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The campaign in Burma in World War Two is often referred to as the forgotten war. Forgotten or not it was a significant one. It was here that the largest Japanese Army deployed in the Second World War was defeated. The campaign in Burma was a lengthy , and oft times brutal one, with both sides forced to deal with the harsh and unforgiving terrain as well as each other.
Louis Allen''s book Burma The Longest War 1941-1945 is perhaps one of the most best accounts of this campaign. It is certainly one of the most detailed and well researched as the extensive bibliography, well written appendices and copious notes attest to.
The book covers all the major events in the campaign. There is the initial Japanese invasion from Thailand in late 1941, the subsequent rout of the British and Indian forces in Southern Burma and the capture of Rangoon the capital by the advancing Japanese. Following this is the long fighting retreat by the Allied forces northward to the border with India.
The campaigns for domination of the coastal region of the Arakaan and further Allied failures follow this as does the actions of the Nationalist Chinese forces on their border with Burma. Finally there is the first Chindit operation.
Technically it is a failure as most of the Brigade of British troops despatched far behind Japanese lines become casualties. However the Chindits are able to demonstrate two important facts that will have a bearing on all future operations. First if properly trained and supplied Allied troops can survive operate and fight in the Jungle, something thought impossible earlier. Equally important the Japanese are shown to be less invincible that earlier believed. They can be beaten.
The crucial battles of Imphal and Kohima on the Indian border are covered in detail. Here The British 14th Army stood fast and defeated and destroyed two Japanese Armies intent on invading India. It would be the turning point in the campaign. At the height of this crucial battle is the second Chindit raid, seven times the size and scope of the first.
The last act is the rapid Allied advance south to retake Burma. The race to capture Mandalay and the road to Rangoon before the Monsoon season begins. This culminates with an Allied airborne and seaborne invasion to recapture Rangoon.
The final act is the allied attempts to surround and destroy the now fleeing Japanese forces in southern Burma before they can cross into safety in Thailand. It is at this point while ambitious plans are being drawn up to recapture Malaya, Singapore and Indonesia that the war ends.
In addition to the battles both large and small, Allen looks at the political and strategic aspects of the campaign from both sides. The Japanese initially had no plan to invade and conquer Burma, at least at this stage in the war. Their initial plans called for a limited invasion of the south part of the country to secure their flank form a possible British attack on their forces invading Malaya and Singapore. Even that invasion was only to eliminate a possible threat to their real goals in 1941-42, the capture of the resource rich area of Indonesia.
However the rapid collapse of British resistance in southern Burma quickly opened the possibility of overrunning the entire country. In addition there were Burmese nationals including some in the Government, who were openly opposed to British rule and had approached the Japanese prior to hostilities commencing. An independent Burmese Government allied with Japan was envisioned and in fact a puppet Government complete with an army was established.
Once Japanese forces reached the border with India their ambitions again overwhelmed them. Dissident Indian Nationals had convinced elements of the Japanese Government and military that if Japan scored a decisive victory over the British/Indian Armies, then all of India would rise up in revolt. A vision of another â Å“puppet stateâ ? and eventual link ups with German forces in the Middle East or the southern USSR were at least partially to blame for the attacks on Imphal and Kohima.
For the British the whole objective in the Burma campaign was at least initially to prevent the loss of India. Later it was to retake by force their conquered colonies, Burma, Malaya, and Singapore. The â Å“liberationâ ? of other European colonies, French Indo China and the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) was also important and envisioned.
The United States on the other hand had no interest or desire to assist their European allies in this endeavour. In addition they could not be seen in any way as supporting it. For the US the whole purpose of the Burma campaign was to keep open the supply lines from India to the Nationalist Chinese forces fighting the Japanese in Western China. For this they only needed the northern portion of the country to be secured. Liberation of any other territories was a low priority.
Coupled with these divergent and often shifting political and strategic aims were the personalities involved. Many of the Japanese Commanders in Burma, especially in the later part of the war were transferred there from other theatres, often because they were found wanting. The British initially also suffered from this lack of leadership. Even successful Generals against the Italians in North Africa such as Wavell did not automatically equate success against the Japanese. Eventually the British found competent commanders such as Mountbatten responsible for the entire theatre, Slim, the charismatic and thorough commander of the 14th Army and the eccentric but brilliant Orde Wingate who commanded the Chindits.
The American presence in the theatre was minimal, and the senior American commander Stillwell
made no secret of his hatred of the British. His position as senior advisor and often defacto commander, to Chang Kai Cheks Nationalist Chinese forces unfortunately allowed his opinions top carry some weight. Ironically the second Chindit Operation was directed against the Japanese forces threatening the Chinese supply routes rather than the Japanese forces attacking Imphal and Kohima, so Stillwell''s success were in part due to British endeavours.
Allen''s writing style is a bit dry and that and the length of the book at almost 700 pages may detract some. However he does throw in some personal anecdotes amidst the sweeping battles. The book has a few photos mainly of the various personalities, but several good and detailed maps which are essential for following the various advances and retreats.
The appendices include detailed orders of battles for both Japanese and Allied forces and several papers covering everything from whom was at fault for the destruction of the Sittang Bridge in 1941 which trapped most of the Allied forces on the wrong side of the river, to the social make up of the opposing forces.
Allen makes extensive use of primary documents, interviews, diaries, memoirs and war journals and had access to both Japanese and allied sources to present a balanced account of events The bibliography alone is almost worth the cost of the book for serious students of this campaign
For those looking for a detailed and comprehensive look at the Burma campaign or those interested in one of the Second World War''s more lengthy but obscure campaigns then this book is worth looking into.
Recommended: Yes
Louis Allen''s book Burma The Longest War 1941-1945 is perhaps one of the most best accounts of this campaign. It is certainly one of the most detailed and well researched as the extensive bibliography, well written appendices and copious notes attest to.
The book covers all the major events in the campaign. There is the initial Japanese invasion from Thailand in late 1941, the subsequent rout of the British and Indian forces in Southern Burma and the capture of Rangoon the capital by the advancing Japanese. Following this is the long fighting retreat by the Allied forces northward to the border with India.
The campaigns for domination of the coastal region of the Arakaan and further Allied failures follow this as does the actions of the Nationalist Chinese forces on their border with Burma. Finally there is the first Chindit operation.
Technically it is a failure as most of the Brigade of British troops despatched far behind Japanese lines become casualties. However the Chindits are able to demonstrate two important facts that will have a bearing on all future operations. First if properly trained and supplied Allied troops can survive operate and fight in the Jungle, something thought impossible earlier. Equally important the Japanese are shown to be less invincible that earlier believed. They can be beaten.
The crucial battles of Imphal and Kohima on the Indian border are covered in detail. Here The British 14th Army stood fast and defeated and destroyed two Japanese Armies intent on invading India. It would be the turning point in the campaign. At the height of this crucial battle is the second Chindit raid, seven times the size and scope of the first.
The last act is the rapid Allied advance south to retake Burma. The race to capture Mandalay and the road to Rangoon before the Monsoon season begins. This culminates with an Allied airborne and seaborne invasion to recapture Rangoon.
The final act is the allied attempts to surround and destroy the now fleeing Japanese forces in southern Burma before they can cross into safety in Thailand. It is at this point while ambitious plans are being drawn up to recapture Malaya, Singapore and Indonesia that the war ends.
In addition to the battles both large and small, Allen looks at the political and strategic aspects of the campaign from both sides. The Japanese initially had no plan to invade and conquer Burma, at least at this stage in the war. Their initial plans called for a limited invasion of the south part of the country to secure their flank form a possible British attack on their forces invading Malaya and Singapore. Even that invasion was only to eliminate a possible threat to their real goals in 1941-42, the capture of the resource rich area of Indonesia.
However the rapid collapse of British resistance in southern Burma quickly opened the possibility of overrunning the entire country. In addition there were Burmese nationals including some in the Government, who were openly opposed to British rule and had approached the Japanese prior to hostilities commencing. An independent Burmese Government allied with Japan was envisioned and in fact a puppet Government complete with an army was established.
Once Japanese forces reached the border with India their ambitions again overwhelmed them. Dissident Indian Nationals had convinced elements of the Japanese Government and military that if Japan scored a decisive victory over the British/Indian Armies, then all of India would rise up in revolt. A vision of another â Å“puppet stateâ ? and eventual link ups with German forces in the Middle East or the southern USSR were at least partially to blame for the attacks on Imphal and Kohima.
For the British the whole objective in the Burma campaign was at least initially to prevent the loss of India. Later it was to retake by force their conquered colonies, Burma, Malaya, and Singapore. The â Å“liberationâ ? of other European colonies, French Indo China and the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) was also important and envisioned.
The United States on the other hand had no interest or desire to assist their European allies in this endeavour. In addition they could not be seen in any way as supporting it. For the US the whole purpose of the Burma campaign was to keep open the supply lines from India to the Nationalist Chinese forces fighting the Japanese in Western China. For this they only needed the northern portion of the country to be secured. Liberation of any other territories was a low priority.
Coupled with these divergent and often shifting political and strategic aims were the personalities involved. Many of the Japanese Commanders in Burma, especially in the later part of the war were transferred there from other theatres, often because they were found wanting. The British initially also suffered from this lack of leadership. Even successful Generals against the Italians in North Africa such as Wavell did not automatically equate success against the Japanese. Eventually the British found competent commanders such as Mountbatten responsible for the entire theatre, Slim, the charismatic and thorough commander of the 14th Army and the eccentric but brilliant Orde Wingate who commanded the Chindits.
The American presence in the theatre was minimal, and the senior American commander Stillwell
made no secret of his hatred of the British. His position as senior advisor and often defacto commander, to Chang Kai Cheks Nationalist Chinese forces unfortunately allowed his opinions top carry some weight. Ironically the second Chindit Operation was directed against the Japanese forces threatening the Chinese supply routes rather than the Japanese forces attacking Imphal and Kohima, so Stillwell''s success were in part due to British endeavours.
Allen''s writing style is a bit dry and that and the length of the book at almost 700 pages may detract some. However he does throw in some personal anecdotes amidst the sweeping battles. The book has a few photos mainly of the various personalities, but several good and detailed maps which are essential for following the various advances and retreats.
The appendices include detailed orders of battles for both Japanese and Allied forces and several papers covering everything from whom was at fault for the destruction of the Sittang Bridge in 1941 which trapped most of the Allied forces on the wrong side of the river, to the social make up of the opposing forces.
Allen makes extensive use of primary documents, interviews, diaries, memoirs and war journals and had access to both Japanese and allied sources to present a balanced account of events The bibliography alone is almost worth the cost of the book for serious students of this campaign
For those looking for a detailed and comprehensive look at the Burma campaign or those interested in one of the Second World War''s more lengthy but obscure campaigns then this book is worth looking into.
Recommended: Yes
