C3 Howitzer Replacement

[Maxman1]

Seeing that AMPV is new and the A7 conversion is, makes me think we'll be seeing Bradleys for some time to come. That actually creates a very good tracked fleet to concentrate on with the LAVs as a second fleet. Honestly if both the Bradley and LAV could be converted to Moog turrets you'd have weapon commonality as well.

Call James Burton, tell him the good news.

 

[Kirkhill]

@markppcli FYI

The 82nd Airborne is dropping munitions from drones

Soldiers at Fort Liberty are dropping munitions from drones during training, the first in the Army to do so, according to Army officials.

taskandpurpose.com

Soldiers at Fort Liberty are dropping munitions from drones while training in the field, making them the first in the Army to do so, according to Army officials.

The new Marine infantry battalion is slimmer, saltier and more techy

Phase one concluded in June. Phase two begins in 2023.

www.marinecorpstimes.com

First Lt. Michael Meier, a Marine Corps Warfighting Lab fellow working with the battalion experiment development team and former company executive officer for 3rd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, the on deck phase two experimentation unit, updated lethality changes.

In the video, Meier pointed to both Javelin and multipurpose anti-armor anti-personnel weapons systems in the company, precision rifles in the company arms room and integration of aerial loitering munitions.

This combination gives the company a 50 km reach for organic fires. Previously that range stood at 3.4 km with the 60 mm mortar. And the 60 mm mortars remain in the company, spokesman Maj. Eric Flanagan told Marine Corps Times.

 

[markppcli]

@markppcli FYI

The 82nd Airborne is dropping munitions from drones

Soldiers at Fort Liberty are dropping munitions from drones during training, the first in the Army to do so, according to Army officials.

taskandpurpose.com

Your claim was specific to squads. Saying that squads would be dropping munitions that’s where I commented.

The new Marine infantry battalion is slimmer, saltier and more techy

Phase one concluded in June. Phase two begins in 2023.

www.marinecorpstimes.com

How on earth are they getting 50 k out of a loitering munition, ah well sure. It’s doubly interesting since they only launched tenders for their loitering munition project in April. Of course the USMC also said there were going to have a JFO in every squad and that never happened.

 

[Kirkhill]

Further to the discussion

June 2024

FPV drones in Ukraine are changing modern warfare

First Person View (FPV) attack drones are shaping the battlefield in Ukraine and transforming our understanding of modern warfare, write Tomas Milasauskas and Liudvikas Jaškūnas.

www.atlanticcouncil.org

March 2024

Outgunned in the Drone Fight: The U.S. Military Is Failing to Adopt the Next Machine Gun - War on the Rocks

The British Army began World War I with only two machine guns per infantry battalion. One gun was a spare, meaning the effective ratio was one per 1,000

warontherocks.com

Aug 2024

New tech will make tomorrow’s wars more dangerous to troops, Army says

New sensors and long-range weapons may force the service to rethink doctrine.

www.defenseone.com

I find myself in the J.F.C. Fuller camp.

 

[KevinB]

Further to the discussion

June 2024

FPV drones in Ukraine are changing modern warfare

First Person View (FPV) attack drones are shaping the battlefield in Ukraine and transforming our understanding of modern warfare, write Tomas Milasauskas and Liudvikas Jaškūnas.

www.atlanticcouncil.org

March 2024

Outgunned in the Drone Fight: The U.S. Military Is Failing to Adopt the Next Machine Gun - War on the Rocks

The British Army began World War I with only two machine guns per infantry battalion. One gun was a spare, meaning the effective ratio was one per 1,000

warontherocks.com

Aug 2024

New tech will make tomorrow’s wars more dangerous to troops, Army says

New sensors and long-range weapons may force the service to rethink doctrine.

www.defenseone.com

I find myself in the J.F.C. Fuller camp.

You go off on these strange tangents, and it’s impossible to follow what you are actually trying to put forward as an argument/discussion point.

 

[MilEME09]

If we need to keep the C3 fleet going for awhile, maybe buying some M101s from Vietnam might be an idea, looks like they are well taken care of.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1818243854216151144

 

[FJAG]

If we need to keep the C3 fleet going for awhile, maybe buying some M101s from Vietnam might be an idea, looks like they are well taken care of.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1818243854216151144

Frankly if keeping the C3 fleet as a training system was in the cards, I'd go to S Korea - they have around 2,000 M101A1s - and I'd buy around 100 sets of S Korean M101A1 barrels, recoil sleighs, recuperators and mount them on the C3 carriage. the range doesn't matter for training. I'm not sure how well that would work because with the barrel mass reduced it might unbalance the gun and we might need to buy M101 trails as well. Long story short we'd be back to something like the older C1 but with a reliable source of parts and the big IP factors that are the problem now would be gone.

It's a simple way to get back to basics. In that scenario I wouldn't object to an M119 either. For me the question really is are we ready and funded enough to outfit the ResF with an operational gun rather than just a training gun. As I mentioned above, IMHO Canada has the RegF and ResF strength already funded to comfortably man 6-7 18-gun regiments. That's about 140 guns all told (including the school and some spares. We already have 33 we can use. That leaves a mere 110 to buy. The costs for the guns alone would be somewhere in the $1/2 to 1 billion depending on the system. Not something that would break the bank but ...

 

[Kirkhill]

You go off on these strange tangents, and it’s impossible to follow what you are actually trying to put forward as an argument/discussion point.

Common thread

Alternative fires and their impact on the modern battlefield.

Related, the lack of haste in adjusting to change.

Fuller, in 1918, had a completely different hand to play than Haig did in 1914.

We are still trying to play with Fuller's cards.

I think that Fuller would be rethinking his plan.

 

[KevinB]

Common thread

Alternative fires and their impact on the modern battlefield.

Related, the lack of haste in adjusting to change.

Fuller, in 1918, had a completely different hand to play than Haig did in 1914.

We are still trying to play with Fuller's cards.

I think that Fuller would be rethinking his plan.

Except that isn’t this thread. This is a C3 Howitzer Replacement thread.

Which means it isn’t the place for your theories on fires. It’s a place to discuss C3 replacement options.

Going off on tangents doesn’t fit the point.

I’d recommend making a Restructuring of the RRCA in Keeping with Technology thread if your goal is to discuss what changes in technology can be implemented to make changes the the Artillery Organization.


Otherwise it’s impossible to understand what you are trying to say and why.

 

[markppcli]

First step how many artillery regiments do we need as a total force and what ought they have for guns?

• I think we all agree it’s 3 Batteries of 6, per our existing doctrine
• We need a minimum of 1 CS regiment per Bde. The reserves can realistically provide another 3 CS regiments, 1 from each division, and the remain reserve artillery structures can provide the STA and AD augmentation.

So we need gun for those regiments with another battery in Gagetown, a battery of spares, and a regiment’s worth of war stock.

So the total becomes 23 “battery sets” of six, or 138. From that we can take out the 36 odd M777s for some kind of air mobile / air assault / light force support - be that a battery of guns per Bde or a light regiment.

 

[suffolkowner]

First step how many artillery regiments do we need as a total force and what ought they have for guns?

• I think we all agree it’s 3 Batteries of 6, per our existing doctrine
• We need a minimum of 1 CS regiment per Bde. The reserves can realistically provide another 3 CS regiments, 1 from each division, and the remain reserve artillery structures can provide the STA and AD augmentation.

So we need gun for those regiments with another battery in Gagetown, a battery of spares, and a regiment’s worth of war stock.

So the total becomes 23 “battery sets” of six, or 138. From that we can take out the 36 odd M777s for some kind of air mobile / air assault / light force support - be that a battery of guns per Bde or a light regiment.

would this be all fires including MLRS or just towed 155's?

eg.
?# of HIMARS
?# of tracked SPH
?# of wheeled SPH
?# of towed
?# of LM launchers

 

[KevinB]

would this be all fires including MLRS or just towed 155's?

eg.
?# of HIMARS
?# of tracked SPH
?# of wheeled SPH
?# of towed
?# of LM launchers

He’s talking Close Support, not GS, so that would generally mean 155

So it wouldn’t be HIMARS/MLRS type systems.

I don’t like to think of Artillery as a Bde system- more of a Division and Corps setups, Bde’s to me should be maneuver units.


So 3-4 CS Arty units / Division and one GS unit (I’m using unit as opposed to Reg’t or Bn).

Given Canada’s predisposition to put 4 maneuver units into a Bde, I would like one CS subunit / maneuver element for direct support . That means 4 gun batteries / unit.
I’m willing to go to a 6 gun Bty (vice my prefered 8 gun) to get the 4th Gun Bty as a CS subunit for the 4th maneuver unit — and I accept tanks won’t be used in isolation, but I still like a 1 Bty / Bn support setup.

That leaves one with an Arty Bde / Div with 4 CS and 1 GS unit. As well as 2 GS Rocket units at higher (Corps Arty).

So you would have 3 Inf and 1 Armour and
Cbt Eng assets for those units / Bde
At Div, you would have the Arty Bde and Eng Bde.

Then your Corps assets

So for a 2 Division force you would need 10 Arty units and 2 for higher for a total of 12.

So each Arty CS unit would be 24 guns (vice 18 from the 3x6 - see I still get my 24 gun Unit )
So 8 CS units @ 192 tubes

4 GS units (3x8 batteries/unit ) @ 96

So in my world you would end up with

96 M109A8 for 1 Cdn Div
96 M777 for 2 Cdn Div
96 HIMARS - 24 to each Div, and 48 on Corps/Theatre Support.

* I would be willing to have 2 of the 4 CS units in 2Div be M109A8 as well - as I believe if 2 Division was needed to be deployed as a Division it would likely be as a result of a LSCO where the Airborne/Airmobile/Light aspect of 2Div would be fairly localized and the fact that half of the Artillery was tracked Artillery wouldn’t be a major issue.

Plus 20% spares and training so let’s say 20 extra of each.

So 116 each.

I would also have 120mm Mortar Platoons run by each Maneuver unit

As well as 1 ADA Unit / Division and 2 at “Corps”

 

[markppcli]

would this be all fires including MLRS or just towed 155's?

eg.
?# of HIMARS
?# of tracked SPH
?# of wheeled SPH
?# of towed
?# of LM launchers

The thread is about C3 replacement, which I take to mean really the gun used by reserve artillery. This leads to a few assumptions:

1. Tube artillery will remain the primary fires of the CAF
2. Substantial reorganization likely won’t happen, but grouping of reserve units into Bty’s is possible.
3. Maintaining a seperate howitzer fleet is inefficient, insufficient, and makes augmentation more difficult.
4. We can go back on forth about how augmentation should be done but the simple fact is that it won’t effect the number of guns we need.

So with that in mind some form of SPH would be ideal. While I like Archer, I think the M109 makes the most sense given where it’s made and the fact that we still have people who remember how to use it.

I have some thoughts about Air Defence (looking at you 5 Fd Regiment) and LRPF but to me that’s outside the scope here. As are mortars.

 

[suffolkowner]

He’s talking Close Support, not GS, so that would generally mean 155

So it wouldn’t be HIMARS/MLRS type systems.

I don’t like to think of Artillery as a Bde system- more of a Division and Corps setups, Bde’s to me should be maneuver units.


So 3-4 CS Arty units / Division and one GS unit (I’m using unit as opposed to Reg’t or Bn).

Given Canada’s predisposition to put 4 maneuver units into a Bde, I would like one CS subunit / maneuver element for direct support . That means 4 gun batteries / unit.
I’m willing to go to a 6 gun Bty (vice my prefered 8 gun) to get the 4th Gun Bty as a CS subunit for the 4th maneuver unit — and I accept tanks won’t be used in isolation, but I still like a 1 Bty / Bn support setup.

That leaves one with an Arty Bde / Div with 4 CS and 1 GS unit. As well as 2 GS Rocket units at higher (Corps Arty).

So you would have 3 Inf and 1 Armour and
Cbt Eng assets for those units / Bde
At Div, you would have the Arty Bde and Eng Bde.

Then your Corps assets

So for a 2 Division force you would need 10 Arty units and 2 for higher for a total of 12.

So each Arty CS unit would be 24 guns (vice 18 from the 3x6 - see I still get my 24 gun Unit )
So 8 CS units @ 192 tubes

4 GS units (3x8 batteries/unit ) @ 96

So in my world you would end up with

96 M109A8 for 1 Cdn Div
96 M777 for 2 Cdn Div
96 HIMARS - 24 to each Div, and 48 on Corps/Theatre Support.

* I would be willing to have 2 of the 4 CS units in 2Div be M109A8 as well - as I believe if 2 Division was needed to be deployed as a Division it would likely be as a result of a LSCO where the Airborne/Airmobile/Light aspect of 2Div would be fairly localized and the fact that half of the Artillery was tracked Artillery wouldn’t be a major issue.

Plus 20% spares and training so let’s say 20 extra of each.

So 116 each.

I would also have 120mm Mortar Platoons run by each Maneuver unit

As well as 1 ADA Unit / Division and 2 at “Corps”

I think we'd be lucky to get the 48 towed howitzers plus your 20% maybe do that again with a SPH and half that for 24 HIMARs

 

[markppcli]

I think we'd be lucky to get the 48 towed howitzers plus your 20% maybe do that again with a SPH and half that for 24 HIMARs

Probably, but this is all idealized.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Frankly if keeping the C3 fleet as a training system was in the cards, I'd go to S Korea - they have around 2,000 M101A1s - and I'd buy around 100 sets of S Korean M101A1 barrels, recoil sleighs, recuperators and mount them on the C3 carriage. the range doesn't matter for training. I'm not sure how well that would work because with the barrel mass reduced it might unbalance the gun and we might need to buy M101 trails as well. Long story short we'd be back to something like the older C1 but with a reliable source of parts and the big IP factors that are the problem now would be gone.

It's a simple way to get back to basics. In that scenario I wouldn't object to an M119 either. For me the question really is are we ready and funded enough to outfit the ResF with an operational gun rather than just a training gun. As I mentioned above, IMHO Canada has the RegF and ResF strength already funded to comfortably man 6-7 18-gun regiments. That's about 140 guns all told (including the school and some spares. We already have 33 we can use. That leaves a mere 110 to buy. The costs for the guns alone would be somewhere in the $1/2 to 1 billion depending on the system. Not something that would break the bank but ...

I read the paper you sent me, frankly I don't get a lot of confidence from it. There is more intent to solve the issue than I gave them credit for. However, looking forward to the coming debt crunch and cutbacks. I feel the Reserve Artillery issue will be pushed off the table to "Later". The CPC will likley order the bare necessity to equip Latvia and training establishments via UOR's with SPG's and hopefully some MRLS. This will make them look good for minimum effort.
Possibly a couple of Reserve units collocated near bases might get a hand me down M777 as a training gun (Likely guns that have a limited life left). As I mentioned the only hope I see is SK realizing the issue and tossing in some M101's to sweeten the KS-III offer.

 

[Kirkhill]

Except that isn’t this thread. This is a C3 Howitzer Replacement thread.

Which means it isn’t the place for your theories on fires. It’s a place to discuss C3 replacement options.

Going off on tangents doesn’t fit the point.

I’d recommend making a Restructuring of the RRCA in Keeping with Technology thread if your goal is to discuss what changes in technology can be implemented to make changes the the Artillery Organization.


Otherwise it’s impossible to understand what you are trying to say and why.

This thread started 8 years ago considering what, if anything, should be purchased to replace the 105mm howitzer family (M101, C1, C2, C3, LG1) in Canadian service. It has considered if the money and PYs invested in that capability is necessary or useful. It has contemplated the replacement of the 105mm batteries with 155mm batteries (towed and self-propelled, wheeled and tracked, armoured and unarmoured). It has considered mortars (81 and 120mm) as well as Long Range Precision Fires in the form of rockets, missiles, guided munitions and loitering munitions. It has discussed if the money and PYs are better spent on defensive fires systems such as C-RAM, C-UAS, GBAD, Airfield Defence, IAMD and even Coastal Defence batteries.

The discussion has taken in every tube, barrel and projectile combination known to man.

In a world where the projectiles, or missiles, which are the true weapon of the artillery, are as likely to be self-powered and self-guided, as they are to be punted out of a tube with gunpowder, compressed air or even a spring, where the difference between a self-guided 155mm with smart sub-munitions and a manned fighter converted into a long-range unmanned, armed drone is vanishingly small, I consider it fair to consider all means of delivering projectiles on targets as fair game.

Otherwise we risk buying Brown Besses while our enemies are buying Maxim guns.

....

My theory of fires....

I don't have one.

My theory of technology....

Buy anything that will kill the largest numbers of the enemy for the least cost with the least disruption to civil society.

My standard of command and control...

The same standard I have employed in every factory that I have built, two operators and a coffee pot, one to watch the screens and the other to keep the first awake with both of them stretching their legs on rounds to verify that the screens and reality match.

....

The articles posted, if read, articulate a sense that others share my opinions that this is no time for conservatism, that things are moving quickly and change, not necessarily progress but change, needs to be embraced through lots and lots of experimentation.

Artillery is not about guns. It is about destroying targets. By any means.

 

[Kirkhill]

Related - the mailed fist of the RCAC.

The RCAC as a projectile that can be thrown against the enemy to punch through the lines - Armoured guns (tanks and howitzers), Armoured engineers and Armoured infantry.

I further suggest that infantry equipped with sensors and broadly distributed so as to give a continuous common picture of the battlefield is reducing the need for dedicated recce.

I'll go further and suggest that infantry will do much of the job of Forward Observers.

What infantry can't do is make use of that which has been observed.

The business of seeing all that has been observed, analyzing that which is seen, and then deciding which targets need to be served, for how long and with what - that obviously requires co-ordination. Now the question in my mind is this:


OR

 

[FJAG]

I read the paper you sent me, frankly I don't get a lot of confidence from it.

I certainly appreciate that. The term "unfunded" carries a lot of uncertainty especially in a climate of fiscal restraint. OTOH, Ukraine has upped the awareness and support of the other arms to artillery and the threat facing NATO. Only the most Pollyannaish politicians would choose to ignore that right now.

This thread started 8 years ago considering what, if anything, should be purchased to replace the 105mm howitzer family

And the tread is well behind the projects to replace the guns. For me the hallmark is around 2003 and 2004 when we started dicking around with the concept that "we ain't gonna do big war, no more," and we started shelving and divesting Cold War tools (aka M109). There was a project (at the time called the Future Indirect Fire Capability (FIFAC)) and was (Ta Da) looking at an SP gun (most probably wheeled) and a LRPR (most probably HIMARS) but with an IOC of no earlier than 2015. That left the LG1 and C3 as the only weapons available to the army - both RegF and ResF.

FIFAC did not have replacing the ResF C3s on its agenda (They were mostly working okay at the time)

When the LG1s came back from Kabul, and the M109s were gone, the problems with the LG1 were discovered and the C#s started self divesting as we couldn't get the IP or parts for it.

July of 2005 saw the CLS's transformation of the field artillery directive which reduced our gun batteries from 9 to 6 and our RegF from 54 to 24 gun detachments. It did give a hint about a light weight towed howitzer and precision munitions, and then, shortly after the Kandahar mission jelled, the program to UOR FMS buy 6 and then another 6 M777s. FIFC, as a project, remained unfunded.

So for me, the issue is really, at least, 20 years old.

Artillery is not about guns. It is about destroying targets. By any means.

And Canada's artillery knows this. Loitering munitions are definitely being considered alongside guns. The issue is not being ignored. It'sjust that it's not the oly issue facing the army.

What you need to understand is that there is a distinct difference between weapon systems in use within the battalion required to support the battalion's operations within its assigned area of responsibility at all times as well as weapon systems designed to reinforce those battalions and yet capable of massing across the various battalions' and even brigades' boundaries. Regardless of whether they are mortars, or guns, or armed UAVs, or rockets, it's the digitized 21st century command and control systems that matter - a project (Joint Fires Modernization) that the army has already funded alongside a project to improve target acquisition (Land ISR Modernization) and revive air defence (GBAD).

Technology is rapidly changing the capabilities and cost of the various ground effects projectiles. These can be grouped into two broad categories: precision guided and area effects. That's regardless of whether you are dealing with the battalion's dedicated systems or the artillery's. Whether a gun or other systems delivers it doesn't matter as much as capabilities vary over time. What matters is that there are adequate delivery means available to be able to adapt to new technology and the tactical requirements of how it is employed. You tend to focus on precision effects, but you need to remember that there are still needs for e.g. illumination, smoke, and area neutralization which precision guided projectiles are inadequate for because of cost, available numbers and payload carried. Old technology still works for those.

Canada's problem is that it is very slow to change its structures and organizations (That great struggle for PYs) and to acquire equipment (and the nebulous quantities of war stocks of the projectiles). That means that you need to build a force structure that is right the first time but still amenable to adapting as technology changes.

I further suggest that infantry equipped with sensors and broadly distributed so as to give a continuous common picture of the battlefield is reducing the need for dedicated recce.

I'll go further and suggest that infantry will do much of the job of Forward Observers.

That's because you've never been either a forward observer or a JTAC or a field engineer or a logistician. To be any of those requires skills and training just as infantrymen require skill and training in their field..

There is no doubt in my mind that there are infantrymen and engineers and logisticians who, if given the right training, could do the job of a FOO or JTAC. Just as the same infantryman, engineer and logistician could operate a tank, if given the requisite training. But it's not about who can do the job or what label you put on an individual, but about the overarching development of the entire system. The army is divided into logical fields. Every once in a while there is a need to fine tune or adjust things but overall, the division of labour and skill progression within the army has been proven over the centuries and remains valid even today.

What infantry can't do is make use of that which has been observed.

The business of seeing all that has been observed, analyzing that which is seen, and then deciding which targets need to be served, for how long and with what - that obviously requires co-ordination. Now the question in my mind is this:

I'm not sure if you are trying to be provocative or silly here. I'm opting for silly because you're smarter than this and there isn't even a realistic debate that arises out of that issue.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I certainly appreciate that. The term "unfunded" carries a lot of uncertainty especially in a climate of fiscal restraint. OTOH, Ukraine has upped the awareness and support of the other arms to artillery and the threat facing NATO. Only the most Pollyannaish politicians would choose to ignore that right now.

Our Politicians will say: "Hold my beer and watch me show you my ignore superpower"

UOR's will be their bandaids and the average voter does not understand how dilapidated our Reserve artillery is. Sadly we need a gun to blow up ,, killing and maiming a gun crew of Reservists to get the issue on the front page of the media.