t make any sense to replace something with a different system that doesn’t fill the role the other had. Common sense should dictate that a 40mm Automatic Grenade Launcher is primarily a direct fire weapon, with low trajectory indirect fire possible in some circumstances.

Unfortunately the role provided is only one of the issues under considerations. There are numerous organizational to fiscal considerations that come into play - everything from PY allocations and need to LCMM workload to shelf space for ammunition in ammo dumps. I've looked at a number of communications and divestment plans now for the Afghan era timeframe and there is a constant push - originating from DCDS at the L1s and from there downward - to make decisions on how to keep a status quo balance in all the other factors when trying to introduce a new capability.

The same stupidity saw the Mortar platoons cut from the Infantry and assigned to the Artillery without any PY increase.

Not wishing to sound smart here, but it was a whole different type and level of stupidity.

IMHO it starts with the group of operational functions (command, sense, act ...) That leads to categorizing army components into categories - this does "act", that does "sense" etc. That leads to the evaluation (in tight fiscal situations) of trying to see where there is overlap that can be rationalized by combining. The whole thing was then topped off by a major PY need for CMTC and some other roles, the current operational roles (Bosnia with a high rifle platoon, low arty and tank requirement). Before you knew it you had folks trying to carve out a role to stay relevant - tankers as "THE" direct fire bunch - combining MGS, ADATS and TOW UA; engrs as the construction guys for everything; arty as "ALL Things" indirect fire; and a logistics system unleashed as national support elements working out of FOBs. On the side you can throw in the attempts to get every sense function grouped under ISTAR and All-source intelligence centres.

You then bring in the concept of "building blocks" of a little act here, and a little sense there, and a slice of command over there. Before you know it you are building "tactical self sufficient units" (which morph into the "optimized battle group" - a set of preassembled building blocks) and JIMP brigades.

Like I said - a whole different level.

 

[KevinB]

Unfortunately the role provided is only one of the issues under considerations. There are numerous organizational to fiscal considerations that come into play - everything from PY allocations and need to LCMM workload to shelf space for ammunition in ammo dumps. I've looked at a number of communications and divestment plans now for the Afghan era timeframe and there is a constant push - originating from DCDS at the L1s and from there downward - to make decisions on how to keep a status quo balance in all the other factors when trying to introduce a new capability.

So what replaced Eryx
As it got removed without replacement. A better solution would have been to get a new 60mm Mortar, get the C-16 as a new vehicle mounted fire support capability, and if really needed fill the missing Erxy gap with the C-16 (which is also stupid - but better than what occurred with the Infantry in a 2:1 net loss (albeit Eryx wasn’t really anything other than a paper capability)

Not wishing to sound smart here, but it was a whole different type and level of stupidity.

Yup.

IMHO it starts with the group of operational functions (command, sense, act ...) That leads to categorizing army components into categories - this does "act", that does "sense" etc. That leads to the evaluation (in tight fiscal situations) of trying to see where there is overlap that can be rationalized by combining. The whole thing was then topped off by a major PY need for CMTC and some other roles, the current operational roles (Bosnia with a high rifle platoon, low arty and tank requirement). Before you knew it you had folks trying to carve out a role to stay relevant - tankers as "THE" direct fire bunch - combining MGS, ADATS and TOW UA; engrs as the construction guys for everything; arty as "ALL Things" indirect fire; and a logistics system unleashed as national support elements working out of FOBs. On the side you can throw in the attempts to get every sense function grouped under ISTAR and All-source intelligence centres.

You then bring in the concept of "building blocks" of a little act here, and a little sense there, and a slice of command over there. Before you know it you are building "tactical self sufficient units" (which morph into the "optimized battle group" - a set of preassembled building blocks) and JIMP brigades.

Like I said - a whole different level.

Not a lot of adulting going on during that period.

IMHO if the CA couldn’t spare the PY for the required roles, they needed to go to the mountain to get more, or cut some of the excess units (like an Armoured Reg’t that isn’t Armoured, and some Infantry BN’s)

 

[FJAG]

So what replaced Eryx
As it got removed without replacement. A better solution would have been to get a new 60mm Mortar, get the C-16 as a new vehicle mounted fire support capability, and if really needed fill the missing Erxy gap with the C-16 (which is also stupid - but better than what occurred with the Infantry in a 2:1 net loss (albeit Eryx wasn’t really anything other than a paper capability)

Don't mistake the concept of "to get something new you have to give up something old" with the concept of "When you give up something old we'll give you something new." The two are not synonymous.

Not a lot of adulting going on during that period.

I don't go that far and I'm cynical as hell. I think a lot of folks were doing the best they could for the tribe they were with under very difficult circumstances. That. however, doesn't take the decision out from under being shortsighted and narrowly focused.

I think Canada has been in the rut of focusing on today's defined problems at the expense of preparedness for the vague possibilities of the future. IMHO, that is the wrong approach for a defence force, especially when the vague future problems become more defined and probable day by day.

IMHO if the CA couldn’t spare the PY for the required roles, they needed to go to the mountain to get more, or cut some of the excess units (like an Armoured Reg’t that isn’t Armoured, and some Infantry BN’s)

PYs are the currency of government. It's how the length of your d*ck gets measured. IMHO we tend to put many of those PYs into the wrong places - like Ottawa. You need admin staff to run programs. The question is how much are some of these programs needed. Dollars will get you donuts that when we talk PY cuts the PYs in the halls of Ottawa are protected and fought over harder than the ones a hundred, or a thousand, kilometres away. I always thought that the infantry should have given up a rifle coy instead of mortars and ATGMs but I wasn't there to watch the arguments. My guess is that there was some gunner and black hat support if it meant absorbing some of those responsibilities kept cuts from happening in their own camps. Gunners gave up over half of their guns for more and better FSCCs, FOOs, FACs, and STA in order to balance PYs.

Pay and major equipment come out of separate defined purses. The problem is that in negotiating funds with the government, the need and quantification of pay packets is much easier than the costs associated with capability acquisition and lifetime support. The first is a simple and mathematical exercise that most politicians do understand. The second requires a comprehension of the military and how it functions which they do not.

Always remember that the defence budget is the single biggest discretionary budget that the government has to work with. They may hesitate to fire ten thousand people in DND but they won't hesitate to spout "I'll take one piece of paper, I'll take my pen, and I will write zero helicopters" or "We will not buy the F-35 fighter jet."

 

[KevinB]

Don't mistake the concept of "to get something new you have to give up something old" with the concept of "When you give up something old we'll give you something new." The two are not synonymous.

Unfortunately true.

I don't go that far and I'm cynical as hell. I think a lot of folks were doing the best they could for the tribe they were with under very difficult circumstances. That. however, doesn't take the decision out from under being shortsighted and narrowly focused.

I think Canada has been in the rut of focusing on today's defined problems at the expense of preparedness for the vague possibilities of the future. IMHO, that is the wrong approach for a defence force, especially when the vague future problems become more defined and probable day by day.

Agreed

PYs are the currency of government. It's how the length of your d*ck gets measured. IMHO we tend to put many of those PYs into the wrong places - like Ottawa. You need admin staff to run programs. The question is how much are some of these programs needed. Dollars will get you donuts that when we talk PY cuts the PYs in the halls of Ottawa are protected and fought over harder than the ones a hundred, or a thousand, kilometres away. I always thought that the infantry should have given up a rifle coy instead of mortars and ATGMs but I wasn't there to watch the arguments. My guess is that there was some gunner and black hat support if it meant absorbing some of those responsibilities kept cuts from happening in their own camps. Gunners gave up over half of their guns for more and better FSCCs, FOOs, FACs, and STA in order to balance PYs.

I think you are 110% there -- given the fact that a Rifle Company is the easiest Company to replace, the Infantry Corps should have (IMHO) said Roger that - cut a Rifle Coy, and come up with a 70/30 plan to fill that Coy with the PRes. Cutting Combat Support Coy Platoons was incredibly dumb - and frankly if not needed immediately TOW/ADP, Mortars and Pioneers could all form a Rifle Coy if needed in a pinch if Cbt Spt roles where not immediately required. Heck Gunners and others have filled in for Rifle Coy's in the past...

The Guns should have done the same to come up with extra guns/troops from the PRes instead of accepting the massive loss of tubes.

Pay and major equipment come out of separate defined purses. The problem is that in negotiating funds with the government, the need and quantification of pay packets is much easier than the costs associated with capability acquisition and lifetime support. The first is a simple and mathematical exercise that most politicians do understand. The second requires a comprehension of the military and how it functions which they do not.

At the end of the day I blame CCA and staff of the CA for the abject failure to sell the NEEDS of an Army to the rest of the CAF, DND and the Cdn Politicians.

Always remember that the defence budget is the single biggest discretionary budget that the government has to work with. They may hesitate to fire ten thousand people in DND but they won't hesitate to spout "I'll take one piece of paper, I'll take my pen, and I will write zero helicopters" or "We will not buy the F-35 fighter jet."

Yup.